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I^JEEACE
At the date of the commencement of these Reports, I was in
duced by a desire to render service to my professional brethren and
the public, to publish the notes, which I had taken only for my own
use, of the cases in Hilary, 1835. They first appeared in the
Royal Gazette, and were then issued in pamphlet form. I continued
so to publish the cases determined during that year.
In the Session of 1836, the Legislature, satisfied of the “ great
importance of obtaining correct reports of the decisions of the Su
preme Court,” authorized the Lieutenant Governor to appoint a
Reporter, secured to him the copyright of his work, and granted
an annual sum as a remuneration for his services. Under this Act
I had the honor to be appointed, and have, from the time of my
appointment, carefully collected and reported all the decisions of
the Court.
Among the cases of 1835, there were several of very great and
general importance, and as I was enabled, by the kindness of their
Honors the Chief Justice andthe other Judges, to have access to their
notes and written judgments; Iconsideredit only due to the liberality
and kindness with which my efforts had been met, to re-publish the
whole of the cases from the beginning of 1835 ; this has now been
done, and although I have thereby incurred a heavy pecuniary
expense, yet I shall be enabled to proceed with more satisfaction
to myself and the public than I could by Continuing a work im
perfectly commenced. Much delay has occurred in the printing,
but I am now induced to hope that the work will be proceeded with
diligently until completed, and that hereafter the numbers will be
issued within a reasonable time after every Term.
It is proper that I should acknowledge the very great assistance
which, during along illness, I have received from Mr. George Lee,
as well in compiling the latter part of the cases now published, as
in the general correction of the Press.
G. F. S. BURTON.
Fredericton, January, 1839.
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CASES
ARGUED AND DETERMINED
IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF

NliW BRUNSWICK,
IN

HKABT TEB®,
IN THE FIFTH YEAR OF THE REION OF WILLIAM IV.

1835.

KING v. WILSON AND OTHERS.
A Grant of Land put in evidence referred to a plan annexed; a
plan not annexed was produced by one holding Land under the
Grant, as heir to his father, an original Grantee named therein, who had
them in possession 25 years, and knew them in his father’s possession. 15
years before—he had never seen the plan annexed to the Grant—the plan
purported to be a methodical and complete delineation of the contents of
the Grant in detail, signed by the Survey >r General;
Held that the plan was sufficiently authenticated, as the plan originally
annexed to the Grant, to authorize the Court, prirna facie, to admit it in
evidence as the original plan.
Letters patent granted Lands, described as extending from the point of
departure, “ 32 chains or to a certain road, leading between certain
Lands and the Tract described in the Grant, and thence to run a
certain course on said road,” the road was 69 chains 50 links from the
5rst bounds.
Held that the words of the Grant necessarily import that the alternative
secondly mentioned, snail be the controlling one.
An admission of the Crown, upon record under the Great Seal, is
evidence against the Crown itself.

rfipHIS was an information for intrusion on Crown Lands in Char
-S- lotte County, tried before CHIPMAN, Ch. J. at Bar, in last
Hilary Term.—Verdict for Defendant.
The Attorney General in the same Term obtained a Rule Nisi
to set aside the verdict on the grounds,
1 st. That a plan, purporting to be a plan of Lands granted by
the Crown, was improperly received in evidence, not being annexed
to the Letters Patent.
2d. That the Locus in quo was improperly considered by His
Honor
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Honor the Chief Justice to be within the hounds of the Grant called
the Chamcook Grant.
The case was argued last Trinity Term by the Attorney Gene
ral for the Prosecution, and Mr. Street (now Solicitor General,)
for the Defendants.
The Judgment of the Court was now delivered as follows, by
Chipman, C. J.
This was an information for intrusion, tried before me in Hilary
Term, 1834.
The Crown gave in evidence the Grant commonly called the
Chamcook Grant, (under an exemplification,) with the Plan
annexed, which Grant is as follows:

Nova Scotia.
George the Third, &c. Know ye that we, of our special grace,
certain knowledge and mere motion, have given and granted, &c.
unto Thomas Wyer, &c. &x.,fowr several Tracts of Land, con
taining together in the whole 1,534 acres, in the County of Sun
bury, in our Province of Nova Scotia, bounded and abutted,
situate, lying and being as follows, to wit: Unto Thomas Wyer, &c.
a plantation
[then follows a description of the Tract at Oak
Point J>ay,\ containing 500 acres, with the usual allowance
for waste: “ Unto Thomas Wyer, Colin Campbell, and William
Gallop, another Plantation, situate, lying and being, abutted and
bounded, as follows, beginning at a stake and stones at a Gove bear
ing northwest from Chamcook Island, being the northeastern bound
of Farm Lot No. 205, on the Bay of Passamaquoddy aforesaid,
thence to run south 63°, west thirty two chains, or until it comes
to the road leading between Farm Lots Nos. 38 to 47, and this
Tract; thence to run north 28° west 128 chains on said road, thence
north 63° east 98 chains, thence (south 27° east 96 chains to the
sea shore of said Bay, thence by the several courses of the said
Bay, crossing Chamcook River to the bounds first mentioned, con
taining 500 acres, allowance being made for roads, &c. : Unto John
Jones a Plantation &c. [describing it] containing 500 acres, with
allowance for roads: Unto William Pagan, &c. a Lot of Land
&c. [describing it,] also the Point opposite, marked A, containing
34 acres. And containing in all the aforesaid Tracts of Land
1,534 acres, and hath such shape, form and marks as appears by a
Plat thereof hereunto annexed. Given under the great seal of our
Province of Nova Scotia. Witness Ac. this third day of August,
1784, &c.”
The Defendants claimed under this Grant, and it was contended
on the part of the Crown that their possessions were not within the
limits of the Grant upon the true construction of it. The Defend
ants claim rested upon the ground, that the true construction of the
Grant
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Grant was, that the first line of the Grant should, in all events, run
to “the road leading between Farm Lots Nos. 38 to 47 and this
Tract,” and should not stop at the end of thirty two chains,” the
first alternative mentioned in regard to the extent of this line;
whereas, the Attorney General contended, that the true construction
of the Grant was, that this first line should stop at the end of the
32 chains. The Penobscot Association Grant, the Grant which
contained “ the Farm Lots” mentioned in the Chamcook Grant,
was given in evidence on the part of the Defendants, and is as
follows:

“Nova Scotia.
George the Third, &c. Know ye that we, of our special grace,
certain knowledge, and mere motion, have given and granted &c.
unto Stephen Roberts, &c. &c. (inter-alios Colin Campbell,) certain
several Tracts of Land, containing together in the whole 1,900
acres, in the County of Sunbury, in our Province of Nova Scotia,
bounded and abutted, situate, lying and being as follows, &c.:
First—one certain Tract of Land &c., bounded and measuring
and being the Lots from No. 1 to No. 20, both inclusive, compre
hended within the bounds following, to wit, beginning on the sea
shore, &c. &c.—the boundary line of lands of James Boyd, at a
Beech Tree marked I B, &c. &c.
Secondly—one other certain Tract of Land bounded and mea
suring and being the Lots Nos. 23, 24, 28 and 205, lying between
the Town Plot and Common of Saint Andrews and Passamaquoddy
Bay, bounded easterly on said Bay, southerly on said Town Plot
and a part of said Common, westerly on the aforesaid large Com
mon, and northerly on Land granted to Colin Campbell, Thomas
Wyer, and William Gallop, each and every of the aforesaid four
Lots containing 100 acres, more or less.
Thirdly—one other certain Tract of Land, bounded and measur
ing and being the Lots from No. 38 to No. 64, both inclusive,
and the Lots froia No. 67 to No. 76, both also inclusive, except
the Lot No 70, and the Tracts marked in the Plan as reserved
by the Surveyor General of the Woods, and for Fortifications com
prehended within the bounds following, to wit: beginning on the
eastern bank of the River Scoudic or St. Croix, on the northerly
bounds of the Common aforesaid, and thence running on said
bounds north 62° east, 330 rods, thence north 23° west, 358 j
chains, thence north 62° east, 20 chains, thence north 14° west,
179 chains, thence south 76° west, to a branch of said River,
called Waweig, on Lands of John Jones, and thence on the banks
of the said Branch, and the Main River to the bounds first men
tioned, each and every of the said last mentioned 36 Lots contain
ing by estimation 100 acres, more or less.
Fourthly- -one other certain Tract of Land, [describing it.]
Fifthly
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Fifthly—one other certain Tract &c. [describing it.]
And sixthly—one other certain Tract &c. [describing it.]
The aforesaid 190 Lots, Tracts of Land containing together in
the whole 19,000 acres, allowance being made for all such roads as
may hereafter be deemed necessary to pass through the same, and
being all Wilderness Land, and hath such shape, form and mark
as appears by a Plat thereof hereunto annexed &c. Habendum
unto Stephen Roberts Lot No. one, &c. &c.
Given under the great seal of our Province of Nova Scotia.
Witness &c. the third day of August, 1784.”
The Defendants also tendered in evidence a Plan which they
contended was the Plan annexed to this Grant. This Plan was
admitted by the Attorney General, subject to an exception which
had been taken to the same Plan in an action of replevin, tried
before me at the Charlotte Circuit, April 1833. Richard Hasluck,
vs. Ralph Cookson; and it was agreed that my notes of the evi
dence in regard to this Plan should be taken for the purpose of
determining whether the Plan was admissible (vid. infra). The
Defendants also gave in evidence a Grant, under the great seal of
New Brunswick, to the Justices of the Peace of the County of
Charlotte, called “ the School and Ministers Grant” and in com
mon parlance “ the Glebe Grant,” Dated 9th November, 1787,
which is as follows:

•

“ New Brunswick.
Unto--------- the Justices of the Peace of the County of Char
lotte for the time being, in trust for the uses hereinafter mentioned,
a Tract of Land, situate, lying and being in said Parish of Saint
Andrews, in said County of Charlotte, and abutted and bounded
as follows, to wit:—beginning on the northerly bank or shore of
Passamaqnoddy Bay, at the southeasterly corner or bounds of
Tract of Land granted to Thomas Wyer and others at Chamcook
River, thence running along the easterly line of the said Grant, to
the north easterly corner or angle thereof; thence along the
northerly line of the said Grant to Thomas Wyer and others, until
it meets the rear or easterly line of Lots in the third Tract or
Division of the Grant to the Penobscot Association, thence along
the said rear or easterly line of the said Lots, northerly, 91 chains
of 4 poles each, thence N. 77° E. by the magnet 165 chains, or
until it meets the westerly line of Lot No. 20 in the first Tract or
Division of the said Grant to the Penobscot Association, thence
along the said westerly line of the said Lot south easterly, until it
comes to the mouth of a River or Creek (at the western point or
entrance of the same,) which discharges into a cove or inlet from
Passamaquoddy Bay, thence along the westerly branch or shore
of the said cove or ' det, and along the westerly and northerly
branch or shore of Passamaquoddy Bay, following the several
courses
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courses of the same southerly and westerly to the bounds first
mentioned, containing in the whole 1,660 acres, more or less, with
the usual allowance for roads and waste.” A Plan was annelid to
this Grant which agreed with the Plan annexed to the Penobscot
t&rant.
It appeared in evidence that the rear line of the “ Farm Lots,”
mentioned in the Chamcook Grant (which wei^e granted in the
Penobscot Association Grant,) and were commonly called the
Saint Croix Lots, because they fronted on the Saint Croix (or
Schoodic River) had been in dispute between the proprietors of the
Chamcook Grant and these Saint Croix Lots. There was a Hem
lock Tree Line, and an Ash Tree Line. The Hemlock Tree
Line agreed with the actual admeasurement of “ 330 rods/’ run
from the shore of the Saint Croix mentioned in the Penobscot
Grant. This Hemlock Tree was found by actual admeasurement
in the year 1829, (instead of thirty two chains, the distance men
tioned in the-Cliamcook Grant,) to be 69 chains 50 links from the
beginning of the Chamcook Grant on Passamaquoddy Bay; taking
off one chain or 4 rods for “ the road,” would leave 68 chains 50
links. The Ash Tree was 3 chains 33 links nearer the Passa
maquoddy Bay. The Ash Tree Line was decided by the
verdict of the Jury in the above mentioned cause of Hctsluck, vs.
Cookson, to be the acknowledged and binding boundary as between
the proprietors of the Chamcook Grant and the Saint Croix Lots.
And it was proved, that the Chamcook proprietors had from the
beginning in 1784, always considered their western boundary to be the
rear line of the Saint Croix Lots, and that no claim on the part of
the Crown had been advanced before the discovery made of the
actual distance by the admeasurement in 1829. It appeared in
evidence that the Defendants were in possession up to the Ash
Tree Line. There was some discrepancy in the testimony of the
Surveyors who were examined as to the running of the other lines
of the Chamcook Grant, for the purpose of shewing the actual
number of acres contained within the limits of this Chamcook
Grant as held by the Defendants; but it may be stated as the gene
ral result of the evidence, that these limits would give them double
the quantity of acres named in the Grant. It was further proved
that about one third of the Grant was mountain and water and
about two thirds fit for cultivation, and that other grants in the
same neighbourhood included in the same Patent with the
Chamcook Grant contained a similar overplus. It was further
proved that by stopping at the end of 32 chains, and then running
N. 28° W. 128 chains, and then S. 63 chains 98 links, according
to the Grant, would give more than 800 acres; but the “ Glebe
Grant” would now intervene long before 98 chains, the distance
on this line mentioned in the Grant, could be completed from the
termination
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termination of the line run from the end of the 32 chains. It was
further proved that the Defendants had made large imnrovements
within the space now claimed by the Crown.
I directed the Jury (according to what I had hold at Nisi Prius
in the above cause of Haduch vs. Cookson, which still remains for
decision by the Court in Banc,) that it was the true construction
of the Chamcook Grant, that this Grant should in all events be
bounded by the rear line of the Saint Croix Lots in the Penobscot
Grant, and that I considered this construction to be much fortified
by the Glebe Grant which was not in evidence in the case of
Hasluck, ps. Cookson, and that they should therefore find a verdict
for the Defendants, which they did.
A rule for a new Trial was obtained on the two grounds,
1st. That the Plan purporting to be the Plan originally annexed
to the Penobscot Association Grant, was under the circumstances
not admissible as such Plan.
2d. That I misdirected the J ury in regard to the construction of
the Chamcook Grant.
The case was very elaborately argued in Trinity Term last, by
the Attorney General for the Crown, and the present Solicitor
General for the Defendants, and now stands for judgment, and I am
to pronounce the judgment of the Court.
In giving judgment I shall take up the points upon which the
rule for a new Trial was granted in their order.
1st. Was the Plan, purporting to be the Plan of the Penobscot
Grant, admissible in evidence ?
Colin Campbell was the witness who produced the Grant and
the Plan. He said that he found the Grant and the Plan together,
in the same bundle with the Mill Privilege (z. e. the Chamcook
Grant,) and the Saint Andrews Town Grant. They were left by
his father, who is dead, and who was an original Grantee both in
the Penobscot and the Chamcook Grant. They had been in the
witness’s possession for 25 years, and in his father’s possession 40
years ago. That he had-never seen the Plan annexed to the
Grant. That this Plan had not been used on account of the dif
ference in the meridians. That the County Plan in which the
meridian lines were corrected, was for this reason the Plan in actual
use.
In Mr. Starkie’s Treatise on Evidence, vol. 1, p. 170, it is laid
down as the rule relating to the reception in evidence of documents
of this nature “ that the authority of the document should be
established by the only kind of proof of which it is in generalcapa
ble, that is by proof that it came out of the proper repository; and
this rule is supported by the cases cited by Mr. Starkie. Now the
usual and proper repository or place of custody for the King’s
Grants of Lands is with one of the Grantees who have an interest
in
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in their preservation, and the proper place of custody for a Plan
purporting to have been annexed to a Grant, but actually separated
from it, is obviously in company with the Grant, wherever that
may be. But it was objected at the Trial that there was no
evidence that this Plan had ever at any time been annexed to the
Grant. Upon this point it is material to remark, that the Grant
expressly refers to a Plan thereunto annexed; it contains six seve
ral Tracts or Blocks of Land, comprising 190 lots and 19,000 acres
in the whole, having “ such shape, form and marks as appears by a
Plat thereof hereunto annexed.” The Grant describes only the
exterior lines of each block, and not the interior subc'ivision of the
blocks into lots, the several lots being designated in the Grant only
by numbers, thus “To have and to hold to Stephen Roberts, Lot
number one,” and so on. F urther, there are exceptions and reserva
tions in the Grant ascertainable only by the plan ; for instance, as
to the third Tract (one specifically connected with the question in
this cause,) there is an express exception from the premises com
prehended within the bounds of that Tract, as described in the
Grant of “ the Lot No. 70, and the Tracts \narked in the Plan
as reserved by the Surveyor General of the Woods and for Fortifi
cations.” Without reference to the Plan, therefore, it Is obviously
impossible to give effect to the Grant, either with regard to the
gift of the Crown to the individual grantees, or to the parcels
which the Crown has excepted and reserved to itself, out of the
Blocks or Tracts of Land comprehended within the described
limits. Under such circumstances, a supposition that the Grant
was issued by the officers of the Crown, without the requisite accom
paniment of the Plan, according to the express all Jgation of the
instrument itself, is in my mind inadmissible. Such a supposition
would go to vacate for uncertainty a solemn act of the Crown,
under which hundreds of persons hold their inheritance. The
maxim of Law on the contrary is, that every man, especially
every public officer shall be presumed to have properly discharged
his duty. Again, when documents are offered in evidence under
circumstances like the present, the Court will examine them for
the purpose of ascertaining whether they bear upon the face of
them marks of authenticity ; and in the case of Carlo vs. Lewis,
4 Esp. N. P. C. 1, where a Plan which was admissible as coming
from a proper custody, but upon inspection was found to contain
only a single delineation of the limits of a Parish, drawn in an
unartificial manner, and was not signed by any person having a
public character or office in the Parish, it was rejected. In the
present case, the Plan purports on the face of it to be a methodical
and complete delineation of the contents of the Grant in detail, and
moreover purports to be signed by the Surveyor General, the officer
whose duty it was to authenticate it by his signature; and it was
held
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held in the case of Taylor vs. Cook Price R. 653, that in such a
case the signature of a person whose duty it was to sign must be
presumed to be of his handwriting. It was objected on the argu
ment that this plan was not the best evidence that could be produced,
inasmuch as the party could have produced an inspeximus of the
Grant with a copy of the plan annexed. Now the plan was ad
mitted in evidence as the Plan originally annexed to the Grant,
the original Grant itself being in evidence, and if it be the Plan
originally annexed to the Grant, it is indisputably tlie very best
evidence that could be produced, clearly better evidence, as being
the original document, than a copy of the Plan annexed to a copy
of the Grant under an inspeximus, since all copies are liable to
mistakes. The whole question turns upon this—whether the Plan
admitted in evidence was sufficiently authenticated, as the Plan
originally annexed to the Grant, to authorize the Court
so to admit it as the original Plan. And for the reasons I
have stated, we are of opinion that it was sufficiently authenticated
for that purpose, and therefore was properly admitted in evidence.
The second question is, what is the true construction of the
Chamcook Grant? Upon this point it is not necessary to have
recourse to the principles which govern the construction of the
King’s Grants, in contra-distinction from those of a private person;
the rule with regard to the latter, being always to construe the
words of the Grantor most strongly against himself; it being sup
posed, that his self-interest will always bind him to be careful of his
expressions; whereas, in the case of the King, he being considered
the Representative and Trustee of the Public, and having no pri
vate interests to guard, there shall be no such intendment or pre
sumption. Nor is it necessary to enter upon a consideration of the
authorities, which give to the words “ special grace, certain know
ledge and more motion.” which are found in this Grant, the effect of
reducing a royal grant to the same standard of construction as that
of a subject ? for the Attorney General fairly, and most properly,
put the question broadly upon the ground of intention. What did
the King intend to grant ? What did the subject expect to re
ceive ? This is indeed the only true and reasonable principle, and
it has the express sanction of the highest authority. “ There is an
incessant rule (says Lord Coke, 2 Inst. 596) for construction
of the King’s Letters Patent, not only of liberties but of lands and
tenements which he may lawfully grant, that they have no strict
or narrow interpretation for the overthrowing of them sed secun
dum commodum plenitudinem judicuntur, that is, to have a liberal
and favourable construction for the making of them available in
law usque ad plenitudinem for the honor of the King. Taking
this principle for our guide, let us proceed to the consideration of
this Grant. The premises granted are a “ plantation,” in other
words
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words a Tract of Land “ situate, lying and being, abutted and
bounded as follows,” beginning &c., then proceeding to describe the
lines which 1 shall presently consider, and making a complete am
bit “ to the bounds first mentioned.” It is expressly, therefore,
a grant of the land bounded by and comprehended within the lines
which are described,—a grant by metes and bounds. The descrip
tion goes on “ containing 500 acres,, allowance being made for
roads, &c.’H Now this subsequent mention of the quantity con
tained can never be admitted to control the previous definition of
boundary by lines particularly described. Indeed, it was admitted
by the Attorney General, that where the lines are certain, the men
tion of the quantity of land comprehended within them, is imma
terial. Let us then endeavour to ascertain the lines of boundary,
truly intended by the Grant. The lines of the Grant which have
a bearing on the present case, are contained in the following part
of the description, viz:—“ beginning at a stake and stows, at a
cove bearing north west from Chamcook Island, being the north
eastern bound of Farm Lot No. 205 in the Bay of Passamaquoddy
aforesaid, thence to run south 63° west, thirty two chains, or until
it runs to Z/mroad, leading between Farm Lots numbers 38 to 47
and this tract: “ thence to run north 28° west 128 chains on said
road.” The question raised upon the intention of the Grant is this,
whether the first line of the Grant running south westerly from
Passamaquoddy Bay shall peremptorily terminate at the end of
thirty two chains by measurement or -whether the other specified
alternative shall be adopted and this Grant be extended to what
is described as “ the road leading between Farm Lots No. 38 to
47 and this tract.” It is obviously impossible to understand this
description, without a reference to the “ Farm Lots” “No. 205,”
and from “ No. 38 to 47” mentioned in it. These Farm Lots are
described in the Grant called the “ Penobscot Association Grant.”
This Grant bears date the same day with the Chamcook Grant,
and in its turn has an express reference to the Chamcook Grant.
The second tract in this Grant is described as “ bounded and mea
suring and being the lots numbers 23, 24, 28 and 205,” bounded
inter alia “ westerly on the large Common of Sair.t Andrews” and
“ northerly on land granted to Colin Campbell, Thomas Wyer and
William Gallop” (the Chamcook Grant). The third tract is bounded
and measuring and being (inter alia) the lots from No. 38 to 64
both inclusive, &c. &c. “ comprehended within the bounds following,
to wit, beginni ng on the eastern bank of the River Scoodick or Saint
Croix, on the northerly bounds of the Common aforesaid, and thence
running on said bounds north 62° east 330 rods, thence north 28°
west 358 J chains” &c. &c. Each of these Grants refers to a Plan
annexed. The inspeximus of the Chamcook Grant given in evi
dence has a copy of the Plan annexed to the copy of the Grant cerB
tified
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tified under the Great Seal. The original Plan of the Penobscot
Grant was, as already remarked upon, given in evidence in com
pany with the original Grant.
These Grants, with tlieir respective Plans, issued as they were
on the same day, and bearing mutual reference each to the other,
must evidently be considered irt'connexion with each other, in order
to ascertain the true intent of the Crown in regard to the premises.
Neither of the •Grants can be well understood without a reference
to the Plans ; and if there be any ambiguity in the expressions of
the Grant, the Plans which contain a visible delineation of the
respective parcels of land which it was the intention of the Crown
to convey are, by the Grants themselves, designated as the means
of obtaining certainty in this respect. The Plan belonging to the
Penobscot Grant is evidently intended to contain the more particu
lar and complete delineation, not only of the Grant to which it be
longs, but of the Chamcook Grant also. The necessity of referring
to the Penobscot Plan, in order to ascertain the severalty of each
Grantee/awrZ even the reservations of the -Crown itself has already
been noticed in giving our opinion on the admissibility of that plan
in evidence, ar.d it is worthy of remark with regard to the Chamcook
Grant that in the description of the fourth tract therein granted to
William Pagan and others, one pieee of Land is described only as
“ the point marked A,” which makes it absolutely necessary to
refer to the Plan, to obtain any knowledab of the piece of Land
designated by that letter. This is a further and very strong cir
cumstance to shew the reliance placed by the officers of the'Crown
who prepared these instruments upon the Plans to aid and supply
the descriptions in the Grants. Having made these general re
marks upon the twO'Grants and Plans, I will proceed to a conside
ration of them in immediate reference to the question now in dis
pute. The leading impression made by an inspection of the Plans
is that they both shew the'whole space between the wpter of the
Passamaquoddy Bay on the Chamcook or eastern side and the
water of the Schoodick or Saint Croix River, on the western side as
granted land, without any intermediate vacant land. Again, both
the plans shew a road as bounding the rear of the Chamcook
Grant. In the Penobscot Plan this road is marked on the rear of
the Saint Croix Lots for the whole length of the Block from No.
38 to No. 64, inclusive, and immediately divides, or in the lan
guage of the Chamcook Grant “ leads between” these lots from
No. 38 to 47 and the Chamcook Tract; and in the Chamcook
Plan the road divides or leads between that Grant and a block of
land evidently intended to represent the whole content of the same
Farm Lots No. 38 to 47. The Chamcook Grant describes the
second or rear line of the Tract thereby granted as running “ north
28° west 128 chains on said road.” The Penobscot Grant de
scribes
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scribes the second or rear line of this Tract as running the former
course “north 28° west 3581 chitins" On the Penobscot Plan
the 128 chains, the measure of the second line of the Chamcook
Grant, and the 1358? chains the measure of the second line of the
Penobscot Grant, are marked upon the same line, running north
28° west. These circumstances, appearing upon an inspection of the
Plans in connexion with the Grants, in my mind render the con
clusion irresistible that it was the intention of the Crown, in making
these Grants, that the Chamcook Grant was to extend to the rear
of the Saint Croix Lots in the Penobscot Grant, leaving only the
space of the road between them ; the rear line of the Saint Croix
Lots being determined by the Grant without any alternative, to
run from the termination of a line measured from the Bank of the
river the exact distance of 330 rods on the northerly bound of the
Saint Andrew’s Common. It is however insisted on the part of
the Crown, that the expression in the Chamcook Grant, in the al
ternative “ 32 chains or until it comes to the road” &c., is necessarily
to be taken as limiting the Grant to the first mentioned alternative,
namely the termination of the 32 chains. But in the description
of this part of the bounds we think that the words of the Grant
even without reference to the Plan, necessarily import, that the
alternative secondly mentioned shall be the controlling one. The
words are “ to run south 63° west 32 chains, or until it comes to
the road leading between Farm Lots numbers 38 to 47 and this
tract, thence to run north 28° west 128 chains on saidroad.” The
second line is to run from the termination of the first; it is also to
run on the said road ; the termination of the first line must there
fore necessarily be on the same road along which the second line is
to run. And how is the road defined and ascertained ? It is the
road “ leading between" the Farm Lots No. 38 to 47 and the
Chamcook Tract, and therefore a road bounding the Farm Lots,
as well as the Chamcook Tract; thereby making the rear line of
these Farm Lots or the Saint Croix Lots as they are called, which
we have seen is a line fixed by the Grant at the distance of 330
rode from the Saint Croix River, the medium of regulating and
ascertaining the rear line of the Chamcook Grant, and id certum
est quod certum reddi potest is a maxim of universal application in
the construction of written instruments. This exposition of the
words of the Grant exactly corresponds with the intention, which
is so apparent on the face of the Plans. But it is said that if this
had been the intention there was no use or propriety in inserting
the disjunctive “ or” and the line would have been described as
running absolutely to the road in question; and unquestionably
such would have been the correct and accurate mode of description.
But these Grants do not by any means exhibit in other parts of
them the careful and accurate phraseology which one expects to
find
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find in solemn instruments of this kind. I think it is evident that
the framer of the Grant considered it as the fact (probably deduced
from the imperfect surveys which had then been made of that part
of the country) that the distance from the Chamcook shore to the
rear of the Saint Croix Lots, as granted and laid down in the Plan,
was 32 chains, and therefore inserted this as another circumstance
descriptive of this line of the Chamcook Grant, without any appre
hension that it would differ from the other alternative, namely, the
road marked out in the -rear of the Saint Croix Lots. It is a
common use of the disjunctive “ or” to apply it in denoting different
expressions for the same thing as well as to denote different things;
and if the distance in question had been 32 chains and no more
the expression would not have been in itself improper, although an
unnecessary and inartificial accumulation of descriptive" terms.
Be this as it may, we think that the clear intention manifested as
well in the context of the Grant, as in the Plans to carry the
Chamcook Tract to the rear line of the Saint Croix Lots, and not
to leave any vacant ungranted tract between them, must in this
case overrule and bear down any argument drawn from
the mention of the distance of the 32 chains^ and it being the
acknowledged fact that this distance is a great deal more than 32
chains, the mention of it becomes so clearly inconsistent with the
unquestionable intention of the Grant, collected from other circum
stances, that in construing the Grant it must be thrown aside and
be deemed a particular that is not true. The rule of construction
in such case is found in Com. Dig. Fait E. 4. “ If the thing de
scribed is sufficiently ascertained, it is sufficient, though all the
particulars are not true, as if a man conveys his house in D
which was R. Cotton’s when it was Thomas Cotton’s, Hob. 171. If
he demises the manor of D, which manor is in lease for such a rent,
the demise is good, though the rent be mistaken.—Per Pofh. 2
Cro. 34. If he demises his meadows in 3 and D, containing 10
acres, where they contain 20 acres, all the meadows pass.”—
Sav. 114.
It is worthy of remark, that the Plan annexed to the Chamcook
Grant does not mention the 32 chains, nor indeed any course or
distance, while it does, as before noticed, contain the road, and the
rear line of the Saint Croix Lots, which corroborates the inference
that the latter circumstances indicate the prominent and controlling
intention of the Grant, which svas not left to be ascertained by the
measurement of distance.
This construction of the Chamcook Grant is fully corroborated
by the terms of the Grant to the Justices of the Peace for the Coun
ty of Charlotte, dated 9th November, 1787, commonly called the
Glebe Grant, one line of which is described as running “ aloi^the
northerly line of the said Grant to Thomas Wyer and associates
(the
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(the Chamcook Grant) until it meets the. rear or westerly line of
lots in the third tract or division of the Grant to the Penobscot As
sociation, ” thereby expressly declaring in an instrument of record
under the Great Seal, which has express reference to the Chamcook
Grant, that the northerly line of this Grant extends to the rear line
of the Saint Croix Lots, and it appears to us unquestionable upon
the first principles of evidence, that an admission of the Crown
upon record, under the Great Seal, is evidence against the Crown
itself. It is also observable that this Glebe Grant contains an in
stance where the alternative of a specified distance must necessa
rily be controlled by the subsequent expression of a particular
boundary. One line in this Grant is described as running “ N.
77° E. by the magnet 165 chains, or until it meets the westerly
line of lot No. 20 in said first tract or division of the said grant to
the Penobscot Association, thence along the said westerly line of
the said lot south westerly until it comes to the mouth of a Riner or
Cteekf fc. Here the westerly line of Lot No. 20 being made the
boundary, the line must obviously be extended to meet that boun
dary, whether it exceed 165 chains or not, although the alternative
expression is used. «No other consistent construction can, in our
opinion, be given to the Grant.
The argument, however, was put by the Attorney General
in another shape, and it was said that as stopping at the end of 32
chains would give to the Granteeseven more than 500 acres of land,
and as 500 acres is the quantity mentioned in the Grant it was the
intention of the Grant not to go beyond the 32 chains ; it being as
sumed and urged by the Attorney General that it was the para
mount intention of the Crown to convey this certain quantity, viz.
500 acres of land. Now the primary rule for determining the in
tention of the King’s Grants, is to consider the words and references
contained in the Grants themselves, interpreted by just rules of
construction. In the present case the King gives and grants “a
plantation” or tract of land “ abutted and bounded” as mentioned
in the Grant, and this tract so “ abutted and bounded" is further
said to contain “ 500 acres, allowance being made for roads, &c.”
The King therefore here intends what l:e expresses, namely, a tract
of land having the abuttals and boundaries which he sets forth and
describes. The mention of the contents of the Grant is necessarily
to be taken as by estimation an expression very usually inserted in
Grants, especially (with the indefinite adjunct “ allowance being
made for roads fc." To admit this estimation of contents with
the unlimited “ allowance for roads
as therule for determin
ing the metes and bounds of the parcel of land granted, would be to
violate the first principles of construing written instruments ; these
metes and bounds can be determined only by the description ac
tually given of them. And however the Crown may have been
mistaken
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mistaken in the contents of the tract granted, this cannot alter or
affect the boundaries assigned to it in the Grant, when the ques
tion turns solely upon the construction of the Grant in regard to
the limits actually expressed therein.
Thus far the argument in this case proceeded upon the circum
stances of tlie case itself. But it was much insisted upon that there
is an existing decision of this Court upon a Grant containing simi
lar expressions 'with that now in question, which decision is in point,
and establishes the construction now contended for on behalf of the
Crown. The case referred to is that of Nokes dem. Simonds, vs.
Hazen and White. In that case the material words were “north
15° west 160 chains, or until it meets the River Kennebeckasis,
and from thence to run westerly until it meets the N. E. bound of
the former Grant.” And it was decided that the line running,
north 15° west, should terminate at the end of the 160 chains, and
should not be continued to the River Kennebeckasis, which lay at
a considerable distance beyond. If the cases were parallel we
should feel ourselves bound by this decision, confirmed as it was by
repeated consideration and appearing upon record, first upon special
verdict, and then upon a demurrer to evidence, and fully concurring,
as we do, in the correctness of it. But the two circumstances upon
which we found our opinion in the case now in hand did not exist
in the case of Simonds vs. Hazeh and White. First in that case,
the Grant did not refer-to any Plan to indicate its intention, and
secondly the line running from the alternative point is not in that
case described as running on or along “the River Kennebtickasis”
which would have shewn, that the point from which it springs must
be at that Riycr ; whereas in the present case the corresponding
line is described as running on “ the road,” thereby indicating
that the point from which it springs must be at the-road ; and in the
instance before adverted to in the Glebe Grant, the line is described
as running on the westerly line of Lot No. 20, thereby indicating
that in all events the line immediately before described, must extend
to the said westerly line of Lot No. 20 ; the case of Simonds vs.
Hazenand White,therefore cannot govern or afford aprecedent for the
present case, because it is in its circumstances essentially different.
Having formed an opinion in this case upon tlig grounds which
I have stated, it is very satisfactory to reflect that the construction
which we think the terms of the Grant require is in exact accord
ance with the actual possession, held and enjoyed under all the
Grants involved in these discussions, and it would seem with the
received opinions in the Surveyor General’s office for a period of
nearly half a century. The rule for a new trial must be discharged.
Note.—This was distinctly and properly the judgment of Chipman Ch.
Justice, and Botsford J., the surviving Judges before whom the case was argued.
This written judgment was submitted to Career J., who concurred. Parker J.
had been Counsel in the case, and declined giving any opinion.
WIGGINS
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WIGGINS v. GARRISON AND WOOD.
Under a Writ of Replevin, a Sheriff cannot justify the taking of the
Goods therein mentioned, unless they be found in the possession of the
Defendant named in the Writ.

This question came up on demurrer and was argued in last Mi
chaelmas Term, by the SoliUtor General for the Plaintiff, and
Neville Parker for the Defendant.
The pleadings aud arguments are fully detailed in the judgment
of His Honor the Chief Justice.’
In this Term the Court delivered their opinions.
Chipman, C. J.
The Plaintiff’s declaration in this cause stated that the Defend
ants on &c., at &c., seized, took and carried away certain Goods and
Chattels, viz.: Ten joints of Timber, containing 100 sticks White
Pine Timber, 100 sticks Red Pine Timber, and 100 sticks of other
Timber, and converted and disposed of the same to their own use.
The Defendants pleaded the General Issue, and secondly,
As to seizingr taking and carrying away three joints, containing
59 sticks White Pine Timber, parcel of the Goods and Chattels in
the first Count of the Declaration mentioned. James White and
Andrew Garrison pleaded that at the time when &c., to wit:—on the
14tli July, 3d Wm. 4th, a certain Writ commonly called a Writ
of Replevin was issued out of the Supreme Court, &c., directed to
the Sheriff of the City and County of Saint John by which Writ the
King commanded the said Sheriff, that if George Woods should
make him secure of prosecuting his complaint, and also of returning
the Goods land Chattels, viz.—three joints of White Pine Timber,
marked W X M, and containing 59 sticks, which William Turner
had taken and unjustly detained &c. &o., that then the Goods and
Chattels aforesaid to him the said George Woods without rlelpty he
should catfee to be replevied, and that he should put by sureties and
safe pledges the aforesaid William Turner, that lie should be before
our Lord the King at Fredericton on the Saturday next after the
second Tuesday in October, then next to answer to the said George
Woods cf a plea wherefore he took the said Goods and Chattels, and
them unjustly detained &c., which said Writ before the return
thereof, viz., on the 24th July in the year last aforesaid, was direct
ed to the said J. White, who then &c. was Sheriff of the said City
and County of Saint John, to be executed &c., the plea then averred
the giving ofthe replevin bond before the time when &c., and before
the return of the Writ, viz., on the -said 24th July, and that the
said George Woods made the said J. White, Slieriff&c., secure of
prosecuting his complaint against the scM.'William Turner,
and of returning the said Goods &c.:—and thereupon the said
J. White delivered the said Writ to the said A. Garrison, to be exe
cuted
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cuted in due form of Law, which said Andrew Garrison, then &c.
was Deputy of the said J. White &c. &c., and thereupon the said
Andrew Garrison afterwards &c., to wit at &c. did peaceably and
quietly seize and take the said Goods and Chattels named and di
rected in the said Writ, which said Goods and Chattels just before
the said seizure and taking thereof, and on the same day of such
seizure had been in the possession of the said William Turner;
but just before the said seizure and taking thereof had been taken
by, and were at the time of the said seizure in the possession of the
said Stephen Wiggins, who had then and there taken possession
thereof by virtue of a sale from one Dibblee, who untruly pretended
to be the owner of the said Goods, and the said Andrew Garrison
being such Deputy &c. then and there replevied and delivered the
said Goods &c. to the said George Woods, as by the said Writ the
satid Sheriff was commanded, which said George Woods then and
there took and carried away the same. The declaration then avers
the return of the Writ by the said Sheriff, &c &c.
To this plea there is a general demurrer: and the question stated
in argument on the demurrer by the Plaintiff was—that it appears
by the plea that the writ of replevin was against William Turner,
who ismo party to this suit, and that under such Writ the Defend
ants took the Timber out of the possession of the Plaintiff, who it
appears by the plea came to the possession thereof by a bona fide
purchase from one Dibblee—and as there is no allegation in the plea
that there was any fraud or connivance at fraud on the part of the
said Plaintiff in his purchase, the Defendants had no legal right to
take the Timber out of his possession under a writ of replevin against
another party. The question was properly made to rest by each of
the learned Counsel wlio argued this cause in the course of their
respective arguments upon what is the exigency of the writ
of replevin set forth in the plea for it was conceded on both
sides and it cannot be denied that the Sheriff and his officer, who
are not joined in the plea by the third Defendant, George Woods,
were justified in having done what the writ commanded the Sheriff
to do, and on the other hand are not justified but are wrongdoers
and trespassers, if they have done what the Writ did not command
the Sheriff to do. The words of the Writ according to the setting
forth of the same in the plea are “ if George Woods shall make you
secure of prosecuting his complaint and also of returning the Goods
and Chattels, viz., three joints of White Pine Timber marked
W X M, and containing 59 sticks, which William Turner hath
taken and-unjustly detained as it is alleged, if a return thereof shall
be adjudged that then the Goods and Chattels aforesaid to him the
said George Woods without delay, you cause to be replevied and de
livered.” It is contended on the part of the Defendants that the
exigency of this writ is to replevy the articles named therein if they
shall
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shall be found within the Bailiwick of the Sheriff, and that the onlycircumstance which the Sheriff need regard, is the identity of the
articles which are specified and described in the writ. On the
part of the Plaintiff it is contended, that there is a further essential
condition contained in the writ which must occur in order to give
the Sneriff authority, namely, that the specified articles shall be
found in the possession of the party against whom the writ is sued
out or in the words of the writ shall be “ detained” by such party.
I am clearly of opinion that this latter is the true construction and
exigency of the writ. The command of the writ is that the Sheriff
do replevy the Goods which William Turner hath taken and un
justly detained, the words of the writ must undoubtedly be so con
strued as to give effect to the principles of Law applicable to the
subject. Replevin is an action of a peculiar nature, and I find its
peculiarities as derived from English authorities well condensed in
Mr. Dane’s abridgment of American Law, vol. 5, p. 514: “ The
“ action of replevin differs from all other actions in some material
“points. 1. In other actions the party demandant is not put in
“ possession of the thing demanded until after a trial and a decision
“ in his favour. But in Replevin the Plaintiff is put in possession
“ of the Chattels in dispute by the officer’s delivery before any
“ trial, in fact in the first stage of the suit. Hence results,
“ 2. Another material matter peculiar to this action, a return of
“ the Chattels to the Defendant whenever in the course of the
“ action he shews he is i< ititled to a returu; and it further results—
“ 3. That the Defendant to have this return must in his pleadings
“ claim a return in addition to the other matters he pleads. There“ fore, 4. It follows in a manner peculiar to this action, that the
“ Defendant is to many purposes an actor, and pleads and claims on
“ two grounds ; he justifies the taking the Cattle damage fea“ sant, for rent in arrear or for some other cause, and so far he
“ strictly defends his conduct in the case, but when he claims a
“ return of the Chattels to him, he acts on a general principle pecu“ liar to replevin, the consequence of the delivery of the thing to the
“ Plaintiff as above stated. In this part of the case the Defendant
“ is an actor and takes the ground of a Plaintiff, as he undertakes
“ to shew that he ought to recover back the personal property in
“ dispute, and thence must make out a title to recover and have
“ the thing delivered to him.” From the principle that in replevin
the Defendant may claim a return of the Chattels replevied which
return will be adjudged to him if he makes out his claim, it neces
sarily follows, that the party from whose possession the Chattels
are replevied, must be made the Defendant in the action ; for they
are to be returned to the possession of the party from whom they
are replevied, if the right be found for him. The detention of the
Goods by the party against whom the action is brought and the writ
C
is

20

CASES in HILARY TERM,

is sued out, is a circumstance equally essential with the taking of
the goods by such party, to render this peculiar remedy applicable ;
it would be palpable injustice to permit goods to be replevied from
B, in an action brought, and under a writ sued out against A, in
which action, B could net come in and assert his right to the goods
found in his possession and taken therefrom by the officer, and
have a return of the goods if he established his right thereto. The
writ of replevin established by rule of this Court in Easter Term
1810, under the Act of Assembly 50 Geo. 3, C. 21, appears to
have been very carefully framed by the Judges of that day, and
a primary object which they evidently had in view was to give the
party against whom the writ is sued out, a day in Court, which lie
had not under the former practice until a pluries wr't of replevin
was issued; accordingly it was such former practice to string these
writs, viz : the original or first writ, the alias and the pluries toge
ther under one seal. The present writ it will be seen (upon an ex
amination of it with reference to 2 Sellon’s Prac. Tit Replevin), is
compounded of the command to the Sheriff to replevy and of the
writ of pone the object of which writ of pone was to compel the
Defendant named in the writ of replevin to appear and answer to
the suit. Our writ of replevin, therefore, goes on to require the
Sheriff, to put by sureties and safe pledges the Defendant named in
the writ, that he be at Fredericton on the return of the writ to
answer the Plaintiff of a plea wherefore he took the said Goods and
Chattels, and them unjustly detained against gages and pledges.
To fully effectuate this object the above mentioned rule of Court
in case of the non-appearance of the Defendant at the return of the
writ of replevin, goes on to authorise the Plaintiff to issue a capias
against him, and to takejudgment by default, in case of non-appear
ance to this capias, as in the case of Common process in otheractions.
Ail these proceedings, and it may be added the Replevin Bond also,
are evidently founded on the principle that the Defendant named
in the writ of replevin, is the person from whom alone the goods
are to be replevied, and who is to answer the Plaintiff for taking
and detaining them, and to have a return of the goods if he shew
himself entitled thereto. The converse follows, that if the goods are
not found in the possession of the Defendant named in the writ, the
writ is not applicable and cannot be executed. In this plea it is
alleged that when the ‘officer sewed the goods under the writ of
replevin, they were out of the possession of William Turner, the
Defendant named in the writ, and in the possession of the present
Plaintiff, Stephen Wiggins. This writ therefore was not applica
ble and ought not to have been executed. It was conceded by the
learned Counsel for the Defendant, that under the circumstances
stated in this plea, replevin could not have been maintained against
Stephen Wiggins, because he was not the taker of the goods, they
having
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having been delivered to him under a contract of sale and it
being clear law that Replevin like Trespass lies only against
the man who is actually or constructively the taker of the goods
from the possession of the party who seeks to replevy them. Upon
this principle; it was that Groves vs. Griffith cited at the bar was
decided in this Court. And it is to be remarked that there is no
allegation of fraud or other circumstance to make S. Vviggins a
constructive taker of the goods. But if the proceedings set forth
in this plea be justifiable, the present Plaintiff, Stephen Wiggins,
is in a far worse plight than if he had been the taker, either actually
or constructively of the goods, and replevin had been brought
against him; in such an action he might have appeared and have as
serted his right, and claimed a return of the goods, which he could not
do in the action brought against William Turner, nor could he have
stopped the proceedings of the Sheriff by claiming property and
having the writ de propintate probanda, for it is the Defendant in
the suit alone that can do this.—6 Bae. Abr. Tit. Replevin.
The effect of the dictum of Lord Holt in Hallett vs. Brit.
Cartliew, 380, urged by the learned Counsel for the Defendants,
that the officer is justified in replevin because he is expressly com
manded to take the goods in specie, must evidently depend upon
what the Writ commands. I have" already stated that I think
that the tenor of the command is to take the goods specified in the
writ out of the possession of the Defendant named in the writ, and
the officer will be justified in doing this although the property of the
goods should be in another person.
It is not necessary for the decision of this question to advert to
any other of the topics urged at the Bar.
I am of opinion that under the writ of replevin set forth in the
plea which was sued out against William 1 urner, there was no
authority given to. the Sheriff to replevy goods which, upon his own
shewing in the allegations in the plea, were in the possession of
Stephen Wiggins and out of the possession of William Turner, and
for this reason there must be judgment for the Plaintiff.

WARD v. DOW.
Under a Writ of Inquiry the Jury gave no verdict. A second Writ was
thereupon issued and damages assessed. Held regular.

Cleary, the Attorney for the Plaintiff, in last Hilary Vacation
issued a Writ of Inquiry of Damages, returnable in Easter Term
The Jury would not give a verdict for any thing in favor of the
Plaintiff, and not being able to find for Defendant, were dismissed
without giving a verdict. The Plaintiff’s Attorney, in Easter
Vacation, issued another M7rit, and Damages were assessed at £20.
In
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In Trinity Term last, Wilmot for Defendant, obtained a rule nisi
to set aside the second Writ of Inquiry and Inquisitiou for irregu
larity with Costs. The irregularity complained of was, that the
second Writ of Inquiry was improperly issued without the leave of
the Court having been first obtained. Berton for Plaintiff, showed
cause in Michaelmas.
Per Curiam.
We think the Plaintiff has pursued the correct course, and that
which was least expensive to the Defendant.
Rule discharged with costs.

REX v. STERLING.
A Return by Commissioners of Highways is not in itself a laying out
of a Road within the meaning of 50 G. 3, C. 6,—the Road must be laid out
before it is recorded.

Indictment for obstructing a Highway. Tried before Botsford, J.
in Michaelmas Term.
On the part of the Prosecution, a Record of a Road made by
the Commissioners of Highways of the Parish of Saint Mary’s, in
York County, was put in evidence. The road never had been
marked or laid out on the land, and never had been opened. Se
veral points were taken by the Solicitor General for the De
fendant :
1st. That it was necessary to shew not only the Record of the
Road, but that the previous steps required by the Act, in altering
a road, had been taken by the Commissioners, and that the Re
cord could not be considered even prima facie evidence of the cor
rectness of the preliminary proceedings.
2d. That the road never had been laid out and opened, and
therefore could not be considered a highway.
3d. That before the road could be opened it was necessary that
the compensation awarded to the owners of the land should be first
paid.
The Points were reserved, and a Verdict entered against the
Defendant.
The Solicitor General having obtained a rule nisi to enter a
Verdict for the Defendant upon the Points above stated.
D. L. Robinson at this Term shewed cause.
The Court in giving Judgment, considered only the second
point.
Chipman, Chief Justice:
This is an Inlictment for obstructing a Highway. The ob
struction must be shewn upon a Highway It is not necessary to
remark
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remark on the doctrine of usor. It is quite sufficient to refer to
the Act of Assembly, 50 Geo. 3, c. 6, under which these proceed
ings were had. This return is not sufficient evidence of a laying
out. It is not necessary for the decision of this case to prescribe
what would be sufficient, but in the present case the return or re
cord does not specify or particularly define through what part of
the lands the road was intended to pass ; it is so vague that the
intended course cannot be ascertained,—one expression is “run
ning from point to point, as straight as the nature of the ground
will permit.” The strong inclination of my opinion is, that in or
der to make a good laying out under this Act. there must be some
marking out upon the land—this may also be designated upon a
plan. The return is only the record of the road as actually laid
out, and the tenth section of tlie Act clearly shews that the road
must be “ laid out,” before it is entered in writing or recorded.
Botsford, J. :
In order to sustain this Indictment, it is necessay to establish
the locus in quo to be a highway. The Act of Assembly, before
referred to, prescribes the course the Commissioners are to pursue ;
their duty is plain, and following the directions of the x\ct there
can be no difficulty; but here, instead of doing so, from some fear
of the correctness of their own acts, as appeared by the evidence
of one of the Commissioners, they have neglected to open the road,
and have instituted this proceeding to test their legality. Looking
to the return, can any person point out the exact course of the road ?
If evidence had been adduced of the actual laying out of the road,
I am not prepared to say the return, vague as it is, would not be
sufficient evidence. Tne return or record is not to be made until
the road is actually laid out.
Carter, J.:
The locus in quo must be shewn to be a highway. Even grant
ing that the return is correctly made, it must be so definite that
any person may go upon the land and point out the road. Here
two persons may go from one terminus to the other by different
courses.
Parker, J.:
The only question I will consider here is—Is the road laid out ?
What, in the first place, is a road ? It is a piece of ground stretch
ing from point to point and of a certain specified width. The re
cord is not the laying out the road, but the evidence of it. Then
is it to be evidence of an act or of an intention only ? Who can,
by the record before the Court, point out the road ?
Verdict entered for the Defendant.
D. L. Robinson for Prosecution.
The Solicitor General for Defendant.
DICKINSON
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DICKINSON, v. BALLOCH.
Where in Assumpsit the Verdict is under £5, the Verdict is considered
prima facie the amount of the demand for which the Plaintiff brought hi s
action.

Assumpsit.

Tried before the Chief Justice, at the Carleton Cir
cuit, in September last.
The Declaration contained only the Common Counts.—Plea—the General Issue with notice of set off.
The Plaintiff’s demand was for a large quantity of timber, for
work and labour in driving that timber, and there were also sundry
small items of account. By an agreement put in evidence by the
Plaintiff, it appeared that Defendant was to make timber in the
Woods, and Plaintiff to haul it, and have one half for so doing—
but the first half that was harried was to belong to Defendant, and
he was also to have the refusal of the remainder. By the same
agreement it appeared that Defendant had paid stumpage on the
timber, amounting to £25, one half of which was to be repaid to
him by Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant had received
much more than his half, and sought to recover payment for the
remainder—the -evidence on this point was vague, and it evidently
was not considered sufficient by the Jury. There was evidence
also of work and labour, and it was questionable if the Jury did
not set off the £12 10s. tonnage money, against that—the amount,
if sufficiently proved, being about that sum. Two items, amount
ing to 25s., were clearly proved. No evidence was offered on the
part of the Defendant. The Jury found a general Verdict for the
Plaintiff for 25s.
In last Michaelmas Term, Berton and Wilmot for the Defend
ant, obtained a rule nisi to enter a suggestion to deprive the Plain
tiff of costs ; they urged that the 10th Section of the Provincial Act
of 50 G. 3, c. 17, was a literal copy from the London Chart of Re
quests Act; and that by the decisions under that Statute, the Verdi< t must be considered the amount in demand. They cited 2
Tidd’s Prac. 994, 4 Burr. 2133, 8 East. 238,316, 1 M. & S. 393,
6 Taun. 452, 1 Taun. 397, 2 Cromp. & Jer. 505, 4 B. & C. 769,
1 Dowl. Pr. Ca. 580, 2d do. 58.
The Solicitor General at this Term shewed cause, and contended
that this action did not come within the intent of the Act of
Assembly. It was for a large and important demand, and the
Verdict was a general one, and it could not be said that it was
upon any particular item of the account, and further that the sum
of £12 10s. mentioned in the agreement must be considered in the
nature of a set off; he urged that had the Verdict been for the
Defendant, the learned Judge would not have certified to give
double costs, and that shewed the cause was not within the Act.
The action could not have been tried in a Justice’s Court.

Chipman,
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Chipman, Chief Justice:
This action was for goods sold—the Verdict was for 25s. The
cause involved matters of a large amount; there were two small
articles proved distinct therefrom, which made exactly the amount
of the Verdict. It has been contended on the part of the Plaintiff
that the real matter or cause of action should be considered. The
law is clearly settled that the sum recovered by the Verdict is to
be considered the debt due—4 B. & C. 769, 2 C. & J. 505, 1
Dowl. Pr. Ca. 580, 603, 704, all settle the same point—-nrima
facia the Verdict is evidence of the debt due. In 2 Dowl. Pr. Ca.
58, the Plaintiff failed in proving part of his demand from the ab
sence of a witness, the Verdict being under £5, a suggestion
was entered. The Law, as collected from these cases, is, that the
amount of the Verdict is the sum in demand, and the onus’is on
the Plaintiff to shew circumstances to take the case out of the
rule. Here it is evident that but for the two items, before men
tioned, the Verdict would have been for the Defendant.
Botsfokd, J.:
I entertained doubts upon a case in 8 E. 346, where Lord Ellenborough remarked upon the Plaintiff having a reasonable cause to
bring his action for a larger sum than <£5. But the Law is clearly
settled by later decisions. The present case is stronger than 1 M.
& S. 391, where failing on the special counts, Plaintiff recovered
a small Verdict on a balance of large accounts. 6 Taun. 452, is
clear also as to the Verdict being the amount of the debt.
Carter, J :
Looking at the circumstances and applying the Verdict to the
evidence, little. doubt can be entertained tnat the Verdict in this
case was for the two small items ; but even supposing it were other
wise—that the Verdict was upon the larger claim, the case in 2
Dowl. Pr. Ca. 58, and other cases, make it imperative to enter
the suggestion. I cannot draw a distinction between this and the
case I have mentioned.
Parker, J.:
I have looked at all the cases. There appears a perfect unani
mity in Westminster Hall upon the subject. The Verdict s the
general rule, not the exception. The Judge’s notes shew there
was doubtful evidence of the larger demands, and clear proof of the
small—and so His Honor charged the Jury. The Court must be
satisfied that the Jury found upon the large demaud and not on
the small, or the suggestion must be entered.
Rule made absolute.
The Solicitor General for Plaintiff.
Berton and Wilmot for Defendant.
FOULIS
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FOULIS v. KINOTAR AND ANOTHER.
Arbitrators are competent to determine matters of law.
The Court will not entertain an application to disturb an award if the ap
plicant be in laches.

Action of Assumpsit.—Referred by Rule of Court. Judgment to
be entered on award as on the Verdict of a Jury.
The award was made on the 8th July—the first day of Trinity
Term, 1834. In Michaelmas Term, Wright for Defendant, ob
tained a rule nisi to set aside the award upon two grounds:
1st. The award was not conclusive.
2d. The improper conduct of the Plaintiff’s Attorney.
Cause was shewn at this Term by N. Parker for Plaintiff, and
the Solicitor General was heard in reply.
Chipman, Chief Justice :
The first point depends upon the circumstance of the Arbitrators
having thrown out of their consideration two articles, a Cylinder
Bottom on the one side, and certain Boiler Plate on the other,
which they directed to be exchanged. JSTow if the.Arbitrators un
dertook to determine the Law upon this subject, it was competent
for them to do so, and the Court will not interfere ; but on this
point, even if there were grounds for the application, the Defend
ants are out of time. The award was made u.n the Sth July—the
Defendants were aware of it before the 11 th, and if they did not
know, had full opportunity to inform themselves of the grounds of
it; they suffered the Trinity Term to pass, and on the 22d day of
July gave notice of motion. The same rule as to time must pre
vail in this case, as in motions for new trials—the award being en
tered on the postea as the Verdict of a Jury.
As to the second point. It is stated there was misconduct on
the part of the Plaintiffs Attorney. To support that, it should be
clearly shewn that there was a breach of faith in entering up the
Judgment; but the paper to-support that contains no condition
precedent to, but is predicated upon the award. It expressly states
the award, and merely guarantees the return of one article when
the other shall be restored. There is not the slightest ground of
imputation against the Attorney.
Botsford, J.:
The award is final, so far as the Arbitratorshave considered the
accounts. It appears that the two articles they directed to be in
terchanged, they considered not matters of account, and as they
could determine Law as well as fact, the Court will not decide that
they have not done right; but at any rate the Defendants are
guilty of laches. On the 11 th July, they expressed that the award
would be paid with the costs, although they were dissatisfied. The
last
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last day of Trinity Term was the 19th; and not until the 22d, did
the Defendants intimate their intention to question the award. On
the 1st of August notice of taxation of costs was given, and
judgment was signed on the Sth August. The Defendants should
not have allowed the Term to pass.
As to the second point, no imputation can be cast upon the
Attorney ; he has acted correctly and with diligence.
Carter, J.:
The award is final. It awards <£11 10s. lOd. to be paid to the
Plaintiff, and the other articles are not considered.—As a matter
of law the arbitrators determined the two articles were not in
cluded in the reference, and did not consider them in making up
the amounts of the accounts ; but under the circumstances merely
directed an exchange.
The Attorney appears to have acted properly and honorably,
and the Defendants are clearly in laches.
Parker, J.:
Concurred. The action was for goods sold and delivered. The
arbitrators were to consider what goods were so ; they determined
that the two articles could not be so considered. Some discrepan
cies appeared in the affidavits, which however could be reconciled ;
but it was worthy of remark, that there were in this case two De
fendants, and two Attornies jointly acting for them—all of whom
acted in the matter of the reference, and yet the affidavit of only
one had been offered : the Court should have had affidavits from
all. As to the conduct of the Attorney—when the term improper
was applied, there should have been something to found it upon :
there was clearly nothing. The Defendants were in laches, in not
having moved in Trinity Term.
Rule discharged with costs.
N. Parker for Plaintiff.
The Solicitor General and Wright for Defendants.

HEANEY v. LYNN.
A record produced in evidence cannot be questioned at Nisi Prius.
After an acquittal, no copy of an indictment should be furnished without
the order of the Judge or the fiat of the Attorney General.

Action for a malicious prosecution for felony. Tried before
Botsford, J. at the Northumberland Circuit, in September last,
when the Plaintiff was nonsuited. The question arose upon
the production of the record of acquittal of the Plaintiff.

An order of the Judge, presiding at the Court of Oyer and Ter
miner, having been obtained, the Clerk of that Court was sworn as a
D
witness,
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witness, and produced the record, signed by himself, as the officer
of the Court. J. A. Street for Defendant, inquired from whence
he obtained the record, by whom was it made up, and had it been
compared with the indictment, &c. Berton for Plaintiff, objected
to any question being put, and to the admission of any parol evi
dence, to affect or impugn the record. The objection was over
ruled, and it was stated by the witness that the record was made
up by Mr. Harding, the Plaintiff’s Attorney, who filed it with
him, and that he had not examined its contents with the original
papers. Two objections were then taken :
1st. That even if the record were correct, an order of the Su
preme Court should be obtained for its production, without which
it could not be received in evidence.
2d. That it could not be considered a record of the proceedings
in the criminal prosecution.
Berton contra. As to first objection, cited Leggatt v. Tollervey,
14 East. 302, and urged that the record being properly authenti
cated could not be questioned.
The learned Judge supported the objection, and ordered a non
suit.
In Michaelmas Term, a rule nisi was obtained to set aside the
nonsuit and grant a new trial, upon the grounds taken at Nisi
Prius.
J. A. Street at this Term shewed cause.
Chipman, Chief Justice:
This is an action for a malicious prosecution for felony, in
which the Plaintiff was acquitted. A record was offered in evi
dence, produced by the Deputy Clerk, in whose custody it was. I
am of opinion, that the record, however improperly made up, could
not be questioned at the trial. The rule as to affording copies of
records in such cases was made by the twelve Judges, and is a
wholesome restraint upon actions which might tend to prevent the
prosecution of public offenders. The Clerk acted improperly in
authenticating a record made up by the Attorney for the purposes
of this action. It is upon his signature the record depends; and a
record produced from his custody, and with his signature, cannot
be questioned. A copy of the indictment should not have been
furnished except upon the order of the Judge, and 1 think the ap
plication for such an order should have been made in open Court—
nevertheless these matters cannot be looked into at Nisi Prius.
The case of Leggatt v. Tollervey is conclusive.
Botsford, J.:
There should be an application in Court, when the circumstances
are fresh in the mind of the Judge, for a copy of the indictment;
but I am now satisfied that the record should not have been refused.

Carter,
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Carter, J. :
However culpable the Clerk of the Court may have been in pro
ducing the record, it should have been received, and could not be
questioned when produced.
Parker, J.:
The same case as this came up in Leggatt v. Tollervey, and
clearly settles that the record cannot be refused. No copy of the
indictment should have been furnished without the order of the
Judge or the fiat of the Attorney General.
Berton and Harding for Plaintiff.
Street and Kerr for Defendant.

THE EXECUTORS OF GROSVENOR v. AGNEW.
If an executor declares on promises to himself, he is liable for costs.

Assumpsit. The declaration in this cause contained counts
on promises to testator, and also on promises to the executors,
and a count on an account stated with the Plaintiffs as executors.
The Plaintiffs were nonsuited. The Master having refused to
tax the Defendant’s costs—1st. Because as executors they were
not liable to pay costs, and 2d. Because he was a party Plaintiff.
■—Berton, at this Term, moved for a rule ni&i, to allow the Defend
ant her costs, and that the same should be taxed by one of the
Judges of the Court; and cited 2 Chit. Pl. 102, 110, and 9 Bar.
& Cres. 666, Dowbiggin JdiiixJU Harrison.—Robinson, for Plain
tiffs, shewed cause, and urged that the case cited in Bar & Cres.
was directly contrary to all the other cases.

Per Curiam.
This case is precisely the same as the one cited at the bar, and
as the latest decision, the Court must be bound by it.
Carter, J.:
Mentioned, that since the case of Dowbiggin f. Harrison, it was
very unusual in England to insert a count on an account stated
■with executors.
Rule absolute.
Robinson for Plaintiffs.
Berton for Defendant.
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Note.—In this Term there were present only His Honor the Chief Justice
and Mr. Justice Carter.

WILMOT v. CORNWELL AND BABINO.
Judgment against two Defendants; one applied for relief under insolvent
acts. The name of the other Defendant was not stated in the title of the
affidavit; the affidavit was received.
An applicant for relief under insolvent acts, must satisfactorily account
for all property he may appear to have possessed.

The Solicitor General, on a former day in this Term, applied on
hehalf of the Defendant Cornwell, a confined debtor in Westmor
land, for relief under the Act of Assembly, 1 W. 4, c. 43 ; the affi
davit of the Defendant stated his inability to support himself, and
that he had no property; it was entitled “ Wilmot v Cornwell.”
Berton contra, produced, affidavits of Plaintiff and others, wifi ch
contradicted the affidavit of the applicant in several particulars,
but did not shew him to be possessed of property or means of sup
port—shewing also that Babino was a co-Defendant, and con
tended—1st. That the applicant’s affidavits were improperly en
titled, Babino not being named a Defendant therein. 2d. That
the applicant’s statements being contradicted in several instances,
were unworthy of credit, and could not satisfy the Court.

Per Curiam.
We are of opinion that although the Acts of Assembly contem
plate the application being made in the suit, yet upon the whole, it
may be considered a distinct judicial proceeding—one which may
be taken not only in the Court wherein the suit is or has been pro
secuted, but before Justices of other Courts; and it would therefore
perhaps be giving the Acts too strict a construction to require
greater correctness in the titles of the affidavits or application. We
are less inclined to dismiss the application on the first ground of
objection, as the second is so material that it cannot be got over.
The law provides, that it must appear to the Court that the person
has no property or means of support. The Defendant’s affidavit
taken
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taken alone, is exceedingly loose ; no schedule of property is an
nexed, although one is spoken of in the affidavit—nor is the pro
perty mentioned therein sufficiently accounted for ; and the state
ments of the Defendant are so contradicted by the affidavits pro
duced on the other side, and so contaminated, that we can give no
credence to them, unsupported as they are by other testimony. It
is sufficient therefore to say that we are not satisfied, upon the
affidavits, that the party is entitled to relief; he must satisfactorily
account for all property he may appear to have possessed.
Application dismissed.
Berton for Plaintiff.
The Solicitor General for Defendant.
THE EXECUTORS OF ANDREWS v. CLARKE.
L Defendant charged in execution, discharged by one of several Plain
tiffs, cannot be arrested a second time at the instance of a co- Plaintiff.

S. G. Andrews, one of the PXintiffs, gave notice to Defendant
of an application for leave to issue a ca sa to arrest Defendant a
second time, on the ground that he had been discharged from arrest
under a former execution by fraud and collusion with DeVeber, a
co-executor and Plaintiff;—the notice was subscribed S. G. An
drews, acting executor.
Wilmot moved for rule nisi, which was obtained by consent of
Defendant’s Counsel—who stated his reason for such consent, that
the Defendant had been put to expense in preparing affidavits to
resist the application and shew the merits of the case, which ex
penses he could not recover, under the practice of the Court, unless
the rule should be granted; the cause was therefore entered in the
special paper of the Term.
On hearing a part of the affidavits in support of the rule, the
Court determined, that the Defendant having been discharged by
one Plaintiff, could not be again arrested at the instance of another.
They allowed the Defendant’s affidavits to be filed in answer to
those produced on the other side, and discharged the rule with
costs, to be paid by the applicant, S. G. Andrews.
Wilmot for Plaintiff.
Berton for Defendant.

LESLIE v. RAE.
A peremptory undertaking will not be discharged on account of the De
fendant having gone out of the jurisdiction.

Wilmot moved to discharge a peremptory undertaking to try at
this Term, and for leave to discontinue without costs, on an affidavil
which
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which stated that Defendant had been seen by deponent in the
United States, where he was employed in digging a cellar ; that
he told deponent he did not intend to return to this country; and
deponent believed at the time he went away from the Province
he was not worth much property.
Berton contra, contended that the affidavit was insufficient even
to enlarge the peremptory undertaking; the absence of the De
fendant was a circumstance of no importance, and no evidence of
insolvency had been offered.

Per Curiam.
The Plaintiff has shewn no cause to enlarge the peremptory un
dertaking ; the Defendant may have left property in the Province;
or if not, a judgment against him can follow him to the place of
his abode.
Rule absolute for judgment for Defendant.

ABBOTT v. LEDDEN.
A demand of security for costs was sent by post.

Held sufficient service.

Berton moved for security for costs on an affidavit shewing that
Plaintiff was out of the jurisdiction of the Court; and an affidavit
of Defendant’s Attorney, stating that he had put in the Post Office
at Newcastle, a letter addressed to the Plaintiff’s Attorney at
Saint John, containing a demand of security and notice of this
motion.
The Court doubted if posting a letter were a sufficient service of
notice on the opposite Attorney, in order to obtain a stay of pro
ceedings ; but afterwards on the authority of Aldred v. Hicks, 5
Taun. 186, granted rule nisi, with stay of proceedings.
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PETER FISHER v. BRYCE JEWETT AND JOSHUA
JEWETT.
When a Plaintiff has no right in point of Law to recover, a nonsuit will
be ordered, although the objection appear upon the Record.
A Negotiable Note is such a Contract as an Infant may in Law ratify
and confirm when lie arrives at full age, and thereby bind himself to perform.

Assumpsit on a Promissory Note, dated 22d January, 1825, for
£22, payable in June following ; drawn by Defendants in favor of
James Dingee, and by him indorsed to Plaintiff. Joshua Jewett
was not served with Process. Bryce Jewett pleaded—1st. Nonassumpsit, 2d. Infancy, 3d. Statute of Limitations. The Plaintiff
replied to second plea—That the Defendant before the commence
ment of this suit, to wit, on the 1st day of December, A. D. 1830,
attained the age of 21 years, and afterwards and before the com
mencement, &c., to wit, on the 1st day of July, A. D. 1831, under
took and promised, &c. ; and to the third plea—Assumpsit infra
sex annos :—Rejoinder to Replication to second plea—That De
fendant did not, after he attained the age of 21 years, undertake,
&c. The cause was tried before Chipman, Chief Justice, at Bar
in last Michaelmas Term. It was >roved on the part of the Plain
tiff, that in the winter of 1831—2, Defendant acknowledged that
he had drawn the Note, but stated that he was under age, and
therefore not legally liable to pay it, but he was satisfied his father
(the other Defendant) had the cattle, (in payment for which the
Note was given,) and he felt bound to pay it; that he would pay
the note as soon as the timber was down—perhaps by the 1 st day
of July, it might be a month or two later for part of it. It was
proved that he expressly and positively promised to pay the whole
in the course of the season.
A nonsuit was moved for by Wilmot for Defendant, on the
ground that an Infant can in no case be liable to the indorser of a
note; in support of which doctrine, 2 Esp. N. P. C. 628, Tlirupp v.
E
Fielder,
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Fielder, 5 Esp. 102, Harmer v. Killing, Chitty on Bills, 16, 17,
Trueman v. Hurst, 1 T. R. 40, 2 Barn. & Cres. 824, Thornton v.
Tllingworth, 4 D. & R. 545, and 8 East. 330, were cited.
Fisher contra, cited 4 Esp. N. P. C. 188, Roscoe’s Ev. 256,
246, 2 Saun. Pl. & Ev. 581.
The Chief Justice refused the nonsuit, but gave leave to move
the Court in Banc to enter a nonsuit. A verdict was thereupon
taken by consent for the face of the Note, £22, without interest,
subject to the opinion of the Court, on the motion and under the
pleadings in the cause.
A rule nisi having been obtained to set aside the Verdict and
enter a nonsuit, the cause was argued in Hilary, and stood over
for consideration until this Term.
Chipman, Chief Justice:
At the trial of this cause, a doubt was started—whether as the
question might have been raised upon the Record, it should be en
tertained on a motion for a nonsuit; but the practice is so clearly
settled, that when the Plaintiff has no right in point of Law to re
cover, a nonsuit will be ordered, although the objection appear
upon the Record, that I merely advert to this doubt for the pur
pose of disposing of it.—See 2 Tidd’s Prac. 267, (3d Ed.) 1
Camp. 256.
The grand question which this case presents is this—Whether a
negotiate Note made by an Infant, is such a contract as the In
fant may in Law ratify and confirm when he arrives at full age,
and thereby bind himself to perform; for the promise made in this
case at full age was distinct and express, and so found by the
Jury.
There is much vagueness and confusion in the Books in the use
of the terms void and voidable, as applied to the contracts of In
fants but the true character of such contracts may nevertheless
be ascertained with sufficient precision :—thus Per Curiam, in
Holt v. Ward, Strange 938, (1731) “The contract of an Infant
for necessaries will bind him as necessary to his preservation ; in
such case a single bill will bind him, though a bond with a penalty
shall not. WTien the contract may be for the benefit of the Infant,
or to his prejudice, the Law so far protects him as to give him an
opportunity to consider it when he comes of age, and it is void or
voidable at his election ; but though the Infant lias this privilege,
yet the party with whom he contracts has not—he is bound at all
events.” And
Per Lord Chief Justice Eyre, in Keane v. Boycott, 2 H. Bl.
Rep. 511, “ Some contracts of Infants even by deed shall bind
them. Some are merely void, viz. such as the Court can pro
nounce to be to their prejudice; others, and the most numerous
class.
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class, of a more uncertain nature as to benefit or prejudice, are
voidable only ; and it is in the election of the Infant to confirm
them or not.”
In Cookshot v. Bennett, 2 T. R. 766, it was said, per Ashhurst,
J. “ This is not like a security given by an Infant which is only
voidable, for that may be revived by a promise aftei lie comes of
age. In such case, he is bound in equity and in conscience to
discharge the debt, though the Law would not compel him to do
so; but he may waive the privilege of infancy, which the Law
gives him, for the purpose of securing him against the impositions
of designing persons; and if he choose to waive his privilege,
the subsequent promise will operate upon the preceding consi
deration.”
Lord Chief Justice Gibbs said, in Bruce v. Warwick, in error,
6 Taun. 118, “ The Court are all of opinion that the judgment of
B. R. is perfectly right. It has been urged that it is incumbent
on the Defendant in error to shew that an Infant can enter into a
trading contract; the general Law is, that the contract of an In
fant may be avoided or not, at his own option. We are of opinion,
that this is in the same case, as other contracts made by an Infant,
which he may either avoid or enforce at his pleasure.” And in
Bacon’s Abridgment, 354, it is laid down “ that the contract of
an Infant not absolutely void, but only voidable at his own elec
tion, is a doctrine now settled and established.”
The general rule then, without encumbering one’s self with the
terms void and voidable, clearly is, that it shall be in the election
of an Infant, when he arrives at full age, whether to affirm a con
tract made by him during his infancy or not.
If at full age he does affirm and ratify the contract, he is bound
by it.
In Southerton v. Whitlock, Strange 690, before Raymond, Ch.
J., it was held that if goods which are not necessaries, are delivered
to an Infant, who after full age rat’fies the contract, by a promise
to pay, he is bound ; and he left it to the Jury whether there was
any confirmation of the contract at full age.
In 2 Atk. 34, Lord Hardwick, Ch. J. said,—“ If an Infant
takes up goods before he comes of age, and gives a note for it
after he is of age, if there is no fraudr«it is good at Lawand
by the same, in Smith v. Trench, ibid 245,—“ If an Infant who
contracts a debt during his minority, shews his consent to it by
confirming it after he comes of age, it shall effectually bind him,
though it was voidable at his election.”
There a^e many other authorities to the same effect, and as a
general rule, it is unquestionable, that a promise made by an In
fant after he comes of age, will bind him to the performance of a
contract, made by him, during his minority.
To
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To these general rules there are nevertheless some exceptions:
Thus it is held that an Infant cannot bind himself even for neces
saries by an obligation with a penalty, and that he cannot bind
himself for payment of interest, and an obligation under a penalty
and a contract for payment ot interest are held to be, on the face
of them, so clearly prejudicial to an Infant, that they cannot be
set up by a promise at full age.
In Co. Lit. 172, the distinction is taken that an Infant may
bind himself to pay for his necessary meat, drink, apparel, neces
sary physic, and such other necessaries, and likewise for his good
teaching and instruction whereby he may profit himself afterwards ;
but if he bind himself in an obligation, or other writing with a
penalty for the payment of any of them, that obligation shall not
bind him.
Fisher v. Mowbray, 6 East. 330, was an action of Debt on Bend,
plea Infancy. Replication Setting forth condition of Bond, inter
alia, for payment of interest. Demurrer and Joinder. Lord Ellenborough, Ch. J. said—“This goes beyond all the other autho
rities m charging the Infant with interest, and this objection goes
not only to the quantum of damages, but to avoid the whole secu
rity ; for the judgment must be for the sum due on the Bond, and
part of that sum is due for interest, for which an Infant cannot
give security.”
In Baylis v. Dineley, 3 M. & S. 477, Lord Ellenborough said—
“ It is clear upon the face of the instrument, that it is to the pre
judice of the Infant, for it is an obligation with a penalty and for
the payment of interest.”
But I do not find any decided case, or even any dictum, that an
instrument, merely because it is by the commercial law negotiable,
is on the face oi it so prejudicial to an Infant, as not to admit of
confirmation when he comes of age ; and if such had been the
Law, it is most extraordinary, that in the universal prevalence of
such ii istruments in modern times, there should not have been an
adjudged case to this effect; the authority of the most approved
writers on the Law of Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes is
directly in favor of such contracts, falling within the general rule
and adinitting of such confirmation.
The drawing, indorsing or accepting Bills by an Infant, is voida
ble only, not void ; and if he ratify the act after he comes of age,
it will bind him. Bayley on Bills, (Sth Ed.) 45, citing Gibbs v.
Merill, 3 Taun. 307, and in Chitty on Bills, (8th Ed.) 23—“ As
the contract of an Infant is only voidable, and not absolutely void,
he may, by a promise to pay the Bill made after he attains full
age, and before action, (2 B. & C 824,) render it as operative
against him, as if he had been of age at the time it was made.”
(Taylor P. Croker, 4 Esp. R. 187.)
The
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The dicta of Text writers such as those which 1 have quoted,
are at the least, good evidence of what are the received rules of
Law on the subject of which we are treating.
In Taylor v Croker, Lord Ellenborough applied the general
rule of Infants confirming contracts, after they became of age, to
a Bill of Exchange.
And in another late case, to which I shall presently more parti
cularly advert, (2 B. & C. 824,) although the Judges in terms
considered all contracts made by Infants for purposes of trade as
absolutely void, and not merely voidable, yet they recognized the
doctrine of the Infant when at full age, binding himself to the per
formance of such contracts.
I am therefore of opinion, that a negotiable instrument made by
an Infant, is not by Law distinguished from other contracts, which
may be confirmed by him after he arrives at full age, and be there
by rendered binding upon him ; and this being a contract not
made under seal, a verbal confirmation is of as high authority in
the contemplation of the Law as a confirmation in writing, in cases
where a written promise is not expressly required by Statute ;
and by a late Statute in England, (9 G. 4, c. 14, s. 5,) indeed,
confirmations after full age, of promises made by Infants, must be
in writing.
Having come to this conclusion on the general question, I will
only add with regard to the particular circumstances of the present
case, that I have not found in the English books any authority for
holding, that a contract of suretyship is distinguishable from the
general run of contracts made by an Infant, and is incapable of
being confirmed at full age. The general rule is, and I think it
just and reasonable, that the contracts of Infants should be deemed
capable of being confirmed when they arrive at full age ; and I
should not be disposed to limit the operation of this rule beyond
what decided cases of binding authority oblige me to do.
It was argued by the learned Counsel for the Defendant, that
the legal effect of the Note was to bear interest from the time
when it became payable, and therefore according to Fisher v.
Mowbray, 8 E. 330, it was utterly void against the Infant De
fendant, and would not be made valid by a promise at full age ;
but there is a clear distinction between cases, where there is an
express undertaking to pay interest on the face of a written instru
ment, and where it is only allowed by the usage of trade, as in the
present instance. In the latter, it constitutes no part of the debt
or contract, but is in the nature of damages which a Jury may al
low or not, according to the circumstances of the case. Interest
cannot be added to the principal sum due on a Bill of Exchange,
so as to constitute a good petitioning Creditor’s debt, unless inter
est be specially made payable on the face of the Bill: 2 B. & A.
305,
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305, Cameron v. Smith, and in 10 Bing 257, it is said, “ A Plain
tiff cannot arrest for interest, unless reserved by the Bill.”
In the present case, therefore, as there is not an express under
taking on the face of the Note to pay interest, it does not fall with
in the range of the case of Fisher v. Mowbray, or Baylis v. Dineley, which I have referred tq, and it is to be remembered that at
the trial, the learned Counsel for the Plaintiff very discreetly
waived all claim to interest, and took his verdict for the principal
only.
There is still another point, on which, from the impression of the
Judges, in Mountain v. Illingworth, 2 B. & C. 824, I at first en
tertained some doubt, viz. whether the distinction should not have
been founded on the special promise after the Defendant became
of age. In that case, Bailey, J. said,—“ In the case of an Infant,
a contract made for goods for the purposes of trade is absolutely
void, and not voidable only ; the law considers it against good po
licy that he should be allowed to bind himself by such contracts. If
he make a promise after he come of age, that binds him on the
ground of his taking upon himself a new liability, upon a moral
consideration existing before ; it does not make it a legal debt from
the time of making the bargain.” And per Holroyd, J.—“ The
new promise is the sole ground of action, and not the renewal of
the old one.” And per Littledale, J.—“ The contract of an In
fant under such circumstances as the present, being void and not
voidable, the promise in this case did not prove that any legal
cause of action existed at the time when the action was com
menced ; but infancy is a personal privilege, which the Infant may
or may not set up, in answer to an action brought upon a contract
made during his infancy. The constant course and settled rule
therefore seems to be, to declare on the original contract, and if
the Defendant pleads infancy, to state the promise made at full age
in the replication; or if the Defendant gives infancy in evidence
under the general issue, to give the subsequent promise in evidence ;
and I again see no ground for a distinction in this respect, between
negotiable instruments, and other parol contracts.” The only
point decided in Mounten v. Illingworth, was, that the confirma
tory promise after full age, must be made before the commence
ment of the action.
Upon the whole, I am of opinion that the rule for entering a
nonsuit must be discharged.
Botsford, J. :
I concur in opinion with his Honor the Chief Justice.
The question, whether the contract of an Infant is void or only
voidable, must depend upon the nature and circumstances of the
case, and in many instances must remain in doubt and uncertainty,
until
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until the Court shall have decided whether it he one of benefit or
prejudice to his interest—a rule so variable may in some measure
account for the conflicting decisions in the books, and may have
led to that general position, that the deeds of Infants are not void,
but only voidable, and will admit of subsequent confirmation by
them. Lord Hardwicke- held in Harvey v. Ashby, 3 Atk. 607,
that where an agreement appears upon the face of it to be preju
dicial to an Infant, it is void ; but if for his advantage, then voida
ble only. In Zooch v. Parsons, Lord Raymond’s Rep. 818, the
semblance of benefit to the Infant was made the ground of Lord
Mansfield’s decision, by which the surrender of a Mortgage by an
Infant was Held to be voidable only, contrary to the opinion of the
Court in Thomson «>. Leach, 3 Mod. 300, which made the surren
der of an Infant by deed absolutely void. It was this rule by
which the case of Keans v. Boycot, 2 II. Bl. 511, and Warwick v.
Bruce, 2 M. and Sei. 205, were decided.
In looking to the facts and circumstances of the case now before
the Court, and supposing the contract to be one rather of prejudice
than benefit to the Infant, I had great doubt whether the present
action could be sustained, but these doubts have been removed by
the case of Bishop v. Chamber, in 3 Car and Payne 55, which I
consider much in point. The Law seems settled that Courts will
support actions against Infants, if they confirm their contracts after
they come of age, (except in the few cases of contracts with pe
nalties, for interest, &c.) as already mentioned.
I have considered all the cases with attention, and am of opinion
that the rule should be discharged.
Carter, J.:
I am also of opinion that the rule for a nonsuit in this case should
be discharged.
I shall not take up time unnecessarily, by reviewing all the cases
on this point, after they have been so carefully gone through by
his Honor the Chief Justice. The general rule which I deduce
from them, is this—that if a person after attaining full age confirm
a contract entered into during infancy, such confirmation being
express and voluntary, and with a full knowledge of the privilege
that the Law allows him of avoiding his former contract, such con
firmation is one which may be enforced by Law. This rule seems
to me so consistent with the principles of reason and justice, that
I should not b< inclined to narrow its limits more than decided ca
ses compel me to do. Much difficulty has arisen on this point,
from the use of the terms absolutely void, and voidable, as terms
of classification for the contracts of Infants. Now it would seem
quite clear, that a contract which could be pronounced absolutely
void, in the full extent of the meaning of those words, could not be
confirmed by any subsequent acknowledgment or promise, and
would
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would be one of which the Ii fant himself could not take advan
tage, as stated by Mr. J. Best, in Goode v. Harrison, 5 B. & A.
147. It would therefore seem reasonable, that the Court should
only pronounce the contract of an Infant absolutely void, where
they can pronounce from the terms of the contract itself, that it
must be prejudicial to the Infant; and that where they cannot,
from the terms of the contract itself, pronounce whether it is ad
vantageous or prejudicial to him, they will leave it to his own
election, after he attains full age, to decide whether he will avail
himself of the privilege the Law allows him, and avoid liis contract
or not. Consistently with this view of the case, I find the only
cases in which it has been decided, that the contract of an Infant
cannot be confirmed by a subsequent promise after full age, in the
cases of an obligation with a penalty, and for the payment of in
terest : Baylis v. Dineley, 3 M. & S. 477, and Fisher v. Mow
bray, 8 East. 330. There the Court distinctly held that the obli
gation was void, because on the face of the instrument itself, it
was clearly to the prejudice of the Infant.
To apply these rules to the present case—This Note is not for
the payment of interest; and can the Court, by looking at the
Note, say that its effect must be to the prejudice of the Infant ?
I think certainly not. We find then, that after he attains full age,
being aware that he was not legally liable on account of his having
been under age when he drew the Note, he voluntarily and ex
pressly promises to pay it. Under these circumstances, it occurs
to me that he is in law bound by that promise, and that therefore
this rule must be discharged.
Parker, J.:
I am free to confess, that during the tr.al and subsequent argu
ment, and until I had carefully examined the various cases on the
subject of Infants’ contracts, the inclination of my mind was in
favor of the Defendant; yet I am now happy to say* on full con
sideration, my opinion is in accordance with that of the Chief
Justice and the rest of the Court.
It is singular, that among the variety of cares, commencing with
the earlier Reporters, and extending down to the present time, none
are to be found in which the point in question has come up for ex
press decision in Westminster Hall, although one would suppose it
must have frequently occurred in the ordinary business of rife.
Upon more than one occasion, however, it has been adverted to,
and I shall cite some authorities, in which the Courts of England
have treated contracts like the present, if not strictly speaking
capable of ratification, yet as affording a sufficient consideration to
render valid a subsequent promise made for their performance.
The contracts of Infants nave been divided into three classes,
viz. good, void and voidable. The first, such as bind the Infant
from

in the

Sixth Year of WILLIAM IV.

43

from the time of the making, requiring no affirmance or acknow
ledgment, and admitting of no avoidance at full age, extend not
beyond necessaries, unless indeed the general principle laid down
by Lord Mansfield be adopted—that if an agreement be clearly
for the benefit of the Infant at the time, 11 shall bind him. Much
discussion Jias taken place as to the binding nature of a marriage
settlement by an Infant, with the consent of parents and guardians,
in which a good deal of general learning as to the acts of Infants
may be found. 3 Atk. 610, 2 Eden. 72, 1 Bro. C. C. 105, 18
Ves. 275, 5 P>. P. C. 570, 2 T. R. 159.
In the second class, viz. such as have no operation, being wholly
incapable of confirmation by any promise at full age, the Court
ha ve placed bonds made with penalties, for which a double reason
is given, that Infants are not bound by forfeitures, and cannot be
made chargeable with interest; Cro. Eliz. 700 & 920, 8 East. 330,
3 M. & S. 477, Co. Litt. 172 a. 10 Bing. 257; and the rule would
appear by the reasons given in these cases, to comprehend all con
tracts, to the non-fulfilment of which penalties aie annexed, or by
which interest is expressly secured, though before it is extended so
far, a further consideration would be highly desirable.
Warrants of Attorney made by Infants have also been consi
dered void, and set aside by the Court. W. Bl. 1133, I H.
Bl. 75.
In two old cases, in Cro. Car. 502, and 3 Mod. 301, a rent
charge and a surrender of lease made by Infants, were held void ;
but from more recent decisions, it would seem that such were ca
pable of ratification. Hudson v. Jones, 3 Mod. 301, and Zooch v.
Parsons, 3 Burr. 1794, and the cases there cited.
All contracts of Infants other than those above enumerated, 11 ave
either by express decisions been included in the third class of
voidable, or remain to have their department assigned to them as
they may seem to fall, either in this or the preceding division. I
speak of voidable contracts under one head, although some, of the
nature of the present, might with more propriety be termed af
firmable, as not requiring any act to repudiate them, but needing
an express confirmation and promise at full age to render them
obligatory. There is manifestly a great want of precision in the
language of some of the learned Judges, as their opinions are re
ported ; the distinction between void and voidable is often not ad
verted to ; many contracts are spoken of as void, not because they
were incapable of, but because they bad not received, an express
confirmation. 1 Vern. 132, 2 M. & S. 205, and the same case in
error, 6 Taun. 118. The language of Bayley, J. in 2 B. & C.
821, already adverted to by the Chief Justice, is remarkable, and
that of Mr. J. Littledale is to the same effect.
After the full review which the different cases have already unF dergone,
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dergone, I will not take up time by again going over them. I
come to the same conclusion as his Honor, that in whatever way
the Courts may have expressed their meaning at different times,
the general rule deducible from all cases is broadly this—that the
contract of an Infant is not absolutely void, but voidable or af
firmable at his election; the few instances of valid and absolutely
void contracts being exceptions: 4 Bae. Abr. 354, Str. 938 &
690, Fitzg. 175 & 275, 2 Atk. 34 & 243.
The reasons urged by the learned Counsel for the Defendant
for making the present case an exception to the above rule, are :
1st. That the contract on which the action is brought is a ne
gotiable instrument, and consequently liable to be enforced by a
person not one of the original parties.
2d. That it is necessarily a contract for payment of interest.
These objections are on the face of the instrument.
3d. That the Defendant did not himself receive value for the
Note, but signed it as a surety for his father, the other promiser
and a co-dependant.
'lliis objection is to be gathered from the evidence. As to the
first objection, no decision, or even express dictum has been cited at
the bar nor have I been able to find any; nor indeed is it laid down
in any of the text writers, that the Bill or Note of an Infant must
be considered void, on account of its negotiability. It is not es
sential to a promissory note that it should possess this quality, nor
does that make it necessarily prejudicial to an Infant. It might
indeed be a good ground for the Defendant’s availing himself of
hi legal right, but I can see no good reason for saying he shall
not have the option to affirm it if he please, when he comes of age.
When the subject has incidentally come beforp the Courts, no such
distinction as this has been drawn, and in some of the cases to
which I shall refer as recognizing the Defendant’s liability, the
secuiities appear to have been negotiable.
The expressions of Mr. Justice Asliurst in Cockshott v. Bennett,
2 T. R. 766, and of Lord Ellenborough in Taylor v. Croker, 4
Esp'. 187, have already been noticed.
In Holmes v. Blogg, as reported in 1 B. Moore 468, Copley
seij., in arguing on the effect of Infants’ contracts, contrasting
such as require some act to disaffirm, with those which must be
expressly affirmed, considers engagements such as Bills of Ex
change and Promissory Notes, which expose the Infant to losses,
capable of confirmation, by some positive act at full age. In
Bishop v. Chambers, 3 C. & P. 55, which was an action on a negotia.b e note, and the pleadings were precisely the same as In the
present case, evidence having been given of an acknowledgment
by the Defendant and a promise of payment, some objection arose
to the Plaintiff’s recovery by reason of an alteration appearing on
tne
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the face of the Note ; and Denman, of Counsel for the Plaintiff,
was desirous that the whole,case should be left to the Jury ; Lord
Tenterden, C. J. says—“ I will ask the Jury whether they think
the word may is in the same handwriting as the rest of the note ;
but the effect of the Defendant’s admission as answering the plea
of infancy, and the plea of the Statute of Limitation is for the
Court and not for the Jury.” A verdict was found for the De
fendant on account of the alteration ; but so far from the promise
being considered inoperative, by reason of the nature of the secu
rity, no objection was made on that ground, and a rule nisi for a
new trial was granted on the question whether the admission of
the Defendant was.not sufficient to entitle the Plaintiff to recover
on the account stated.
In Jeremy’s analyt. Dig. 1834, p. 100, the case of Hunt v.
Massey is abstracted from 3 Nev. and Man. 109, as follows—
“ Where after attaining full age, the party directed a third person
to pay the amount of a Bill accepted during infancy, from funds in
his hands, held that it was not necessary to declare specially, and
that the letter; would be presumed to have been written on the
day of its date.”
The full report has not yet reached this country, but so far as
we can judge from this short abstract, the affirmability of such a
contract was not questioned.
The best test-writers on Bills of Exchange and Promissory
Nates, viz. Mr. Justice Bayley and Mr. Chitty, speak distinctly
of such contracts, though made during infancy, becoming available
by virtue of an express promise to pay. A very late author, Mr.
Byles, in his Treatise on Bills, though he speaks of Infants’ ac
ceptances and contracts made in the course of trade, as absolutely
void, yet says, “ the moral obligation to fulfil them w’ill support
an express promise to pay, after he is of full age and before action
brought.”
There are cases also to shew that the promise, in order to be
binding, must be voluntary, and with full knowledge of legal rights.
The promise in the present case fully satisfies these requisitions,
and I do not think the Defendant can now avai1 himself of the ob
jection to the nature of the security, to avoid the promise he has
so deliberately made.
The case of Cameron & al v. Smith, 2 B. & A. 305, is a suffi
cient answer to the second objection.—The note here is certainly
made payable at a fixed day, which arrived before the Infant at
tained his majority, but no interest is expressed, and though in
practice it has been customary to allow interest as a matter of
course, after the day of payment, yet it appears clear that such is
not necessarily payable on an instrument in that form, but allowed
by the Jury only in the value of damages.—They are not bound
to give it in every case, and. in the present none has been allowed.
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As to the last objection, which does not appear on the face of
the contract, but arises out of extrinsic evidence,—It has befen ar
gued, that although contracts of an uncertain nature as to benefit
or injury may be affirmed, yet that the contract in the present
case was entered into under circumstances which made it neces
sarily prejudicial, and the Court seeing this, are bound to declare
it wholly void.
By all the authorities, it appears that this is a question for the
Court, and not for the Jury, and it may well be doubted whether
the rule is not confined to those cases in which the objection ap
pears on the face of the instrument.
In Bacon’s Abridg. vol. 4, p. 360, the rule is thus laid down,—
“ That for the better security and protection of Infants, the Law
has made some of their contracts absolutely void, i. e. all such in
which there is no apparent benefit or semblance of benefit to the
Infant —but it is evident from the subsequent passage in the
same Book, in which the question whether the lease of an Infant
not reserving rent be wholly void or not, is discussed, that no ju
dicial determinations had gone to the full extent of the above rule ;
and many sound reasons are given for holding it even for the In
fant’s benefit, that he should be allowed when he comes of age,
and is capable of considering over again what he has done, either
to ratify and affirm his contracts, or to break through and avoid
them ; this power being a sufficient protection to him against
imposition, and the full exercise of it being essential to his freedom
of judging for himself.
From the language of Lord Raymond in the well known case
of Holt v. Ward, Strange 969, cited and relied on by Mr. J. Dam
pier, in 2 M. & S. 210, the Infant has equally the power of af
firming the contract, whether it turn out to his prejudice or to his
benefit;—and from the manner in which Lord Ellenborough ex
presses himself in the case of Baylis v. Dineley, 3 “Ml & S. 431, it
would appear that he considered the face of the instrument as that
which was to govern the Court; and it is to be remembered, in
using these qualified terms, he refers to the words of Eyre, C. J.
in Keans v. Boycot, 2 H. Bl. 515, which would admit of a broader
construction.
The language of Best, J. as just cited by Mr. Justice Carter, is
similar to that of Lord Ellenborough, and I think affords the safest
ride for us to go by.
Taking the whole matter into consideration, I am not disposed
to carry the doctrine of void contracts more beyond the decided
cases than it has been extended by this rule in its qualified terms,
and there being nothing more in the present instrument than the
ordinary words of a promissory note, I think we may, without
touching on any of the standing cases, or violating any principle
necessarily deducible therefrom, treat it as the security of the De
fendant,
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fendant, which he might by his promise at full age, render himself
liable to pay; and in this view of the case I do not feel bound to
say what ought to be our decision, had it appeared on the face of
the Note, that the Infant Defendant merely signed it as security ;
or whether considering the relative situation of the two Defendants,
and the nature of the consideration, the transaction was attended
with no benefit or semblance of benefit to the Infant.
It was clearly a Note for a fair and valuable consideration ; the
affiri lance of it at full age was voluntary and deliberate—it recog
nized the consideration ; it was made with a full knowledge of le
gal rights, and contained a positive promise of payment, by which
I think the Defendant must be bound, and that the rule for en
tering a nonsuit should be discharged.
Fisher for Plaintiff.
Wilmot for Defendant.

THE QUEBEC AND HALIFAX STEAM NAVIGATION
COMPANY v. CUNARD & ALLEN.
A new trial will be granted where the verdict is not warranted by the
evidence, or if irrelevant testimony were admitted at the trial, on which the
jury may have founded their verdict.
A right to retain for agency and commission is exercisable only on the
specific monies received for which the charge is made.

This was an action of Assumpsit for money had and received.
Plea General Issue,—Tried before Botsford, J. at the Northum
berland Circuital 1834. Verdict for Defendants.
In appeared in evidence that the Defendants were appointed
Agents at Miramichi, by the subscribers to the above-named Com
pany resident there, previous to the incorporation of the Company,
to collect, receive and remit the amounts of the several shares to
Quebec, where the same were required to be paid ; the number of
shares at Miramichi was at first 97, whereof 6 were abandoned ;
of the remaining 91, some paid the first instalment to the Defend
ants, others remitted the money to Quebec, and some jointly gave
Defendants Bills on Quebec for the aggregate amounts due from
them ; part of the subsequent instalments were paid in like man
ner ; the Defendants took promissory notes from several, expressed
payable to them, “ Agents for the Quebec and Halifax Steam Boat
Company,” at specified periods, “ with such sum in addition as
might be necessary to make good the remittance to Quebec
some of these were paid, others remained unpaid, and were handed
over subsequently to Plaintiff’s solicitor.
When the Company commenced business, the Defendants were
their Agents at Miramichi, and settled the disbursements there of
the Company’s steam vessel, for which services they charged com
mission,
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mission, and rendered accounts stating the same at each voyage.
A settlement between Plaintiff’s agent from Quebec and the De
fendants, was made on the 15th October, 1833, at which time the
Defendants rendered an account current, in which was the fol
lowing item :
“ Agency and compensation for trouble in attending to the bu
siness of the Association on 91 shares, at <£25 each, £2,275, at 5
percent—£113 15s.”
The account was settled except this item, which was reserved
for future consideration, and this action was brought to recover the
amount so retained.
At the trial, evidence was admitted of the Defendants’ services
as the general Agents of the Company, and the Defendants claim
ed to retain the amount as a compensation for their services gene
rally rendered to Plaintiffs. Ilis Honor left it to the Jury to con
sider if the Defendants were the agents of Plaintiffs, but did not
distinguish between their capacities as agents for the Plaintiffs and
agents for shareholders.
In Michaelmas Term, a rule mst was obtained, to set aside the
Verdict and grant a new trial on the following grounds :
1st. The admission of improper evidence on the part of De
fendants.
2d. The misdirection of his Honor the Judge.
3d. That the verdict was against evidence.
The points were argued in Hilary Term, and stood over for the
opinion of the Court until this Term.
Chipman, Chief Justice:
The question in dispute between the parties in this cause turned
upon the right of the Defendants to retain the sum of £113 15s.,
mentioned in the account stated by them on 15tli October, 1833.
The shares mentioned in this charge, it appears from other evi
dence, were the shares in the capital stock of the Quebec and Ha
lifax Steam Navigation Company, (the Plaintiff in the cause,)
that had been subscribed by persons at Miramichi, which shares
so subscribed, amounted to the number of 91.
An obvious remark upon this charge, upon the first reading of
it in the manner in which it is framed, is that there seems to be
neither justice nor propriety in making the compensation for trou
ble in attending to the business, that is, the general business of the
Association after it was formed, to be rated by a per centage on a
certain number of shares which contributed to form it; especially
as it appeared from other accounts which were given in evidence,
that the Defendants uniformly charged, and were allowed a com
mission on all their receipts and disbursements in attending to the
business of the Association, [after its business commenced,] at Mi
ramichi. These commissions, thus charged and allowed, must be
considered
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considered as the compen&Mon for attending to the business of the
Association after it went into operation.
There can' be no propriety in charging1 a per centage on the
specific charges subscribed at Miramidhi, unless it be for agency
in collecting the amount of those shares; and remitting the same
to Quebec. And lierJ arises the question, whose agents were the
Defendants in performing this service ? Their appointment as
agents took place at a meeting of the subscribers at Miramiclii on
the 12tli October, 1830, more than five months before the act of
incorporation of the Company, and they were at that meeting
elected by such subscribers by ballot.
Their duty under this appointment appears in the minute of a
previous meeting of these subscribers on the 8th October’, which
declares the object of the meeting which was to be held on the
12th, to be “ that of appointing an Agent to the shareholders in
“ Miramiclii, whose business it shall be to receive the instalments
“ now due, and to take notes in his own name for the balancer,
“ and to transmit the sum when collected, to the Treasurer at
“ Quebec, pursuant to the resolution of the Quebed'Committee.”
It appears from the evidence of W. Stevenson,1 that the resolutions
of the Quebec Committee required “ £25 net per share free of all
deductions to be paid in Quebec.” ■
■ At the above mentioned meeting on the 12tli October, it was
resolved- “that the Miramiclii shareholders should not be liable
“ for any more than the sum of £25 for each share subscribed,
“ except any loss or exchange in remitting to f&iebec.”
The Notes given by the Miramiclii subscribers for their respec
tive balances were in the following terms,—“ being balance due
by me for — shares in the Quebec and Halifax Steam Boat Com
pany, with such sum in addition as may be necessary to make
good the remittance to Quebec.”
All these things shew incontestibly that it was the understand
ing and stipulation of the Miramiclii subscribers, before the incor
poration of the Company, that £25 per share, without any deduc
tion, was to be paid into the hands of the Treasurer at Quebec.
The act of incorporation passed on the 21st March, 1831, speaks
the same language, for sec. 2 provides, that the shares shall be
£25 each, to be paid “ into the hands of the Treasurer of the said
Companyindeed it is evident that any deduction from the
amount of the shares paid at Quebec would have been pro tanto a
diminution of the- capital stock of the Company, which it is ob
vious was inadmissible^
It is clear I think, tliat it was considered at the time the agents
were appointed, that the collecting the amount of the shares at
Miramiclii, and remitting the same to Quebec, should be a gra
tuitous service on their part, so far as they should be called upon
to
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to perform it, for in many instances the subscribers made tlieir
own remittances to Quebec. Nothing appears upon the proceed
ings of the meeting of the Miramichi subscribers with regard to
compensation for the service. Johnson, in his testimony states,
that nothing was said about commission at the time—that he^was
a candidate for the appointment of agent—that he expected if ap
pointed agp^t for the Miramichi subscribers, he should be appoint
ed general agent for the Company at Miramichi, which was his
sole object m seeking the former appointment.
The conduct of the Defendants themselves shews clearly that
they did not consider themselves entitled to any compensation for
this service of collecting and remitting the shares, at least from the
Company : In several of their letters they enclose remittances for
shares to Quebec, and say nothing about commissions ; these re
mittances were madp before the act of incorporation : In June,
1831, they state an account with the Company after its incorpo
ration, and give credit for amount received on shares, and charge
a remittance for the full sum without making any charge or de
duction for commission : In subsequent accounts they charge com
mission on receipts of freight, &c., and their disbursements, for the
Company, and still make no charge of commission on the shares ;
and it is not until their last account of 15th October, 1833, after a
lapse of nearly three years, that they bring forward this claim, and
it does appear to me that they are not upon any principle entitled
to it.
It remains to apply this view of the case to the proceedings at
the trial. It appears to me that these proceedings were much
complicated and perplexed, and that the attention of the learned
Judge was for the greater part of the time kept away from the
true merits of the case by the Defendants withholding, till a very
late period of the trial, the production of the account of tlij 15th
October, 1831. I think that all the evidence which was given as
to the trouble which the Defendants were put to in attending to
the general business of the Company, was entirely irrelevant to
their claim for a commission on the amount of shares, as developed
in the account of 15th October, 1833, and was therefore inad
missible.
Moreover, the point that the Defendants were (in the business of
collecting and remitting the shares) to be viewed entirely in their
original character as agents of the Miramichi shareholders only,
and therefore were not entitled to make any charge for this service
against the Company, was not put by the learned Judge to the
Jury so distinctly, as upon full consideration I think the case
required.
On these grounds, I am of opinion, that the rule for a new trial
should be made absolute.

Carter,
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Carter, J.:
This was an action for money had and received by the Defend
ants to the use of the Plaintiffs, and the defence set up by the De
fendants was that they were entitled to retain £113 15s., the sum
in question, as commission, at the rate of 5 per cent, on the whole
amount of 91 shares of £25 each, which they were employed by
the Company as their agents to collect. To establish this defence
it would be necessary to shew two things : 1st, that these Defend
ants were the agents of the Company for this purpose , and as such
agents, were entitled to a commission of 5 per cent, on the amount
of shares received ; and 2dly, that this money claimed to be re
tained by the Defendants was part of the money received by them
as such agents on account of the 91 shares.
If there has been any difficulty in considering this case, it seems
to me to have arisen mainly, if not entirely, from confusing the
characters of the Defendants in the collection of the shares where
tb°ir agency was confined to the 91 shares, and that in which they
afterwards acted, when they attended generally to the concerns of
the Company, by superintending all business connected with the
Company and the Boat at Miramichi. From the evidence, it
seems to me quite clear, that at the time when the agency of the
Defendants was confined to the 91 shares, they were not the agents
of the Plaintiffs. It is quite clear they were not originally appoint
ed to act in that capacity by the Plaintiffs, and every thing which
was proved respecting what took place at that time is perfectly
consistent with the fact of their acting as agents for the holders of
the 91 shares, while the regulations of the Company, that the
whole and complete amount of every share was to be remitted ar.d
made good at Quebec, is wholly inconsistent with the fact of their
having appointed agents at Miramichi, who were to have a right
to retain a certain proportion of each share. The fact too of the
Defendants having rendered accounts in which commission is
charged on disbursements made by them, and. no commission is
mentioned on the amount of shares received, shews very strongly
that the Defendants themselves did not consider themselves
entitled to such commission, but that this claim was an after
thought
With respect to the second point I have mentioned, it is quite
clear on the evidence, that supposing it had been established be
yond doubt that the Defendants were the agents of the Company
for the collection of these 91 shares, and were as such entitled to 5
per cent, commission on the amount of these shares, that the
amount of £113 15s., for which the verdict now stands, is far be
yond the sum which was proved to be in their hands on account of
the 91 shares, and which alone they could in such case be entitled
to retain.
G
From
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From the confused and complicated manner in which the evi
dence m this Case, most of it being wholly irrelevant, seems to
have been produced, I think the attention of the learned Judge
who tried this cause, in his direction to the jury, was not confined
to the distinct and clear points on which the case turned, and
therefore I am of opinion that the ride for a new trial should be
made absolute.
Parker, J.:
I am quite of the same opinion ; this “case might indeed be de
cided on a very narrow ground, for supposing the Defendants to
have been entitled to remuneration for their service's from the
Plaintiffs, they should have resorted to a set off, and not relied on
a mere right to retain the balance in their hands.
There is no doubt that a right to reduce a Plaintiff’s demand,
or wholly to defeat it on account of some matter connected there
with, may in some cases be supported, and is distinct from a cross
claim which is the subject matter of a set off or action ; the right
to retain for agency and commission is, I think, properly exercisa
ble only on the specific monies received on the shares for which
the charge is made, and could not be made on the general balance
of accounts without some particular usage of trade or distinct agree
ment, neither of which existed in the present case. Remuneration
for other services in the general business of the Company, has cer
tainly no necessary connection with one part of the stock more
than another, and ought not to have been blended with the charge
of agency on the Miramiclii shares.
It may however be more satisfactory to decide the case dn the
broader ground which the parties themselves have taken at the
trial and argument: and this depends on the question, whether or
no there was evidence to support the charge of per centage for
agency and compensation for trouble in attending to the business
of the association on 91 shares, in whole dr in part; and on a care
ful consideration of all the facts, the time,‘‘nature and purpose of
the Defendant’s original appointment; the1 Effect which sirch a
charge would have in reducing the capital stock ; the absence of
any evidence from which it could be inferred that such was ever
contemplated or sanctioned by the Company, or indeed that such
was intended by the Defendants until the unfortunate progress and
termination of the adventure made the Company’s business less
profitable than had been anticipated ; I think the Jury were not
warranted in the verdict they have found ; but that the Plaintiffs
were entitled to recover the sum of £113 15s., which the Defend
ants had received on their account, and that consequently the rule
for a new trial must be made absolute.
BOTSFORD, J. concurred.

J. A. Street, Kerr, and Berton, for Plaintiffs.
A. K. S. Wetmore and Wilmot for Defendants.
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JOHNSTON v. WINSLOW.
A writ of fieri facias was altered and re-issued as an alias.—In an ac
tion of trespass against the Sheriff for taking goods under it, the writ was
held void, and not receivable in evidence.
An exemplification of an execution stated the writ to be returnable tin
Hilary, 1834,—the Sheriff’s indorsement “ was received 16th August, 1834.”
Parol evidence was refused to shew the execution in the Sheriff’s hands in
October, 1833, and that the indorsement was a mistake.

This was an action of trespass, for seizing and carrying away
Plaintiff’s timber ; Plea the general issue.
At the trial before Chipman, C. J., at the Carleton Circuit, in
September, 1834, the taking having been proved, the Defendant
(who is Sheriff of Carleton) offered in evidence an exemplification
of a judgment, and an alias writ of fieri facias thereupon issued
against one Bishop ats Phillips, to whom it was offered to be pro
ved, the property in question belonged ; an objection was taken by
the Solicitor General for Plaintiff, that the wit offered was so al
tered and interlined, that it could not be received in evidence as a
writ; after some discussion it was admitted that the original writ
of fieri facias had been returned by the Defendant, and had been
altered by Mr. Hazen, the Plaintiff’s Attorney, and re-issued as
an alias. Plis Honor determined that it was a void writ, and re
fused to receive it as evidence.
An exemplification of another judgment and execution, Banks
against Bishop and another, was then offered; the execution so
exemplified was indorsed as received by the Sheriff, 16th August,
1834 ; the trespass was committed in October, 1833 ; the Defend
ant’s counsel offered evidence to shew that there was a mistake
either in the indorsement of the writ or the exemplification thereof,
that the writ was in the Sheriff’s hands at the time of the seizure,
and that he levied under and by virtue thereof, but his Honor re
fused to admit any evidence to contradict the record. Whereupon
the Plaintiff obtained a verdict.
In Michaelmas Term, a rule nisi was obtained to set aside the
verdict and grant a new trial, on the ground of the improper re
jection of evidence at the trial.
Cause was shewn in Hilary Term by the Solicitor General and
Wilmot for Plaintiff, who contended that the Sheriff having taken
goods out of the possession of a person not named in the writ, must
shew that the judgment and every proceeding down to the execu
tion, and the writ itself w'ere regular and correct, or he must be
considered a mere wrong-doer. As to the execution, Banks v.
Bishop, the Sheriff’s indorsement shewed that he did not receive
it until after the trespass was committed ; and that indorsement
being part of a record, could not be disputed.
Berton in support of the rub, as to the first writ, urged that a
Sheriff
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Sheriff could only be required to take reasonable precaution ; if he
found on record a judgment, to warrant the execution, he could
not determine what erasures or interlineations would vitiate the
writ: it came to him under the seal of the Court, and knowing
the property in question to belong to the person against whom the
execution issued, he levied upon it; but even if there were an ir
regularity in the writ, he contended it was not sufficient to make
it a void writ—and if only irregular, then it was a sufficient justi
fication until set aside : as to the execution, Banks v. Bishop, evi
dence was not offered to vitiate, but io support a record:—by the
Sheriff’s indorsement, it appeared that the execution was received
in his office in August, 1834, the writ was returnable in Hilary,
1834, which was an absurdity ; the evidence offered was to shew
the mistake of 1834 for 1833, and that would have supported the
writ, and have rendered it effective. He cited Dickson v. Fisher,
1 W. Bl. 664 ; Watson’s Sheriff, 53, s. 4 ; 3 Wils. 345 ; 2 Bur
row, 964 ; 15 East. 614, (d ); 3 Bac. Abr. 419, 420.
Curia advisari vult.
The Court delivered judgment at this term.
Botsford, J.:
I am of Opinion that this rule must be discharged upon both
grounds. The writ of fieri facias having been changed into an
alias, by the interlineation of the wcrds “ as before we have com
manded you,”—and by the alteration of the teste and return may
be said to be destroye I, and the alias so called with such interlinea
tions and alterations upon the face of it, and without having been
resealed, must be considered as a nullity in the nand3 of the
Sheriff.
With respect to the second ground, I think the case of Dickson
and ^isher, 1 W. Bl. 664, is decisive ; there it was held by the
Court, “ That parol evidence ought not to be admitted to vitiate
“ the record, and prove it to have been wrong, though it may have
“ been admitted in order to pronounce it right.”
Carter, J.:
This was an action of trespass against the Defendant for taking
certain timber alleged to be the Plaintiff’s property. The defence
was that Defendant, as Sheriff of Carleton, seized the timber in
question under two executions issued on judgments in two actions
against a person named Bishop, and in support of this defence
two documents were offered in evidence ;—the first which purport
ed to be an alias fieri facias issued against Bishop, at the suit of
Phillips, was admitted to be the original fieri facias, altered by
erasures and interlineations into the form of an alias
In the case of Plucliart v. Greenes, 2 Keble 705, trespass was
brought against a Sheriff and his bailiff for false imprisonment, and
they jnsthied by warrant writ to the Sheriff. Plaintiff replied—
no
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no writ was then taken out, to which Defendant demurred, and
judgment was given for the Plaintiff, for “ albeit the bailiff hath a
“ warrant, yet he is liable if there be no writ, contra if the writ be
“ void, if delivered.”
Now, can it be said in the case before the Court;, that there was
any writ ? In its original form it clearly was a writ of fieri facias,
but in its altered form, where it purports to be an alias, it seems
to me to be nothing more than a piece of parchment issuing from
an Attorney’s office, and carries with it no authority as a writ.
As well might the Attorney have made such alterations and inter
lineations as would have transformed it into a cap. ad sat., and of
fered it as a justification for the Sheriff in making an arrest.
The second document was an exemplification of a writ of fieri
facias against Bishop at the suit of Banks, which appeared by the
Sheriff’s indorsement not to have been received till the 16th Au
gust, 1834, whereas the seizure which was the ground of this ac
tion took place in October, 1833. It was proposed to shew by
the Sheriff’s book, that the writ was in fact received on the 16th
August, 1833, but this evidence was rejected by his Honor the
Chief Justice as tending to falsify a record.
I see nothing in this case to make it an exception to that which
is well known as a rule of evidence, and which is distinctly recog
nized by Lord Kenyon in a case of Reed v. Jackson, 1 East. 357,
where it was attempted to shew by other evidence, that a verdict
which had been entered generally, had been so entered by mistake
of the officer, instead of having been entered on a particular plea.
Lord Kenyon, in his judgment, says,—“ The evidence offered by
the Defendant went to impeach the authenticity of a record, and
therefore was inadmissible.”
This case is a stronger one, inasmuch as the part of the r< cord
which is sought to be contradicted, is an entry made by the very
person who now seeks to contradict it. I think his Honor the
Chief Justice was right in refusing to admit the evidence offered
in both cases, and thai this rule must therefore be discharged.
Parker, J.:
I think, on both the points which have come before the Court in
this case, the Chief Justice was right in rejecting the evidence
offered at the trial.
as regards the first execution, had the question merely turned
on the effect of erasures and interlineations, ’t would have been a
matter of consideration whether they were .n material parts, and
at what time made; Crowther v. Wheat, 8 Mod. 243—6 < )m. Dig.
290; but when it appeared that what was produced as an alias
fierifacias, had in fact been the original fieri facias, which had as
such been already in the Sheriff’s hands, I think it was properly
treated as a nullity; and could no more warrant the Sheriff’s
proceeding
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proceeding than if it had been a mere blank. In 2 Dowl. P. R.
745, a summons originally issued into Middlesex, but altered to
Surrey without resealing, was treated as a nullity.
This no doubt is a case of great hardship so far as the Sheriff is
concerned, but if the Attorney has put into his hands to Execute
that which1 purported to be the writ of the Court, but iii fact is not,
he must have his recourse on him.
The nature of the Sheriff’s office exposes him to much risk ;
nothirfg perhaps more exemplifies this, than the decision in Lake
r. Billers, 1 L. R. 773, fully confirmed by Martin v. Podfrer, 5
Burr. 2631, and 2 Bl. 701, that in an action by third persons
against the Sheriff for seizing goods under execution, he must not
only shew a good execution, but a judgment to warrant it.
Another objection in the present case, as strongly put by the
Solicitor General, is, that there is no original execution remaining
to warrant the award of an alias, but the first ground is I think
sufficient.
With regard to the second execution offered in evidence by the
Defendant, I think the indorsement made by the Sheriff of the
time of receiving it, pursuant to the direction of the Provincial
Statute of Frauds, 26 Geo. 3, q. 14, s. 13, was conclusive... To
allow evidence at the trial on the part of tliQ Sheriff to contradict
this, would in effeiff render nugatory that which the Legislature
has provided for the better manifestation of the time of thelexecutions coining into his hands. Besides in the present case the writ
had actually been, returned to the Court, and was with the indorse
ment thjjreon -exemplified, as a record, which on clear principles of
law, could not be contradicted by parol testimony.
Upon a proper application to this Court, shewing a mistake in
the indorsement^ an amendment might, I conceive, have been al
lowed ; 1 T. R. 782: and the, Defendant, who must have been
aw^p. of the necessity of this evidence, should have applied before
the trial to have the error, if such it were, corrected.
Chipman, Chief Justice:
I remain of the same opinion I expressed at the trial. The
Sheriff, in an action by a third person, must shew himself right in
omnibus. That which purported to be a writ was a nullity.
The second writ was a record taken from the files of the Court,
and exemplified under the seal of the Court. I had no hesitation
in rejecting evidence to contradict its contents. No evidence can
be admitted to contradict a record. The rule nisi must be dis
charged.
The Solicitor General and Wilmot for Plaintiff.
Dibblee, A. K. S. Wetmore and Berton for Defendant.
FOWLIE
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FOWLIE v. STRONACH AND ANOTHER, Administra
tors of English.
Where a writ of enquiry is ordered to be executed before a Judge at Nisi
Prius, the Judge sits only as an assistant to the Sheriff. The writ should
be directed and tlie inquisition returned as in ordinary cases. A writ di
rected to the Sheriff and Judge, and an inquisition returned under the seal
of the Judge, held defective, and were set aside, but without costs.

This was an action of covenant in which tlie Plaintiff had
judgment on demurrer. The Defendant obtained a rule for the
execution of a writ of inquiry of damages in the presence of a
Judge at Nisi Prius.
The writ of inquiry was directed to the Sheriff and the Justices
of Assize, and commanded the Sheriff to summon a jury and the
Justices to certify the inquisition.
The damages were assessed under this writ at Northumberland
in September last, and the wri* and inquisition were returned as
directed by the wrrit.
A rule nisi was obtained in last Michaelmas Term, by N. Par
ker and Wilmot for Defendants, to set aside the writ of inquiry for
the assessment of damages, and the return thereto, for defects and
irregularities apparent on the face of them.
The Solicitor General and J. A.Street shewed cause inHilary T erm.
Curia advisari vult.
In this term the Court delivered judgment.
Botsford, J.:
It appears that a writ of inquiry for the assessment of damages
was issued, directed to the Sheriff of the County of Northumber
land, and to the Justices assigned to take the assizes in and for
the said County, bearing date the twelfth day of July, in the fifth
year of His Majesty’s reign, and returnable the second Tuesday
in October then next following; that the Sheriff was command
ed to summon a jury to appear before the said Justices of Assize,
who were commanded to certify the inquisition : and it appears by
the return that the inquest was holden before the Justice of Assize,
who signed and certified the same.
It is contended by the Counsel for Defendants, that the writ
ought to have been directed to the Sheriff alone, who is the person
designated by law to hold the inquest—that the Judge at Nisi
Prius is only an assistant to the Sheriff, by whom the return ought
to have been made. The irregularity is admitted by the Counsel
for the Plaintiff, but it is contended that the same was waived by
the Defendants, whose Counsel were present, and who attended on
their behalf, before the Judge of Assize on the taking of the inqui
sition, and by taking subsequent steps in giving notice of an in
tended motion to this Court to set aside the inquisition, on the
ground of improper rejection of evidence by the Judge of Assize.
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To this it is answered, that the proceedings are defective, am
cannot be amended, cured or waived.
With respect to the writ of inquiry and the return thereto, I am
of opi lion that they are defective—that the Judge of Assize had
no power, neither could he derive any, under the writ of inquiry—
that he could only act as an assistant to the Sheriff, agreeable to
what is said by lolt, Chief Justice, in an anonymous case, (12
Mod. 610,) “A Judge at Nisi Prius upon trial of a writ of inquiry,
“ is only an assistant to the Sheriff, and has no judicial power.”—
The writ of inquiry and proceedings under it being defective and
not merely irregular, I am of opinion that they could not be waived
by any of the steps taken by the Defendants. In Massey and
Wilson, 5 T. P. 254, a distinction was taken between a mere ir
regularity in the mode or time of the proceedings, and a defect in
the proceedings themselves, that the latter kind could not be
waived by the adverse party, though the former might; and this
distinction was allowed by the Court
Carter, J.:
This was a motion to set aside a writ of inquiry, which had is
sued to assess damages, (after judgment on demurrer) and the in
quisition thereon, the action being in covenant on a lease. It ap
peared that the writ was directed to the Judge of Assize, and not
to the Sheriff, and that it was executed before the Judge of Assize,
and the inquisition was under the hand and seal of the Judge of
Assize—and that the Defendant appeared and made defence at the
execution of the writ. It is clear that the direction of this writ
was wrong, and that this was a case in which the Judge of Assize
could not have power to take the inquisition.
In considering this case, I have had considerable doubts whether
this defect n the proceedings was not one which should be taken
advantage of by another method than a motion to set aside the
proceedings; but on the whole, I am led to conclude that the
whole proceedings under this writ are not irregular only, but wholly
defective, ab initio: and that therefore the subsequent steps taken
by the Defendants, which would clearly have been a waiver of an
irregularity, do not waive this, which is a complete defect in the
proceedings.
On this ground, I flunk the ride should be made absolute.
Parker, J.:
I am quite of opinion that the Defendants in the present case
are not entitled to any favor from the Court. They appeared by
their Counsel at the execution of the writ of inquiry; made no ob
jection whatever to the form of the writ or the proceeding theieon;
went into their defence ;—it was moreover at their instance that
the Judge of Assize was associated with the Siu riff; and under
such circumstances, all mere irregularities must be considered
waived;
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waived ; and the Plaintiff is entitled to liis judgment, unless the
defect he of such a nature as to render the whole proceeding null
and void. I would here observe that I do not agree with the
learned Counsel for the Defendant in his position, that in all cases
where defects are cured by the statutes of jeoffaiis, the Court will,
nevertheless, set the proceedings aside, if application be made be
fore they are upon record. In all such cases, the Court must ex
ercise a sound discretion, and in one like the present, should cer
tainly not interfere to deprive tl.e Plaintiff of any benefit which he
might derive from those statutes. Indeed I am of opinion that the
Court would, if the defect were amendable, allow the Plaintiff to
amend, although he has made no direct application for leave so to do.
My reason for thinking the ride obtained in this case must be
made absolute, is, that the defect is of such a nature as cannot be
waived, and would not be aided by any of the statutes of amend
ment or jeoffail ; that if the Plaintiff proceeded to enter up his
judgment, it must be erroneous; that seeing this, the Court will
not allow him to incur useless trouble and expense, but in order
that he may have his damages properly assessed, will set aside the
writ and inqu’sition.
It is clear from all the authorities, that there is a great distinc
tion between a defect in the proceedings and a mere irregularity ;
the latter may be waived, the former cannot be. Sell. Pr. 100, 5
T. R. 254, 4 T. R. 349 : Mr. Sellonsays,—“ Ihe time of taking
advantage of any irregularity depends on the nature of the defect,
whether it be such as vitiates the proceedings in toto so as to ren
der them null and void, or only such an irregularity as may be
cured or waived by some subsequent act of the parties, for there is
a distinction between a defect in the proceedings and a mere irre
gularity.”
In 1 Dowl. P. R. 29, Mr. J. Taunton says,—“ There is this
difference between an irregularity and a nullity,—an irregularity
may be waived, but a nullity cannot.”
L1 the present case, a writ of inquiry has issued, directed to the
Sheriff and the Judge of Assize, by which the Sheriff is directed
to summon the jury, and the Judge to make the inquiry and return
the inquisition under his hand and seal. The action is covenant,
in which the damages are to be assessed in the ordinary way, and
not debt on bond with breaches assigned, for which a particular
mode of inquiry is appointed by statute. We are to determine
whether the writ and the proceedings thereon are a mere nullity
or only an irregularity.
Asa rule was obtained for having the inquisition taken in pre
sence of the Judge at the Circuit, the first point for consideration is,
whether that circumstance makes any difference in the nature of
the proceedings on the record. It appears clearly from all the
H
books
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books of practice, that the writ and inquisition are precisely the
same, whether taken in presence of the Judge or not: the Sheriff
is the officer in either case, in whom the judicial power is vested,
and the inquisition is returned under his hand arid seal, and those
of the jurors. In 12 Mod. 610, Holt, C. J. said,—“ A Judge of
Nisi Prius upon trial of a writ of inquiry, is only an assistant to
the Sheriff, and has no judicial power.” In this Province, the
Judges sit at Nisi Prius, under the Act of Assembly, 26 Geo. 3, c.
8, by which they are empowered to try causes brought to issue in
the Supreme Court. Any other power by them to be exercised
on the Circuit, must be derived from the established practice of
the Court, or some special enactment.
The Sheriff, where he is not an interested person, is the known
officer of the Court, to whom the duty of inquiry of the damages
in ordinary cases, as well as the execution of other writs, must be
assigned, and we have no power to substitute the Judge or any
other person ; we can no more I conceive award a writ to the
Judge to make the inquiry in ordinary cases, than we can autho
rise the Sheriff to do it under the statute of Win. 3d. relative to
bonds. The Sheriff under the writ now before us was functus
'tfficio after returning the jury; if he appeared at the inquisition, it
was wholly without authority, as the writ gave him none: the
Judge and not the Sheriff has the judicial authority by the writ to
swear the jury and witnesses, and he alone has made the return.
I cannot but think the whole proceedings were coram non judice,
and are consequently defective. In support of this opinion, I find
it laid down in 6 Com. Dig. 289,—“ If writ of inquiry be executed
before him who has no authority, it is error as in an Inferior Court
if it is directed to the Serjeant at Mace, and is executed before the
Mayor, who is Judge of the Court; Yelv. 69.” In the case in
Yelverton, the Court said,—“ An inquiry before the Mayor is not
warranted by any writ, and by consequence judgment to recover
such damages placed before a wrong officer is erroneous.”
In Comyn, it is further said,—“ If a writ of inquiry is erroneous
it shall not be amended, but the Plaintiff may have another
writ.”
In 2 Wils. 378.—An inquisition taken before two under-Sheriffs
extraordinary was set aside, the Court holding that the High She
riff coidd appoint no more than one under-Sheriff extra.
In Blakamore’s case, 2 Rep. 310, it is held that misprision of a
clerk to be amended did not extend to a case where the clerk mis
takes the form of the writ.
The case of Grant v. Bagge, 3 East. 128, is important to shew
that a writ directed improperly to an officer not accustomed to re
ceive such, would be quashed on motion quia improvide emanavit,
and would not justify the officer who took upon him to execute it.
In
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In the Queen v. Twdein, 1 Salk, 51, Lord C. J. Holt and Powel
& Powys, J. say, that though a misawarding of process on the roll
might be amended at common law of the same term, because it was
the act of the Court, yet if any clerk at common law issued out an
erroneous process on a right award of the Court, that was never
amended in any case at common law.
Some cases have been cited of amendments injury process, such
as the distringas and venire after verdict; and it has been argued
that the statutes of jeoffail curing defects in substance as well as
form, extend now to cases where judgment is given by default,
confession or on demurrer, as well as those after verdict.
I have carefully examined the statutes of jeoffail, and find that
the position is not exactly correct; by stat. 4 & 5, Ann. c. 16, it
is true all omissions or defects which were then cured after verdict
were equally cured by judgments of confession, default, &c.; but
it is not until the statute 5 Geo. 1, c. 13, that defects in substance
in judicial writs are aided ; and this is expressly confined to cases
after verdict. But independent of this statute, there is a great
distinction between writs of venire, &c., which do not convey the
power under which the trial is had ; and writs of inquiry which
are the direct authority to the officer for his proceeding.
In Crowderjy. Rooke^2 Wils. 144, where the cause was tried
at a certain sitting, subsequent to that for which the nisi prius re
cord, &c., were made up, the Court considered the trial as coram
non Judice, refused leave to amend; but ex officio awarded a venire
de novo.
Two cases have been cited from Strange’s Reports, in one of
which, p. 878, it is said, the want of a writ of inquiry is aided by
the statute of jeoffails ; and the other, p. 1077, where the writ of
inquiry had been lost, and the Court made a rule for a new writ
and inquisition fiom the Sheriff’s notes. 3oth cases are very
loosely reported, and the first contains no statement of the proceed
ings, nor does it inform us of the nature of the action, or how the
damages were assessed, or the record made up. The last turned
evidently on the ground that the proceedings had been regular,
though the writ and inquisition were lost: and the only ground on
which I can conceive the first to have been decided, is that the
Court would presume that a writ had issued, and that it was a
proper writ; but we can make no such presumption here, as we
have the defective writ before us, and can presume no other.
In truth this is not the case of a mistake or misprision of the
clerk, but an intentional application of a writ, provided by statute
for one purpose, to another, for which it is not warranted ; I say
intentional, for the Plaintiff’s Counsel at first insisted that the writ
was proper for the purpose, and accorf'iig to the latest book of
practice, though he is now satisfied he was mistaken.
The

CASES in TRINITY TERM,

62

The rule to quash the writ and inquisition must I think be made
absolute, but without costs : If we do not so interfere, what can
the Plaintiff do ? It is not a case in which the Court could assess
the damages, for supposing that we have the power, which may be
questioned, when the provision of the Act 26 Geo. 3, c. 21, and
the uniform practice in this Province are considered^ the Plaintiff
has not called on us to do this, but has resorted to a writ of inquiry.
Can he award a proper writ on his roll, and enter that which has
issued ; or can he enter a different writ from that under which he
has proceeded ? I think not: if we discharged the present rule
obtained at the Defendants’ instance, the Plaintiff must himself
ask it of us if he wishes to proceed. Were it necessary indeed
the Court might I think ex officio award a new writ ; but there is
no occasion for that being done.
Chipman, Chief Justice :
I was not present at the argument, but I fully concur in the
opinions expressed by their Honors.
A proceeding after default is necessary to inform the Court what
amount of damages the Plaintiff has sustained by reason of the
premises.
A particular statute has altered the common law in some pro
ceedings therein especially mentioned ; in those laws, everything
is mentioned to be done according to the form of the statute, .and
if that course is imported into other cases not specified in the sta
tute, the statutes of jeoffails will not cure the defect. The present
proceeding is coram non juclice, and must be set aside.
J. A. Street for Plaintiff.
N. Parker, Wilmot and J. H. Peters for Defendants.
WILMOT v. BABINO AND CORNWELL.
Applications by confined debtors are considered in the first instance
after notice and copies of the affidavits given.

The Solicitor General moved in last Easter Term, on behalf of
the Defendants, for relief under the insolvent Act; but after argu
ment the Court dismissed the application (vicl. ante.) Notice was
given to Plaintiff’s Attorney of a further application at this Term ;
but copies of the affidavits to support the same were not delivered.
The Solicitor General was about to call the attention of the Court
to the former affidavits and to some further statements—Sed

Per Curiam.
This must be entirely a new application, and it does appear con
venient that we should pursue the practice which has been estab
lished of giving notice and communicating copies of all the appli
cant’s affidavits to the opposite party, that he may be prepared to
answer
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answer them : the course lias been not to grant a rule nisi, but to
take the matter into consideration in the first instance.

DICKINSON v. KETCHUM
In replevin, where several issues are found—some for Plaintiff and some
for Defendant—each party is entitled to iosts on the issues determined in
his favor.
The postea was ordered to the Plaintiff for one month to enter the judg
ment, aud in case of his neglect to do so, then to the Defendant for the
same purpose.

Replevin for divers quantities of timber.
Defendant pleaded as to part of the timber, non cepit.
2d. As to another part, property in himself.
3d. As to another part, non cepit.
4th. As to another part, property in himself.
And Sth. As to another part, the same.
At the trial before Chipman, Chief Justice, at the Carleton Cir
cuit. in September last, a verdict was found on the first issue for
Defendants. On the 2d, as to part of the timber therein mentioned
for the Plaintiff, and as to the remainder for the Defendant. On
the 3d and 4tli, issues for the Defendants: and on the Sth, for
Plaintiff. A question thereupon arose as to who was entitled to
the record, and which party should recover costs.
The Solicitor General for Defendant, obtained a rule in Hilary,
to shew cause why the postea should not be given to the Defend
ants. Cause was shewn at this Term by Wilmot for Plaintiff.

Per Curiam.
Each party is entitled to costs on the issues determined in his
favor; see 2 Bos & Puller, 368: as to taxing costs in replevin,
see Lutw. 1190, confirmed in 4 B. & A. 43. The Plaintiff having
carried down the record, let him have the postea for one month to
enter up the judgment, and after that time if Plaintiff shall neglect
to do so, the Defendant may enter up the judgment.
Wilmot for Plaintiff.
The Solicitor General and C. P. Wetmore for Defendant.

BATES v. LYON.
Where Plaintiff in trespass quart clausum fregit had it in his power to
shew definite bounds, but rather defended on the uncertain lines of another
grant, and the jury found against him, the Court refused to disturb the
verdict.

This was an action of trespass quare clausum fregit, tried
before Parker, J. at the King’s Circuit in January last. Verdict
for Defendant.
The
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The Plaintiff proceeded for two distinct trespasses on different
grants of land, viz :■—One on what is called the Middle Land
grant; the other in what is called the Taylor and Underhill
grant.
In Hilary Term, the Solicitor General obtained a rule nisi to set
aside the verdict, and grant a new trial on two grounds, viz:—First,
that the verdict was contrary to evidence as related to the Mid
dle Land grant; and secondly, to the charge of his Honor the J udge
as related to the Taylor and Underhill grant.
N. Parker for Defendant, shewed cause at this term, and con
tended as to the first point, that there was conflicting testimony
before the jury, and therefore the Court would not interfere ; and
as to the second point, that the question was wholly of fact, and
within the province of the jury ; and even were it otherwise, the
damages sought to be recovered being trifling, was a sufficient
reason for not disturbing the verdict.
The Solicitor General, in support of the rule, urged with regard
to the Taylor and Underhill grant, that although the trespass was
in itself of no great importance, yet as the object of the action was
to try a question of boundary, and the verdict would establish a
right, the Court would on the second ground set aside the verdict.
Chipman, Chief Justice :
This rule was obtained on two grounds; the first, that the ver
dict was against evidence, as to the Middle Land grant, has been
virtually abandoned by the learned Counsel for the Plaintiff, and
at any rate there was conflicting testimony before the jury. On
the second ground, with regard to the Taylor and Underhill grant,
we are urged to grant a new trial, because it is said that the ver
dict will establish a right.
On looking at the evidence as reported by Mr. Justice Parker,
I am of opinion that the Plaintiff has brought his cause into Court
in a way that will not entitle him to a new trial. He produced a
grant in evidence, called the Taylor and Underhill grant, which
specified certain bounds and courses. The next step on his part
should properly have been to give evidence of the bounds designa
ted in that grant, and if those could not be found, to have run
lines according to the grant; but instead of that he depended on
another old line connected with another grant. There is great
uncertainty in the line as shewn by the Plaintiff, and he clearly in
curred the risk of that uncertainty, and the result is that the bounds
still remain as uncertain as ever. I am therefore of opinion that
the Plaintiff is not entitled to ask for a new trial. If his rights
should hereafter be invaded he can seek his legal remedy, and this
verdict cannot be evidence against him.
Botsford, J. and Carter, J. concurred

Parker,
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Parker, J.:
This was a question of fact, depending on an immense mass of
evidence. Three days were occupied in the trial, and in putting
the case to the jury I stated how I thought the cause should be
considered.
The question is not, if the Court agree with the jury, but if the
jury had a right to determine as they have done. The Plaintiff
came into Court in an extraordinary way. He offered a grant,
and evidence of bounds almost indefinite, when he might have
shewn definite bounds. The obscurity was the fault of the Plain
tiff himself. He had the means of producing evidence to shew the
true line of boundary, but he rather depended on the uncertainty.
I think the jury came to a more correct decision than I did at the
trial, and I am not dissatisfied with the verdict.
Rule discharged.
The Solicitor General for Plaintiff.
Parker for Defendant.
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MTLHANEY v. WISWALL.
Plaintiff’s demand amounted to £30, and was reduced by payments or set
off. Plaintiff stated the amount due him to be £7 or £8 ;—there was no
evidence to reduce his demand below that sum; the verdict was for less than
£5. The Court refused to deprive the Plaintiff of his costs.

A rule nisi having been obtained in this cause, to deprive the
Plaintiff of his costs, pursuant to the Act of Assembly, 50 G. 3,
c. 17, s. 10,cause was shewn in last Trinity Term.
Curia advisari vult.
In this Term the Court delivered their opinions.
Chipman, Chief Justice :
This was an action of assumpsit, for work and labour, tried be
fore Parker, J. at the St. John January Circuit, 1835.-—Plea, Ge
neral Issue.—Verdict for the Plaintiff for £3 4s. 6d.—The Plain
tiff proved work done for more than six months as a carpenter
and the amount of his account therefor was about £30 ; it was
proved that the Plaintiff had received sundry articles from the De
fendant, under his order, which might be considered as payments,
to a considerable amount; and that Plaintiff had acknowledged,
after all these nayments had been made, that he thought a balance
of £7 or £8 only was due to him.
There was a notice of set off, but whether the evidence given by
the Defendant was as set off or payment, did not distinctly appear.
There was no evidence to reduce the demand below what the
Plaintiff had stated was due to him, viz. £7 or £8, and it is not
known upon what ground the jury did go.
The clause of the Provincial statute, 50 G. 3, c. 17, s. 10, on
which this application is founded, is in the following terms :—“ If
“ any action or suit shall be commenced in any other Court than
“ the Justices Court for any debt not exceeding the sum of £5, and
“ recoverable by virtue of this Act in the Justices Court, then, and
“ in every such case, the Plaintiff in such action or suit shall not
“by reason of a verdict or judgment for him, &c., have or be
“ entitled
* This act is repealed by 4 W. 4, c. 45, and new regulations made by 77 paragraph.
I
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“ entitled to any costs whatever/’ In order then to deprive the
Plaintiff of costs under this Act, it is essential that the debt for
which the action is brought shall not exceed the sum of £5, and
shall be recoverable in the Justices Court. If the original debt be
reduced by a sec off, it is clear, and has always been held, that it
could not have been sued for in the inferior jurisdiction, and the
.\ct does not apply ; and it is only in case this evidence should b"
considered as evidence of payment, and not of set off, that this ap
plication can for a moment be sustained ; in this view of the mat
ter it may indeed be considered to be settled as a general rule, that
the verdict shall be taken as the evidence of the amount for which
the action is brought.

Fitzpatrick v. Pickering, 2 Wils. 68.
Shaddick v. Bennett, 4 Barn and Cres. 769.
Drew v. Coles, 2 Tyr. 503; 2 C. & J. 505 ; 1 Dowl. P. C. 580
Jones v. Harris, 1 Dowl. Pr. Ca. 433.
Baddley v. Oliver, 1 Dowl. P. C. 598; 1 C. & M. 219.
Moore v. Jones, 2 Dowl. Pr. Ca. 58.

Nevertheless, it is only as evidence of the amount of the original
debt rightfully due, that the verdict is to be received; and it is not
conclusively binding on the Court in all cases, to deprive the Plain
tiff of his costs, when found for the Plaintiff for a sum which is
within the Justices jurisdiction: accordingly in Drew v. Coles,
Lord Chief Baron Lyndhurst says,—“ It is not necessary to say
“ that in every case the verdict shall rule as to the amount of the
“ debt due to the Plaintiff which might have been rightfully de“ manded by him, but there is no doubt that in the generality of
“ cases it shall decide the question:” and Baron Bayley-says,—
“ prima facie, a verdict is to be taken as evidence of what the
“ debt was when the action was commenced.” In any case there
fore, when the original debt proved at the trial shall exceed five
pounds, and the jury shall think fit to bring in their verdict in res
pect of that debt, for a sum under five pounds, and without there
being a foundation in the evidence given at the trial, for so redu
cing it, I do not consider that the Court is bound to receive tlie
verdict as such conclusive evidence of the debt originally due, as
to deprive the Plaintiff of his costs under the Act.
The case most analogous in its circumstances to the present, is
that of Harsant v. Larkin, 3 B. and B 257. In this case, the ac
tion was brought for measured work and labour, which a surveyor
of the Defendant’s own appointment had estimated at upwards of
£34 ; and upon this estimate, the balance proved to be due the
Plaintiff was more than £9 ; the jury however, in a manner unac
countable to the Court, reduced the estimate to £26, and thereby
reduced the balance due to the Plaintiff to £1 2s., for which lastmentioned
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mentioned sum they gave their verdict, ard the Court, under these
circumstances, refused to deprive the Plaintiff of his costs.
Now, although the doctrine broadly laid down in Harsant v. Lar
kin, as to the discretion of the Court in these cases, must be con
sidered as very much limited by subsequent decisions, yet the de
cision itself, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, has never
been questioned, and I think affords a precedent for the determi
nation of the present case under its peculiar circumstances. The
Plaintiff in the present case had an original demand, which was
proved, of £30 ; this demand had indeed been reduced,—and in
the view I am now taking, let it be supposed that it was reduced
by payments,—yet there was no evidence of a reduction below £7
Under these circumstances the Plaintiff surely could not bring his
action in the Justices Court fcr a sum under £5.
This case differs entirely from that of Dickinson v. Ballocli,
(ante p. 24) formerly decided in this Court. In Dickinson v. Balloch, the Plaintiff had a distinct demand, amounting only to 25s.,
for which sum the verdict was given ; and although a large demand
had been litigated at the trial, yet it was evident that if this larger
demand only had been in question, the verdict would have been
for the Defendant; and that the verdict was found for the Plaintiff
only for the separate demand of £1 5s., which separate demand
might have been sued for in the Justices Court.
The decision of this case is not of much moment as a precedent,
as the late Act for the recovery of small debts, 4 W. 4, c. 45,
makes improved and more complete regulations on the subject; the
present rule for entering a suggestion must, I think, be discharged.
Botsford, J.:
I fully concur in opinion with his Honor the Chief Justice. I
am very much governed by the case of Moore v. Jones, in 2 Dowl.
Pr. Ca. 58 ; although the items proved on the part of the Defend
ant might have been in the nature of payments, yet having been
treated as a set off by the Defendant himself, he is not now entitled
to consider the Plaintiff’s demand as reduced by payments ; and
at any rate it was not reduced below £5, and therefore was not a
demand recoverable in the Justices Court.
Carter, J.:
I am of opinion that in this case no suggestion should be en
tered.
In cases of this description it seems very difficult, if not impos
sible, to lay down any general rule which may govern al1 cases.
The question to be decided is whether this was an action brought
to recover a debt not exceeding £5, and in order to determine this,
we must consider how far the debt for which the action is brought
is ascertained by the sum which is actually recovered by the verdict.
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If, in all cases, the Court can only look to the verdict to ascer
tain the amount of the debt, and are bound by that, it would seem
that this might become a motion of course, on an affidavit stating
the nature of the action, and the amount of the verdict. That this
is not so, the numerous cases and arguments to be found in the re
ports of the English Courts plainly shew ; and if not so, it would
then seem that each case must rest on its own circumstances, and
tnat there is a discretion left to the Court to take the circumstan
ces of each case into consideration,—to look at the evidence on
which the verdict was founded, and the verd’ct itself, and then to
decide the question on all these considerations jointly, and not by
looking tc the verdict, and to that alone. The language used by
Chief Justice Abbot, in Shaddick v. Bennett, certainly goes very
far to the conclusion that the debt for which the action is brought
is to be ascertained by the sum which is recovered by the verdict;
but referring that language to the circumstances of the case, then
under the consideration of the Court, it seems that there was no
doubt as to the amount of the debt, or the facts of the case, but the
only point was, whether a debt, barred by the statute of limitations,
was to be taken to be the debt, for which the action was brought,
or the sum admitted to be due in the acknowledgment produced,
to take the case out of the statute. No doubt existed in the mind
of the Court as to the propriety and justice of the verdict on the
law and evidence of the case, and under such circumstances there
can be no doubt that the debt is to be ascertained by the amount
of the verdict.
So in Younger v. Kilsby, (6 Taun. 452,) Chief Justice Gibbs
says,—“ The debt is that which is found by the verdict —but it
does not appear that there was any reason to doubt the propriety
of the verdict in that case.
In Tucker v. Crosby, 2 Taun. 169, the ground on which the
Court give judgment is, that the verdict was right, which expres
sion clearly shews that the Court conceived it within their dis
cretion to consider the propriety of the verdict on the law and
evidence of the case.
The language of Lord Ellenborough, in Horn v. Hughes, 8 East.
317, leads to the conclusion that in the opinion of that very learned
Judge the verdict was not in all cases conclusive, as to the debt
for which the action was brought; for he says,—“ It is unneces“ sary to say what we might have thought, if it had appeared that
“ the Plaintiff had a reasonable ground for bringing ' is action, for
“ more than five pounds, but that from the absence of a material
“ witness, or other cause, without his default, he had failed in pro“ ving lis whole demand ; but here it appears, [«. e. to the Court,
“ as well as the jury,] that less than that stun was due at the time
“ of bringing the action, by means of a part payment, of which he
“ must
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“ must have been cognizant.” This therefore was a case in which
there appeared to the Court no reason to be dissatisfied with the
verdict of the jury.
I come now to the case of Harsant v. Larkin. In that case the
action was brought for £34 5s. Id., a sum fixed as the value of
work done by Plaintiff for the Defendant, by a surveyor appointed
by both parties; the Defendant proved payments on account,
amounting to £24 18s., but the jury formed a lower estimate of
the work, found a verdict of £1 2s., instead of £9 and upwards,
which would have been the balance, tak.ng the surveyor’s valua
tion ; there the Court took all the circumstances of the case into
consideration, and decided that it was not a case which ought to
have been submitted to an inferior Court, and therefore refused the
application. The language of Justice J. Burrough seems to me
very applicable to the case now under consideration. He says,—
“ In all cases much may be left to the discretion of the Court upon
“ the facts as they appear in evidence ; the intention of the Legis“ lature was, that the suggestion as to costs should be applied to
“ cases where there was a clear demand for less than forty shillings;
“ but if we look at the facts of this case, we can have no doubt
“ that it is not one of that description ; here is a demand for more
“ than £34, a valuation by consent of both parties, a balance
“ struck, particulars of demand given, and the valuer called, and
“ though for some reason to us unknown, the jury have found a
“ verdict for less than the balance, I am satisfied on the merits of
“ this case, that it is not within the Act.”
The principle laid down in this case has not been over-ruled by
any subsequent case, for in Drew v. Coles, in which this question
was fully argued, Lord Lyndhurst carefully abstains from saying
that in all cases the verdict of the jury should be the criterion of
the debt justly due, and he also says, that “ in the case then before
“ the Court, in a conflict of testimony, the jury decided that the
“ Plaintiff was only entitled to a sum under £5, which sum he
“ could only rightfully demand. In the same case, Justice B.
Bayley says, “ prima facie the verdict of a jury is the estimate of
“ what is the just debt due between the parties at the period when
“ the action was commenced
and he further says, “ if the Court
“ could exercise a discretionary power in ordinary cases of this
“ kind, this is not in my opinion a case in which such a discre
“ tionary power ought to be exercised.” Justice B. Holland ex
pressly says, that the judgment of the Court in that case will in
no way trench upon the decision in Ilarsant v. Larkin.
The result to which a careful consideration of all the cases leads
me, is, that the Court are not finally and universally concluded by
the verdict of the jury, as to the amount of the debt, though I am
quite of opinion that the discretion which rests with the Court
should
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should be very cautiously exercised. Looking to the facts of the
present case as they appeared in evidence, it seems that the origi
nal debt proved by the Plaintiff amounted to between <£20 and <£30,
but that, by his own admission, it had been reduced to about <£7
or £8. The Defendant proved payments, or delivery of goods in
lieu of payment, to the amount of only £5 or £6, and the learned
Judge who tried the cause told the jury, that as the balance made
by deducting the amount proved by the Defendant from the origi
nal debt, would be larger than that admitted by the Plaintiff to be
the real balance due, they had better take the latter amount for
their verdict; the jury however found a verdict which can be ex
plained by neither mode of calculation, viz. for £3 4s. 6d.
Upon these facts, as they appear in evidence, though the jury
have found a verdict for only £3 4s. 6., (an amount which it seems
impossible to explain by any construction of the evidence,) I must
say I am satisfied that this is not a case in which the Court should
feel themselves prevented by the amount of the verdict so found,
from refusing to allow the proposed suggestion, which 1 am satis
fied is not called for by the merits of the case.
Parker, J.:
I agree with the opinion expressed by his Honor the Chief Jus
tice and my brethren. I think we may decide this case without
trenching on decisions either at home or here.
The Plaintiff proved between £20 and £30; the Defendant
gave notice of set off, and proved items which perhaps might have
been payments, but were given under set off, and it was not made
a distinct point that they were as payments, and he put a witness
on the stand to prove the Plaintiff’s admission that only £7 or £8
was due to him. The Plaintiff ought not to be deprived of costs
unless he has sued for a demand recoverable in a Justices Court.
Now if the verdict is binding on the Court as to the amount of the
debt due, this application, (as has been remarked) would be a mo
tion of course ; but in all the cases, the Courts have looked at the
circumstances and considered them, and if they have a right to do
so, then there can be no doubt that in this case tlie rule should be
discharged.
Lugrin and Wilmot for Plaintiff.
R. L. Hazen and R. Sands for Defendants.

CAMPBELL, Sheriff of Charlotte, v. WM. HENAN,
MORRISON, O’NEIL, FARREL, & T1IOS. HENAN
In an action by the Sheriff upon a limit bond under 10 & 11 G. 4, c. 30,
it is a good defence to shew that the Sheriff had received the Defendant
again into close custody, either upon being rendered by the bail, or by the
Defendant rendering himself in discharge of his bail.
Non
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Non damnificatus is a good plea only where the condition of a bond is
merely to indemnify.

This was an action of debt on a bond made to the Plaintiff by
the Defendants, conditioned for William Henan, one of the De
fendants, then a prisoner in the Plaintiff’s custody, continuing
within the limits of the gaol of Charlotte County.
Thomas Henan was not brought into Court.
The declaration contained only one count on the bond.
The Defendants, William Henan, Morrison, O’Neil, and Farrel,
craved oyer, and set forth the condition of the bond, which was as
follows, viz. :—“ Whereas the above-named Colin Campbell,' She“ riff as aforesaid, hath given permission to the above bounden
“ William Henan, a debtor confined in the gaol of the County
“ above-mentioned, to go about and have his liberty, within the
“ yard or limits of such gaol: Now the condition of this obligation
“ is such, that if the said William Henan shall not go or be at
“ large, out of the said limits of such gaol, or escape at any time
* while he has the liberty of the same, thenfj &c., being in the
form prescribed by the Act, 10 & 11 G. 4, c. 30, s. 13, and plead
ed, 1st, Non est factum ;(1£d, Actio non, &c., because that after
the making, &c., and while the said William Henan had the liber
ty of the said limits of the said gaol, as in the said condition is
mentioned, to-wit, on, &c., at, &c., the said Morrison, O’Neil, and
Farrell took the said William Henan to the said gaol of the said
County of Charlotte, and then and there surrendered and delivered
him up to the custody of the Plaintiff as such Sheriff as aforesaid,
in discharge of the said writing obligatory, and their liability there
on, and the said Plaintiff as Sheriff-, qp afonexaid,\then- and there,
receibgd and took the said William Henan into 1-is custody, as
such Sheriff, in discharge of the said Morrison, O'Neil and Far
rel, and committed him to the said gaol of the said County of
Charlotte, and there kept and detained him for a long space of
time, to-wit, for the space of two days. And the said Plaintiff
afterwards, to-wit, on, &c., without the consent or leave of the said
Morrison, O’Neil, and Farrell, discharged and set at liberty the
said William Henan.
3. That after the making, &c., to-wit, on, &c., at, &c., the said
William Henan surrendered and yielded himself to the Plaintiff,
as such Sheriff as aforesaid, in discharge of the said writing obliga
tory, and the said Plaintiff as such Sheriff, then and there received
and took the said William Henan into his custody, and afterwards
on, &c., at, &c., suffered and permitted the said William Henan to
go and be at large, &c.
4th. That the said William Henan did not go nor was at large,
out of the limits of, &c., nor did he escape at any time while he
had the liberty of the same
Sth.
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5tli. That the Plaintiff hath not at any time since the making
of, &c., hitherto been in anywise damnified ; nor hath he sustained
any damage by reason of the said William Henan going at large
out of the limits of the said gaol.
The Plaintiff demurred generally to the second, third, and fifth
pleas, and took issue upon the first and fourth. The Defendants
joined in demurrer.
Chandler in support of the demurrer.
The bond declared upon is under the Provincial Act, 10 & 11
G. 4, c. 30, the 11th section of which empowers the Justices of
the Peace to designate certain limits to the gaol yards ; by the
13th section the Sheriff is empowered to permit prisoners to have
their liberty within such limits upon a bond being given to the
Sheriff, conditioned that the prisoner shall not be at large or
escape, &c.
*
The second and third pleas can only be sustained on the princi
ple that the Defendants were in the same condition, as principal
and special bail, and that the bail for the limits under the said Act
have a power of render, which is not the case. The power which
ivas formerly given to the Sheriff by 6 G. 4, c. 10, upon reason
able cause to revoke the permission to prisoners to go about within
the limits, and renew it if he thought fit, is cancelled by 10 & 11
G. 4, c. 30, wliich contains no such provision. It would be an
act of trespass on the part of the sureties to take the principal for
the purpose of surrendering him, as well as on the part of the She
riff to receive or detain him when so surrendered. The effect
therefore of sustaining the pleas in question would be to establish
that the illegal conduct of the parties is a sufficient answer to the
action.
BoTSFORD, J. .
Is it not alleged that the Sheriff received him back ? If the bail
had no right to render, it would follow that the pri ncipal had no right
to render himself, and that the Sheriff had no right to receive him,
or if he did, and the prisoner applied for his discharge, the Sheriff
would have been a trespasser by detaining him. The only availaole
defence w’ould be to shew a discharge by some instrument, or by
some act tantamount thereto, on the principle eo ligamine quo
ligatur, dissolvetur.
As to the fifth plea, non damnificatus, it is clearly bad upon the
authority of Holmes and another v. Rhodes, 1 B. & P. 638, and 1
Saun. Rep. 117, note 1. Theie is also a discretionary power
vested in the Court to extend relief to the bail in such cases as
they may think proper.
The Solicitor General contra.
Ifthe construction oftheActwereas contended for by thePlaintiff s
counsel, it would render the Act of Assembly in a great measure
nugatory,
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nugatory, as it would be impossible for many debtors to obtain security
for the limits, if (having obtained it) they were at once placed be
yond the control, either of their sureties or the Sheriff. But the fail
construction of the Act and the form of the bond contradict the po
sition; the party shall not escape, “ while he has the liberty,” and the
Sheriff “ is authorized and empowered to permit,” &c.; neither the
words may of shall are used, but the Sheriff is merely empowered to
permit debtors to go about within the Jamits; and while there, they
are in the eye of the law as much in custody as if within the prison
walls; and it cannot be contended therefore, that the Sheriff has no
control over them.
A debtor is not discharged as he would be on a bail bond being
given, when he is entirely at large; but even in that case, if he
should deliver himself up before the return of the writ, he would be
in custody in the same manner as if he had not been at large.
The second and third pleas are a full answer to the action; the
Defendants, (and one of them the very debtor himself,) plead that
the debtor was delivered up to the Sheriff, and received, taken and
detained by him in custody. Now the condition of the bond is,
that the debtor shall not escape while he has the liberty of the li
mits ; the pleas aver that he escaped while in close custody after
his surrender; how then can the Sheriff, after receiving and de
taining the debtor as stated, and after either a negligent or wilful
escape, turn round upon the bail.
Bonds may be discharged by things equivalent to performance,
as here, by rendering up the debtor, a'though a question might
have arisen if the Sheriff had refused to receive him. In Hotham
v>. the East India Company, 1 T. R. 638, Buller, J. says,—“ If
an act undertaken to be done is dispensed with by the other party
it is sufficient to state it on the record.”
As to the fifth plea, no action is contemplated by the Act to be
brought by the Sheriff unless he has sustain ed an injury. If a
debtor escape, he may assign the bond to the Plaintiff at whose
suit he was confined, or else it stands in effect an indemnity to him
against any loss or damage by reason thereof.
\Chipman, C. J.—The bond is given by the lav,, and if forfeited,
why should not the Sheriff sue on it; it only protects the Sheriff for
enlarging the walls of the gaol. The bond is intended as a guard to
the Sheriff in respect of damages ; he is entitled to the amount of
any damages he may have sustained, and no more, under the sta
tute ; then what is the quantum of damages the Plaintiff in this case
is entitled to recover.—The bond is in effect an indemnity bond.]
Chipman, Chief Justice :
This is an action of debt on a bond commonly called a lmii>
bond., given by the Defendants to the Plaintiff, as Sheriff of the
K
County
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County of Charlotte, under the Act of Assembly, 10 & 11 G. 4,
c. 30, s. 13. After recapitulating the pleadings as before stated,
his Honor continued :—This demurrer has been argued during the
present term, and now stands for judgment. With regard to the
second and third pleas which may be considered together, it is not
necessary for the decision of this case to determine, either on the
one hand, whether the Sheriff after having given a party the liberty
of the gaol limits upon the requisite bond being entered into, may,
against the will of the party, replace him in closeicustody within
the walls of the gaol; nor on the other hand, whether the party
himself or his bail, may, against the will of the Sheriff, make a
surrender into such close custody, The essential allegation in
both these pleas is, “ that the Sheriff received the debtorf when
so re-delivered to close custody, as stated in the second plea, upon
a render by the sureties, and as stated in the third plea, upon a
render by the debtor himself.
Being then delivered up, and received into close custody again,
the operation of the limit bond necessarily ceased, for this bond by
the express tenor of the condition, was only to be in force while
the party had the liberty of the gaol limits. Upon this single and
short ground, I am of opinion that there must be judgment for the
Defendants on the second and third pleas.
Upon the demurrer to tlie fifth plea, I am of opinion there must
be judgment for the Plaintiff. The plea is no answer to the con
dition of the Bond; it admits that the condition of the bond has
not been complied with, and alleges that the Plaintiff hath sus
tained no damage thereby. Non damnificatus is a good plea only
when the condition of a bond is merely to indemnify.
When the condition of a bond is for the fulfilment or performance
of any particular thing, and not merely to save the Plaintiff from
any damage by reason of such thing, the Defendant must set forth
specially the performance of the condition.
Botsford, J:
I shall forbear to give an opinion as to the fifth plea, but as to
the second and third pleas, I am satisfied they contain a full and
sufficient answer to the condition of the bond, and therefore upon
those pleas the Defendant is entitled to judgment.
Carter, J.:
I am also of opinion that there is sufficient in the second and
third pleas to answer the condition of the bond.
When the escape took place the Defendant had not his liberty
withii. the gaol limits, and the condition of the bond was only that
he should not escape while he had such liberty.
Without deciding the question on a render by the sureties, or by
the debtor himself, or their right to make such reader, or upon a
taking
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taking into close custody by the Sheriff against the will of the
debtor, it is sufficient to determine this case, that the Sheriff re
ceived the debtor and had him in close custody.
There is also a further allegation in the second plea, upon which
it is not now necessary to decide ; but it might have been argued
that the escape took place by the sufferance and permission of the
Sheriff.
As to the fifth plea I had considerable doubts, but have now a
strong opinion that the plea is insufficient.
Parker, J.:
I quite agree in opinion with the rest of the Court. The fact,
as substantially set out in both the second and the third pleas,
“ that the debtor was rendered to, and received by the Sheriff in
the gaol, and kept there in discharge of the bond until released by
him,” is, I think, a sufficient answer to the action of the Sheriff
thereon.
The demurrer to the fifth plea is, in my opinion, sustainable.
Non damnificatus is a good plea to an action on a bond only where
the condition is specifically for indemnity, for in that case it denies
that the condition has been broken;—Carthew, 374, and 5 Mod.
243. In the present case the plea admits a breach of the condition.
It must be remarked that the form of the limit bond has been
prescribed by the Legislature, who would have given a different
one, or might specially have authorized the plea of non damnifica
tus, had they intended that the bond should not be available to the
Sheriff, until he had actually sustained damage himself in conse
quence of the debtor going at large.
Judgment for Defendant on the second and third pleas.
J. W. Chandler for Plaintiff.
The Solicitor General and A. L. and G. D. Street for Defendants.
ELLIS v. NEWTON.
Where the affidavit, oil shewing cause, contradicts the one on which the
rule was obtained, the latter must prevail.

F. A. Kinnear, in last Trinity Term, obtained a rule nisi to set
aside a judgment as in case of a nonsuit in this cause for surprize ;
the rule was served on the Defendant’s Attorney on 31st August.
D. L. Robinson now shewed cause on affidavit.

Per Curiam.
The rule must be discharged ; the facts are differently stated in
the affidavits, and in such cases the affidavit of the party shewing
cause must prevail.
There was great laches in not serving the rule nisi at an earlijtr
period.
GIBBS
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GIBBS v. DeVEBER.
Security for costB will not be granted, unless application be made in due
time.
A rule nisi for security for costs in this cause was obtained by
Wilmot in last Trinity Term.
J. W. Chandler, for Plaintiff, shewed cause,—1st. On affidavits
which stated that the Plaintiff’s absence was only temporary.—
Issue was joined in Trinity, 1834. The Plaintiff went to England
in January, 1835, to seek evidence in the cause, and was shortly
expected to return.
2d. The Defendant was too late in his aDplication, having known
of the Plaintiff’s absence previous to last Easter Term.
Rule discharged.

JOHNSTON v. BRANSFIELD.
Two writs for the same cause of action were simultaneously issued to dif
ferent Counties, and Defendant was arrested on both and bail entered there
on ; Plaintiff’s Attorney immediately notified Defendant’s Attorney of the
fact, and only filed declaration on the one writ. Held that judgment of non
pros cannot be .igned on the other. The proper course is to apply to the
Court for relief.

The Plaintiff sued out two writs against Defendant, returnable
in Hilary, 1835, one to York, the other to Carleton; both were
indorsed on oath for the same amount. The Defendant was ar
rested in York in November, and immediately entered special bail,
of which notice was given to the Plaintiff’s Attorney. In Decemner he was arrested in Carleton, and again entered special bail, of
which notice was also given, lhe Plaintiff’s Attorney then ap
prized the Defendant’s Attorney that there was but one cause of
action, and expressed his intention to discontinue on the second
writ. In June a declaration was filed, but the second recognizance
remaining m force, the Defendant afterwards signed a judgment
of non. pros.
Wilmot for Plaintiff, in Trinity Term obtained a rule nisi to set
aside the judgment for irregularity, a declaration having been filed
in the cause previous to the judgment.
J. A. Street for Defendant, now shewed cause, contending that
the judgment of non. pros. applied to the writ which was set out
in the record, and that there having been two arrests, it was not
competent for the Plaintiff after the arrest made, and bail entered,
to assert there was only one cause of action ; and even if such were
the case, a judgment of non. pros, might be signed as to part of
the action without affecting another part.—2 Ch. Arch Pr. (1835'
893, Dordsy m Cook, 4 B. and C. 135.

Per
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Per Curiam.
The leading fact in this case is, that there is but one cause which
has been put an end to by a judgment cf non. pros. which is irre
gular, a declaration having been filed previous to the signing of
the judgment. It is competent for a I laintiff to sue writs into
different Counties, and if in this cause there has been an irregula
rity, the Defendant has misconceived his remedy; he should have
applied to the Court for relief. The rule was made absolute with
out costs; and on the application of the Defendant, it was further
ordered, that an exoneretur should be entered on the bail-piece last
given, and that the Plaintiff shotdd pay to the Defendant his costs
of entering such last-mentioned bail and appearance.
Wilmot for Plaintiff.
J. A. Street and Berton for Defendant.
CALIFF v. WILSON.
When a person having authority by law, as contra-distinguished from an
authority in fact, abuses that authority, this abuse of the authority makes
every thing under it void.

Trespass for taking and carrying away Fish Nets, &c.
The Defendant pleaded,—1st. The General Issue; and 2dly,
justified the taking as an overseer of the fisheries, for that the said
net was set contrary to the provisions of the Act of Assembly, 8
G. 4, c. 11, and averred that the said nets were not claimed within
five days, and were thereupon sold as forfeited, pursuant to the
said Act. Flamtiff replied, that the nets were claimed within the
time limited, on which issue was joined.
The cause was tried at the August Circuit in Charlotte, and a
verdict given for the Plaintiff.
J. W. Chandler for Defendant, moved for a rule nisi to set aside
the verdict and grant a new trial, on the ground that trespass was
not sustainable, inasmuch as the original taking by the Defendant
having been legal, there was not proved any such subsequent act
as would make the Defendant a trespasser, ab initio.
Chipman, Chief Justice:
There were in this case two issues,—1st. The General Issue.
2d. That the Plaintiff did not appear to claim the nets within the
time limited by law. Both these issues have been found in favor
of the Plaintiff, and it thereby appears on the record, that the De
fendant after, and notwithstanding the claim of the goods made by
the Plaintiff, sold them ; if this is not such an act as would make
the Defendant a trespasser, ab tnitiu^ the Defendant can move in
arrest of judgment; but the case is so clear that it not necesoarv
further to agitate the question.
It
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It is clear that when a person having authority by law, as con
tra-distinguished from an authority in fact, abuses that authority,
this abuse of the authority makes every thing done under it void.
It is not, however, a mere negative abuse of the authority that will
have this effect. There must be some positive act, not a mere
non-feasance; some direct invasion of property, to make the whole
proceeding void, and the party a trespasser, ab initio. What then
is the present case ? The law provides that if the nets seized are
not claimed in a certain time they shall be forfeited and sold;—in
tics case they were claimed within the time limited by law, and
therefore no forfeiture was incurred; the Defendant nevertheless
went on to sell and deliver the nets as if they were forfeited. This
was a direct invasion of the property of the Plaintiff, and made the
Defendant a trespasser, ab initio, and all his proceedings void. The
case of the estray, reported in 1 T. R. 12, Oxley v. Watts, is
directly in point.
The seizure here was originally lawful, but became unlawful by
reason of the subsequent sale, when not forfeited according to law,
and the Defendant is therefore rightfully mulcted in all the dama
ges arising from his proceedings.
Botsford, J. concurred.
Carter, J.:
If there was anything in this objection, it appears on the record,
and the Defendant might have demurred, or moved for a nonsuit,
or may move in arrest of judgment, but clearly there is no ground
for an application for a new trial.
1 agree with his Honor the Chief Justice, that there is nothing
in the point taken by the learned Counsel; the illegal sale was an
act which made the party a trespasser, ab initio, and rendered him
liable for all the damage the Plaintiff sustained in consequence of
such sale. In Cornyn’s Digest, Tres. C. 2, are two cases of acts
which make a man a trespasser, ab initio, which seem applicable
to the present case. “ If a purveyor who takes my cattle for the
“ King’s honour—sells them.”
“ If a man has authority given by statute, and does not pursue,
“ or abuses his power; as if a man having authority by statute, 2
“ W. and M., to sell a distress for rent if it be not replevied within
“ five days after notice! he sells it without notice given.”
In both these cases the original taking was legal, but the sub
sequent sale was illegal, and therefore the man was a trespasser,
ab initio.
Parker, J.:
I agree with his Honor the Chief Justice and my brethren. This
was an action of trespass to personal property. The Defendant,
it was proved, took, carried away, and disposed of the Plaintiff’s
goods
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goods. The defence set up was such as could ouly be available on
a special plea of justification. This justification was so leaded,
and an issue joined thereon, which being found for the Plaintiff,
destroys this defence. The only other issue was the general issue,
denying the fact of the taking, ar.d which was necessarily found
for the Plaintiff on the evidence. I think the verdict was clearly
right on both the issues, and ought not to be disturbed.
Rule refused.

PINE AND ANOTHER v. M‘LACHLAN.
The Court will, in their discretion, allow a party to amend his declara
tion, on payment of costs.
The Defendant demurred to the Plaintiff’s declaration. De

murrer books were delivered to the Court, and the cause^entered
in the special paper for argument.
J. W. Chandler for Defendant, moved for leave to amend his
declaration on payment of the costs of the demurrer ; 1 Arch. Prac.
479. The Solicitor General suggested that the rule, as to amend
ments at the present stage, was not general, but applicable only to
special demurrers.—Sed

Per Curiam.
This is a matter in the discretion of the Court, and we think the
Plaintiff should have leave to amend on payment of costs.

BLACK AND OTHERS v. KIRK.
Where a Judge has reported the material question in a cause to be the
construction of a deed, under which Plaintiff seeks to recover for use and
occupation, the case is clearly within the exception of the Act 50 G. 3, c. 17.

R. L. Hazen obtained a rule nisi in Michaelmas, to enter a sug
gestion to deprive the Plaintiffs of costs, under the Act of Assem
bly, 50 G. 3, c. 17. The action was assumpsit. The declaration
contained counts for use and occupation; for wharfage and slippage
of vessels, and the common money courts.
At the trial before Carter, J. at the St. John Circuit in June,
the Plaintiffs obtained a verdict for £4. Carter, J. now reported
the cause as an action brought to try the right to a wharf and part
of a slip in the City of St. John, and the wharfage appurtenant
thereto. The Plaintiffs proved their title to the premises under
the will of the late Hon. John Black ; and also put in evidence a
conveyance made by the said John Black to L. Donaldson, of ad
joining premises, which the Defendant had occupied under Do
naldson. It was proved that the Defendant’s vessels, while lying
at Donaldson’s wharf, had extended oyer the Plaintiff’s property
and
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and that the Defendant had received the wharfage dues of othei
vessels similarly situated. Notice had been given to him of the
Plaintiff’s claims. The defence rested on the construction of a
particular clause in the Deed of Black to Donaldson, which his
Honor corceived to be clearly in favor of the Plaintiffs; and that
as they had made out their title to the freehold of the property, so
partially occupied as aforesaid, they were entitled to recover ; and
directed the jury accordingly. That the amount of damages was
not very material, the action being brought to try the right, and so
specifically stated in the bill of particulars. His Honor considered
that the freehold had been in question.
N. Parker shewed cause at this Term. The action was of an
intricate nature, in which damages were not the object, but the
settlement of an important right; it was tried by a special jury,
and certified as a proper cause for a special jury; the amount of
the demand, if insisted on, would have exceeded £‘25, and besides
the title of the freehold was expressly in question. He cited Drew
v. Fletcher, 1 B. & C. 283; Axon v. Dallimore, 3 D. & R. 51.
R. L. Hazen, in support of tlie rule, urged that the Plaintiffs’
case did not affect the freehold ; the Defendant did not claim that;
the question was more in the nature of a right of way claimed by
Defendant over the Plaintiffs’ property. An easement, 12 E. 162.
The action was for money had and received, in which the title to
the freehold could not be tried; the Plaintiff called for and gave in
evidence the Defendant’s deed, but the Defendant made no ques
tion as to the freehold, and called no witnesses.
The difficulty or intricacy of the case formed no sufficient objection
to its trial before the Inferior Tribunal, if by its amount it was con
fined to it by the A ct of Assembly. Keay v. Rigg, 1 B. & P. 11.
Botsford, J.:
Referred to Double v. Gibbs, 1 Dowl. Pr. C. 533, and Sandby
v. Miller, 5 East. 194. Holden v. Newman, 13 East. 160, was
also referred to.

Per Curiam.
The Act of Assemble 50 G. 3, c. 17, excepts from the jurisdic
tion of Justices of the Peace, actions wherein the freehold of lauds
may in any way come in question. The learned Judg J has re
ported the material question to have been the construction of a
deed under which the Plaintiffs’ right to recover for the occupation
of then: land was disputed, and he considered the freehold in ques
tion ; the case is therefore clearly within the exception of the Act.
Parker, J. having been concerned in the cause when at the
bar, gave no opinion.
Rule discharged with costs.
N. Parker for Plaintiffs.
DOE
R. L. Hazen for Defendant.
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DOE EX DLM DUNCAN v. CHRISTOPHER.
Where no verdict has been given, a nonsuit will not be granted by the
Court above, on a point reserved at the trial.

THIS was an action of ejectment, tried before Parker, J. at the
Gloucester Assizes in September. At the trial, a motion for non
suit was over-ruled, but leave was given to move in banc upon
the point reserved, and the case went to the jury. After the jury
had retired, a juror was taken suddenly ill, and it being considered
by a physician, who by direction cf the Court had visited hiri in
the jury room, that his illness was of an alarming nature, and re
quired immediate medical aid, the parties not being able to come
to any agreement, his Honor discharged the jury.
J. A. Street at this Term moved for a rule nisi, for a nonsuit
on the point reserved at the trial.—Sed

Per Curiam.
The point cannot new be considered ; there is no verdict to set
aside ; the cause has not in fact been tried, but stands as a remanet.
Rule refused.
FLAHERTY «. SAYRE.
Unless the husband be directly interested in the subject matter of the
suit, the wife is a competent witness for either party.

THIS was an action of trover, tried before Carter, J. at the
Westmorland Assizes in September last.
The Plaintiff offered in evidence a bill of sale to him of the pro
perty in question, made by John Smyth and William Smyth. 'I re
instrument was attested by two witnesses, one of whom was proved
to be out cf the Province, and evidence was given of his hand
writing ; the other witness was the wife of John Smyth before
mentioned.
The Plaintiff proposed to give evidence of her hand-writing, but
it appearing that she was within the Province,
J. Stewart, for Defendant, objected to the evidence as inadmis
sible ; the witness ought to be produced.
A. Stewart contended, that the witness being the wife of a per
son immediately interested in the event of the suit,. was incompe
tent, and could not be examined, if produced ; and he submitted
that the deed was sufficiently proved by the evidence of the hand
writing of the other subscribing witness ; that it was unnecessary
to go further, as it appeared that Mrs. Smyth, at the time of her
attestation, was incompetent; the deed was therefore the same as
if the name did not appear on the face of it. He cited 5 T R.
271, Swire v. Bell, and Roscoe’s Evidence, 68.
E. B. Chandler
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E. B. Chandler and J. Stewarl submitted that the incompetency
of the witness was occasioned by the interest of her husband,
through whom the Plaintiff claimed title to the property, and they
had it in their power, by releasing the husband, to make her com
petent—knowing her to be interested, the Plaintiff had made In r
a witness, and could not now object to her competency. 3 Camp.
195, Honeywood v. Peacock. The deed could not be read without
the testimony of the attesting witness.
Carter, J. was of opinion that the witness should be pro
duced.
The Plaintiff not being able to produce the witness, and the bill
of sale being the foundation of their action, they became non
suited.
The Solicitor General at this Term moved for a rule nisi to set
aside the nonsuit for the improper rejection of the testimony. No
notice of the motion had been given to the Judge.
Chipman, Chief Justice:
The rule requiring notice of motion to be given to the Judge,
appears not to have been fully understood, and therefore as Mr.
Justice Carter has his notes in Court, we will hear this motion ;
but it is to be distinctly understood that the rule requiring notice
to the Judge of motions for new trials, is to apply to all cases,
whether the points be reserved or not.
The Solicitor General, in addition to the arguments used at the
trial, urged, that if the wife had not been a witness, then the proof
necessary to establish the deed was completed,■ that she being in
competent at the time of the execution, the attestation by her was
a nullity. It was unnecessary for the Plaintiffs to bring or pro
duce the witness, if in fact she would have been objectionable when
produced. The learned Counsel took a distinction between this
and the case if the wife had been the only witness, then there
would have been no evidence to establish the deed ; at the trial
moreover, evidence of the vender’s hand-writing was offered. He
cited the case mentioned at nisi prius, and also 1 Star. Ev. 103,337.
On a subsequent day the Court refused the rule.
Chipman, Chief Justice :
The ground of the incompetency of a wife as a witness, is the
interest of her husband in the subject matter of the suit; but it did
not appear in the present case that the husband had any interest
in the suit. His Honor mentioned a case in 1 Strange, 504, cited
in Bac. Abr. Tit. Ev. A., where in an action for goods sold, a wife
was admitted to prove the goods delivered on the husband’s credit,
and observed that this case was much stronger; the husband in
the case in Strange might have been subject to a legal demand in
consequence of the wife’s evidence; it did not appear that even
this
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this would be the effect in the present case. If this objection to
the wife’s competency should be sustained, a wife never could be a
witness to prove the signature of her husband.
The Solicitor General and A. Stewart for Plaintiff.
J. Stewart and E. B. Chandler for Defendant.
MARTINDALE & WIFE v. MURPHY & WIFE.
In defamation for calling a woman a whore,—Held a sufficient induce
ment to aver that Defendant intended to impute unchastity, without averring
a specific offence.

This was an action on the case for defamatory words spoken by
the Defendant’s wife of the wife of the Plaintiff, tried before Parker,
J. at the last Northumberland Circuit, to which the General Issue
was pleaded, and a verdict given for the Plaintiff on the third
count, with £32 damages.
The declaration contained the usual averment of good character,
and that the words were spoken with the intent to impute unchas
tity,—the expressions charged were very gross, but the material
words were,—“ She is a d—d strumpet, and J. P’s whore
there was no inuendo explanatory of the words.
J. A. Street, for the Defendant, moved in arrest of judgment,
and contended that the words were not actionable in themselves,
nor had the Plaintiffs put such a construction on them in their de
claration as would make them actionable, and there was no allega
tion or proof of special damage. The Act of Assembly, 31 G. 3,
c. 5, which had been referred to at the trial in support of the action,
applied only to certain specific offences, viz., incest, adultery, and
fornication, neither of which were necessarily comprehended un
der the term unchastity, as that term would equally apply to the
adultery of the heart, which was in the Scripture considered as
much a crime as the commission of the act itself; unchastity might
be imputed without any charge of the offences to which the Act of
Assembly refers ; and the declaration, n order to sustain the action,
ought to have charged a specific imputation of adultery or forni
cation.

Per Curiam.
Under the Act of Assembly, a charge of this nature is clearly
objectionable in this Province, if the words are such as to impute
the offences thereby made actionable in the temporal courts. The
words in this declaration, calling a married woman a strumpet and
J. P’s whore, admit of no ambiguity or doubt. Unchastity is a
general term, like theft, which may include various particulars.
To call a man a sheep stealer, thereby meaning to impute theft, is
an analogous case. There is nothing in the inducement (supposing
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it to be material,) which can be take n to contract or abridge th«
natural and commonly received import of the words spoken.
Rule refused.
IV CarmarfifoT Plaintiffs.
Street Kerr for Defendants.

CLARKE v. ROBINSON.
The Court will not set aside a verdict to enable Defendant to set up a
release from Plaintiff, given prior to the trial, where it appears that the me
ritorious cause of action is in the wife, and the defence is unconscionable.

Assumpsit. Tried before Parker, J. at Northumberland, in
September last. Verdict for Plaintiff.
J. A. Street, for Defendant, moved on affidavits, for a rule nisi,
to set aside the verdict. The affidavits stated that a release had
been Bxecuteu by the Plaintiff previous to the trial, and that he
had not authorized the bringing, of the action. The release was
annexed to the affidavits, and contained a certificate that the
Plaintiff bad not authorized the bringing of the action ; this was
dated 19th August, 1835. It appeared that the Plaintiff formerly
resided in this Province, but had left it some years ago, and was
now living in the United States, separated from his wife, who had
been left by him at Miramiclii.
This action was instituted by her for wages due her from De
fendant for services performed subsequent to her husband’s depar
ture. When the case was put at issue, the Defendant went to the
residence of the Plaintiff at Calais, in the State of Maine, and pro
cured a full release. The Defendant’s affidavit further stated that
he was prevented by illness from getting to Miramiclii in time for
the trial, and that he did in fact arrive the evening of the day on
which the case was tried.
It was urged that although the action was for the .services of the
wife, yet being in the name of the husband, who alone was entitled
to the money, if recovered, his release and acknowledgment were
sufficient to induce the Court to interpose and prevent his having
the benefit of a verdict, which had been obtained in consequence of
the return of the Defendant having been delayed by illness. An
application had bean made at nisi prius to put off the trial on an
affidavit of the Defendant’s Attorney, which however was admitted
to be insufficient.
The following authorities were cited---8 Taun. 206 ; Cov. and
Huglied, lit Illg; 10 Mod. Rep. 202; 2 Chitty’s Arch. Pr.
927 ; 2 Salk, 618; 3 Taun. 484 ; Pratt. Dig. 629.

Per Curiam.
This is an application to the equitable jurisdiction of the Court,
to
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to re-open a cause for the purpose of admitting an unconscionable
defence. The Plaintiff had abandoned his wife—she was compelled
to seek her own livelihood, and earned an amount by her industry,
to recover which she instituted this action necessarily in the name
of her husband; the Defendant did not attempt to meet her claim
on any just or meritorious ground, but went out of the Province in
quest of the Plaintiff, in order to procure a release, which would
cut up by the roots the demand against him ; had he been in time,
probably in law, the release, if pleaded puis darien continuance,
would have been a bar to the action, but having failed in that, he
is not entitled to the least favor ; he has not shewn that any actual
adjustment of accounts or fair settlement took place between him
and t’ne Plaintiff, upon which the discharge was founded; he has
no right to appeal to the equitable jurisdiction of the Court.
Rule refused.
End and Wheeler for Plaintiff.
J. A. Street and Kerr for Defendant.

HOLMES L. CLARKE.
Where personal property of the Defendant is in the actual possession of
Plaintiff under an agreement, the latter may maintain trespass against the
former for the forcible taking.

This was an action of trespass, tried before Parker, J. at the
Carleton Assizes in September.
The declaration contained several counts for trespass, quare
clausum fregit, and others, de bonis asportatis.
An agreement was put in evidence by the Plaintiff, by which it
appeared that the Defendant had let to the Plaintiff the premises
in question for the years 1834 and 1835, and vqSAianted “ to fur
nish a team for the use of the farm
in a subsequent part of the
instrument it was mentioned that “Defendant should have the
mare to ride when not employed on the farm.” The Defendant
reserved a part of the house and farm to himself, and had a right
of access over every part of it.
It appeared that the Defendant was dissatisfied at the Plaintiff’s
manner of working the farm, and had declared that if he did not
furnish more labour, he, the Defendant, would not allow him to
remain on the place or use the team.
It was proved that there was a team of horses on the farm be
longing to the Defendant which the Plaintiff had been in the habit
of using in ploughing and other farming operations.
On the 7th of May, the Plaintiff and his son took the horses of
this team from the barn, and were getting them ready to put to
rhe plough, when the Defendant interfered with much violence,
and took them from them, and returned them to the barn.—The
other
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other trespasses complained of were abandoned, and the Plaintiff’s
case rested upon this alone.
The Solicitor General and Berton moved for a nonsuit, on the
ground that the horses in question were the property of the De
fendant, in his barn, and in his possession ; and that the fact pro
ved did not amount to an act of trespass, but a breach of contract.
The Plaintiff had not such an exclusive possession of the horses as
would support trespass.
PARKER, J. over-ruled the objection, but reserved the point for
the consideration of the Court in banc. Tin; learned Judge left it
to the jury to consider whether the team of horses in question was
that which, by the terms of the agreement, was to be furnished by
the Defendant; stating it as his opinion, if that were the case, that
the Plaintiff had at the time such a possession as would enable him
to maintain trespass even against the Defendant himself for forcibly
taking them away. His Honor confined the attention of the
jury, in assessing the damages, strictly to the act of trespass,
and the injury immediately resulting to the Plaintiff thereupon.—
A verdict was returned for the Plaintiff with £4 damages, to set
aside which, and enter a nonsuit,
The Solicitor General now moved for a rule nisi; he contended
that the act of the Defendant was only a refusal to allow the Plain
tiff to use his (the Defendant’s) horses, or to furnish a team ; and
that if the Plaintiff had thereby sustained damage, his remedy was
by action on the agreement, and not for trespass.
[Chipman, C. J.—If the Plaintiff had been ploughing, could
Defendant have taken the horses from the plough.]
If the horses were engaged in ploughing, then the presumption
would have been that the Defendant had allowed them to be taken
for the day; but as it was, when the Plaintiff was about to take
them, the Defendant stopped him. The property was in the De
fendant, and even if the Plaintiff had a right to take the horses
without reference to the Defendant, his right was only that of a
tenant in common, and would not sustain trespass. 1 T. R. 658.
Chipman, Chief Justice :
Had no doubt upon the question. By the agreement, the De
fendant let to Plaintiff his farm for two years, and agreed to pro
vide a horse team ; the import of the expression was that the
Plaintiff should be put in possession of the team for the use of the
farm. The subsequent part of the agreement explained any am
biguity as to the intention*of the parties, and provided that the
Defendant should have the use of the mare, when not engaged at
farming, for riding; the definite article implied a specific team
provided. The question put to the jury was, whether the horses
were the team provided for the use of the farm. In point of fact
they
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they were not in the stable, but were in the Plaintiff's hands for
actual use on the farm, when the Defendant took them. I thiuk
a clear case of possession was proved, and that the verdict should
not be disturbed.
BOTSFORD, J. :
The agreement produced was a lease of a farm on shares, in a
way very common in the country. The Defendant reserved a
part of it; all the rest was let to the Plaintiff on certain conditions.
The Defendant had a qualified right to the mare to use her for
riding, when not engaged on the form.
The verdict establishes that the horses were furnished under the
agreement, and it appears that they were in actual use—when they
were taken they were in the possession of the Plaintiff, and the
Defendant had no right to take them.
Carter, J. concurred.
Parker, J.:
I thought at the trial, and so stated, that it would have been
better if the action had been on the agreement, as thereby the ma
terial matters in dispute between the parties would have been set
tled, which were necessarily excluded from consideration in this
action, and I took much pains to confine the attention of the jury
strictly to the particular act of trespass proved. There was direct
evidence that a team of horses was on the farm, which the Plain
tiff had been in the habit of using in the farming operations, to the
exclusive possession of which for that purpose I considered him
entitled under the agreement, at the time they were taken away
by the Defendant.
The jury have by their verdict established the point that the
horses were in the Plaintiff’s possession under the agreement, and
I think there is no ground to disturb it.
Rule refused.
Beardsley and Wilmot for Plaintiff.
The Solicitor General, Berton and Needham, for Defendant.

BRANSFIELD v. BISHOP, WHITE, & Two Others.
In an action of trespass for taking Plaintiff’s ox,—Held that Defendant’s
admission that he had killed the ox and ought to pay for it, was not suffi
cient to make him a trespasser without proof of the trespass.

Trespass for taking cattle, tried before Parker, J. at the Carle
ton i Circuit in last September.
There was evidence that the Plaintiff’s oxen had been at differ
ent times employed in the work of the several Defendants, and
that one of the oxen while ploughing for White had been seriously
injured, and afterwards died. But supposing these to have been
acts
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acts of trespass, there was nothing to shew a connection between
the Defendants, except a declaration made by White, that “ they
had killed the ox, and ought to pay Bransfield for him.”
At the close of the Plaintiff’s case, the learned Judge required
the Plaintiff’s Counsel to elect against which of the Defendants
he would proceed.
Berton, for Plaintiff, elected to proceed against Bishop, and
claimed also to be allowed to proceed against White, because his
admission was sufficient to connect him with any other Defendant.
This not being objected to by Robinson, the Defendants’ Counsel,
was allowed, and the other two Defendants were thereupon ac
quitted.
On the part of the Defendants, evidence was given that the
Plaintiff’s agent had the cattle, and had used them in the service
of the Defendants respectively, and some evidence of his authority
from the Plaintiff was also given.
His Honor directed the jury that they might find against the
two Defendants jointly, or against either of them individually ; if
jointly, then only for the trespass proved against Bishop ; ar.d left
it to them to consider if the cattle were in the possession of the
Plaintiff’s agent, and if he had authority to use or permit them to
be used, or if the Defendants were ignorant of his want of autho
rity ; stating it as bis opinion, that the Defendants’ act in using
the cattle by permission of the Plaintiff’s agent, was not a trespass,
if the oxen had been left in the agent’s possession, and the Defend
ants were ignorant of his want of authority so to employ them.
Verdict for Defendants.
Berton, for Pla' itiff, moved to set aside the verdict, as being
against evidence, and contended that the admission of White was
conclusive against him, and without reference to the other De
fendants, entitled the Plaintiff to a verdict against him.—Sed

Per Curiam.
White’s admission might be sufficient to charge him with the
value of the ox; but connected with the other evidence, is not suf
ficient to make him a trespasser. It is consistent with his admis
sion to suppose that he hired or obtained the oxen from the autho
rized agent of the Plaintiff, and if so, and the ox were injured, the
Plaintiff’s remedy would not be by action of trespass.
Parker, J. intimated that he had submitted the cause to the
jury against both Defendants, in the manner already stated, at the
instance of the Plaintiff’s Counsel, ■which was not objected to on
the other side; but he thought it had been left much more broadly
than even the Plaintiff’s case justified.
Rule refused.
Berton and Needham, for Plaintiff.
L. Robinson for Defendants.
FERGUS
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FERGUS v. M'INTOSH.
Costs of a commission to examine witnesses are, under 5 W. 4, c. 34
costs in the cause.

Chandler moved on affidavit to have the expenses of issuing a
commission to examine witnesses and in taking the depositions,
allowed in the costs of the cause.

Per Curiam.
Let the costs of the commission and depositions be made costs
in the cause ; under the late Act of Assembly such expenses are
made part of the costs.
L. Robinson—Am Cur mentioned a case, Barlow v. The Saint
John Marine Insurance Company, in Easter, 1830, where on mo
tion the Court ordered a review of the taxation, and the Master to
allow £10 10s. costs of executing a commission.

M

ACT OF ASSEMBLY

6 Wm. 4, Cap. XIV.

An Act to provide for reporting and publishing the decisions of
the Supreme Court.
Passed 8th March, 1836.

i TfATHEREAS it is an object of great importance to obtain
v ▼ ‘ correct reports of the decisions of the Supreme Court
‘ in cases heard and determined in the said Court—
I. Be it therefore enacted by the Lieutenant Governor, Legisla
tive Council and Assembly, That His Excellency the I. ieutenant
Governor or Commander in Chief of this Province for the time
being, by and with the advice of His Majesty’s Executive Council,
is hereby authorized to appoint some suitable person, learned in the
law, to be a Reporter of the opinions, decisions, and judgments,
which may from time to time be given, made and pronounced, by
the Supreme Court of Judicature in this Province, or the Judges
thereof, in, upon or respecting causes pending or that may here
after be pending therein ; and that it shall be the duty of such Re
porter, by his personal attendance, or by any other means in his
power, to obtain true and authentic reports of such opinions, de
cisions and judgments ; and such Reporter shall publish not less
than two hundred copies of the same in pamphlets, after each
Term of the said Court.
II. And be it enacted, That the sole liberty of printing and re
printing, and publishing such reports, shall be and the same is
i-erebv vested in and secured to the author and compiler thereof,
his heirs and assigns ; and if any person shall print, repr nt or pub
lish any such reports, without the consent of the author and com
piler or proprietor thereof, he shall be liable to an action on the
case, at the suit of such proprietor, in which action such proprietor
shall recover double the damages he may have sustained by any
such infringement of the copy rieht hereby secured to him.
III.
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III. And be it enacted, That in addition to any profits that may
arise from the publication and sale of such reports, such Reporter
shall receive annually from the Province Treasury the sum of fifty
pounds, to be paid by warrant of His Excellency the Lieutenant
Governor or Commander in Chief for the time being, on the cer
tificate of the Chief J ustice of the said Court, that such Reporter
has diligently performed the duties by this Act required of him for
the year for which such allowance may be claimed.
IV. And be it enacted, That this Act shall be and continue in
force for three years and no longer.

BY AUTHORITY.

CIVIL APPOINTMENT.

George F. S. Berton, Esquire, to be Reporter of the de
cisions in the Supreme Court.
Royal Gazette

CASES TA MILABY TEK3I,
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WIGGINS v. WHITE, GARRISON AND WOODS.
Persons wlio jointly manufacture timber, which it is agreed shall be divi
ded between them, are not partners, but tenants in common, or joint owners,
and each has only a right to dispose of his own share.
Quere.—If any and what a<'ts of a tenant in common or joint owner of a
chattel, other than a destruction of the property, will enable his co-tenant
to maintain trespass or trover ?

THIS was an action of trespass, for taking a quantity of timber,
tried in last Trinity Term before Chipman, C. J. ;—the verdict
was for the Defendants. A rule nisi to set aside the verdict hav
ing been obtained, the rule was argued in Michaelmas Term, and
in this Term the Court pronounced their opinions.
The facts and circumstances of the case and the arguments of
Counsel are fully detailed in the opinions of the Court, and are
therefore omitted here.
Chipman, Chief Justice :
The only question which, I thinkrtshould be deci’ed under the
present circumstances of this case, is that which arises upon the
construction of the following agreement, made between the De
fendant Woods and one George A. Lockwood, and producedin
evidence on tlie part of the Plaintiff :—
“
“
“
“
“
“
“
“
“
“
“
“
“

“ This agreement made and entered into this day, between George A. Lockwood of the one part, and George Woods of the other part, witnessetli; the
said Woods is to make one thousand tons white pine timber on Little River at
the Grand Falls—pay the stumpage,
to pay half, and the si<id Woods to
advance,) and make said timber in such a place as not to have more than two
miles to haul on an average—each to find equal hands in cutting all main oads
through the timber and clearing the stream sufficient to drive said timber—
and said Lockwood is to haul said quantity of one thousand tons for one half on
the brow. Each party to find equal hands and supplies to drive, raft and take
the same to marke t. Said Woods to take all defective timber when re-examined at Saint John, and said Lockwood to take any timber that may remain in
the woods of the said quantity:—should he fail in hauling the whole quantity—
and should he be kept idle for want of timber to haul, his time to be paid for
by the said Woods. For the true and faithful performance of this agreement,
“ each
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“ each bind themselves uniu the other in the penal sum of five hundred pound*
“ of lawful money of New-Brunswick.
“ GEO. WOODS,
(Signed)
“ GEO. A. LOCKWOOD.
“ Dated the 18th day of Oct. 1831.
“ Witness present,
(Signed)
“John Grant.”

The parcel of timber which was in question in this cause, had
been made by Woods and hauled by Lockwood, under this agree
ment. It was rafted and carried to market at Saint John, under
circumstances which it is not at present necessary to advert to ;
and there it was taken by the Defendants Garrison and Woods
from the Plaintiff, who was in possession thereof, having derived
his title thereto from Lockwood. The Defendant Garrison was
proved to be the Deputy of the Defendant White, he being the
Sheriff of the City and County of Saint John, and Garrison was
considered by the witness who spoke to this transaction, as acting
in his capacity of Deputy Sheriff. This taking constituted the
trespass complained of in this action.
The view taken of the agreement at the trial, on the part of the
Plaintiff, was that it constituted a partnership between Woods and
Lockwood in the timber made and hauled under it—that Lock
wood had a right, as partner, to dispose of the partnership property
—that the sale by him, from which the Plaintiff derived his title,
operated as a valid transfer of the whole property in the timber in
question, and that the Defendants were trespassers in taking the
same from the Plaintiff.
On the part of the Defendants, it was contended at the trial, that
Woods, as the maker of the timber under the licence from the
Crown, which licence they gave in evidence, had originally the
sole property in him, which had never been changed ; that Lock
wood, by hauling the timber, gained no property therein, but only
a right to receive, as a remuneration for his labour in hauling the
same, a certain portion of thi timber, and that, until Woods had
allotted to him a specific part of the timber, as payment for his
services in this respect, no property in any of the timber vested in
him : that no such allotment having been made, the sale by Lock
wood did not alter the property in the timber, which remained iD
Woods, and he, therefore, had a right to take his own property
out of the Plaintiff’s possession.
On the argument for a new trial, a new view of the agreement
was presented by the learned Counsel for the Defendant, and it
was contended by him, that if "Woods was not the sole proprietor
of the timber in question, and if Lockwood had any right of pro
perty therein by virtue of the agreement, such right of property in
Lockwood was at most that of a tenant in common, and not thar
of a partner—that as tenant in common, Lockwood had only a
right
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right to dispose of his own undivided share, and, therefore, that the
sale by him, under which the Plaintiff derived his title, operated
only as a transfer of the property in one undivided moiety of the
timber, the property in the other undivided moiety still remaining
in Woods.—Woods being, in this view of the case, a tenant in
common with the Plaintiff, it was contended that the latter could
not maintain trespass against Woods for the bare act of taking
the timber, the common property of both, from the Plaintiff’s
possession.
Upon a review of the agreement, I am,-.'.in the first place, of
opinion, that it cannot be maintained that Lockwood had not, by
his acts under it, gained any property in the timber in question.
The most material stipulation on this point, is the following,—
“ said Lockwood is to haul said quantity of one thousand tons for
“ the one half on the brow.” It is further stipulated that “ each
“ party shall pay one half the stumpage
(the expression it w’ould
seem in common use among lumberers, for the purchase money of
the timber paid to the proprietor of the land, in this case, the
Crown.) And further, that each party is to find equal hands in
cutting main roads and clearing the stream, and equal hands and
supplies to drive, raft and take the timber to market.
The expression, “ for the one half on the browf necessarily
imports that the hauler is to have the property in one half on the
brow. The price stipulated for this property being not merely the
hauling, but his liability to pay one half of the stumpage, and to
provide for an equal share of the other expenses and labour speci
fied in the agreement.
It is clear from the subsequent part of the agreement, that it
was not intended that there should be a division of the timber on
the brow. Each party is to bear equally the expense of conveying
the whole timber from the brow to market, and it is not until the
timber reaches Saint John that a division is contemplated; and
upon the division, Woods is to take all defective timber, and Lock
wood to take any timber that may remain in the woods. An un
divided moiety is therefore clearly the nature and extent of Lock
wood’s property and interest in the timber on the brow under the
agreement; the property and interest in the other undivided
moiety being in Woods.
Each of the parties to this agreement, thus having the property
in one undivided moiety of the timber on the brow ; the next ques
tion is, whether under the stipulations of the agreement, this com
mon interest constituted a partnership between them.
In the case of Cooper v. Eyre, 1 H. Bl. 37, it is laid down by
Lord Loughborough, C. J. that “in order to constitute a partner“ ship, a communion of profit and loss is essential. The shares
“ must be joint, though it is not necessary that they should be
N
“ equal.
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“ equal. If tlie parties be jointly concerned in the purchase, they
“ must also be jointly concerned in the future sale, otherwise they
“ are not partners.”—Let us look, then, at the agreement in the
present case, for the purpose of ascertaining whether it contains
this essential condition of a community of profit and loss. The
parties, it is true, are as we have seen, to be jointly interested,
each in an undivided moiety, in the timber on the brow ; they are
to be jointly concerned in carrying the timber from the brow to the
market. But when the timber reaches the market at Saint John,
it is not to be sold or disposed of for their common profit or loss ;
but on the contrary, as we have seen, a division is to take place
according to the particular stipulations of the contract, and each
party would thereupon have the separate profit or loss upon his
own individual lot; and this circumstance it is, which is conclu
sive, to prevent the relation of partners arising between the parties
to this agreement, and to confine the nature of their common in
terest, to that of a mere tenancy in common, in the chattels which
are the subject of it. Nor is this a mere technical distinction with
out a substantial difference. It is a general rule of the law of
partnership, that each partner has a power, singly to dispose of the
whole partnership effects; but a mere tenant in common, where
the relations of partners does not exist, has a right only to dispose
of his own share. And I apprehend, that it would be entirely at
variance with the intent of this agreement, to consider it as giving
to each party a right to dispose of the share and property of the
other party, in the timber in which they had this undivided inter
est and possession. Upon the whole, I am clearly of opinion, that
the parties to this agreement, Woods and Lockwood, were tenants
in common, not partners, in the timber, which is the subject of this
suit, as it lay on the brow.
And here I think we should stop for the present, and let the case
go to a new trial, in order that the facts may be investigated, un
der this view of the rights of the parties which wrns not taken on
either side at the former trial. Such further investigation is, I
think, essential to the ends of justice, for the attention neither of
the parties nor of the Judge, at that trial, having been directed to
this view of the subject, the examination of the facts with reference
to what now appear to be the true bearings of the case, was im
perfect. This view of the case, moreover, might have elicited par
ticular questicns proper for the distinct consideration of the jury ;
as for instance, whether there was before the sale by Lockwood,
under which the Plaintiff claims, a severance of the tenancy in
common, and a vesting of the exclusive property in the lot of tim
her in question, in him,—and if this were not the case, and the
tenancy in common continued quite down to the taking of the tim
ber by the Defendants, whether there were circumstances attendant,
upon
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upon this taking, which would give one tenant in common a right
to maintain an action of trespass against his companion. As there
is to be a further investigation of the case, I abstain from expres
sing any opinion whatever upon the effect of any evidence bearing
upon these points at the former trial.
For the reasons I have stated, I think the rule for a new trial
should be made absolute.
Botsford, J. :
The question in this case must be governed by the agreement
made between Woods and Lockwood, by the terms of which,
Woods undertook to make one thousand tons of white pine timber,
and Lockwood was to haul the same for one half on the brow ;—
the former was to be at the expense of making the timber, the lat
ter to contribute his work and labour in hauling it; both were to be
equally concerned in making roads and clearing the stream suffi
ciently for driving the timber ; the stumpage, (so called,) was to
be paid by both, but in the first instance to be advanced by Woods ;
the timber was to be rafted and taken to Saint John at their joint
expense, and when re-examined at that place, Woods was to take
all the defective timber, and Lockwood all the timber that might
have remained in the woods.
By this agreement it would appear that the timber was to have
been divided between them at St. John, and not to have been sold
on their joint account; they were not to share with one another in
the profit or loss—each party was to have a distinct share or moiety
of the timber, and they were not jointly interested in the future
disposition or sale of it. There was not that community of profit
and loss which was held by Lord Loughborough, in Cooper v.
Eyre, (1 II. Bl. 37,) as essential to constitute a partnership. I
am therefore of opinion that Woods and Lockwood were not part
ners in this transaction, but tenants in common and joint owners
of the timber on the brow, each entitled to one undivided moiety
or half part thereof.
As it is clear that one tenant in common cannot lawfully dis
pose of the whole property held by him in common with another,
but only of his own share or interest, it consequently follows that
Lockwood could not sell more than his own undivided moiety or
share of the raft in question to Dibblee, and that the Plaintiff who
derived his right to the timber from Lockwood, through Dibblee,
cannot be in a better situation, but must be considered as the pur
chaser of one undivided moiety of the raft, which Lockwood owned
as tenant in common with Woods, whose right to the other undi
vided moiety had never been legally divested.
It is equally clear that one tenant in common cannot maintain
trespass or trover against a co-tenant. In Coke Lit. 199 and 323,
it is laid down, that “ if one tenant in common take all the chattel
personal,
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personal, the other hath no remedy by action, but may rake them
again.”—In Brown v. Hedges, (1 Salk, 290 , it was resolved,
“ one joint tenant, tenant in common or parcener, cannot bring
trover against another because the possession of one is the poi ses
sion of both.”
In Barnadiston v. Chapman, (4 E. 121,) it was said, that when
one tenant in common doth not destroy the thing in common, but
only takes it out of the possession of the others and carries it away,
there no action lies by the other tenant in common.”
The case cf Graves v. Sawcer, in Sir J. Raym. Rep. 15, is to
the same point.
Although the authorities deny the right of one tenant in com
mon to maintain trespass or trover against a co-tenant, there are
some circumstances which have been alluded to by his Honor the
Chief Justice, which make it necessary that this case should be
sent to another jury for further consideration.
Carter, J.:
As this case stands before the Court, the Plaintiff, Wiggins,
must rest his case entirely on the interest of Lockwood, in the
timber in question.
In order, therefore, to decide the case, it is necessary to ascer
tain clearly, what that interest was, wider the agreement put in
evidence by the Plaintiff.
In the course of the argument, three positions have been taken
with respect to this point,—1st. That Lockwood never had any
property whatever in the timber, but was merely to receive a cer
tain proportion in lieu of wages. 2d. That Woods and Lockwood,
under the agreement, became partners in the transaction, and
therefore a sale by Lockwood of the whole or any part, was good
against Woods ; and 3d. That Lockwood and Woods were, under
the terms of the agreement, tenants in common in the timber, and
Lockwood, by a separate sale, could only transfer his own interest
in the timber.
With respect to the first position, viz. that the sole property in
this timber was from first to last in Woods, it seems to me impos
sible to read the agreement, and for a moment think that such
could have been the intention of the parties, or the legal effect of
the words of the agreement; it seems to me quite clear, from that
agreement, that, at all events, on the brow, there was a joint pro
perty in Woods and Lockwood in the timber which had been
hauled ; the stumpage money was ultimately to be paid jointly—
the labour of cutting roads and clearing the stream was to be pro
vided jointly, as also the labour of driving, rafting and carrying
to market; indeed, the whole expense and labour of getting the
timber and carrying to market was to be joint, with this exception,
that
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that the whole of the making of the timber was to be done by
Woods, and the whole of the hauling by Lockwood.
Smith v. Watson, (2 B. & C. 401,) is an authority to shew that
under the terms of this agreement, there was a joint interest in the
timber. In that case it was decided that an agreement that a
broker, instead of brokerage, should receive a proportion of the
profits arising from the sale of goods purchased by hiift for a mer
chant, he at the same time bearing a proportion of the losses, did
not vest in the broker any share in the goods so purchased, or in
the proceeds. In that case, Mr. Justice Holroyd says,—“ If
Sampson, (the merchant,) had in terms agreed that Gill, (the
broker,) should have that proportion of the property itself, it would
no doubt have become the joint property of the two.” Then comes
the question, was the interest of the parties under this agreement
a partnership or joint tenancy by which one can dispose of the
whole property ; or, a tenancy in common, under which each can
only dispose of his own undivided moiety. The case of Barton v.
Williams, (5 B. and Aid. 395,) cited in the course of the argu
ment, quite satisfies me that under this agreement Woods and
Lockwood were tenants in common of the timber on the brow ;
the agreement contains no provision for that which is an essential
ingredient in the formation of a partnership between two persons,
inter se, viz. a participation in the profits and losses of the whole
transaction—it contains no provision for a joint sale of the timber,
or any division of the proceeds of such sale.
For these reasons, it appears to me, that under the agreement,
Woods and Lockwood were tenants in common of the timber on
the brow; and it therefore becomes unnecessary to consider any
argument founded on the doctrine of Mr. Justice Best, in Barton
v. Williams, in which he denies the right of each partner to dispose
of the whole partnership property, in the case of a partnership in a
particular instance, and confines it to partnerships in trading con
cerns generally. It follows from this that unless a division of the
property took place before the sale to Dibblee, Lockwood by that
sale could only transfer his own rights to Dibblee, and therefore
Dibblee would become tenant in common with Woods, and the
same would follow with respect to Dibblee’s assignee, the Plaintiff
in this action. This view of the case however, being one which
was not considered at the trial, but which has been wholly sug
gested since, I quite agree that the case had better go back to a
jury, in order that it may be fairly and properly decided.
Parker, J.:
I quite agree from the evidence reported to us by his Honor the
Chief Justice, that the Defendant, W oods, was tenant in common
of the timber in question with Lockwood, under whom the Plaintiff
derives his right. I think also as a general proposition, it cannot
be
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be disputed, that one tenant in common, joint tenant or partner,
cannot maintain trover or trespass against another for the common
property. There is one exception however, in the case of tenants
in common, equally clear as the rule itself, namely, where there
has been a destruction of the property ; and it is a matter worthy
of very serious consideration, whether any and what other acts—■
which so far as the interest of the parties is concerned, are equiva
lent to a destruction—can come within the limits of this exception.
I had intended to have said more on this point, but as further re
marks in the present state of the case would be considered extra
judicial, I forbear ; I fully concur with his Honor the Chief Justice,
and my brothers, that the case should go to a new trial, and for
the reasons which have been stated by his Honor.
Rule absolute to set aside verdict.
The Solicitor General for Plaintiff.
N. Parker for Defendant.

CAMPBELL v. WILSOX.
A verdict was taken for the Plaintiff for ,£1000, “ subject to the award
of arbitrators, to he agreed upon.” Plaintiff’s expressed intention was to
secure a verdict;
The reference was, “of all matters in the cause.” The arbitrators al
lowed the Defendant half the price of a vessel, sent by him and another to
the Plaintiff to sell, without any evidence of a sale by him.
Held, 1st. Under the submission as explained by affidavits, an award for
the Defendant was bad ; the power of the arbitrators was confined to the
quantum of damages.
Unless it appear distinctly on the rule that arbitrators may change a ver
dict, they shall not be held to have any such power.
2d. The Defendant’s right of action, if any, on account of the vessel, was
for a breach of duty in the Plaintiff as his agent, and for unliquidated da
mages ; the claim was therefore inadmissible, either as payment, or set off,
and, having been allowed by the arbitrators, vitiated the award.

A rife nisi was obtained in this cause in last Michaelmas Term,
by the Solicitor General, for the Plaintiff, to set aside an award
made in favour of the Defendant, on the grounds stated in the affi
davits recited in the opinion of the Court.
The cause was argued at this Term.
Chipman, Chief Justice :
This is an application to set aside an award upon two grounds.
1st. That the arbitrators made an award, and found a balance
in favour of the Defendant, when they were only authorized by
the submission, to reduce the verdict entered at nisi prius for the
Plaintiff.
2d. That the arbitrators took into their consideration a matter
not referred to them
As
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As to the first grcund,
Kinnear, the Plaintiff’s Attorney, states in his affidavit, “ that
during the sittings at nisi prius, a proposition was made by N.
Parker, the Counsel for the Defendant, to arbitrate, which he,
(Kinnear,) refused to accede to, but said he would agree to take a
verdict for the amount claimed, subject to the award of three arbi
trators, chosen in the usual way:; and at the same time remarked
that he supposed the Defendant would not consent, as he claimed
to owe the Plaintiff nothing; that Deponent’s it tention was to
secure a verdict for the Plaintiff, and that the arbitrators should
only have power to settle the amount of damages, thinking the
practice was so ; that on the last day of the sitings, Mr. Parker
mentioned that the Defendant agreed to the Plaintiff's proposal,
and a memorandum was drawn up by Mr. Parker, wlierehy it was
agreed, that a verdict should be taken by consent, for £1000, sub
ject to the award of three arbitrators to be mutually agreed on,” &c.
As the statement in this affidavit is not contradicted, nor ex
plained in the affidavits on the other side, it must clearly be taken
to have been the original understanding and agreement, that at all
events there should be a verdict for the Plaintiff, and that the
power of the arbitrators should be confined to the quantum of
damages.
An agreement or consent rule was afterwards drawn up in a
more extended form, and signed by the Plaint ff’s Attorney and
the Defendant, whereby after reciting the terms of the first agree
ment, and that a verdict had been thereupon entered for the Plain
tiff, the parties agreed to nominate James Keator, E. DeW. Ratchford, and Angus M'Kenzie, as the arbitrators ; and that their award,
or the award of any two of them, should be entered on the postea,
as the verdict of the jury, and judgment thereupon with costs to
be taxed, &c.
Now, although tills consent rule is more full and particular in
its expressions than the original memorandum, yet no intention ap
pears on either side to vary the meaning and substance of this
original memorardum.
If this rule had formed the original agreement between the par
ties, and were to be construed by its terms alone, without reference
to any extrinsic matter, I think a strong argument might be raised
upon the clause, “ that the award should be entered on the postea
as the verdict of the jury? that it was intended to subject the
verdict itself to the award of the arbitrators ; but it is by no means
clear that such would have been the effect of it. The practice of
entering a verdict at nisi prius, previous to the submission to arbi
tration, has not by any means been so usual in this Province, as
that of referring to arbitration generally, upon the condition that
the award should be entered on the postea as the verdict of a jury,
and
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and therefore the effect of such previous entry of a verdict has not
been much considered by the profession. But in construing rules
of reference, where a verdict has been entered at
prius, I
should be disposed to hold most strictly in all future cases, that
unless it appeared distinctly on the face of the rule, that the arbi
trators should have power to change the verdict so entered, and
cause a verdict to be entered for the opposite party, they should
not be held to have any such power. Where such power may be
intended to be given, it will be very easy to express it.
Under the circumstances of this case, as stated in the affidavits,
I think that upon the first ground, the rule must be made absolute
to set aside the award.
The second point, that the arbitrators considered a matter not
referred to them, is equally clear to set aside the award. The
action is assumpsit; the plea was the general issue, with which a
notice of set off was given, as stated at the bar, in general terms.
The submission was of all matters in the cause, not of all mat
ters in difference between the parties, and it was not competent to
the arbitrators to enter upon and consider any matter which would
not have been receivable in evidence on a trial.
The subject matter which they improperly considered was the
value of the brig Active, alleged to have been sent by Wilson the
Defendant, and one Mackie, to the Plaintiff, to sell on their ac
count. This evidence could have been made admissible, only, by
proving a sale of the vessel to have been made by the Plaintiff.
It was agreed, indeed, that the property in the vessel was jointly
in Wilson and Mackie, and therefore was not a proper matter of
set off by Wilson alone. But it is to be observed that the letter
of instructions sent with the vessel, contemplates separate shares
in the proceeds when sold. The essential defect is, that there is
no evidence of the sale.
The expression in the affidavit of the arbitrator is, that only one
half of the value of the vessel was allowed to Wilson; the affida
vits do not state that the vessel was sold, or that any evidence of
sale was given before the arbitrators. I take it for granted then,
that there was no evidence of any such sale ; and if the vessel was
not sold according to the instructions, the Defendant’s right of ac
tion, if he had any, would be for a breach of duty in the Plaintiff
as his agent, and for unliquidated damages, which could not be
considered either as a payment or a set off, and admissible in evi
dence in this cause.
Botsford, J.:
I do not think, under the circumstances of the present case, the
arbitrators were empowered to find for the Defendant. I am not
clear, that apart from the undertaking which must be considered
to have existed, the arbitrators would have been justified by the
strict

in the

Sixth Year of WILLIAM IV

107

strict terms of the rule in so doing.—I agree with his Honor the
Chief Justice, that on both points the rule should be absolute.
Carter, J.:
I had doubts as to the terms of the consent rule, and I think
from the terms of it I can see a line of argument which would en
title the arbitrators to find for the Defendant; but under all the
circumstances, I am of opinion the award should be set qside, and
in, future, parties should state clearly and distinctly the powers
they intend to vest in the arbitrators.
On the second point also, I think the award should be set aside.
It is clear the arbitrators have considered the value of the ship as
estimated by the owners ; and it is equally clear that no evidence
was produced beiore them of any sale, or the proceeds of any sale :
it is quite consistent with all the evidence that Wilson and Mackie
are still the owners of the ship
Parker, J.:
I agree also, that the award must be set aside, on both the
grounds taken ; and as the cause is of some amount and importance,
I will take the liberty of stating my opinion at some length.
1st. As to the form of the rule,—With this much of the argt.
ment of the Defendant’s Counsel I agree—that were we called on
to decide the case, on the mere literal construction of the rule, my
present impression is, that as the terms are general, and there is
no restriction on that point, it would authorize a verdict to be en
tered for the Defendant ; and for damages in his favour, if under
his set off he were legally entitled to a balance. Again—-if it had
appeared that the Defendant’s Counsel, when the proposition for ;
reference was made, on the basis of a verdict being entered for the
Plaintiff, did not understand this condition, in the same manner as
the Plaintiff’s Attorney has sworn that he did; or afterwards,
when the rules were entered into, he had conceived it agreed on
both sides, that the arbitrators were to have power to alter the
verdict into one for the Defendant; the Court ought not, I think,
to go out of the strict construction of the rule. Further—if it were
a matter of clear established practice, that a rule in the form of the
present would authorize a verd.ct for Defendant, whatever might
have been the understanding of the Plaintiff’s Attorney on the.
subject, I think nothing but a case of misconduct on the oilier side
in obtaining it, would warrant the Court in disturbing it. But
considering this an unsettled point of practice, there being in fact
other forms of rules in the books so expressed as to be clear of the
present objection, (see 5 East. 139. and 1 Taun. 151,) and finding
that what is distinctly sworn to on the Plaintiff’s side as to tlie
condition of the reference, has not been contradicted or varied by
any counter affidavit; the Court ought in my opinion, to take all
the circumstances into consideration, and having done so, are bound
o
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in the present case to set the award aside, which is, in fact, only
placing the parties in the same position as they were when the re
ference was assented to. In so doing, I would observe that there
is no comparison between the extent of injury which the Defendant
sustains, in having this award set aside if right, and that which
would be inflicted on the Plaintiff in upholding it, if wrong.
I am well aware that a form of rule might have been adopted,
which would have secured to the Plaintiff a judgment in Lis favour,
without any question ; and for that reason, I think he was bound
to make out a clear and strong case, to induce the Court to go out
of the terms of the rule.
2d. A s to the award itself—I heartily concur in the expediency
and propriety of giving effect to awards, whenever we can do so
with justice ; but, I conceive, in order to induce parties to resort
to this domestic tribunal, which (in many cases, and particularly
those between merchants,) is enabled to settle differences more
satisfactorily than Courts and juries can do ; it is necessary, care
fully to examine their proceedings when properly brought before
the Court, and not less important to set them aside when manifestly
wrong, than to support them when right. Nay, I think it essen
tial, that such a control should be exercised, particularly as to
references at nisi prius, where the award is to take the place of a
verdict, in order that parties who have legal rights, may feel con
fidence and security in resorting to this mode of settling them.
And no case calls more for the consideration of the Court, than
one in which it is to be determined from the evidence before the
arbitrators, whether a matter in difference, on which they have
acted and decided, was or was not included in the submission of a
particular cause.
The material objection to the present award on the merits, is
that the arbitrators have allowed the Defendant the value of one
half the brig Active, (a certain deduction from vessel and cargo
excepted ;) that they have done this is admitted ; and also that it
was objected to by the Plaintiff;—their power to do it therefore
rests solely on the point of the notice of set off in the ordinary form,
properly including this as an item of charge, recoverable in an ac
tion of common assumpsit. Was this so recoverable ? It cer
tainly was, if the vessel were sold by the Plaintiff; it certainly
™as not, if no such sale took place. It is not said there was any
direct evidence of a sale, but it is insisted, that the facts afforded
a sufficient presumption thereof, and that in the absence of any
account, the arbitrators had a right to charge the Plaintiff with
the value. In order then to determine whether the matter was
submitted or not, we must examine the facts as brought before us ;
and giving full credit to all that has been stated on the Defendant’s
side in support of the award, I taink sufficient has not Deen shewn
to
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to justify the presumption on, which alone the question depends.
It is important to observe that the nature of the property was such
as to require certain forms and rules in the transfer, which would
make the proof of sale of a snip easier than that of other personal
property; and that it has not been shewn that the Plaintiff was
vested with authority to make a legal transfer in regular form un
der the Registry Acts. In the absence of any evidence to shew
that the vessel was in fact sold at all, regularly or irregularly, of
any legal power to transfer in the Plaintiff, of her ever having
passed out of the possession of John Mackie the master, and other
part owner, of her not being in existence at the present day, and
the Defendant still vested with the legal right of owner, which
would continue even if this award were to stand; I think the ar
bitrators were not justified in presuming a sale, in order to charge
the Plaintiff with the value under the set off. Something was
said in the argument of its being a payment; but a payment is a
satisfaction of an adverse demand ; and, if the Defendant were en
titled to any credit as an overpayment, the difference, if allowable
at all, could only come in as a set off, but independently of this,
there was nothing to shew that the vessel was to be a payment in
specie, although the proceeds of sale might be so.
It has keen further urged upon us by the Defendant’s Counsel,
that arbitrators are not bound by the same strict rules as govern
Courts and juries, and that they might, if it appeared to them, on.
the evidence, that the Plaintiff had deprived the Defendant of his
property, allow him the value of it in this action, if he were enti
tled to recover it in another form of action. I need hardly advert
to the different effect which a recovery in tort, and a recovery in
this suit, would have on the property in the ship ; and on this part
of the case it is sufficient to say, that before arbitrators should be
allowed to take into their consideration a demand not properly
cognizable in the form of action submitted, it ought to be clearly
shewn, either that the party originally agreed, or subsequently as
sented to their so doing ; and that the facts were such as would
entitle the party to recover in another action ; none of which have,
in my opinion, been made out in the present case. I mean not
to impute any intentional misconduct to the arbitrators, who are
admitted, on all hands, to be highly respectable and intelligent
merchants ; but it would have been more satisfactory, as they did
not trust to their own judgment, but took legal advice, (from which it
is to be inferred that they meant to proceed according to law,) if they
had communicated to the Plaintiff’s Attorney, and now set out in
the affidavits, the opinion they received and the questions pro
posed ; for, as the case is presented to us, they certainly went be
yond their powers, and their award must be set aside.
Rule absolute.
The Solicitor General and F. A. Kinnear for the Plaintiff.
N. Parker for the Defendant.
SHAW
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SHAWJiM GRANT.
If a tenant in common, owz the consent of his co-tenant, sell more than
his own share of the common property, he shall be considered in respect
thereof to have acted as the agent of his companion, and monev had and re
ceived may be maintained against him.
Queue.—Tf the sale were without the consent of his companion, if such
action would be maintainable ?

This was an action of assumpsit, tried before Chipman, C. J.
in last Michaelmas Term. The Plaintiff charged in his particu
lars, inter alia, a sum of money had and received by the Defend
ant to the Plairtiff’s use, as to which item,
It appeared in evidence that the Plaintiff and Defendant worked
together in getting timber in the winter of 1833—4 ; each furnished
his own team, hired his own men, and procured his own supplies ;
they had no joint accounts ; the timber was all put on the same
brow, and rafted promiscuously in four joints. There was no evi
dence of any agreement as to the manner of working, or dividing
the timber. When the timber was rafted, each took two joints ;
those taken by the Defendant contained the greatest quantity of
timber. Plaintiff and Defendant met at Fredericton, on their way
to St. John, to sell their timber, and some discussion took place in
the presence of a third person, T. R. Robertson, as to the timber,
when Grant said, “ Shaw is to have half the whole timber at St.
John,” and also, “ he is to half one half of the proceeds of the
timber.”—The surveyor who measured the timber being called to
prove the quant' ties contained in the several joints,
Wilmot, for the Defendant, objected—that the Plaintiff and De
fendant were partners in the transaction, and therefore one could
not sue the other until a division and settlement took place ; and
secondly, that the conversation in the presence of Robertson,
amounted to a special agreement as to the disposal of the timber,
which should have been specially set out in the declaration.
Berton, contra, contended that the parties were not partners in
the transaction, and that the conversation proved, rendered Grant
liable to the Plaintiff for money had and received, on proof of the
sale of the timber.
\Chipman, C. <7.—The relationship between the parties is that
of tenants in common; and the question is, whether if one tenant
in common have, or dispose of more than his share of the common
chattels, his companion can maintain money had and received
As at present advised—1 think he cannot.]
Berten, for Plaintiff then submitted that the evidence should be
received, (as the point was new and important,) subject to a mo
tion to reduce the verdict; which being acceaed to,
It was proved that the two joints taken by the Plaintiff,
contained
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contained 90 tons and 27 feet of timber and those taken oy the
Defendant, 109 tons and 12 feet; and that the Defendant sold the
timber taken by him to one Hammond. The amount of the Plain
tiff’s claim for his proportion of the excess was agreed at £10 14s.,
and he thereupon had a verdict for £33, to be reduced to the sum
of £22 6s., if the Court should be of opinion that this claim was
not sustainable in tl s action.
Wilmot, in the same term, in moving for a rule nisi to reduce
the verdict, took the following grounds :
1st. That the parties were tenants in common, and therefore
the Plaintiff’s claim was not sustainable at law.
Smith v. Orieil, 1 East. 368 ; Martin v. Knowlys, 8 T. R. 145 ;
Bovil «. Hammond, 6 B. & C. 149, and 9 D. & R 186.
2d. That money had and received could not be maintained,
inasmuch as it had not been shewn that the Defendant had re
ceived money for the timber.
Nightingale v. DeVeme, 5 Burr, 2582, and 2 W. Bl. Rep.
684 ; Harvey I. Archbold, 5 D. & R. 500 ; 3 B. & C. 626, and
R. & M. 184.
3d. The conversation in the presence of Robertson, if it amount
ed to any thing, constituted a special agreement, and was not
evidence under a count for money had and received. Defendant
was to account or del_ yer one half the timber.
Borton, for the Plaintiff, on a former day in this Term, shewed
cause.
The Plaintiff and Defendant were tenants in common, each had
a distinct property in an undivided half of the common chattel,
and neither had any right to convert the whole to his own use. It
was not necessary that an absolute destruction of the common pro
perty should take place, but a sale of the whole property by one
tenant in common would equally constitute a conversion, and con
sequently trover would be maintainable. Barton v. Williams, 5
B. & A. 395, and the party might, 'f he pleased, waive the tort,
and sue for money had and received. Willes, 209 ; Markin v.
Knowlys, 8 T. R. 146, 1 Chitty on Pleading, 45 ; Evans v. Ben
net, 1 Camp. 299 ; by the sale the joint interest was determined ;
but apart from so broad a position, the conversation in the present
case constituted the Defendant the agent of the Plairtiff; under
that agreement he had a right to sell, and having sold, must be
presumed to have sold for money, and was liable for money had
and received. Wells v. Ross, 7 Taun. 404 ; Spratt v. Hobhouse,
4 Bing. 178; Longchamp v. Kenny, 1 Doug. 137.
Chipman, Chief Justice:
This is a motion to reduce the verdict of the jury uader the fol
lowing circumstances:—The Plaintiff and Defendant were tenants
in
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in common of timber at Fredericton, when a conversation took place
in the presence of the witness, Robertson. The timber was then
undivided ; each had two joints ; those of the Defendant contained
the most timber. The witness proved that Grant said, ‘ ? one half
the timber was Shaw’s, and should be delivered accordingly at St.
John.” He also said, “ one half of the value of the timber was
to be Shaw’s.”
The action is for money had and received ; and a question has
been raised, if this action can be maintained between these parties,
for the value of one half the overplus quantity of timber sold by
the Defendant, the whole amount of which overplus was £21 8s.
It was contended by the Counsel for the Plaintiff, that if one
tenant in common sell a larger portion of the common property
than would fall to his share,fan assumpsit should be raised, and he
should be made to account for the overplus to his co-tenant, and
that the proceeds of the sale would be money had and received in
his hands to the use of his co-tenant, to the amount of the share
of the latter.
The authorities certainly go far to substantiate this position, but
it is r.ot necessary in the present case to decide that point. The
conversation in Fredericton was quite sufficient to convey an au
thority from Shaw to Grant to sell the timber. In that conversa
tion it must be considered to have been agreed between the parties
that Shaw should have one half of the value of the timber: and
this necessarily implies an assent on the part of Shaw that the
timber should be sold by Grant.
It was proved that Grant did sell, and thereupon under the au
thority of Wells v. Ross, 7 Taunt, 404, he must be taken to have
sold for money. He therefore received Shaw’s share of the pro
ceeds as his agent, and is liable in an action for money had and
received to the use of Shaw.
Bct^sford, J :
I am of the same opinion.—Grant took the timber to St. John
as agent for Shaw, and sold it to Hammond, and thus as agent is
clearly liable to the action for money had and received.
Carter, J.:
I think the conversation with Robertson amounted to an autho
rity to constitute Grant the agent of Shaw.
The sale of the timber took place, and under the authority of
Wells v. Ross, money had and received well lies.
It is not necessary to decide the other point, whether if a tenant
in common sells the joint property, money had and received will
lie by his co-tenant for his share ; but if the case in Willes is good
law, there can be no doubt upon the point. Chief Justice Willes’
expression is very clear, and is certainly recognized by Lord Ken-'
yon in 8 T. R.

Parker,
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Parker, J.:
Whether the Plaintiff would be entitled to recover tlie sum in
question, in this form of action, if the sale of the timber had been
made by the Defendant witlwut the consent of the Plaintiff, I will
at present offer no opinion, as I think the other ground is quite
sufficient to sustain this verdict. The parties were tenants in
common, and as such, each had a right to dispose only of his own
share ;—if, then, the Defendant sold the Plaintiff’s share with his
assent, which the evidence shewed, he may be fairly considered to
have received the purchase money of such share as agent for the
Plaintiff, and is liable to him for the amount, as money had and
received. I cannot see any difference between a case of this sort
and a sale of sole property ; and I am glad that this decision settles
the transaction between the parties as justice requires.
Rule discharged.
Berton for Plaintiff.
Wilmot for Defendant.

SPENCE v. STEWART, impleaded with THOMPSON.
On nul tiel record, pleadel^to debt on recognizance of bail entered in the
Charlotte Common Plea§, and issue joined^ the Court on the trial con
fined their consideration to the single point, “ whether the record produced
corresponded with the record set forth in the pleadings.”
An allegation under a videlicet, that a writ was sued out on a particular
day, does not necessarily import that the day stated is the MB of the writ.

Chipman, Chief Justice:
This was an action of debt on a recognizance of bail entered
and acknowledged in the Inferior Court of Common Pleas for the
County of Charlotte. The Defendant pleaded, first, nvl tiel, record
of the recognizance of bail. Secondly, nul tiel record of the judg
ment set forth in the declaration. Thirdly, no ca. sa. issued on
the judgment. The Plaintiff replied to the two first pleas respec
tively, “ that there is such a record,” &c., which she prays may
be inspected, &c. To the first plea she replied, that after the re
covery of the judgment, &c., and before the commencement of this
suit, to-wit, on the 8th day of September, 1830, a ca. sa. was sued
out, which she sets forth. To the replication to the third plea, the
Defendant rejoined, nul tiel record of the ca. sa. to which rejoinder
the Plaintiff sur-rejoined “ that there is such a record of the ca. sa.
which she prays may be inspected,” &c. Upon these pleadings,
the cause came on for trial by the record by the Court at the last
Term, and the tenor of the several records put in issue was brought
in by writ of certiorari, returned from the Inferior Court of Com
mon Pleas for the County of Charlotte.
The Defendant’s Counsel at the trial made no objection to the
record
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record of the recognizance and judgment on the two first issues:
On the issue arising from the third plea, he objected, first, that the
ca. sa. did not pursue the judgment, the judgment being for £567
19s. 2d. debt, and £8 J 7s. lOd. costs, and the writ of ca. sa. set
forth in the rejoinder, and sent up under the certiorari, being for
£72 9s. debt, and £8 17s. lOd. costs. Secondly, that by com
paring the teste of the r«. sa. with the indorsement on the writ, it
appears to be tested on a day after it issued, viz. on the 17th Sep
tember. With regard to these objections, whatever might have
been the result of the first, if properly brought before the Court,
the second is a matter of irregularity, of which advantage could
be taken only by motion in the Court below, and neither of them
can avail on this issue, which depends on the single point—whether
the record produced corresponds with the record set forth in the
pleadings. And this is to be ascertained by inspecting the record
brought in, which is so much a matter of mere comparison, that it
appears to be the practice in the Court of King’s Bench in Eng
land, that this inspection should be made by the Master, (2 Tidd’s
Practice, 744.) It is alleged in the replication, that after the re
covery of the judgment, and before the commencement of this
action, v’z. on the eighth day of September, 1st Wm. IV., the
Plaintiff sued out a writ of ca. sa., by which said wit, &c. setting
forth the writ,—and the record produced corresponds with this
writ thus set forth. The writ produced bears teste it is true on.
the seventeenth day of September, 1st Wm. IV., but I do not con
sider that the time of suing out the writ therein alleged, especially
as the allegation is under a videlicet, necessarily imports the day
of the teste of the writ. In the actual setting forth of the writ in
the subsequent part cf the plea, the return of the writ is set forth,
but the teste of the writ is not set forth, and there is no variance
between the writ thus set forth and the writ produced. I am
therefore of opinion, that the writ produced supports the plea on
all the issues now under trial by the Court, and that upon these
several issues there must be judgment, that the Plaintiff hath per
fected the record.
BOTSFORD, J. concurred.
Carter, J. .
The only question we are called on to decide in the shape in
which this case is presented, is whether or not there is a variance
between the writ of capias ad satisfaciendum, set out in the repli
cation and the writ itself as sent up by the Court below. If the
8th September mentioned in the allegation necessarily ’’mported
the teste of the writ, which on inspection appears to be the 17tli
September, I am inclined to thir k the variance would have been
fatal on nul tiel record, but on looking at the allegation, it appears
to
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to me that tlie material part of it is that the writ of ca. sa. was
sued out after the recovery of the judgment, and before the com
mencement of the suit, and the date is merely put in under a
videlicet as matter of form, and does not at all import the teste of
the writ. I am of opinion therefore, that the replication is sup
ported, and judgment must be for the Plaintiff.
Parker, J.:
In my view of this case, the duty now assigned to us, is merely
that of trying three distinct issues, which have been joined by the
parties on these pleadings ; and for the proof of which, certain re
cords of another Court, having jurisdiction in the matter, are ap
pealed to. On the first and second no question is now made. On
the third the issue is not made up on the plea and replication, but
substantially on the replication and rejoinder ; and in my opinion,
the objections urged by the Defendant’s Counsel do not properly
arise in the present state of the record. As to the first objection,
the issue is not whether a ca. sa. was duly sued out on the judg
ment, but whether a particular ca. sa., as averred in the replica
tion, was in fact issued and returned ; and if it appear bj inspec
tion of the record of the Inferior Court that this was done, the
averment is proved. It is true the ca. sa. set out does not follow
the judgment, it being for a much smaller sum ; but that objection
is, I conceive, completely waived by the course the Defendant has
taken. Let us for an instant suppose the parties before us giving
in their pleadings ore terms. The Plaintiff first says, the Defend
ant owes me £567 19s. 2d., as he was special bail for one Ebenezer
Tuttle, at my suit, against whom I obtained judgment in the Char
lotte County Common Pleas, and who was not rendered according
to the undertaking of the bail. Defendant answers:—No ; I am
not liable ; for though I did become special bail, and though you
did recover judgment as you allege, no ca. sa. against Tuttle was
duly issued or returned. The Plaintiff, not making an issue of
this, replies :—A ca. sa. was sued out on that judgment against
the principal on the 2d September, returnable, &c. for £72 9s.
debt, and £8 17s. lOd. damages ; the same was delivered on the
said 2d September to the Sheriff of Charlotte, and was returned by
him non est iqventus, as by the said ca. sa. and return, duly filed
of record in the said Inferior Court, will more fully appear. On
this, several courses were open to the Defendant; I will not say
which would have been the most advisable, but it is clear, if he
simply deny that such a ca. sa. was issued and returned, he puts
the case on that fact. That he has done in his rejoinder; the
Plaintiff sur-rejoins and produces the record of a ca. sa. from the
Inferior Court, which on inspection is found to correspond with his
replication, and we are bound to pronounce the allegation proved.
As the pleadings stand, 1 agree with his Honor the Chief Justice,
p
that
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that the point of variance with regard to the teste, is not brought
distinctly up. Had the whole writ been set out in the replication,
or on oyer in the rejoinder, it might perhaps have been taken ad
vantage of ; but as it is a question of practice of another Court, I
have doubts whether even then we should be bound judicially to
notice, that the day of issuing! must necessarily mean the teste, in
opposition to the real time. See Sandon v. Proctor, 7 B. & C. 800,
and the case there cited. As the case stands, there must be
Judgment as to all the issues, that the Plaintiff hath perfected
the record.
F. A. Kinnear for Plaintiff.
J. W. Chandler for Defendant.

RAYMOND AND ANOTHER v. LUKE.
If a cause be referred to three arbitrators, with a stipulation that any two
may make an award ; and two of them meet, without notice to the third,
and make an award, such award is irregular.

This cause was referred by rule of Court to three arbitrators,
‘ the decision of whom or any two of whom should be final.’
Weldon moved to set aside an award made by two of them, on
the following grounds, as stated in the affidavit of the third arbi
trator :—
The three arbitrators met and completed the examination of
evidence ; they met to consider and make up their award. One
dissented from the opinion of deponent and the other arbitrator,
and left them, declaring his intention to act no further in the re
ference. Deponent and the other deliberated further, and ad
journed with an understanding that they would have another
meeting, of which their absent companion should have notice.
Deponent was not further consulted, the other two brought to
him an award they had made up and signed, and requested him to
sign it also, which he refused to do.
He cited 2 Vern. 19, Ruton v. Knight; 2 Chitty’s Gen. Prac
tice, 119 ; and Goodwin v. Sayres, 2 Jac. and W. 249.
A rule nisi having been obtained, Chandler now shewed cause.
The rule submitted the cause to the decision of three persons, or
any two of them. All attended and heard the evidence ; they de
liberated upon the case, and afterwards two made their award, and
it was no ground to disturb it, that the third arbitrator dissented
from it.
\Chipman, C. J.—Ought they not to be altogether, or notice be
given to the absent person, until they agree to disagree ?]
They had finished their deliberations, and merely went to the
dissenting arbitrator to execute the award.
Weldon,
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Weldon, in support of tlie rule, was stopped by the Court.

Per Curiam.
The doctrine laid down in Goodman v. Sayres, that if two arbi
trators out of three meet alone, excluding the third, or not giving
him notice, it is irregular, and will vitiate the proceedings, must
govern this case.
Here it appears when the three arbitrators last assembled, a
further meeting- was contemplated, and such a meeting was in fact
held by two without notice to the third. The rule must be held
strictly, that every arbitrator who takes upon himself the burden
of the reference, and consents to act, must be present, or have no
tice of the meetings of his co-arbitrators. It is impossible to say
what arguments might be used by the absent person to change
the opinions of the others.—It would strike at the root of all just
judgment to suppose that an arbitrator, before the final decision of
the question, had so made up his mind as to exclude argument.
Rule absolute.
E. B. Chandler for Plaintiff.
Weldon for Defendant.
TURNER v. ELLIOTT.
IN ERROR.

From, the Inferior Court of Common Pleas for the County of
Westmorland.
A general release to an interested person, “excepting a certain judg
ment in the releasor’s favour,”—Held sufficient to make such person a com
petent witness, it not appearing that the judgment related to the matter in
question.

The Defendant in error, sued the Plaintiff in error in the Court
below, in an action of special assumpsit. The cause was tried in
that Court in November, 1831.
It appeared in evidence at the trial, on the part of the then
Plaintiff that the then Defendant (the Plaintiff in error,) was
owner of a vessel, and engaged with the Plaintiff to carry certain
goods for freight from New Horton Flats to the city of St. John.
The goods were accordingly shipped ; Edward Buck was master
of the vessel, which sailed on her purposed voyage, .and proceeded
to St. John; that the said Edward Buck did not there deliver the
goods to the Plaintiff, but sold and converted them to his own usi
The Defendant thereupon in his defence offered and produced
the said Edward Buck as a witness in his behalf, to prove both the
carrying and delivery of the goods according to the agreement;
Whereupon the Counsel for the Plaintiff insisted that Buck was
not
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not a competent witness for the Defendant to prove the matters
proposed, by reason of his interest as master of the vessel in the
question at issue ; whereupon the Defendant’s Counsel produced a
release, duly executed by the Defendant to the said Buck—releas
ing him “ from all and all manner of debts, dues, demands, claims,
sum and sums of money due, or owing by or from him the said
Edward Buck to the said Defendant, and all manner of action and
actions, cause and causes of action, from the beginning of the
world to the day of the date, except a certain judgment in the In
ferior Court of Common Pleas in the County of Westmorland, in
the said Defendant's favourand insisted that such release resto
red the competency and rendered Buck a competent witness for
the purposes proposed ; but to this
The Plaintiff’s Counsel replied, that the release was insufficient
to restore the competency—and the Justices delivered their opinion
that the said Edward Buck was not a competent witness; and
that such release did not restore or make him a competent witness
on behalf of the Defendant; and thereupon refused and rejected
his testimony, and with that opinion and direction left the cause to
the jury, who gave their verdict for the Plaintiff for £15 2s. 6d.
damages.
A bill of exceptions having been tendered and allowed, the pro
ceedings were brought into this Court by writ of error.
D. B. Chandler for Plaintiff in error:
The competency of the witness could be restored by release ; 1
Phil. Ev. 125 ; Rose. N. P. Ev. 96-7. Whenever a witness can
be released, he is made competent by the release, and any objec
tion goes only to his credibility. The question therefore is as to
the sufficiency of the release. The instrument tendered was suffi
cient to release the witness from any liability to the owner of the
vessel; the cause of action as between the releasor and releasee,
(if any) had already accrued and was complete, and therefore was
discharged by the release. Bac. Abr. Rel. 2.
The Solicitor General for Defendant in error:
The witness may be released, but it must be by such an instru
ment as will remove any liability he may be under by reason of
the subject matter in which he is to be a witness ; nor was it ne
cessary for the owner of the vessel to wait until action brought
against him or until he had suffered loss by the conduct of the
master ; his right of action had already accrued, but the question
must turn upon the sufficiency of the instrument. In this release
a , adgment is excepted, and for aught that appears, the action in
which that judgment was obtained may have related to the very
cause in which his testimony was required ;—[Chipman, C. J.: If
so. the witness was competent without a release.]—but that
judgment
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judgment may have been by confession, with a defeasance relating
to this action and its event, or it may have been an interlocutory
judgment; and taking into consideration the position of the parties
and the want of explanation, it is fair to presume that tlie witness
was not fully released. General words in a release shall be quali
fied by special words. Stark. Ev. 1291.
Chipman, Chief Justice :
The true criterion of exclusion is, if the verdict to be given in
the case in hand, can be evidence for or against the witness, in
any subsequent trial; and if the owner of the vessel had already
recovered a judgment, then the verdict would no longer affect the
witness. The point before the Court is narrowed to the import of
the terms of the exception in the release, and upon that I entertain
no doubt; the worcls of the exception are, “ except a certain
judgment,” &c. ; these words import a final judgment, and even
if it were for this cause of action, it would not be a necessary con
sequence that it was conditional or subject to the determination of
this action. It is said there might have been fraud or collusion
between the releasor aod-the releasee ; that might have been shewn,
but cannot be presumed. Then it is urged that the judgment ex
cepted may have been only interlocutory, but we are not to pre
sume this against the natural import of the term. It was open for
the party objecting to have shewn by evidence that the judgment
was merely interlocutory; we will adhere to the natural meaning
of the language, especially in a release, where everything must be
taken most strongly against the releasor, the effect of which would
be to extend the general words, and to narrow the exception.
BOTSFORD, J. concurred.

Carter, J.:
The only ground to render the release inoperative, is to suppose
the judgment excepted was an interlocutory judgment—or that
being a final judgment, it related to this cause of action, and was
affected by fraud or collusion : either of these circumstances might
have been proved, but we should carry the doctrine of presumption
much too far, in the absence of any evidence, to support either
supposition.
Parker, J.:
There can be no question that the witness Buck was incompe
tent without, but could be made competent by, a sufficient release.
It is said the release does not cover all demands, but excepts a
judgment which might relate to the present cause of action;—
nothing however of that kind appears on the face of the instrument,
and, prima facie, the judgment has no relation to the cause of
action in the present case. The party objecting, might have had
the witness sworn on his voire dire, and have shewn the relation
which
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which the excepted judgment had, if any. Not having done so.
he could not, I think, call upon the Court to make thatjpresumption, so as to destroy the effect of the release.
Judgment for Plaintiff in error.
Chandler for Plaintiff in error.
The Solicitor General for Defendant.

REILLY v. GILLAN.
An award will not be disturbed, because the witnesses were examined
without being sworn, although the rule of reference required them to be
sworn, if the party objecting to the award were present, and consented to
such examination.

In last Michaelmas Term, Robinson, for Plaintiff, obtained a
rule nisi to set aside an award made by the arbitrators to whom
the cause was referred. The terms of the submission were that
the witnesses should be examined on oath. The Plaintiff’s affida
vit, on which the rule was granted, stated that the witnesses, con
trary to his expressed wish and protestation, were examined with
out being sworn, and that the Plaintiff’s wife, from whom he lived
apart, was also examined, contrary also to his protestation and
remonstrance.
The Solicitor General, for the Defendant, now shewed cause,
and produced the affidavits of two of the arbitrators, which directly
contradicted the statement of the Plaintiff as to swearing the wit
nesses. The Plaintiff’s own witnesses were first examined, and
without being sworn. The Plaintiff was present at the examina
tion of his wife, and did not object, and the arbitrators expressly
swore, that her testimony was immaterial, and without it, their
award would have been the same as they had made.
Per Curiam.
The Plaintiff must be considered as having consented to the
examination of the witnesses without their being sworn, inasmuch
as his own witnesses were first examined in that manner. The
wife could not properly be examined without the consent of the
Plaintiff; he was present however, and did not object to it; and,
as it appears by the positive statement of the arbitrators, that her
testimony did not alter their opinion, and that they would have
made the same award without it, there remains no reason for dis
turbing the award.
Rule discharged.
D. L. Robinson for Plaintiff.
The Solicitor General for Defendant.
DOUGLAS
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DOUGLAS ^HANSON.
Plaintiff before action brought, rendered Defendant an account amount
ing to .£63, reduced by credits therein to less than £20; Defendant did
not admit the balance.
Plaintiff sued for the whole amount, and recovered a balance of £16 15s.
3d.; Defendant at the trial gave in evidence the account rendered, and
sought further to reduce the balance,—Heid that Plaintiff was entitled to
full costs,

J. W. Chandler, for the Defendant, jobtained in Michaelmas
Term last, a rule nisi for taxing the Plaintiff’s costs, on the scale
of the Inferior Courts, according to the practice of the Court when
the action is brought for a sum under £26^ on an affidavit of (S'.
G. Andrews, the Defendant’s Attorney, which stated that the
action was common assumpsit,—was tried at the last Charlotte
Circuit, and a verdict obtained by the Plaintiff for £11.
N. Parker, for Plaintiff, now appeared to shew cause.
Botsford, J.:
Reported the case, by which it appeared that the action was
brought for goods sold and delivered, amounting to £63 14s. 6d. ;
that prior to the action, the Plaintiff had rendered an account of
the above to the Defendant, in which account were contained sun
dry credits, amounting to £46 19s. 3d., making the balance £16
15s. 3d. ; that the Defendant had admitted the correctness of the
debit side, but disputed that of the credit side ; and instead of re
lying on the account as stated and settled, had given a notice
and particulars of set off, amounting to £78 18s. 6d., on which
he went into evidence.
The action was brought before the passing of the Act 4 Wm. 4,
c. 41, establishing a summary practice in the Supreme Court.
The Court were clearly of opinion that there was no ground for
the motion, as the Defendant had made it necessary for the Plain
tiff to proceed for his whole demand; and the Defendant had no
pretence now to set up the account as stated and settled, which he
had refused to abide by.
Rule discharged.
N. Parker for Plaintiff.
J. W. Chandler for Defendant.

DOE EX DEM HOWE v. MEALLY.
An attachment against a witness for contempt, in not attending on a sub
poena, must be applied for at the term next after the contempt committed.

The Solicitor General moved for an attachment against Duston
Woodbury, a witness subpoenaed in this cause at the Charlotte
Circuit in August last. The witness attended, and afterwards
absented nunself,—he was called on his subpoena.
On
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On reference to 3 Chitty’s Gen. Prac. 834, and 3 Bing. 223,
Thorpe v. Graham,—tlie Court refused the application, it not
having been made at the first term after the Circuit.

PALMER, FOSTER AND SIX OTHERS v. LONG.
When a number of persons jointly agree with another as to any particu
lar matter, the agreement or contract can only be rescinded or put an end
to by the consent of all.

Indebitatus assumpsit, for work and labour in and about De
fendant’s ship; the declaration contained the common counts:
Plea, general issue, and notice of set off; but Defendant not hav
ing complied with a Judge’s order for particulars, was precluded
from going into evidence of his set off.
On the part of the Plaintiffs, a special agreement between the
Plaintiffs and Defendant was proved, by which it appeared that if the
Defendant failed in paying either the first or second instalment of a
certain sum therein mentioned, the Plaintiffs should be at liberty to
quit, and rescind the whole contract: holding the Defendant answer
able for the work done. It was proved that the Plaintiffs worked for
the Defendant under that agreement, and the Defendant failed in
making payment agreeably to the contract,—that it was rescinded
by the parties about the 24th July, 1832,—that work had been
done about the Defendant’s ship from February to July, and some
extra work, which jointly formed the subject matter of the action.
The defence was, that before action brought, the Defendant had
settled with six of the Plaintiffs acting on behalf of all, who gave
the Defendant a discharge of all claims, both under the special
agreement and for work and labour done. An agreement dated
28th July, 1832, signed by the Defendant and six of the Plaintiffs,
was given in evidence, which specified “ that the special contract
“ had been and was given up, and rendered null and void ; that
“ the Plaintiffs were to be paid monthly tvages during the said
“ time the said Plaintiffs had been at said work, according to the
“ account of their time kept by Mr. John Lobey ; that the
“ Plaintiffs renounced all claim upon the ship, and gave her up to
“ the Defendant, who agreed to accept her, and pay the Plaintiffs
“ for the time they had been at work at her.” A letter written
by Robert Lobey, and signed by Lobey on behalf of the said six
Plaintiffs, was proved to have been sent by two of the Plaintiffs to
the Plaintiffs’ Attorney, (notice to produce had been given,) de
siring “ that all proceedings against the Defendant might be stop“ ped on a certain contract for building Defendant’s ship, as they
“ had settled with Defendant all differences relative thereto,” also
cautioning him “not to commence any action in their names
“ against
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“ against Defendant at the instance of Palmer, as they would not
“ recognize any such proceedings, and to transmit his account,
“ the amount of which they would pay.” It was proved that
Pelmer and Foster, the two remaining Plaintiffs, did not agree to
these arrangements, but that the papers were executed during
their absence, and against their will; that neither the contract nor
its contents were sent to the Attorney ; that Palmer and Foster
had never been paid their proportions of the work and labour, and
that the amounts due them remained unpaid by the Defendant;—
the amounts due the other six Plaintiffs Lad been paid. The ob
ject of the Defendant in taking possession of the special contract,
was to prevent them or any of the other Plaintiffs from bringing
an action thereon.
Chandler, in support of motion for nonsuit, contended, that as
this was a partnership concern, the agreement of 28th July, 1832,
coupled with the letter to the Attorney cf the Plaintiffs, was a
discharge of Plaintiffs’ claim, and that, therefore, no action could
be sustained ; 5 Stark. 1068 ; Roscoe Ev, 184 ; 12 East. 317 ; 1
Stark. R. 102 ; 2 Camp. 561 ; Gow on Partnership, 141, 202.—
And further, that the papers of 28th July, 1832, operated as a
severance of Plaintiffs’ claim under the special contract, and vested
a separate right of action in each ; that the payment of the then
respective shares to six of the Plaintiffs, could not be deemed a pay
ment to the other two, and therefore that Palmer and Foster could
recover their respective proportions by actions in their own names.
Stewart, in reply, contended, the agreement of 28th July, 1832,
was a mere arrangement for the payment, and although probably
rescinding the special contract, yet did not destroy the joint inter
est of the Plaintiffs ; that the Plaintiffs did not declare on the
special contract, considering it as rescinded, but that they resorted
to the indebitatus assumpsit, which the law implied with the De
fendant, for their joint work ; that the special contract was merely,
therefore, used for the purpose of ascertaining the proportion and
mode of payment of the eight joint contractors ; that the testimony
of Defendant’s witness shewed that Palmer and Foster had not
been paid. As to the letter, it was a mere direction to the Plain
tiffs’ Attorney to suspend proceedings ; it might be made a ques
tion between the Plaintiffs and their Attorney, but could not affect
Plaintiffs’ claim against the Defendant—it could not be considered
a release or discharge to Defendant, and evidenced no statement
or payment by Defendant. It was not pretended that the six
Plaintiffs who were paid their monthly wages, settled for Palmer
and Foster ; the receipts being after action brought, were evidence
co reduce the damages, and they only shewed payments of i n divi
dual proportions according to the agreement of 28th July, 1832.—
The authority adduced was a case where a debtor had agreed to a
q
severance
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severance of the joint debt between joint creditors, which, although
it vested a separate right of action in each, did not preclude the
creditors bringing one joint action ; but the debtor w’ho assented
to a severance, was estopped by his own act from asserting a joint
debt. 2 Saun. Pl. & Ev. 714 ; 3 B. & C. 421.
CARTER, J. suggested that the parties had better agree that the
Plaintiffs should take a verdict for a certain sum, reserving the
points for the opinion of the Court above, on a motion for a nonsuit,
which was agreed to, and the Plaintiffs had a verdict for £20.
A rule nisi, to set aside the verdict, was obtained in Michaelmas
Term, and the points were argued at this Term by Chandler for
the Defendant, and the Solicitor General for the Plaintiff;—the
Court gave judgment at the close of the argument.
Chipman, Chief Justice:
It does not appear that any time is wanted for consideration in
this cause.
A joint contract was entered into by eight persons with the De
fendant for building a ship, and six of those eight persons after
wards agreed with the Defendant to put an end to the former con
tract. Now, if the contract had been put an end to, these eight
contractors would have been entitled to an action on the quantum,
meruit;—but the question is, if the joint contract were put an
end to.
It is clear, that when a number of persons jointly agree with
another as to any particular matter}" llu number of those persons
can end the agreement or contract, unless all consent. Here the
agreement to put an end to the- original contract was made by
only six of the eight joint contractors ; and I do not consider they
had a right to destroy the remedy of the other two.
Then as to the receipts: there might be reasons why the other
two did not consent to the agreement; the settlement made may
not have been a fair one, and unless they had ail agreed to rescind
the relation of partnership, as I have before said, that relationship
must have continued. Then the joint contract remaining in force
when these receipts were given, the receipts must be considered
under the particular circumstances of the case. The substantial
matter of these imports that the six who agreed to rescind, had
been paid according to the time they had worked, and the Court
will look to the substantial effect of them ; having been given,
therefore, under the agreement, they are to be receiv ed only pro
tanto to reduce the whole amount of the claim of all the eight.
No injustice can be done by this view of the subject. These
parties, although they sue jointly, recover only the balance, de
luding the payments ; and the apportionment of that balance is a
matter for them to settle among themselves.
If
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If the names of parties be Improperly used, they may apply to a
Court of Equity to prevent it ut inter se, but that does not affect
the rights of joint parties as to others. Great injustice would be
done by allowing Long, by an agreement with six of the Plaintiffs,
to defeat the joint claims of the other two.
Botsford, J.:
I take the same view of the subject. An agreement was made
between eight persons, the Plaintiffs, and the Defendant, to build
a ship. Under the agreement, they performed labour on the ship ;
afterwards, on the 28th July, 1832, six of those persons, leaving
out Palmer and Foster, agreed with Long to rescind the agreement,
and made a settlement for the amount cf their labour respectively,
and on the same day a letter was addressed to the Plaintiffs’ At
torney, directing him to stop proceedings. They appear to have
combined with Long to settle, and perhaps for the purpose of
throwing out Palmer and Foster. There is fair ground to infer
connivance for that purpose; and I think another inference is,
that proceedings had been already commenced in this action ; the
instructions in that letter were to stay proceedings. Now, eight
persons having contracted, six could not rescind the agreement,
without tlie approbation of the other two. Is it not just that the
other two should use the names of the eight to recover the amounts
due to them ? The receipts are only evidence pro tanto.
If Palmer and Foster had brought separate actions, the receipts
might, and, I think, would have stopped Long from setting up the
joint contract; but it does not, therefore, follow, that the balances
due cannot be recovered in the action by the whole eight.
Carter, J. concurred.
Parker, J. having been formerly engaged in the cause at the
bar, gave no opinion.
Rule discharged.
The Solicitor General, Stewart and Weldon for Plaintiffs.
E. B. Chandler for Defendant.

KEYS v. FLINN.
Under very peculiar circumstances the Court set aside a verdict for the
Plaintitf—the weight of evidence heing in favour of the Defendant, and the
verdict evidently the result of a compromise.

This was an action of assumpsit, for goods sold and delivered,
and money had and received, tried before Parker J. at the last
Northumberland Circuit, in which a verdict having been returned
for two hundred pounds, in favour of the Plaintiff, a rule nisi was
obtained by J. A. Street, in Hilarj Term, to set the verdict aside,
and
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and grant a new trial, on tlie grounds of the same being contrary
to evidence and the Judge’s charge.
Cause was shewn in this Term by Wilmot for the Plaintiff.
The circumstances of the case were very peculiar ; there
■was evidence on the part of the Plaintiff, of considerable pro
perty having been transferred by him to the Defendant; and
of a large sum of money being paid into the Defendant’s hands
for Plaintiff’s account; the Defendant gave evidence of several
payments made by him for the Plaintiff—he also endeavoured
to impeach the testimony of the Plaintiff’s principal witness,
but principally relied on declarations both written and verbal,
made by the Plaintiff; one, even as recent as the day before the
trial, that the Defendant owed him nothing, and that the suit was
not carried on by his directions. These declarations were attempt
ed to be accounted for by the Plaintiff’s mental imbecility, of
wLicli there was some, though not very clear evidence. It was
late in the Evening before the evidence was concluded,. at which
time the learned Judge proposed an adjournment to the next day,
but the jury, most of whom were talesmen, stating that they could
not attend at that time without great inconvenience, the Counsel
on both sides agreed to waive the privilege of addressing the jury,
and united in a request to the Judge, to sum up the cause without
hearing Counsel, to which his Honor very reluctantly consented,
deeming it a case which peculiarly called for their assistance in
closing, as it was opened very briefly. In charging the jury, his
Honor read over to them the whole evidence, and left the case
rather favourably for the Defendant, considering, that even if the
Plaintiff’s witness were entitled to credit, the Plaintiff’s declara
tions would be a sufficient answer to the action, unless it appeared
that at the time of making them he was, from imbecility of mind,
or otherwise, the dupe of the Defendant; and his Honor adverted
to the circumstance, that he had particularly called tlie attention
of the Plaintiff’s Counsel to the importance of giving distinct evi
dence on that head, which he offered to receive after the Defend
ant’s case had closed. If these declarations were got rid of, and
the Plaintiff’s witnesses were believed, the state of the accounts
between the parties shewed a balance in his favour of about £400,
or over. Another question arose as to whether the whole transac
tion between the parties was not entered into with a view to de
fraud the Plaintiff’s creditors ; and his Honor stated his opinion to
the jury, that if such were the case, the Plaintiff ought not to re
cover, there being nothing to shew that the creditors were at all
concerned in carrying on this action.
The jury retired between 11 and 12 o’clock, and were out the
whole night, and part of the next day, before they could agree,
and
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and then brought in a verdict of £200, which would not accord
with the evidence on either side.
Under the very peculiar circumstances of this case, (of which it
is not necessary to give a more particular detail at present,) the
Court made the rule for a new trial absolute on payment of costs,
considering it a proper case for investigation before another jury ;
especially as the weight of the testimony was in favour of the De
fendant ; the Plaintiff’s declarations t tat the Defendant was not
indebted to him, having been established by several witnesses, and
the state of his mind, (if that afforded a sufficient answer to these
declarations,) admitting of more satisfactory evidence, than was
given at the former trial. The amount of the verdict also appear
ed the result of a compromise, and not in accordance with the
evidence.
Rule absolute.
Wilmot for Plaintiff.
J. A. Street for Defendant.
DOE EX DEM KINNEAR v. WISWELL.
A peremptory undertaking will not be enlarged merely on the ground,
that when the cause was called on at the Circuit, a witness who resided in
the town was not in Court, and that therefore the record was withdrawn.

The Solicitor General moved to enlarge a peremptory under
taking of the Plaintiff to proceed to trial in this cause, at the last
St. John Circuit, on an affidavit which stated that the cause was
entered for trial, and the Plaintiff’s witnesses who were resident at
St. John, were not in attendance when the cause was expected to
come on—the Attorney sent for them, but two of them could not
be found; expecting them to come into Court, the Plaintiff’s
Counsel moved for trial, and withdrew the record after eight of
the jury were sworn, solely from the absence of the witnesses.
N. Parker, for Defendant, urged—that the absence of witnesses
under such circumstances, might be a sufficient cause to discharge
a first rule for judgment as in case of a nonsuit, but was wholly
insufficient to enlarge a peremptory undertaking.
Chipman, Chief Justice—absent.
Botsford, J.:
Very little ground is stated, no reason appears for the absence
of the witnesses. The undertaking ought not to be enlarged.
Carter, J.:
It appears the witnesses were in St. John, and the only ground
of the application is, that they were not in Court when the cause
was called on.

Parker,
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Parker, J. :
This matter is important as a point of practice. Parties and
their witnesses must learn the necessity of a punctual and regular
attendance. No sufficient reason has been given for the non-at
tendance of the witnesses in the present case, to justify the Court
in opening the peremptory undertaking. The rule for a nonsuit
must be made absolute.
MOULTON v. DIBBLEE.
Service on a clerk is insufficient, unless at the office or dwelling house
of the Attorney.

Robinson moved to make absolute a rule nisi, for judgment, as
in case of a nonsuit, on an affidavit of the se rvice of the rule on
one Hammond, the clerk and agent of Needham, the Plaintiff’s
Attorney.

Per Ccriam.
The rule, if served on a clerk, should have been served at the
office or at the dwelling house of the Attorney, which is not stated
in the affidavit to have been done.
Rule refused.

Exparte.

TEE ST. JOHN WATER COMPANY.

An application for a warrant to assess the amount to be paid for certain
lands required by the Company was refused, it not being shewn that the
corporation deemed the lands absolutely necessary.

N. Parker moved for a warrant to be issued to the Sheriff of
St. John, to summon a jury to assess and ascertain the sum or
annual rent to be paid for certain lands of the Hon. Ward Chip
man, upon and through which the Company were desirous of ma
king reservoirs, and carrying pipes and conductors.
The application was founded upon an affidavit, stating that a
committee of the Company had applied to the owner cf the land,
who had declined to sell the land, or to name an arbitrator to de
termine the value. The Company were incorporated by Act of
Assembly, 2 W. 4, c. 26, the 15th section of which Act authorizes
the Company “ to draw water from, erect reservoirs on, and to
“ carry pipes or conductors through (when such shall be deemed
“ absolutei" necessary for the conveyance of water to the city by
,n the said corporation,) the private property of individuals, whose
“ lands may lie at the source or in the line, the said corporation
“ shall think it expedient to convey the water from, or through,”
&c.; and then provides that the corporation shall first pay for the
use
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use of the same, or any damage to tlie owner, which, in case of
disagreement, shall he determined by arbitration ; and if the owner
shall decline making such agreement, or appointing an arbitrator,
“ then the said corporation may make application to the Supreme
“ Court, (stating the grounds of such application,) and such Court
“ is empowered to issue a writ or warrant,” &c.
Carter, J.:
How does it appear to be absolutely necessary to carry the water
through the lands required ? Tlie committee do not themselves
swear that the lands are necessary—they should report to the
corporation. The corporation must adopt their act, and determine
the necessity, and such determination must be made to appear by
the oath of the committee, or directors, or other persons. I do not
express this as a judicial opinion, but throw it out as the least
terms the Act will admit of—it is sufficient in refusing this appli
cation, that it is not made to appear that the corporation deem the
lands absolutely necessary.
Parker, J.:
I am also of opinion that sufficient grounds have not been laid
for the interference of the Court. It does not appear that the cor
poration have, as yet, decided on the necessity of obtaining the
land, which must at all events be done ; but I am rather under
the impression that the Legislature, in directing thfe grounds of the
application to be stated, intended that the Court should also be
satisfied of the necessity, before exercising its authority. I men
tion this now, as the corporation may consider it expedient to ap
ply to the Legislature for an alteration in the Act, if the powers
already granted are not deemed sufficient. The present motion
certainly cannot be sustained.
Note.—The Chief Justice, and Botsford, J. did not sit during this application.

HATTON v. FLAHERTY.
A judgment signed on the 16th October, the rule nisi having been enter
ed on th< 13th—was held irregular, the four day rule not having expired.

THIS cause stood for trial at the St. John Circuit, in June, 1835,
when by the consent of the Attornies, a verdict for £520 15s.
was entered for the Plaintiff, “ subject to be reduced by the award
of Angus M‘Kenzie, — —, — •—, or any two of them.”
Angus M'Kenzie, the only arbitrator named, was nominated by
the Plaintiff; the Defendant was to name another, and the two
were to choose a third, “ their award to be final and binding upon
the parties, if made and ready to be delivere d on or before the first
day of October, and the said verdict, or such reduced amount as
the

130

CASES IN HILARY TERM.

the first arbitrators might award, to be entered on the postea, and
judgment thereon to be entered up with costs to be taxed of the
then next Michaelmas or any subsequent Term.”
The Defendant’s Attorney was under an impression that the
first day of Michaelmas Term was the time appointed for making
the award ; on the 8th day of October he applied to the Plaintiff’s
Attorney, and offered to. appoint an arbitrator and proceed ; the
Plaintiff’s Attorney declined doing so; and on the first day of
Michaelmas Term, the 13th of October, entered a rule for judg
ment on the postea, and on the 16th the roll was brought in, and
final judgment signed for the amount of verdict and costs.
On a subsequent day in the same Term, the Solicitor General,
for the Defendant, obtained a rule nisi for setting aside the judg
ment upon two grounds:
1st. Th at the judgment was signed before the expiration of the
four day rule.
2d. That the Plaintiff was not entitled to enter up judgment for
the amount of the verdict without a special application to the
Court.
Cause was now shewn by F. A. Kinnear, for the Plaintiff.
The Defendant would not, within the time limited, appoint an
arbitrator, and therefore the Plaintiff was entitled to act upon the
verdict which had been entered for his protection and benefit. Evans
v. Davies, 3 Dowl, P. C. 786 ; Doe d. Fisher v. Saunders, 3 B. and
Ad. 783 ; Hall v. Phillips, 9 Bingham, 89.

Per Curiam.
The argument of the learned Counsel for the Plaintiff might
have been a good ground of application to the Court, to call upon
the Defendant to shew cause why the verdict should not stand;
but without agitating the second point, the rule must be made ab
solute on the first; the judgment is irregular, having been signed
too soon. The Court strongly recommend a new arbitration.
The Plaintiff has a right to pursue his own course, but he should
be exceedingly well advised before he ventures again to enter up
his judgment, without an application to the Court.
Rule absolute.
F. A. Kinnear for Plaintiff.
The Solicitor General and L. Hazen for Defendant.

HILARY TERM, 6th Wm. 4th.

1836.
GEUEKAL HUMS.
I. It is Ordered, That in future the Clerk of tlie Pleas do keep
a paper to be called the Motion Paper, in which shall be entered
all motions of which notice may have been given ; such entries to
be made on or before the first day of each Term, and to stand in
the said paper in the order in which they may be made; and the
matters contained in such Motion Paper shall come on to be heard
on the second day of the Term, before the Special Paper is gone
into.
II. It is further Ordered, That if notice of any motion, and a
copy of the affidavit or affidavits on which it is intended to be
grounded, shall be served upon the opposite party, his Attorney or
agent, as the case may be, fourteen days before the Term at which
the motion is intended to be made, a rule absolute may be made
in the first instance, if the Court shall see fit; and in all such
cases the cause shall be entered on the Motion Paper.
III. It is further Ordered, That no motion shall be made for
judgment as in case .of a nonsuit, pursuant to the Statute 14 G. 2,
c. 17, without notice having been first given thereof to the Plain
tiff, his Attorney or agent, as the case may be, together with a
copy of the affidavit on which the same is grounded, at least four
teen days before the Term at which such motion is intended to be
made, and without entering the same on the Motion Paper.
IV. It is further Ordered, That on motion made in open Court
pursuant to the said entry, and on due proof of the service of no
tice, and copy of affidavit as directed by the preceding rule, the
Defendant shall be entitled to a rule absolute for judgment as in
case of a nonsuit, unless the Court, on just cause and reasonable
terms, shall allow a further time for the trial of the issue, or unless
the Court should tl fink fit to enlarge the time for shewing cause
to the next Term.
V. It is further Ordered, That no judgment of non pros shall
be signed for want of a declaration, replication, or other subsequent
pleading, until ten days next after a demand thereof shall have
been made in w riting upon the Plaintiff, his Attorney or agent, as
the case may be.
R
VI.
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VI. It is further Ordered, That demurrer books be delivered
to the Judges on or before the first day of the Term, at which the
demurrer is to be argued ; the books for the Chief Justice and
senior Puisne Judge to be prepared and delivered by the Plaintiff’s
Attorney, and the books for the two junior Judges by the Defend
ant’s Attorney ; and that the same rule do also apply to other
cases in which paper books are required by the practice of the
Court to be delivered to the Judges.
VII. It is further Ordered, That a copy of the bill of particu
lars of the Plaintiff’s demand, and also of the Defendant’s set off,
(if any) shall be filed by the Plaintiff’s Attorney with every
record of Nisi Prius at the time of entering the same.
VIII. It is further Ordered, That it shall not be necessary to
issue more than one summons for attendance before a Judge upon
the same matter ; and the party taking out such summons, shall,
if the Judge see fit, be entitled to an order on the return of the
summons, unless cause is shewn to the contrary.

WARD CHIPMAN,
W. BOTSFORD,
J. CARTER,
R. PARKER.
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KERR v. CONNELL.
A licence to cut a certain quantity of timber from lands described in the
licence and to remove the same, does not convey an interest m lands within
the statute of frauds, or give any property in standing trees.
Such licence gives the licensee no right to timber cut within the descri
bed limits, by a stranger, without authority ;
Timber so cut, remains the property of the owner of the land : against
every other person, the possession of the timber and the labour bestowed
upon it gives the maker, although a wrong doer, the right to it.
If two persons expend labour in cutting and hauling timber under an
agreement that such timber is to be got on the halves, they are tenants in
common—and neither can convey as against the other more than his undi
vided share.

TrilS was an action of trover, to recover damages for a quantity
of timber claimed by the Plaintiff, and taken and converted by
the Defendant. At the trial before Parker, J. at the Carleton
Circuit in September, 1835, it appeared in evidence on the part
of the Plaintiff, that a licence issued in December, 1834, from the
Crown, to one William J. Bedell, “ to cut two hundred tons of
white pine timber from crown lands there'" described, and to re
move the same/’ This licence was procured by the merchant
Bedell, for the benefit of the Plaintiff, who was a lumberer. The
Defendant had a licence at the same period, to cut Lirch timber
on the same land, and in like manner had placed it in the hands
of the lumberer for whom he had procured it, one Walton. Walton
employed a person named Price, to hew birch timber for him
(Walton,) under Connell’s licence ; and it was agreed that if Price
should find any pine timber, he should make and hew it, and pre
pare the roads for hauling; that Walton should haul it, and that
it should he shared between them when hauled to the brow. Price,
under this agreement, commenced making birch timber, and also
manufactured sixteen sticks of pine timber, which were hauled
part of the way to the brow by Walton. At this time the Plain
tiff forbade Price to make any more pine timber, and at the same
time paid him for his labour in making the sixteen sticks, and
bought

131

CASES in TRINITY TERM,

bought from him his right thereto, and hauled the said sixteen
sticks to the brow ; they were rafted in the spring by the Plaintiff,
and carried down the river to a place where the Plaintiff had’other
timber. In the night the fastening of the timber was cut, and a
part of the timber carried away; eight sticks of it, which were the
subject matter of this action, were afterwards found in the posses
sion of the Defendant, who stated that he had purchased them
from Walton, and refused to deliver them to the Plaintiff.
A nonsuit was moved for by Berton, for the Defendant, on the
following grounds, viz : •
1st. That the licence to Bede1! could not be transferred by parol,
inasmuch as an interest in lands was vested in the licensee, within
the statute of frauds ; and being an instrument under seal, it could
not be assigned except in a similar manner.
2d. That the licensee derived by the licence only a right to cut
trees to be made into timber, and had no right to timber already
cut and made by others.
3d. That Price was only a servant of Walton, to be paid in kind
for his work and labour, and had no right in the timber to sell, or
if he had, his right was only as a tenant in common to one half
the timber.
The learned Judge reserved the points, and gave leave to the
Defendant to move for a nonsuit. The Plaintiff obtained a verdict
for the value of the timber.
Berton, for the Defendant, moved, in last Michaelmas Term,
and obtained a rule nisi, to set aside the verdict and enter a non
suit. In support of the first point, he urged that the licence from
the Crown, which gave metes and bounds to the land comprehend
ed therein, vested in the licensee an interest in lands within the
statute of frauds, and therefore, if assignable at all, was not so by
parol. 6 E. 502, Crosby v. Wadsworth ; 2 Bos and Puller, 452,
Waddington v. Bristow ; 3 Taun. 38, Emmerson v. Heelis. The
Court in gran ting the rule, excluded this point, and determined
that the licence vested no interest in the lands within the statute
of frauds.
Cause was shewn by the Solicitor General in Hilary Term.
The licence under which the Plaintiff claimed the timber, was
obtained by Bedell expressly for the benefit of Kerr, as was shewn
by his declarations in evidence. That fact was further substan
tiated by the document being in the possession of the Plaintiff;
the ms inner of obtaining it agreed with the common custom of the
country, and even, if in the opinion of the Court, the licence should
be considered not transferable, yet Bedell must be taken to have
been only an agent, acting for the Plaintiff, his principal. 1 Camp.
337, Duke of Norfolk v. Worthy. As to the right in the licensee
to
i
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to timber already cut, Walton and the Defendant liad no right to
any but birch timber ;■—if, then, Price, even under his agreement
with Walton, cut pine timber, no right thereto was vested in Wal
ton ; and it having been transferred by the maker to the Plaintiff,
his right to it could only be questioned by the Crown ; and even
as between the Plaintiff and the Crown, he having paid stumpage
for a certain quantity of timber, of which this was to be reckoned
a part, and having paid for the manufacture thereof, was, even as
against the Crown, the owner of the timber.
Berton, in support of the rule :—
The licence issued to Bedell, and nothing appeared therein to
shew that he acted for the Plaintiff; the stumpage money was
paid by him—the licence was to him, and to him alone—and no
other person could claim in his own right under that licence. The
Plaintiff rested his claim to the timber on his right under Bedell’s
licence ; if, then, the licence gave him no right, his claim to the
timber was unsupported. And again, even supposing the timber
to have been got under Bedell’s l.cence, it would be fair to pre
sume that Kerr was but the servant of Bedell, and if so, any
action should have been by Bedell, and not by the Plaintiff.
In this Term the Court delivered their opinions.
Chipman, Chief Justice :
This was an action of trover for a quantity of white pine timber,
in which a verdict was given for the Plaintiff, with leave reserved
at the trial for the Defendant to move to enter a nonsuit. The
main question discussed on this motion has been, as to the Plain
tiff’s property in the timber in question. The facts, as deduced
from the evidence given and the finding of the jury, may be stated
as follows:—
On the 18th December, 1834, the following licence was issued
from the Crown Land Office, to W. J. Bedell :
“ Application No. 1207, Licence No. 845, for 200 T. Tonnage.
“X12 15s. paid.
(L. S.)
“ By Ilis Excellency Major General Sir Archibald
“ Campbell, Baronet, G. C. B. Lieutenant Governor
Archibald Campbell. “ and Commander in Chief of the Province of New
“ Brunswick, &c. &c. &c.
“ Upon application made to me by William J. Bedell, of the Pa“ rish of Fredericton, in the County of York, in the Provhice of
“ New Brunswick, and recommended by the C immissioner of Crown
“ Lands and Forests, who has hereto set hi i hand and seal, I do
Mark.
“ hereby grant Licence unto him the said William J. Bedell, to cut,
K
“ subject to the Regulations heretofore published, and under the
“ terms and conditions in those Regulations contained, Two Hun“ dred Tons White Pine Timber, from ungranted and unapplied for
“ Crown Land, situate on the East side the River Saint John, to be
“ bounded South by the line run by Deputy Garden, East by the
“ Monauat, North by Smith’s Brook, and West by the Grante l
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Land, and to remove the same. The said William J. Bedell is not
to cut any Timber without the limits before described, nor cut any
more than the quantity herein specified, on pain of having the
whole seized. This Licence to continue in force (unless legally
suspended) until the first day of May next ensuing the date hereof,
and no longer, after which time no timber is to be cut or hauled
out under pretence thereof.
(L. S.)
(Signed)
“ THOMAS BAILLIE,
“ Commissioner of Crown Lands and Forests.
“ Given under my Hand and Seal at Fredericton, the 18th day of
“ December, in the fifth year of the Reign of His Majesty King
“ William the Fourth, and in the Year of our Lord OneThou“ sand Eight Hundred and Thirty Four.
“ By His Excellency’s Command,
(Signed)
“WILLIAM F. ODELL.
“ Deputy Surveyor Maclauchlan. .
“
“
“
“
“
“
“

This licence was placed in the hands of the Plaintiff by the li
censee Bedell, to get the timber under it; and if the licence could
be assigned by the licensee to another person, and be transferred
by words and delivery onlyji it was not contended that it was not
sufficiently transferred by Bedell, to the Plaintiff : It appeared in
deed that the licence was procured by Bedell for the benefit of the
Plaintiff, according to what was stated to be a common custom,-—
Bedell being a merchant, dealing in timber, and Kerr the Plaintiff
being a lumberer. The Defendant Connell, had a licence to cut
birch timber on the land described in the above licence to Bedell,
and this licence was in like manner put by the Defendant, who is
also a merchant, into the hands of one Walton, a lumberer, to get
the timber under it. One Price was employed by Walton to hew
the birch timber under the latter licence, and it was agreed be
tween Price and Walton, that if Price found any pine timber upon
the ground, they (Price and Walton) should get it to the halves,
on the brow. Price was to cut, hew, and swamp it, and Walton
to haul it out to the brow. The pine timber in question in this
suit was cut and made by Price, and hauled part of the way and
yarded by Walton under this agreement. In this state of affairs
the Plaintiff interfered and claimed the timber under his licence,
(i. e. the above licence to Bedell,) forbidding any more pi^.e timber
being cut by Price, and bought from Price all his right to this tim
ber, paying him for the labour he had expended upon it. The
Plaintiff then hauled the timber to the bank or brow, from the
place where Walton had yarded it. There were in all sixteen
sticks of this pine timber, and the Defendant Connell, under a
transfer from Walton, took possession of eight sticks ;—this action
was brought for these eight sticks. The Plaintiff founded his right
of property in this timber upon the above licence to Bedell—and
it is advisable in the first place to inquire into the nature of the
right
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right which the licence conferred upon the licensee named in it,
supposing him to have been the person who actually exercised the
right which the licence gave : for if it should appear that the li
cence vested no right of property to the timber in question in this
cause in the person to whom it was expressly granted, it will be
unnecessary for the Court, in giving judgment, to go into the ques
tions which have been mooted, as to the power of the licensee to
assign the licence, no such power being expressed in tlie licence ;
or whether the Plaintiff might, under the circumstances, be consi
dered as the principal in the licence, and Bedell only as the agent
in procuring it.
The nature of a licence is explained by L. C. J. Vaughan, in the
case of Thomas v. Sorrell—Vaugh. 351, in the following manner :
“ A dispensation or licence properly passes no interest, nor alters
“ or transfers property in any thing, but only makes an action
“ lawful, which without it had been unlawful. As a ’icerice to go
« beyond the seas, to hunt in a man’s park, to come into his house,
“ are only actions, which, without licence, had been unlawful.
“ But a licence to hunt in a man’s park and to carry away the
“ deer killed to his own use, to cut down a tre in a man’s ground
“ and to carry it away the next day after to his own use, are li“ cences as to the acts of hunting and cutting down the tree, but
“ as to the carrying away of the deer killed and tree cut down,
“ they are grants. So to licence a man to eat my meat, or to fire
“ the wood in my chimney to warm him by, as to the actions of
“ eating, firing my wood, and warming him, they are licences ; but
“ it is consequent necessary to those actions that my property be
“ destroyed in the meat eaten, and in the wood burnt, so as in
“ some cases by consequent and not directly and as its effect, a
“ dispensation or licence may destroy and alter property.”
A reference to the terms of the licence in the present instance
will best explain its meaning. It is “Zocz/7” and “to removef
subject to the conditions of the licence,—“ two hundred tons white
pine timber” from ungranted and unapplied for Crown land, situate
as described in the licence. A licence in these terms clearly
amounts to a grant cf the timber which may be cut and removed
according to the terms of the licence, but of no more. It conveys
no title whatever to any timber which is not cut and removed by
virtue of the licence. The case of Basset v. Maynard, Cro. Eliz.
819, in which a question arose as to the sale of a quantity of wood
to be taken at the vendee’s election, is so apposite to the present
case, and so fully supports the position I have just stated, that I
will cite it at large.
“ Action sur trover and conversion of certain loads of wood.
“ Upon a special verdict, the case was,—Six Thomas Palmer was
“ seized
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“ seized of a great wood, and bargained and sold to one Cornford,
“ and his assigns, as many trees as would make 600 cords of
“ wood, to be taken by the assignment of Sir Thomas Palmer.
“ Coinford assigns over his interest to the Plaintiff. Afterwards,
“ Sir Thomas Palmer granted to the Defendant so much of his
“ wood as would make 4000 cords of wood, to be taken at the De“ fendant’s election. The Plaintiff afterwards, by the assignment
“ of Sir Thomas Palmer, cut down the trees in question, to make
“ 600 cords; and the Defendant claiming them by virtue of his
“ grant, took them. It was found that there was sufficient wood
“ left for the Defendant to make his 4000 cords, et si, &c. Upon
“ this verdict, it was moved, that here was not sufficient title
“ found for the Plaintiff. For first, it is not found that the bargain
<c and sale was for any sum of money, nor upon any consideration.
“ Sed non allocatur. For it is intended to be so, being found by
“ the verdict. But if it had not been so found, it might peradveu“ ture have been otherwise, as Dyer, 91, is.
“ Secondly, it was alleged, that this grant to the Plaintiff is
“ void ; for until the assignment made by Sir Thomas Palmer, no
“ interest vested in Cornford himself, so as he could not make any
“ grant thereof over. But all the Court held the grant to be
“ good ; for being made to h n and his assigns, he may make an
“ assignee, which shall enure as a nomination to one, who is to
“ have by the appointment of Sir Thomas Palmer ; and it may
“ well vest in him, as the interest also. And here he hath no in“ terest before the assignment made by Sir Thomas Palmer ; inso“ much as if Sir Thomas Palmer will not assign it in convenient
‘‘ time, he himself might take them ; and therefore he may assign
“ this interest, as 44 Edw. III. pl. 43, is. But admitting the
“ grant to the Plaintiff had been void, yet Popbam said that the
“ action was maintainable ; because by the cutting down of them,
“ he had possession and a good title against the Defendant and
“ every stranger ; and being cut down, it was not lawful for the
“ Defendant to take them: for if one sells 1000 cords of wood, to
“ be taken at the vendee’s election, and afterwards the grantor or
“ a stranger cuts down some of the wood, the vendee cannot take
“ that which is cut down, but he ought to make his grant good, out
“ of that which is growing. As if estovers were granted unto liim,
“ to be taken in a great wood, and the owner of the wood cuts
“ down some’of the wood, the grantee cannot take that which is
“ ent down, but he must take his estover out of the residue. And
“ if all be cut down, he hath not any remedy, but an action upon
“ the case. So here, although the Plaintiff hath not a good title,
“ yet his having possession of them, being cut down, suffeeth.—■
li Quod Gawdy et Clinch concesserunt—wherefore it was adjudged
“ for the Plaintiff, 5 Co. 24 v.”
In
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In the present case, the timber was not cut under Bedell’s li
cence, but by persons altogether unconnected with it, and so ad
verse to it, that they were forbidden by the Plaintiff to proceed.
If the argument adduced on the part of the Plaintiff, that the li
censee under Bedell’s licence had a right to avail himself of Price’s
acts in cutting pine timber on the land included within the licence,
by paying him for his labour in so doing, were acceded to, it would
make the licence to convey a general authority from the Crown
to compound for any trespass committed in cutting white pine tim
ber on the land described in it—an inference, which requires only
to be stated, to shew its utter inadmissibility. I am clearly of
opinion that not a shadow of title can be derived under Bedell’s
licence to the timber cut by Price, which is the subject of this ac
tion. In whom then was the property in this timber ? I answer
that the property undoubtedly remained in the Crown, the timber
having been cut on Crown lands without authority. But it is for
the Crown to enforce its own rights. Against every person but
the King, the possession of the 1' tuber and their labour bestowed
upon it, gave to Price and Walton the right to it, and the nature
of their relative rights is to be determined by their own agreement.
Each of them had expended labour on the timber under the agree
ment, and by that agreement, as the timber was to be got to the
halves, they were tenants in common, each of one half; and
neither of them could convey as against the other, more than an
undivided moiety. The sale from Price to the Plaintiff, therefore,
conveyed to him Price’s interest only, (i. e. an undivided moiety,)
and the Plain! iff became a tenant in common with Walton or
Walton’s assigns, when Walton conveyed his share. Walton’s
interest in the timber was transferred to the Defendant, who thus
became a tenant in common with the Plaintiff—and as it is the
general rule, to which this case does not afford an exception, that
a tenant in common cannot maintain trover against his companion,
I am of opinion, that upon this ground, the rule for entering a
nonsuit must be made absolute.
Botsford, J. concurred.
Carter, J.:
To maintain this, which is an action of trover, the Plaintiff must
shew some right of property in the subject of the action. This he
has attempted to do in two ways ; first, he claims a right to the
timber in question under a licence from the Crown; the licence
which he offers in evidence in support of this right, appears to be
a licence from the Crown to W. J. Bedell, to cut (subject to cer
tain regulations winch do not appear in evidence) two hundred
tons of white pine timber, from Crown lands described therein, and
to remove the same ;—now it appears mos* clearly from the
s
evidence,
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evidence, that the white pine timber, which is the subject of this
action, was not cut under the licence, either by the Plaintiff, or by
Bedell; but was cut by a person named Price, without any autho
rity or right whatever. The case of Bassett «. Maynard, already
cited from Cro. Eliz. 819, is a direct authority, to shew that this
licence could give neither the Plaintiff nor Bedell any right to
timber so cut; and so far as this case is concerned, ; will be suf
ficient, on this ground alone, to decide that the Plaintiff has failed
in establishing any title to the timber in question under the licence.
On the second ground on which the Plaintiff rests his title, I
think he has also failed : claiming this timber by a transfer from
Price, he cannot have a better title to it than Price himself had.
As far as all three parties are concerned, from the agreement
between Price and Walton, they would become joint owners of
the white pine timber cut by Price—then Walton transfers his
share to the Defendant, and Price his share to the Plaintiff—the
Plaintiff and Defendant would thus become joint owners of the
timber, and therefore an action of trover would not lie by one
against the other.
For these reasons, I think the rule for a nonsuit must be made
absolute.
Parker, J.:
It is impossible for the Plaintiff to establish his right to recover
n this action, by virtue of the agreement made with Price, unless
he can make out a title to the timber in question from the Crown
under the licence given to Bedell. At the time of such agreement,
the timber (setting aside the Crown rights) was either in the sole
possession of Walton, or in the joint possession of Price and Wal
ton, under a previous agreement made between them, for the pur
pose of being hauled from the woods to the brow of the river upon
shares—an agreement which constituted between them the relation
ship of tenants in common ;—it is clear then that Price, at the
time of his delivering the timber to the Plaintiff, had neither the
right of property nor exclusive possession ; and as the Defendant
stands in Walton’s shoes, if the Plaintiff cannot shew a title inde
pendently of Price’s act, he must fail.
One very material question which was suggested at the argu
ment by his Honor the Chief Justice, whether the licence was as
signable at all, was not mooted at the trial; but the two which
have been argued, namely, whether the licence from the Crown to
cut so many tons of pine timber, would give the licensee a right to
take pine timber cut by a stranger ; and whether the interest in
the licence could pass by a parol assignment, were urged by the
learned Counsel for the Defendant; and as it was admitted on all
hands that they were most important in a general point of view,
as
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as they affected the great staple trade of the country, I was glad
to reserve them without giving* an opinion, and the case went to
the jury on the questions of fact as to the identity of the place and
the timber, which they found, and very properly so, in favour of
the Plaintiff ;i for there could be little or no doubt, that the timber
which Connell, the Defendant, avowedly got from Walton, was
part of the same which had been cut by Price within the limits of
the berth described in Bedell’s licence.
I should remark also, that I stated to the jury, that allowing a
parol assignment to be valid, I thought there was quite sufficient
evidence to presume an assignment in this case ; and this seemed
rather conceded by the Defendant’s Counsel; but then, part of the
evidence, namely, Bedell’s declarations, were distinctly objected
to, and received by me, also subject to the opinion of the Court;
and the entire question is, I think, fairly open for discussion if the
case required it.—As to the first point reserved, on a full consi
deration and review of the authorities, I entirely concur with his
Honor and my brothers, that the licence gave no property in the
standing trees, and would not enure as a grant until the trees were
selected and cut by the licensee, or under his authority; that the
property in the pine timber so cut by Price, was, and stih is, for
aught that appeared in evidence, vested in the Crown, and conse
quently neither the Plaintiff 'ilor Bedell could maintain trover for
it, against the person who has a right to the possession, as against
Price and those claiming under him.
The case of Thomas v. Sorrell, from Vaughan, 351, (which has
been already cited,) puts in very clear terms the nature of the
rights which the parties derive under these licences. There is a
manifest distinction in the form of the instrument between a licence
to cut trees within certain prescribed limits to make a specified
quantity of timber, and a bargain and sale or grant of particular
trees, or all the trees on a particular spot of ground ; on this point
the case of Dewclas & al. v. Kendall & al., in Yelverton, 188, is
well worth noting. It would appear indeed, by the cases, that a
demise of all the trees, though with liberty to cut, would not trans
fer the property until cut—there must be an actual sale or grant.
See 14 Vin. Abr. 83 & 84 ; Stukely v. Butler, Hob. 174, 6 ; also
Cheltham v. Williamson, 4 East. 469 ; Still v. Butler, Cro. Eliz.
434; Russell v. Maynard, Cro. Eliz. 819; Raebban v. Jessup, 3
Wils. 333 n. ; Woodson v. Newton, Str. 777, and Smith v. Surnam, 9 B. & C. 573.
As to the several other objections which have been raised, the
view which we have taken of the principal question, renders it un
necessary to give an opinion; but I beg my present silence may
not, as the case now presents itself, be considered in consequence
of any thing which fell from me at nisi prius, as agreeing to the
position,
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position, that the present Plaintiff was clothed with the rightswhich Bedell derived from the Crown licence. It is well also to
observe, that there was nothing in this case to make it an excep
tion to the general rule respecting tenants in common, and that
any presumption of severance of the tenancy would make against
the Plaintiff, as, for anything that appeared, he retained possession
of a moiety of the timber, and his claim went to the whole.
Rule absolute.
The Solicitor General for Plaintiff.
A. K. S. Wetmore and Berton for Defendant.

DOE EX DEM WILT v. JARDINE.
A deed, whereby the releasor released to the releasee, his heirs and as
signs, all his right, title, interest and claim to certain lands, to have and to
hold the same, to him, his heirs and assigns, for ever; the same having
been duly executed, proved and registered, pursuant to the Act of Assembly,
26 Geo. 3, c. 3, is a good conveyance of lands, within the meaning of the
10th section of the said Act.

This action of ejectment was tried before Carter, J. at the Kent
Circuit in August. 1835. The lessor of the Plaintiff established
a prima facie case, under a grant from the Crown to him of the
land in question, bearing date 17th June, 1830. The following
deed was given in evidence for the Defendant, and formed part of
his title, viz :—
“ Knoi all met by these presents, that I, John Wilt, of Liverpool, in the
“ County of Kent, Yeoman, for and in consideration of the sum of two hundred
“ pounds, of lawful money of New Brunswick, to me in hand paid by Robert
“ Jardine and John Jardine, of the same place, Merchants, at or before the seal“ ing and delivery of these presents, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged,
“ have remised, released and quit claimed, and do by these presents remise, re“ lease and quit claim unto the said Robert Jardine and John Jardine, their heirs
“ and assigns forever, all my right, title, interest and property, claim, in and to the
u following demised premises, viz. a certain lot of land, applied for by me to Go“ vernmeni, situated on the South side of the Richibucto River, in the County
“ aforesaid, in the rapids of the main river aforesaid, with all and singular the
“ appurtenances thereunto belonging, to have and to hold the same premises,
“ unto the said Robert Jardine and John Jardine, their heirs and assigns, forever.
" In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and seal, this fifteenth day of
“ October, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and thirty.
(Signed)
“ JOHN WILT. [L. S.J
“ Signed, sealed and delivered
tf in presence of
(Signed)
“ Peter Stubs.”
“ Kent, > “ Peter Stubs, of Liverpool, in the County aforesaid, Esquire, maketh
to-wit. S “ oath and saith, that he, this Deponent, w>as present, and did see
“ the within named John Wilt sign, seal and execute the foregoing deed freely
“ and voluntarily, for the use and purposes therein mentioned, and that the name
“ John Wilt, set and subscribed fis the Grantor aforesaid, is of the proper hand-

“ writing
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“ writing of the said John Wilt, and that the name Peter Stubs, set and subscri“ bed as the subscribing witness thereto, is of the proper handwriting of this
“ Fefonent.
(Signed)
“ PETER STUBS.
“ Sworn to at Liverpool aforesaid,
“ in the County aforesaid, this
(( 27th day of October, 1830,
** Before
(Signed)
u Geo. Pagan, Reg. Deeds, &c.”

“ Registered in Book B. pages 442 and 443, this twenty-seventh day of Oc“ tober, 1830, and is number 208 in said Book.
(Signed)
“ GEO. PAGAN, County Reg.”

J. A. Street, for the Plaintiff, contended, that the deed being
merely a release, required some previous right or interest in the
releasee in the land released, upon which the deed might operate,
and no such right or interest having been shewn, the deed was
inoperative.
The learned Judge ruled, that the deed was sufficient to pass
the fee simple in the land mentioned in it, and under his direction
in this respect, a verdict was found for the Defendant.
In last Michaelmas Term, a rule nisi, to set aside the verdict
and grant a new trial, was obtained.
J. A. Street, in moving for the rule, took the following points :
1 st. That no deed would operate as a conveyance of land in this
Province, except such as would operate by the common law, or
under the statute of uses and Enrollments in England.
2d. That the deed from John Wilt to Robert and John Jardine,
under which the Defendant claimed title, would not operate either
as a feoffment at common law, or as a bargain and sale under the
Statute of uses.
4 Cruise Dig. 48, 49, 107, 115 ; 1 Cruise Dig. 354 ; 1 Shep.
Touchst. 165, 202 ; 2 do. 113.
Cause was shewn in Hilary Term.
E. B. Chandler for Defendant:—
1st. The deed was not offered as a release at common law. It is
a good feoffment, and, having been recorded under the Act of As
sembly, has all the effect of a feoffment in England, with livery
of seisin.
To constitute a feoffment at common law, or by statute, no pre
cise words are necessary.
By the common law, a grantor might go upon land, and express
and declare the estate intended to be conveyed ; and under the
statute, it is only necessary that the intention of the parties should
be expressed in writing. 4 Bl. Com. 310, 311 ; 4 Com. Dig. 285.
The word give, ratty be sufficient to constitute a feoffment. 2 Bac.
Abr. 602. The registry under the Act of Assembly is in place,
and dispenses with the necessity of livery and seisin. The 10th
section
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section of 26 Geo. 3, c. 3, provides, that all bargains and sales of
lands, &c., and all grants and conveyances whatever, which shall
be entered and registered at full length, as required by the same
Act, shall be good, effectual and available, to all intents and pur
poses, for the passing and transferring such lands, &c., and the
estate and possession thereof, without livery of seisin, or other act,
deed or ceremony whatsoever.
Then the question is, whether this deed is a good charter of
feoffment at common law. The material circumstance necessary
in such an instrument is, the declaration of the quantity and du
ration of the estate.
2ndly. The deed operates as a bargain and sale under the
statute of uses, as connected with the Act of Assembly.
No precise form of words is necessary to constitute a bargain
and sale. 1 Bac. Abr. 686. Tit. Bargain and Sale. Any words
sufficient at common law to raise a use, will enure as a bargain
and sale. Then wbat words will raise a use ? Any, which shew
the intention of the parties. 7 Com. Dig. 572-3. Tit. Uses. D. 1.
3dly. The deed may, with the aid of the Provincial statute,
operate as a release—the Act supplying the place of a lease. Lan
guage cannot be more conclusive than are the words of the Act.
[Carter, J.—Is not a previous estate necessary to support a
release ?]
It has been held in the West Indies—in Antigua, St. Vincent,
and Jamaica—under their registry acts, that a recorded convey
ance requires not livery of seisin. 2 Blythewood, 222 ; 3 Bythew,
165 ; 7 Bythew, 149.
The Solicitor General followed on the same side.
The situation of these parties is of a peculiar nature. The party
who made this deed is now attempting to avoid its effect, and turn
out of the possession of the land the persons to whom it was given :
it is an attempt on the part of the lessor of the Plain! iff to defeat
his own deed, made for a valuable consideration. Unless, then, a
very clear case in point of law is made out, the Court will not as
sist him. The question is not within any of the authorities cited
on the other side.
By the common law, an entry on the land and actual livery of
seisin, were necessary, but these are not necessary here. 'The
lease for a year was necessary to do away with livery of seisin, all
which is wholly unnecessary by the provisions of the Act of As
sembly. The deed, shall enure according to the uses, intents and
purposes therein expressed, is the language of the Province law.
What, then, are the uses, intents and purposes of this deed ? There
can be no doubt on this point; the habendum expresses that the
grantees shall hold to thera, their heirs and assigns, forever. The
intention
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intention of the parties being clear, the deed, by the Act of As
sembly, must take effect.
The Solicitor General was stopped by the Court, who directed
the attention of the Counsel on the other side to the Act of As
sembly, on which they considered the question must turn.
J. A. Street in support of the rule :—
The question then is, whether this deed is a good conveyance
under the Act of Assembly, or, in other words, is it such a deed,
as, under the terms of the common law, restrained by the statute
of frauds, would<lcreate a feoffment. The 10th section of the Act
enacts, that all deeds duly recorded, &c., shall be sufficient with
out livery* of seisin ; and comparing this with the statute of uses
and inrollments, it is clear that our Act is founded upon those
statutes: the question, therefore, is resolved wholly into the point
above stated. A deed which will amount to a bargain and sale,
is a good feoffment; but here there are neither such words as will
raise a use or a covenant to stand seised. If it contained the words
grant, bargain, and sell, or any equivalent words, it would be suf
ficient under the Act of Assembly. A release may enure by way
of nutter le droit—enlargement, or extinguishment; in either of
whicl cases, it is founded on the privity of estate between the
parties ; here the parties are strangers, without any privity of es
tate or interest in the release, upon which to found this release—
therefore, it cannot operate as a release ; and being without words
of conveyance, or such as will raise a use or covenant to stand
seised, it cannot operate as a feoffment, and therefore cannot be
considered a good conveyance within even the extensive meaning
of the Act of Assembly.
Curia advisari vult.
In this Term the Court delivered their opinions.
Chipman, Chief Justice:
Referred to the deed as set forth above in the statement of the
cause, and then proceeded :—
The learned Judge ruled at the trial that this deed was sufficient
to pass the fee simple in the land mention® in it, and under his
direction in this respect, the verdict was found. A rule for a new
trial was obtained on the ground that this deed was not good as a
release at common law, there being no antecedent interest in the
land in the person to whom the deed was made, upon which the
release might operate. It was further contended, that it could not
operate as a feoffment at common law, nor as a bargain and sale
under the statute of uses ; and much learning on all these points
was brought forw ard on both sides, in the course of the argument.
I am disposed to rest my judgment entirely on the Act of Assembly, 26 Geo 3, c. 3, s. 10, which was evidently intended to lay
down

i
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down a broad rule to regulate the transfer of lands in this Province,
without reference to particular forms or modes of conveyance.—
The terms of the Act are the most broad and general that the
English language affords:

“ All bargains and sales of any lands, tenements, and heredita-f
ments, by deed indented or deed poll, and all grants and con- ;
66
veyances whatsoever, made by writing, and duly signed, sealed, ■
66
and delivered, and acknowledged by the grantor or grantors,
66
bargainor or bargainors, in such grants, sales and conveyances,
66
&c. &c. # # which shall be entered and registered at full
66
length, &c. &c. *
shall be good, effectual and available
66
to all intents and purposes. whatsoever, for the passing and
66
transferring such lands, tenements and hereditaments, and, the
66
estate and possession thereof, to the bargainee and bargainees,
“ grantee and grantees therein named, according to the intents,
cc uses and purposes in* such deeds and conveyances^ expressed,
without livery of seisin, or any other act, or deed, or form or I
66
ceremony whatever.”
66

“ All grants and conveyances whatsoever,” if “ made by wri
ting,” and duly “signed,” “ sealed,” and delivered,” and “ac
knowledged,” and “ registered,” shall be available “ to dll intents
and purposes whatsoever,” for the passing and transferring of lands,
“ according to the intents, uses and purposes in such deeds and
conveyances expressed.” A subsequent Act, 52 Geo. 3, c. 20,
makes all conveyances duly acknowledged “ or proved” under
the provisions of any Act of Assembly, to be equally good and
available. It was argued on the part of the Plaintiff, that a con
veyance, to be good under this Act, must tally with some technical
form of conveyance known to the law of the mother country. If
an inquiry into this point were necessary in every instance, it
would certainly tend to frustrate the evident object of the Act,
which, as I have already suggested, is to facilitate and simplify the
conveying of lands. This object is pursued in this part of the Pro
vincial statute by declaring that every conveyance, (to which term
I give in this place its popular and ordinary signification of an act
for the transferring of lands,) made by writing, and accompanied
by the other requisites mentioned in the statute, shall ne effectual
for the transferring the lands to which it applies, according to the
intents, uses and purposes “ expressed” in such conveyance, with
out livery of seisin or any other act or ceremony whatever. An
American writer of high legal reputation, Mr. Dane, in his Abridg
ment of American Law, (vol. 4, p. 7,) well describes the general
notion of a conveyance.—“ Strictly sneaking,” says he, “ lands,
“ being immoveable, never can be conveyed, transferred, handed
66
or delivered over from man to man, in the sense a hat, a horse,
“ or
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or other moveable thing is. Still, in the eye of the law, land
passes from the grantor to the grantee. In fact, the grantor relinquishes his right and possession, consents the grantee shall
have them, and he assumes the right and takes possession, by
entering on the land as his own. This is the substance, whatever may be the form of conveyance.”

The spirit of the Act of Assembly coincides with modem autho
rities, which all concur in construing deeds in such a manner as
will best effectuate the intention of the parties, without regard to
technical forms. Thus Lord Mansfield, Cowp. 599 :—“ The rules
“ laid down in respect of the construction of deeds are founded in
“ law, reason, and common sense : that they shall operate accord“ ing to the intention of the parties, if by law they may : and if
“ they cannot operate in one form, they shall operate in that,
“ which by law will effectuate the intention. But an objection is
“ made in this case, which, it is said, takes it out of the general
“ rule and the doctrine of the authorities cited : and that is, that
“ in the release in question the word ’•grant' is not made use of.
“ But that the intention of the parties was to pass all the right and
“ title of the Plaintiff in these premises, is manifest beyond a doubt,”
And Lord C. J. Willes, 2 Wils. 75, 73 :—“ By the word ’intent,'
“ is not meant the intent of the parties to pass the land by this or
“ that particular kind of deed, or by any particular mode or form
“ of conveyance, but an intent that the land shall pass at all
“ events, one way or other.” ®
“ Although formerly accord“ ing to some of the old cases, the mode or form of a conveyance
“ was held material, yet in later times, when the intent appears
“ that the land shall pass, it has been ruled otherwise ; and cer“ tainly it is more considerate to make the intent good in passing
“ the estate, if by any legal means it may be done, than by consi“ dering the manner of passing it, to disappoint the intent and
“ principal thing, which were to pass the lands.” * * # Lord
Hobart, (who was a very great man) in his reports, fo. 277, says :
—“ I exceedingly commend the Judges that are curious and al“ most subtle, astuti, to invent reason and means to make Acts
“ according to the just intent of the parties, and to avoid wrong
“ and injury, which by rigid rules might be wrought out of the
“ Act —and my Lord Hale, in the case of Crossing and Scuda
more, 1 Vent. 141, cites and approves of this passage in Hobart.
By the deed now in question, John Wilt, for the pecuniary con
sideration mentioned in it, remises, releases, and quit claims, unto
Robert Jardine and Jchn Jardine, their heirs, and assigns, for
ever, all his right, title, interest and claim, to the premises des
cribed in the deed, to have and to hold the same to the said Robert
Jardine and John Jardine, their heirs, and assigns, for ever. Is
T
it
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it not manifest, beyond a doubt, that the grantor meant by this
instrument to relinquish all his right and interest in the land des
cribed in it to the grantees ; to consent that they should have the
land, to pass and transfer the same to them ? Is not this the in
tent and purpose distinctly expressed in the instrument ? The
instrument is in waiting, it is duly signed, sealed, delivered, proved
and registered, according to the provisions of the Acts of the As
sembly—and shall it not be available under the same Acts of As
sembly to pass and transfer the land, according to the ,•intent and
purpose thus expressed in it ? To hold the contrary would make
nugatory the Acts of Assembly, and would be a manifest perver
sion of justice. I think the rule for a new trial must be dis
charged.
BOTSFORD, J. :

I concur fully with his Honor the Chief Justice, and am also of
the opinion that the deed in question is a good bargain and sale
within the statute of uses.
Blackstone, in speaking of a bargain and sale of lands as a spe
cies of conveyance, introduced by the statute of uses, says, that it
“■-is a kind of real contract, whereby the bargainor, for some pecu“ niary consideration, bargains and sells, that is, contracts to con“ vey the land to the bargainee, and becomes by such a bargain a
“ trustee for, or seised to the use of the bargainee, and then the
“ statute of uses completes the purchase, or as it hath been well
“ expressed, the bargain first vests the use, and then the statute
“ vests the possession.”—2 Bl. Com. 838.
All the books agree, that whatever words upon valuable consi
deration, would have raised an use of any lands at common law—
the same would amount to a bargain and sale within the statute of
uses. The legal estate in the soil was not transferred by that
mode of conveyance. No livery of seisin was therefore necessary.
The intention of the parties was the leading principle; and any
instrument declaring that intention, was allowed to be binding in
equity.
It is laid down by Lord Chief Justice Holt, in Jones v. Morley,
in speaking of the several ways to declare uses:—“ If there is no
“ transmutation of the possession, as by fine, feoffment or recovery,
“ the declaration will be sufficient without consideration or deed.
“ But if there is no transmutation of possession, then there must
“ be some obligatory agreement or valuable consideration. If an
‘J agreement is, that A, for so much money paid, snail have the
“ land, this will raise an use.”
It was admitted by Sir William Jones, in his argument in Scu
damore v. Crossing, that the consideration of money has been held
so strong, as to carry an estate of fee simple in an use without
words
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words of inheritance;—and in reference to Fox’s case, (8 Co. 185)
said, that the consideration of money, there expressed, carried
that case.
With respect to the construction of deeds, the intention appears
to have been the governing principle. In Wilkinson v. Tranmore,
it was said by Willes, C. J. :—“ Although formerly, according to
“ some old cases, the mode or form of a conveyance was held ma“ terial, yet in later times, when the intent appears that the land
“ shall pass, it has been ruled otherwise; and certainly it is more
“ considerate to make the intent good, in passing the estate, if by
“ any legal means it may be done, than by considering the manner
“ of passing it, to disappoint the intent and principal thing, which
“ was to pass the land.”
It is laid down in 6 Bythewood, 441, that “ the operative words
“ in a bargain and sale at common law, and a bargain and sale
“ under the statute of uses, are the same ; but they are essential
“ to neither, as any other words of conveyance would answer the
“ same purpose.”
In Shove v. Pincke, 5 T. R. 129, it was said by Lord Kenyon :
—“ It never has been held necessary that the word grant should
“ be used in a grant, it being sufficient if the intention to grant be
“ manifest by a deed —and by Buller, J. that the words “ limit
and appoint,” operate as a grant.
In the case of Goodtitle v. Bailey, Cowp. 600, the words “re
nounce, remise, release, and quit claim,” which are the words
adapted to a release, were held to operate as a grant, it being the
intention of the parties to pass all the right and title of the Plain
tiff in the premises.
As to the deed in question, the consideration being for money,
and the words sufficient to shew that it was the intention of the
bargainor to sell all his right and title in the premises, to the bar
gainee, his heirs, and assigns, it would, under the authorities cited,
have been sufficient at common law, and before the statute of uses,
27 H. 8, c. 10, to have passed the use in the land—consequently,
the same is a good conveyance of bargain and sale within that Act.
Carter, J ■
The question in this case is, whether the lessor of the Plaintiff
divested himself of the land in dispute by a former deed, which
deed he now seeks to set aside.
The only words of conveyance used in this deed are the words
“ remise, release, and quit claim,” which are undoubtedly the
operative words generally used in a deed of release—and it cannot
be for one instant disputed, that as a release, cannot create an
original estate—but can only effiarge an existing estate—and in
this case no such existing estate appeared in the parties to whom
this
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this deed was made, the deed would not operate strictly as a
release.
It is well said by Lord Mansfield in the case of Goodtitle v.
Bailey, Cowp. 597, “that deeds shall operate according to the
“ intention of the parties, if by law they may: and if they cannot
“ operate in one form, they shall operate in that which by law will
“ effectuate the intention.” In Osman v. Sheaffe, 3 Lev. 372,
cited in 2 Saun, 97 (a) it is said “ that the Judges of late years
“ have had greater consideration for the passing of the estate, which
“ is the substance of the deed, than the manner how, which is the
“ shadow.'1'’ Looking at this deed, nothing can be plainer than
the intention of the party to convey the land—the evidence shewed
that a bona fide consideration was given for it, and the jury nega
tived any fraud in the transaction. Under these circumstances,
and under the authorities I have mentioned, and others which are
to be found in the books, I should have been inclined to think the
Court, independently of the Provincial statutes, might have given
effect to this deed, and prevented the lessor of the Plaintiff from de
feating his own solemn act. I understand from Mr. Justice Par
ker, that in a late case, the Court of King’s Bench decided that
these words were not sufficient to create a feoffment with livery of
seisin. It is unnecessary, however, to decide the case on this,
which would have been at all events, doubtful ground—for it ap
pears to me perfectly clear, that helped by the Act of Assembly
26 G. 3, c. 3, this deed would operate as an absolute conveyance
of the land therein mentioned. I cannot assent to the position
taken in argument by the learned Counsel for the Plaintiff, that
the provisions of that Act apply only to deeds of conveyance, founded
on the statute of uses. The words of the 10th section seem to rae to
be as general as possible, and to have been studiously intended to
comprehend all deeds of conveyance, and to prevent strict and tech
nical objections, which, if not provided against, might often have
worked great injustice and fraud, when from the circumstances of
the Province, that strict attention to legal forms in the transfer of
real estate could net be supposed to exist; taking the words of the
10th section of the Act of Assembly, this deed appears to me to be
a conveyance of land made in writing and duly signed, sealed,
delivered, acknowledged, and registered—and is therefore good and
effectual, for the transferring of the land therein mentioned, for the
intents and purposes therein expressed. This conclusion > one to
which I come most willingly, for had I felt myself bound by the
strict rules of law to hold this deed inoperative—I much fear that
justice would not have been done between these parties.
Parker, J.:
The argument of the learned Counsel for the Plaintiff who seeks
to sustain this rule is as follows:—No deed will operate as a con
veyance

in the

Sixth Year of WILLIAM IV.

151

veyance of land in this Province, except it be sucli a conveyance
as would operate by the common law, or under the statutes of uses
and inrollments in England : the deed of the lessor of the Plaintiff
to Robert and John Jardine, under which the defendant holds,
would not so operate in England, and therefore not in this Province.
The second proposition is, I think, true ; and I have not arrived
at this conclusion without a full investigation, though perhaps such
an inquiry, in the state of our law, is more curious than useful.
It was argued that the deed would operate as a feoffment, the
registry supplying the place of livery of seisin; as a bargain and
sale ; and as a release at common law. I was rather inclined to
think it would operate as a feofljnent, but I have found a very re
cent case, Doe d. Dearden v. Maden, 4 B. and Ad. 880, in which
it was holden that the -words “ reftiistfj'elease, and forever quit
claim,™ .although accompanied by a warranty, were not sufficient
to make the deed operate as a feoffment; but as there was suffi
cient evidence in that case of an anterior possession, it was held
to operate as a conveyance by way of release.
The effect of the
habendum, in the case before us, might give room for further ar
gument, but it is not necessary to enlarge on this at present.
For a bargain and salefiit appears to me that there are not suf
ficient words—the precise words bargain and sell are not requisite,
but there must be equipollent words, which remise, release, and
quitclaim can hardly be considered; they have not as yet been so
far as I can discover, though many other terms have, which may
be found in2 Inst. 6^2; 2 Com. Dig. 198; 1 Vent. 141, &c.
There was no previous estate or possession on which it could
operate as a release by the law of England. The registry under
the Act of Assembly could not supply the place of the deed for a
year, in the ordinary conveyance of lease and release. I cannot
think the word deed, as used in the concluding part of the 10th s.
of 26 Geo. 3, c. 3, has this meaning ; but is to be construed as a
word ejusdem gennris, with those in the context and not as a deed
of conveyance. The vendor was in the actual possession when tlie
deed was executed, and for some time afterwards, and there was
nothing whereon to found a presumption of any prior estate in the
releasee. Something might be said on the ground of estoppel under
the authority cited from Cowper, 597; but I think the case so
clear under our Act of Assembly, that it is not necessary to call in
aid the general reasoning of Lord Mansfield, which may not pos
sibly be as clearly supported on strict legal, as it undoubtedly is,
on equitable grounds. It is impossible, I think, to read the 10th
sec. of 26 Geo. 3, c. 3, and the 2d sec. of 52 Geo. 3, c. 20, with
out being satisfied of the intention of the Legislature not to bind
us to the same forms of conveyancing as are used in England.
Indeed
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Indeed I conceive the object of the Legislature clearly was to pre
vent such questions as these arising, and to set up a standard for
ourselves by which the validity of a deed duly registered might be
tested; leaving, however, the English law to stand so far as it
might be applicable and be consistent with our local regulations.
The first proposition of the Plaintiff cannot, therefore, in my
opinion, be sustained; but it still.remains to shew that the deed iu
question will operate as a conveyance under our Act. What then
are the requisites which our Acts prescribe for a valid transfer of
land? I need not repeat the sections—but construe them thus—
a writing duly signed, sealed and delivered by the vendor, by
which, for a lawful consideration, the intention and purpose to con
vey to the„ vendee, are sufficiently manifested; the same being
duly acknowledged or proved, and duly registered in the registry
office of the County in which the land lies.
Can any one with our Acts before him look at this deed, and
have any reasonable doubt as to its availability, and according to
the argument, if it has not this full operation, it passes no legal
estate at all ? None of the forms aje wanting, and the intention of
the Plaintiff’s lessor to transfer all his right and title to the land
therein described, is as clear as noon day. He had under the grant
from the Crown an estate in fee simple, and that estate he has
passed. The inclination of the Courts in England has always
been to give effect to the intent of parties, as far as the rules of
law would admit. Lord Ellenborough states this very strongly in
4 East. 475. In the case I have already quoted from 4 B. and
Ad., the Court considered the words remise, release and quit
claim, as clearly manifesting the intention of the grantor to pass
an interest’n the soil; but here we have also in the habendum
clause, words which satisfy the precise definition of an estate in fee,
“ To have and to hold the said premises unto the said R. J. and
J. J. their heirs and assigns for ever.”
“ Tenant in fee simple” says Littleton, “ is he which hath lands
to hold to him and his heirs for ever.” “ If a man would purchase
lands or tenements in fee simple, it behovetli him to have these
words in his purchase, To have and to hold, to him and to his
heirs.”
I perfectly agree with his Honor and the rest of the Court that
the rule must be discharged.
J. A. Street and Kerr for Plaintiff.
E. B. Chandler and TV. Chandler for Defendant
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DOE EX DEM HANNINGTON v. M‘FADDEN.
The statute of uses, 27 H. 8, c. 10, and tlie statute of mrolluients, 27 H. 8,
c. 16, extend to, and are in force within, this Province.

This action of ejectment was tried before Carter, J. at the Kent
Circuit tn September last.—On the part of tlie Plaintiff and as
part of his title, a deed poll by vv'ay of mortgage of tlie locus in quo,
from Francis Boucher to the lessor of the Plaintiff was offered in
evidence. This deed had not been acknowledged, proved or re
gistered, pursuant to the Act of Assembly. Boucher derived title
hy a conveyance from one Jerva, which bore date previous to
Boucher’s deed to Hannington, but was acknowledged pursuant to
the Act of Asse/nbly on the 28th May, 1835, long subsequent to
the date of the deed from Boucher to Hannington. This deed was
received in evidence as1 H regHt^red deed without other proof.
J. A. Street and Welclon, for the Defendant, objected that this
deed from Boucher to Hannington, was insufficient to pass the
estate it purported to conjrpyj without livery of seisin, and that as
to Boucher’s title, the date of the acknowledgment must be taken
as the date of the deed, and therefore Boucher’s title arose subse
quent to the conveyance to Hannington.
It was answered by R. B. Chandler and William, Chandler, that
the deed was prima faiie sufficient, and could only be defeated by
a registered deed to a subsequent purchaser: and that if it could
not take effect under the Act of Assembly, it iiygjit operate under
the statute of uses; that Boucher’s deed must be held to have been
made at the time it Lore date, and the acknowledgment related
back to that period.
J. A. Street objected, that the statute of uses did not extend to
this Province, and even if it did, the statute of inrollments must
also extend, and by the latter statute the operation of this deed
would be prevented, it not having been inrolled.
It was ruled by his Honor J udge Carter, that if the deed depended
on the Provinc ial laws alone, it was inoperative, but that under
the statute of uses, which his Honor considered applicable to this
Province, it might operate, and that such operation was not pre
vented by the want of inrollment, as (in the opinion of his Honor)
the statute of inrollments was not applicable, and therefore did not
extend to this Province.
On the part of the Defendant, several deeds were put in evi
dence and parol testimony was offered to shew that the land, which
was described in the earlier conveyances as lot No. 4, was the
same which was intended to be conveyed to the Defendant by the
last deed by a different description—this evidence was rejected by
his Honor. The lessor of the Plaintiff obtained a verdict, and in
Michaelmas term.
J. A. Street
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J. A. Street moved for a rule nisi, to set the same aside, and
grant a new trial, on the several points raised at the trial. The
lessor of the Plaintiff claimed title through Jerva and Boucher.
The conveyance to Haimington was a deed poll of bargain and
sale by way of mortgage, which purposed to have been made by
Boucher on the 24th February, 1817. This deed must stand in
dependent of the Act of Assembly, 26 Geo. 3, c. 3. By section 6
of that Act, the manner in which a deed should be proved, or ac
knowledged and registered, was directed—by the 10th section of
the same Act, it was provided that all deeds and conveyances
made, executed, proved or acknowledged, and registered according
to the terms of the Act, “ shall be good, effectual, and available,
“ to all intents aud purposes whatsoever, for the passing and trans“ ferring such lands, tenements, and hereditaments, and the estate
“ and possession thereof to the bargainee and bargainees, grantee
“ or grantees therein named, according to the intents, uses, and
“ purposes in such deeds and conveyances expressed, without
“ livery of seisin or any other act or deed, or form or ceremony
“whatever.” And by the 11th section, deeds and conveyances
so executed, acknowledged, and registered, and copies thereof duly
certified, “ shall be allowed in all Courts where such deeds and
“ conveyances, or copies shall be produced, to be as good and suf“ ficient evidence as any bargains and sales inrolled in any of the
“ Courts of Westminster, and the copies of the inrollments thereof
“ are in any Courts of Great Britain.” The deed before the Court
could not be assisted by the Act of Assembly, not having been
“ proved or acknowledged, and registered.” The question was for
the first time presented to the Court, whether a deed under such
circumstances, was a good conveyance in this Province without
proof of actual livery of seisin. The learned Judge had ruled at
nisiprius that it was a good conveyance under the statute of uses
-—but that statute could not be separated from the statute of inroll
ments—both were passed in the same year—their operation com
menced at the same time—they were in effect incorporated, and
formed one statute, and it was for the Court to determine, if they
extended to this Country, or if the machinery of the latter statute
was not in its nature so local as to confine the operation of both to
the Mother Country. If it should be held that both were in opera
tion here, then the deed before the Court net having been enrolled
was not effectual—and again, conveyance by deed of bargain and
sale, was a creature of the statute of uses, and that statute as res
trained by the statute of inrollments applied only to indentures ;
but it was evident from the terms of the Provincial Act 26 G. 3,
c. 3, that the statutes of uses and inrollments had been viewed by
the Provincial Legislature as inapplicable, and therefore they had
appointed a more simple mode of acknowledging, or proving and
registering
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registering conveyances. No mode of transferring land could be
good, except that pointed out by the Legislature. If property
could be transferred independently of the Act of Assembly, feoff
ment was the only common law mode, and that must be accompa
nied by livery of seisin. In support of this point the following
authorities were cited, Adams on ejectment, 281 ; American Jurist,
No. 5, 151 ; Presscot v. Nevers, 5 Mason Rep. 326 ; 1 Shepherd’s
Touch, 54, 223, 507, 508; Chitty’s Notes to statute of uses; 2
Bl. Com. 327, 336; Attorney General v. Stewart, 2 Merivale, 163 ;
Rex v. Vaughan, 4 Burr, 2500; 1 Atk. 544.; Sugden on Powers,
7, 10; 4 Com. Dig. 28, 105, 115, 123.
As to the deed conveying the locus in quo to Boucher, that was
only proved by the certificate of acknowledgment and registry en
dorsed thereon—that certificate bore date the’28th May, 1835,
long subsequent to the date of the mortgage*deed from Boucher to
Hannington. At what time then was this deed delivered,—at the
date of the deed or of the acknowledgment ? The instrument was
only effectual by its delivery, and there was no proof of its delivery
at the date. The acknowledgment was that the grantor executed
the deed for the purposes therein expressed, and not that he execu
ted it twenty years before the time of the acknowledgment. 4
Cruise Dig. 29; Com. Dig. Tait. Coke 264 ; 1 Phil, on Ev. 534 ;
i Starkie’s Ev. 332; American Jurist, No. 26, 426; Dallas
Rep. 384.
As to the evidence offered by the Defendant, wl icli was rejected,
it was tendered to explain an ambiguity in the description of the
land, not to contradict or alter the effect of tlie deed, and for that
purpose was inadmissible. 1 Phil. Ev. 527, 528, 534 ; Peake's
Ev. 113; 6 T. R. 671;' 3 Star. Ev 1018, 21. 24 ; 1 Shep.Touch.
247, 76, (n) b. 87; 1 Barn, and Aid. 247, 699; 1 T. R. 701 :
8 D. & R. 594.
Cause was shewn in Hilary Term
N. Parker for the Plaintiff:—
The statute of uses and the statute of inrollments were distinct
and separate Acts of Parliament, and in determining their exten
sion, the former should be viewed without reference to the latter;
and should it be considered as a general regulation, applicable to
the Colonies, it must be in force here, whatever might be deter
mined as to the statute of inrollments. The statute of inrollments
contained provisions which were essentially local; deeds were Ly
that statute required to be entered and inrolled at
estmnister;
could a deed of land in this country be so entered and jnrolled ?
If it were necessary for a party to plead an inrollment, he must
state the Court in which the deed was inrolled. Cro. Jac. 2:4—
Saund. 250—2 Saund. 12—Could he plead a deed duly entered
V
and
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and inrolled in the Supreme Court of New Brunswick? and even
if such an inrollmerit could he made or pleaded, it would he inef
fectual by the operation of the Province Law—it would be held
fraudulent as against a subsequent purchaser, unless registered in
pursuance of the ?ict of Assembly.
In England there was a particular officer, the clerk of the in
rollments, but no such officer was known here.
The Provincial statute 26 G. 3, c. 3, shewed by its terms that
the Legislature did not contemplate that the statute of inrollments
could apply or have any operation here, else why take the English
practice as an example for admitting copies as evidence?
Assuming that the statute of inrollments did not extend to this
Province, could the two be separated ? he contended that they
could—that the statute of uses was such a general regulation, as
was applicable to the Colonies, that it was complete in itself, and
could be, and was effectual without assistance from the other sta
tute—it had been held to extend in the old Colonies. 4 Kent,
Com. 432, 4 Danes Abr. 214.
The next question was, if the deed from Boucher was a suffi
cient conveyance within the statute of uses; it had sufficient words
of conveyance to create a feoffment at common law, and it had
been held what Was good as a feoffment at common law 'would
raise a use.
Another point worthy of consideration arose from the relation of
the parties, Boucher and Hannington as mortgagor and mortgagee.
Boucher was in possession at the time of making the deed, and
the rule of law was that the possession of the mortgagor was the
possession of the mortgage?—if a time were appointed for the re
demption of mortgaged premises, and it was not expressed that the
mortgagor should remain in possession, it was tacitly implied. If
Boucher had declared subsequent to the deed that he held as
tenant to Hannington, or as mortgagor in possession, it would have
been sufficient proof of livery of seisin—if then his parol declara
tion would have been sufficient, so solemn an instrument as a deed
must be good, 1 Powell, 155, 157, 3 Powell, 1034—Doe v.
Macey, 8 B. & C. 767.—Doe. v. Mason, 3 Camp. 7 ; and could
only be defeated by a conveyance to a bona fide purchaser, for a
valuable consideration, duly registered according to the terms of
the Act of Assembly. The deed from Jerva to Boucher, when re
corded, related to the period of its date—it was acknowledged to
have been executed for the purposes therein mentioned; Boucher
moreover was in possession at the time of making the mortgage
deed to Hannington.
E. B. Chandler, followed on the same side. If the statute of
inrollments ever extended to the Colonies it was virtually repealed
by the Act of Assembly, 26 G. 3, c. 3. A deed of land in this
Province

in the

Sixth Year

of WILLIAM IV

157

Province inrolled at Fredericton or Westminster, would be avoided
by a deed duly registered. 1 Bac. Abr. Tit. bargain and sale. E.
The Act of Assembly did away with the statute of inrollments,
and itself only relates to subsequent purchasers for valuable con
sideration .
As to the admission of parol evidence contended for by the
Counsel for the defendant, if the position could be maintained, the
protection afforded by the Registry Act, would be at an end.
When parol evidence had been admitted, the deed had been con
sistent with the evidence when given. Rose. Dig. 11. 5. T. R.
564, 13 Star. Ev. 1025—1028.
J. A. Street, in support of the ride. The statute of uses as
contended for on the other side did not exist, and never had existed
in England. The statute law only applied to Colonies as part of
the common law : the two statutes were contemporaneous, and if
colonists brought with them the provisions of one it could only be
as restrained or affected by the other, and unless both were appli- ,
cable, neither could apply—the statute of uses so far as related to
bargains and sales of freehold was in effect repealed by the statute
of inrollments.
The question whether a man could dispute his own deed did not
arise here.
It could not be contended that a mortgagee could stand on a
better footing with respect to a deed, than if the instrument had
been an absolute conveyance.
[Chipman, C. J.—This is not ejectment between mortgagor and
mortgagee.]
The Counsel was stopped on this pcint.
As to the deed from
Jarva to Boucher which was recorded the day previous to the de
mise in this cause—
[Chipman, C. J.—The 10th section of the Act of Assembly
will help this; the date is to be taken as the time of delivery, un
less the contrary be shewn.]
In this term the Court delivered their opinions.
Ci-iipman, Chief Justice:
The first question which arises in this case is on the operation
and effect of an unregistered deed produced in evidence, and proved
by a witness en the part of the Plaintiff. The deed is a deed poll
in the foliowing terms:—
“ Know all men by these presents, that I, Francis Boucher, of Buctush, in
“ the County of Westmorland, and Province ofNew Brunswick, (Farmer.) for
“ and in consideration of the sum of fifty pcg-ids of lawful money of the said Pro
“ vince, received to my full satisfaction of Wiliam Hannington, Junior, of She“ diac in the Province of New Brunswick, (Trader.) the receipt whereof 1 do
“ hereby acknowledge, have granted, bargained and sold, and by these presents
“ do
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“ do give, grant, bargain, sell, convey and confirm unto him the said William
“ Hannington, his heirs and assigns, two certain lots; or parcels of land, situate
“ lying and being on the north side of Buctush River, containing in the whole
“ one hundred and fifty acres, be the same more or less, as laid down in the grant,
“ bounded on the east by lands in the possession of Charles Cormier, and on the
“ west by lands in the possession of Girouard, (the said lots being now in the
“.possession of the aforesaid Francis Boucher.) To have and to hold the said
“ lots or parcels of land, together with all the buildings, improvements, and ap“ purtenances thereunto belonging, unto the said William Hannington, his heirs
“ and assigns for ever. Provided nevertheless, that if the said Francis Boucher
“ shall pay or cause to be paid to the said William Hannington, his heirs or as“ signs, one certain note ofhand for fifty pounds, bearing date the twenty fourth
“ day of February, one thousand eight hundred and seventeen, .vith lawful inte“ rest thereon, and that on or before the twenty fourth day of February, that
“ will be in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and nineteen ; then
“ the within deed, being given for the security for the payment of the within
“ named sum, to be void; otherwise to remain in full force and virtue. In wit“ n’ess whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and seal, this twenty fourth day of
“ February, one thousand eight hundred and seventeen, and in the fifty-seventh
“ year of His Majesty’s reign.
his
“FRANCIS BOUCHER,
X
mark.
“ Sealed, signed and delivered in presence of)
“William Hannington, Senior.
his
[>“ Tannis Law Collet,
X
mark” J

The learned Judge at the trial ruled that this deed, although not
acknowledged or proved and registered according to the provisions
of the Provincial Registry Acts, was sufficient to pass the estate
which it purported to convey, liable, however, to be defeated by a
registered deed to a subsequent purchaser of the same land for va
luable consideration. The opinion of the learned Judge upon this
point was objected to on the part of the Defendant, and formed the
principal ground upon which the rule nisi for a new trial was ob
tained. This rule for a new trial has been elaborately and ably
argued by the learned Counsel on both sides, and presents, for the
first time, to my knowledge, within this Province, a very impor
tant question relating to the conveying of lands.
On the one
hand, it was contended on the part of the Defendant, that the deed
which I have recited, not being accompanied by livery of seisin, is
net sufficient to pass a freehold at common law, and that allowing
it to be sufficient for this purpose by the operation of the statute of
uses, (27 II. 8, c. 10,) still, if the statute of uses is held to extend
to this Province, the statute of inrollments (27 H. 8, c. 16,) must
be held to extend also; and this latter statute would prevent any
inheritance or freehold from passing under this deed, it being a
bargain and sale and not indented and inrolled according to the
provisions of the statute. On the other hand, it was contended on
the part of Plaintiff, that the statute of uses did certainly extend
to
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to this Province, and the deed was therefore sufficient by the opera
tion of this statute to pass the estate, which it purported to con
vey, and that the statute of inrollments was not in force in this
Province, and the deed therefore stood unaffected by this latte,
statute.
It was further contended on the part of the Plaintiff, that if the
statute of inrollments had ever extended to this Province, it was
virtually repealed by the Provincial Registry Act. The question,
what Acts of the Parliament of the another country shall be held
to extend to a Colony, is undoubtedly one of the most grave ques
tions which can occupy the attention of a Colonial Judicature, and
may be in many cases one of considerable perplexity. The rule
laid down by Blackstone, (1st Com. 107) is that “Colonistscarry
“ with them only so much of the English law as is applicable to
“ their own situation, and the condition of an English Colony ;
“ such for instance as the general rules of inheritance ; and of
“ protection from personal injuries.” The same doctrine in sub
stance is maintained by Lord Mansfield, (Rex v. Vaughan, 4 Burr.
2500 ; Campbell v. Hall, Lofft. 710,—24 Howell, State Trials,
289.) In the case of the AttorneyiQeneral v. Stewart, 2 Mer.
143, in which the question was, whether the statute of mortmain
(9 Geo. 2, c. 36,) extended to the Island of Grenada, Sir William
Grant, the Master of the Rolls, also adopts substantially the same
rule, and makes the determination of the point to depend upon this
consideration, “ whether it be a law of local policy, adapted solely
“ to the country in which it was made, or a general regulation of
“ property equally applicable to any country, in which it is by the
“ rules of English law that property is governed.” He comes to
the conclusion that the mortmain Act is quite inapplicable to Gre
nada or any other Colony, because “ in its causes, its provisions,
“ its qualifications, and its exceptions, it is a law wholly English,
“ calculated for purposes of local policy, complicated with local
“ establishments, and incapable, without great incongruity in the
“ effect, of being transferred, as it stands, into the code of any other
“ country.”
The two statutes now under consideration, the statute of uses
and the statute of enrollments, having been passed in the reign of
Henry the Eighth, long before the planting of any of the American
Colonies, no question arises upon the time of their being passed, in
reference to the period of any Colonial settlement; and the only
matter for consideration, with respect toueach of them, will be,
whether it be applicable to the Colonies, or, in the words of Sir
William Grant, whether it be “ a law of local policy” adapted
solely to the particular circumstances and condition of England, or
whether it be “ a general regulation of property equally applicable
“ to any country in which it is by the rules of English law that
“ property
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“ property is governed.” With respect to the statute of uses, by
the operation of which the person who has the use, that is, is
entitled to the profits and benefit of land, is held to be in the posses
sion of the land itself, the provisions of it are so,mingled with the
whole body of the English law of real property, that no doubt <»n
exist as to ts aj ..licabilityjn every country, where that law forms
the basis of jurisprudence. Lord Bacon describes it as “ the sta“ tute which of all others hath the greatest power and operation
“ over the heritages of the realmand it was, very generally, if
not universally considered to have been in force in the old Ameri
can Colonies. 4 Kent’s, Com. 1st Ed. 283, 452, 477, 482; 1
Dane’s Abr. 9th do. 362. I cannot entertain a shadow of doubt
that the statute of uses is in force in this Province.
The remaining question is, whether this statute is so in force,
without its concomitant, passed in the same session of Parliament—
the statute of inrollments. In order to decide this question, we
must examine the statute of inrollments for the purpose of ascer
taining whether this be a general regulation of property, applicable
equally with the statute of uses, to any country where the law of
England prevails. This statute provides,—“ That no manors,
“ lands, tenements, or other hereditaments shall pass, alter or
“ change from one to another, whereby any estate of inheritance
“ or freehold shall be made or take effect in any person or persons,
“ or any use thereof to be made, by reason only of any bargain
“ and sale thereof, except the same bargain and sale shall be made
“ by writing, indented, sealed and inrolled in one of the King’s
“ ■Courts of Record at Westminster, or else within the same County
“ or Counties where the same manors, &c. so bargained and sold,
“ lie or be, before the Custus Rotulorum and two Justices of the
“ Peace, and the-Clerk of the Peace of the same County or Coun“ ties, or two of them at the least, of which the Clerk of the Peace
“ to be one, &c. &c.”
Mr. Hargrave, in his notes upon Coke Littleton, (Coke Litt.
48, a. n. 3,) explains the objects of the statute of inrollments in
the following terms:—“Those who framed the statute of uses
“ evidently foresaw, that it would render livery unnecessary to the
“ passing of a ‘ freehold,’ and that a freehold of such things as do
“ not lye in grant, would become transferable by parol only, with“ out any solemnity whatever. To prevent the inconveniences
“ that might arise from a mode of conveyance so uncertain in the
“ proof, and so liable to misconstruction and abuse, it was enacted
“in the same session of Parliament, that an estate of freehold
“ should not pass by bargain and sale only, unless it was by inden“ ture inrolled,—see 27 H. 8, c. 16. The objects of these provi“ sions evidently were-—first, to force the contracting parties to as“ certain the terms of the conveyance, by reducing it into writing;
“ secondly,
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“ secondly, to make the proof of it easy, by requiring their seals
“ to it, and consequently the presence of a witness; and lastly,
“ to prevent the frauds of secret conveyances, by substituting
“ the more effectual notoriety of inrollment, for the more ancient
t‘«ne of livery.” These three objects of this statute, namely,
the ascertainment of the intent of a conveyance by the reduction
of it to writing, the facilitating the proof of it, and the preventing
of frauds by the notoriety of inrollment, are evidently applicable to
any country, where the statute of uses and the English law of real
property are in force.
The only difficulty in the way of extending this statute to a
Colony, arises from the designation of the places in which the in
rollment is required to be made ; and if there should be no esta
blishment in a Colony corresponding with those in England, designateil'in the Act for makingTlie inrollment, I agrefe that it would
not be practicable to transfer the operation of this Act to such a
Colony. The Act requires the inrollment to be made “ in one of
the King’s Courts of Record at Westminster,” or else within the
County where the lands lie “ before the Gustos Rotulorum, and
“ two Justices of the Peace, and the Clerk of the Peace of the
“ same County or Counties, or two of them.” Now as this Pro
vince is divided into Counties in like manner with England, and
as in each County there is a Gustos Rotulorum and a Clerk of the
Peace, and Justices of the Peace, also, with like official powers as
in England, it is quite practicable to carry the Statute into effect,
so far as respects inro!lmefit§ in the Counties. With regard to in
rollment in the King’s Courts of Record at Westminster, Lord
Coke’s comment upon this part of the statute is as follows, (2
Inst. 674,) —“ In any of the King’s Courts of Record at West“ minster, that is, in the King’s Bench, the Chancery, the Com“ mon Pleas, and the Exchequer— s.nd though the words be, “ at
Westminster,” for that at the time of the making of this Act,
“ these Courts were there ; yet if these be adjourned into another
“ place, the inrollment may be in any of these Courts, for the in“ rollment is confined to the Courts wheresoever they be holden.”
The Supreme Court in this Province has by the express terms of
the Commissions to the Judges, all the powers of the three supe
rior Courts of common law in Westminster Hall; and there is also
in the Province a Court of Chancery with jurisdiction and powers
similar to those cf that Court in England. We have therefore
within the Province all the local establishments, constructed upon
the plan of English institutions, wnich are necessary for carrying
the statute into effect.
The practice of inrollment morever, is not one which originated
with the statute of inrollments. It is required in the statute, not
as a new proceeding, then for the first time established, but as one
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of familiar occurrence, which the statute makes imperative with
regard to deeds of a certain description, namely, bargains and sales
of estates of inheritance and freehold. In 14 Vin. Abr. 443, tit
inrollment, citing 2d Lilly’s Prac. Reg. 67, a definition is given of
the term, and “ inrollment of a deed” is stated to be “ the entering
“ of it fairly upon the records of one of the King's Courts of Record
“ at Westminster, or at the Quarter Sessions of the Peace.” So
that inrollment of a deed, ex vi termini, independently of the' sta
tute, imports an entry of the deed upon the records of the Courts
named in the statute ; this practice of inrollment being evidently
an incident to these Courts at common law. Another circum
stance which strongly marks, that the inrolling of deeds is a pro
ceeding at common law, entirely regulated by the Courts them
selves, and not originating with or derived from this statute, is, that
the statute contains no provision for deeds being acknowledged be
fore they are inrolled ; and yet it is laid down in Coke, Litt. 225,
6, that no deed can be inrollcd unless duly and lawfully acknow
ledged. And in Lilly’s Practical Register, as cited in Jacob’s Law
Dictionary, title, “ inrollment^ it is stated, that “ every deed be“ fore it is inrolled, is to be acknowledged to be the deed of the party
“ before a Master of the Court of Chancery, or a Judge of the
“ Court wherein inrolled, which is the officer’s warrant f >r inrolling
“ the same.” And in 1 Salk. 3S9, there is a general rule of the
Court of King’s Bench “ that all deeds shall be acknowledged on
“ the plea side in this Court and not on the -Crown side; and that
“ the acknowledgment shall be in open Court.”
It appears from the case of Worsely ©. Filisker, 2 Rolles Rep.
119, cited in 14 Vin. Alu. 443, that the inrollment office in the
Court of Chancery was not erected until the I6tli Eliz., many
years after the passing of the statute of inrollments—hence it fol
lows, that the existence of a special office in the Courts for the
purpose of inrollment, is not a necessary preliminary to the opera
tion of the statute.
The business of inrollment being then an incident at common
law to the Courts mentioned in the statute of inrollments, and a
matter regulated by the Courts themselves, when Courts are esta blished in a Colony with powers and incidents at common law,
identical with the powers and incidents of the Courts in England,
mentioned in the statute, all difficulty in the application of the
statute for the want of local establishments to carry it into effect,
vanishes.
The extension of statutes to this Province, which are in terms
confined to the Courts of the mother country, is not by any means
without precedent, as is obvious from two very familiar instances,
namely, 1st. the Stat. 4 Anne, c. 16, sec. 20, authorizing the as
signment of bail bonds, which is expressed to apply to persons
arrested
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arrested by any process “ issuing out of any of His Majesty’s
“ Courts of Record at Westminster,”—and 2dly, the stat. 14 Geo.
2, c. 17, authorizing judgments as in case of a nonsuit; which in
like manner is expressed to apply to suits in the King’s-Courts of
Record at Westminster, the Court of Great Sessions in Wales, and
the Courts of the Counties Palatine—and yet each of these statutes
is daily acted upon in this Province, and must be considered as
fully incorporated with our Provincial code.
Upon full consideration of this point, in the aspect in which I
have now presented it, I have come to the conclusion that the
statute of inrollments being a contemporaneous modification of the
statute of uses, equally applicable in principle with the statute of
uses to any country in which the law of England is in force, and
there being in this Province local Courts with powers and inci
dents at common law for carrying the statute of inrollments into
effect, the statute of inrollments equally with the statute of uses
extends to, and is in force within this Province.
As to the fact of the statute of inrollments having been consi
dered to be in force in the old Colonies, Chancellor Kent, in that
part of his commentaries in which he treats of conveyances, ex
presses himself as follows:—
“ Conveyance by lease and release was the mode universally in
“ practice in New York until the year 1788,—the revision of the
“statute law of New York in 1788, which re-enacted all the
“ English statute laws, deemed proper and applicable, and which
“ repealed the British statutes in force in New York while it was
“ a colony, removed all apprehension of the necessity of inroll£ ment of deeds of bargain and sale, and. left that short, plain
“ and excellent mode of conveyance to its free operation : the con“ sequence was, that the conveyance by lease and release, which
“ required two deeds or instruments instead of one, fell immediately
“ into total disuse, and will never be revived.” (4 Kent’s Com,
1st edit. 452.)
From this passage, it is evident that the statute of inrollments
was at least apprehended to have been in force in the Province of
New York, and that this apprehension was so strong in its prac
tical effect, as to cause the universal prevalence in that Province,
of the conveyance by lease and release. There is a case, I under
stand, in one of the Massachusetts reports, in which it was assumed
that the statute of inrollments had never been in force in that Pro
vince. This case will be remarked upon by another member of
the Court. It was argued on the part of the Plaintiff, that even
if the statute of inrollments was in force at the time of the erec
tion of the Province, it was repealed by the Provincial Registry
Act, 26 Geo. 3, c. 3, the provisions of which Act, it was con
tended, were inconsistent with the statute of inrollments. 1 do not
w
perceive
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perceive any inconsistency in the two Acts, the provisions of which
very well stand together. Tlie Provincial Registry Act, (S. 1,)
provides that deeds may be registered, and that unregistered deeds
shall be adjudged frau( ulent and void against subsequent purcha
sers and mortgagees for valuable consideration, whose deeds shall
be registered. And the 10th section of the same Act provides,
“ that all conveyances made in writing, and signed, sealed and de“ livered, acknowledged and registered, according to the provisions
“ of that Act, shall be sufficient to pass estates in lands, according
“ to the intent of the deed without livery of seisin, or any other
“ act or ceremony whatever.” As compared with the statute of
inrollments, the effect of the first section of the Provincial Registry
Act would undoubtedly be that a bargain and sale, although in
rolled according to the provisions of the statutes of inrollments,would
not, any more than a deed of feoffment at common law, accompanied
by livery of seisin, be good against a registered deed to a subsequent
purchaser for valuable consideration, unless registered according to
the provisions of the Registry Act. But this section leaves un
touched the provision of the statute of inrollments, that no estate
of inheritance or freehold shall pass at all from the bargainor to the
bargainee, unless the requisites of that statute are complied with.
The Provincial statute in this respect is similar in its enactment
to the English Registry Acts ; I refer particularly to the stat. 8
Geo. 2, c. 6, for establishing a registry in the North Riding ol York,
from which statute it would seem that many of the clauses of the
Provincial Act were copied. Yet so far from this statute being
considered as repealing the statute of inrollments with regard to
the North Riding of York, the latter statute is expressly recited in
the twenty-first section of it, which makes bargains and sales regis
tered according to its provisions, of equal validity with bargains
and sales inrolled according to the statute of inrolhuents—so the
tenth section of the Provincial Registry Act, the words of which
are affirmative, and the effect of it enlarging, undoubtedly makes
a bargain and sale, in respect to which the provisions of that Act
have been complied with, sufficient to pass an estate of freehold or
inheritance, although it be not inrolled according to the statute of
inrollments ; but it leaves untouched all bargains and sales with
regard to which its own provisions have not been complied with.
Such being the operation of the Provincial Registry Act, if the
statute of inrollments be not in force, there is no law in this Pro
vince, even at this day, to prevent an estate of freehold or inheri
tance from passing under the statute of uses, by writing alone
without seal, as the statute of frauds requires a writing only, not a
deed under seal.
It was further argued on the part of the Plaintiff, that the rela
tion of mortgagor and morgagee having been established by the
deed
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deed in question between the parties to it, it is not competent for
any person holding under the mortgagor, as the Defendant does, to
invalidate it. Upon this ground of argument it need only be re
marked, that if the deed be not sufficient to pass the estate which
it purports to convey, tl.e relation of mortgago: • and mortgagee was
never established.
Upon the whole I am of opinion that the deed upcn which this
discussion lias arisen, net having been acknowledged or proved,
and registered according to the provisions of the Provincial Regis
try Act, and being a bargain and sale not indented and inrolled
according to the statute of inrollments, is not sufficient to pass the
estate of inheritance which it purports to convey ; and therefore
upon this ground, if the point had been reserved at the trial, with
leave to move to enter a nonsuit, anonsuit must have been entered ;
but this not having been done, a new trial must be ordered.
There was another ground upon which the motion for a new
trial was argued, and that was, the improper rejection of evidence
by the learned Judge who tried the cause. It is unnecessary to
say more on this point, than that.I am of opinion that the evidence
was properly rejected.
Botsford, J. •
I entirely agree in the opinion expressed by his Honor the Chief
Justice.
Carter, J.:
The material question on.which tliis'case depends, ig the vali
dity of the deed of mortgage from F. Boucher to W Hannington,
Jun,, because if it be determined that this deed is invalid, the les
see of the Plaintiff has failed to make out such a legal title as will
enable him to recover in an action of ejectment.
The view which I took of this point at the trial certainly was
this,—that the deed was inoperative if it depended on the Provin
cial laws alone, but that it Alight operate under the statute of uses,
which I considered applicable to this Province, and that such ope
ration was not prevented by the want of inrollment, as I considered
the statute of inrollments did not extend to this Province On
full consideration of the case and the arguments which have been
adduced on both sides, I think that on the last point, viz. as to
the extension of the statute of inrollments to this Province, the
opinion I expressed at the trial was wrong. I confess I had very
great doubts on this point, and have felt much difficulty in coming
to a decision upon it; the point being one perfectly new, and on
which there is no direct authority, and hardly any decision winch
may be an authority by analogy. After the elaborate judgment
which has already been given, I do not think it necessary to go at
any great length into all the bearings of tins question, but shall
state,
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state, very briefly, the reasons which bring me to the conclusions
at which I have arrived. I take it, that of the statute law of Eng
land, which existed at the original settlement of this Province, so
much is in force here as is adapted to the circumstances of the
Province, and is not local in its nature and provisions. On this
principle there can be no doubt that the statute of uses must be in
force here ; and there seems to be authority in the passage cited
from Dane’s Abr. to shew that in Colonies similarly circumstanced,
this statute was considered in force. How, then, does this princi
ple affect the statute of inrollments ? It cannot be said that the
policy of this statute is local, that policy being to give publicity to
deeds of bargain and sale of freehold property, which, but for this
statute, might have been, under the statute of uses, of a private
nature. This object is one which is equally applicable to this Pro
vince. Nor is this object fully effected by the Registry Acts, so
as to render the statute of inrollments unnecessary ; for besides
this cons’’deration, that if the statute of inrollment formed part of
the English law which extended to the Province at its first settle
ment, it would still operate, uffess repealed by some Provincial
enactment. The Registry Acts do not fully effect this object—
because a deed of bargain and sale, so far as it depends on them,
is good against all but subsequent purchasers for valuable consi
deration without any registry or inrollment; whereas, by the sta
tute of inrollments, it is absolutely void if not inrolled within six
months after the date. Wherever, therefore, the statute of uses
will extend, it appears to me that the policy of the statute of in
rollments will also extend. Is there, then, any thing in the provi
sions of that statute which shews that it is local ? On first con
sidering this, it certainly appeared to me that the provision that
the inrollment of deeds of bargain and sale should be made in one
of the King’s Courts of Record at Westminster, shewed that the
statute would only apply to that country over which those Courts
had jurisdiction. But on consideration, I think that this provision
is not so purely local as the words, strictly taken, would imply ;
because, if it were so, an inrollment in the Court of King’s Bench,
when sitting in any other part of England than Westminster, would
not be good. Yet we have Lord Coke’s authority in the 2d Inst.
673, 674, that such inrollment would be good. The meaning of
the words seems to be, that the inrollment must be in one of the
King’s Courts of Record, viz. the King’s Bench, Common Pleas,
or Exchequer. For this Province, this Court is undoubtedly the
King’s Court of Record, combining the powers and authority of
the King’s Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer; and therefore
an inrollment of a deed of bargain and sale in this Court would, I
think, meet the provisions of tne statute of inrollments as applica
ble to this Province. For want of such inrollment, I am of opinion
the
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the deed in question is void, and therefore the Plaintiff failed in
making out a legal title, and on th. ground I think there should
be a new trial.
On the other question, with respect to the rejection of the parol
evidence, tendered on the part of the Defendant, to shew that the
land intended to be conveyed by the deed from Casey and Jerva
to the Defendant, was the land described in the former deed as lot
No. 4y I have seen no reason to alter the opinion I expressed at
the trial.
Parker, J.:
I entirely concur in the judgment which has been pronounced on
the principal point reserved in this case, namely, whether a legal
estate in fee of lands ir this Province w'ill be considered to have
passed by deed of bargain and sale, on the mere proof of the signing,
sealing and delivery by the bargainor. It is important as involving
the question of the extension and adaptation of the English statute
lawr, in deciding which wre have no very definite rule to guide us,
that Colonists take with them the statute law to a certain extent
(as well as the common law) is clear; and when we consider the
state of the common law' w'hich recognized no valid transfer of the
legal estate in land, of freehold or inheritance, beside that by feoff
ment w’ith livery of seisin; the period at which the statute of uses
and w'ills, 27 H. 8, c. 10, wras passed, and the general nature of its
provisions, w'hich, intending to carry into effect at lawviXwk Courts
of equity had already enforced, were certainly as applicable to the
condition of new Colonies, as to that of the mother country, I can
not doubt of the extension of that statute to this Province. If additional reasons were required to confirm this opinion, they w'ould
be found in the general understanding of the Legislatures and
Courts in the former North American Colonies, and of the most
distinguished American jurists of the present day.
If, then, the statute of uses extends, it must be admitted that a
statute passed in pari materiA during the same Session of Parlia
ment, must extend also, unless its provisions be w'holly local or inap
plicable to our Colonial situation, or unless there be something in
that or some other English statute limiting its operation to the
realm of England : and as it remains in force there, it must also be.
in force here, unless actually or virtually repealed by some Act of
the Provincial Assembly.
That the intention of the statute of inrollment (notwithstanding
the manner in which it has been evaded by the contrivance of lease
and release) was to control the operation of the statute of uses in
the transfer of real estate, we know from the concurring testimony
of the best writers near the time, and since.
It is difficult to
select from among them ;—I will quote Lcrd Bacon’s observation,
and that of a late Judge.
Lord
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Lord Eacon, in his Elements, 2d Tract, p. 66, after commenting
on the statute of uses, proceeds as follows :
“ But the Parliament that made that statute did foresee that it
“ would he mischievous that men’s lands should so suddenly, upon
“ the payment of a little money, be conveyed from them, perad“ venture in an ale-house or a tavern upon strainable advantages,
“ did therefore gravely provide another Act in the same Parlia“ ment, that the land, upon payment of this money, should not
“ pass away, except there were a writing indented vnode between
“ the said two parties, and the said writing also within six months
“ inrolled in some of the Courts at Westminster, or in the shire
“ rolls in the shire where the land lieth, unless it be in pities or
“ corporate towns, where they did use to inroll deeds, and there
“ the statute extendeth not.”
Mr. Baron Graham, in 3d Price, 507, says .—“ The history of
“ inrollments is well known.—The preamble of the 27 H. 8, c.
“ 10, details the inconveniences which arose from the effects of the
“ clandestine nature of the doctrine of uses, and it was intended
“ that those inconveniences should be obviated by the Act, requir“ ing deeds of bargain and sale to be inrolled in some Court of re“ cord, thereby supplying that notoriety from the absence of which,
“ in such modes of conveyance, so many mischiefsj were said to
“ have arisen.”
That we have not the same authority for the extension’of this
statute as there is for the other, is not surprising, when we consider
the fact that registration of deeds was provided for among the
earliest Acts of all the Colonies. There was an ordinance of the
Governor and Council in Nova Scotia, passed in 1752, for this pur
pose, ratified and confirmed by the general Assembly in their first
Session, 32 Geo. 2, c. 2, (when that which is now New Bruns
wick formed part of Nova Scotia;) and a registry is provided for
tnose who choose to take advantage of it, by one of our first Acts
after this Province was erected ; and when the facility with which
registry may be made, without any limitation as to time, under
our Registry Acts, and the priority which they clearly give to
registered conveyances are considered, it is less to be wondered at
that the present question should not have arisen before, than that
it should now be agitated.
I quite agree that these Acts were passed for the regulation of
registered deeds, leaving unregistered conveyances on the same
footing as they were before, and no farther interfering with them,
than was requisite to give that effect to the registry which the Legis
lature contemplated ; and that although registry, if complied with,
would supersede the necessity of inrollment, it no more operated
as a repeal of the statute of inrollments here, than the invention
of
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of lease and release did in England. Tne assertion that the con
veyance by bargain and sale inrolled is out of use in’ England, is
not quite correct, as may be seen by many instances in the books
at different periods. The establishment of registry offices in some
of the counties in England did not repeal the statute of inrollments
as to them—the registry of bargains and sales, is by the Act
made as effectual and available as .inrollment, but the deedjmay
still be inrolled, and must be registered or inrolled.
The fact stated by Mr. Chancellor Kent in the 4th vol. of his
commentaries, p. 482, already referred to by his Honor the Chief
Justice, is very strong to evince the opinion of the profession in
New York; for there appears no other sufficient reason for the
general use of the double conveyance to pass the freehold or fee
there, and elsewhere, than the restraining effect of the statute of
inrollments upon the one simple deed. I should incline to think
that while using the terms “ apprehension of the necessity of in
rollment, &c.,” Mr. Chancellor Kent meant to include registered,
and not merely unregistered bargains and sales, as registration
seems to ha4e been almost universally practised in New York.
Until a short time since I had been under the impression that in
the neighbouring colony, (now State of Massachusetts,) the ques
tion of inrollment had not arisen in consequence of one of their
early Acts, in the reign of William 3d, having provided a simple
mode of conveyance ; but I find by a case reported in 5 Tyng’s
Mass. Rep. 64,' that of Marshall v. Fisk, which occurred in the
Supreme Court of that State in 1809, that the statute of inroll
ments has been held not to extend to that country; and that the
delivery of a deed of bargain and sale was sufficient to convey real
estate until the Colonial Ordinance of 1641. Their Registry
Act of 1783, I perceive, provides, “ that no conveyance of a free“ hold in, or a lease for a longer term than seven years of any
“ land, shall be good and effectual in the law to hold such land
“ against any person, but the grantor and his heirs, unless the
“ deed of conveyance be acknowledged and registered in the
“ County Records.” It is not stated in that case, nor am I aware
at what particular period of their history, in what manner or on
what grounds it was determined, that the statute of inrollments
did not extend to Massachusetts; but without questioning the pro
priety of their decision, I think a sufficient distinction may be
found between the institutions of the old colony and Charter Go
vernment of Massachusetts, and our own, that would render a
statute wholly inapplicable there, which might nevertheless be
very suitable to us; for the rule is not so general that we must in
order to give effect to a statute here, determine that it is applicato the state and condition of all colonists. Statutes may extend,
but yet be without any operation until there are institutions in a
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Colony to which their provisions are applicable. The very origin
and constitution of the superior Court of Massachusetts gave it
probably a different character from that of this Province, and may
have formed the ground of their decision. If I recollect rightly,
Governor Hutchinson says, the writs in their early days, did not
run in the King’s name.
The Registry Acts of that Colony would appear to have followed
the decision, and were perhaps consequent upon it, (though of this
I can speak with no certainty,) but I will for a moment consider
how far our Registry Act is reconcileable to the notion, that the
statute of uses extends without the statute of inrollments. By
the former of these statutes the land would pass without any deed
or even writing. A writing however, was rendered necessary by
the statute of frauds, and both in Nova Scotia and New Bruns
wick, the provisions of this statute were introduced among the
earliest of the colonial Acts, so that the transfer without writing
may be considered as not having existed ; but still we have the
possession transferred to the use without deed; but supposing even
a deed to be necessary, no further act would be requisite. Then
comes the Registry Act, 26 Geo. 3, c. 3, which by an express
section, the 10th, provides, “ that all bargains and sales of any
“ lands, tenements, and hereditaments by deed indented or deed
“ poll, and all grants and conveyances whatsoever, made by writ“ ing, and duly signed, sealed and delivered, and acknowledged
“ by the grantor or grantors, <^c. which shall be entered and
“ registered at full length, by the register in the public office,
“ <fc., shall be good, effectual and available to all intents andpur“ poses whatsoever, for the passing and transferring such lands,
“ &c., and the estate and possession thereof to the bargainee and
“ bargainees, grantee and grantees therein named, according to
‘ the intents and uses, and purposes, in such deeds and convey“ ances expressed, without livery of seisin, or any other act or
“ deed, or form or ceremony whatever.” This section being con
fined to deeds acknowledged by ths grantor or bargainor, a further
Legislative revision was made, (52 Geo. 3, c. 20, sec. 2,) giving
the same effect as above to all deeds, grants and conveyances,
duly acknowledged or proved, and duly registered; which Legis
lative provisions were unnecessary, indeed almost absurd, if, as
now contended by the Plaintiff’s Counsel, the legal seisin would
pass by the deed alone ; and unregistered transfers are governed
only by the statute of uses and frauds. I think no one can care
fully read the two sections I have quoted, without being of opinion
that the Legislature considered the law as it stood, without such pro
vision, would restrain lands from passing according to the intent of
parties by mere deeds of bargain and sale, or simple grants and
conveyances, though duly registered according to the Act, and
therefore
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therefore an express clause was necessary to give proper effect to
the registry. For, without this, conveyances would probably have j
been made here as in the old State of New York, by lease and
release ; thus subjecting the parties to the unnecessary trouble and
expence of this double form, for the very same purpose which ori
ginated it in England, viz. evading the statute of inrollments.
There is, 1 should observe, a great difference between the word
ing of our Act, and that of the Massachusetts Act of 1783 ; the
words of our Act are words of extension, those of the other, words
of restriction ; well suited to the different state of the law produced
by the reception or rejection of the statute of inrollments.
However it is said (and the position was first taken by the Coun
sel for the defendant as a ground for the statute of usesnot extend
ing,) that as the statute 27 H. 8, c. 16, provides only for inroll
ment in the Courts at Westminster, or by certain officers in the
several Counties; no inrollment made in this Province would be
valid, and that we are driven to the alternative of rejecting the sta
tute altogether, (as was done in Massachusetts) or allowing the
inrollment at Westminster to be good. That the inrollment of deeds
at Westminster would be unsuitable to1 the state and condition of
settlers in an American colony, can hardly be denied; but be this
as it may, I quite concur with the rest of the Court in thinking,
that without resortingto the alternative just mentioned, and “ with
out any great incongruity in the effect,this Act is capable of being
transferred to our code, to an extent sufficient to give it application,
if not to tlie whole ; my opinion being that the Supreme Court as
part of its constitution possesses the power of inrollment, which
was not indeed conferred on the Courts at Westminster by the
statute, but existed by the common law ; and was in use long be
fore the reign of Henry Sth. We have intrinsic evidence of this
in the statute itself, which gives no new ministerial power, ap
points no officers, or fe£s for the inrollment in the King’s Courts,
but refers to it as a power already exercised, and this probably to
some extent, as would seem from a statute, 6 Richard 2d, c. 4,
which provides that the exemplification of the inrollments of such
deeds, as had before“ihen been inrolled in the Rolls of Chancery
and either Bench and Exchequer, and had been destroyed in the
late insurrection or otherwise eloigned, should be as Valid as the
deeds themselves.
Lord Coke’s exposition, 2 Inst. 673, has been already noted.
The principal reason given by the Courts in deciding that certain
statutes do not extend, will not apply to the present case, while
some have been considered in force, and others constantly acted
on. which are liable to nearly the same object’on as this.
The statute of mortmain, .(which, by the bve, was passed after
the establishment of numerous Colonies, without naming them,)
X
and
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and certain other statutes mentioned by the Master of the Rolls in the
case, 2 Merivale, 143, are inapplicable either in their object, or
provisions, to the situation and condition of Colonies. So it is said
oy Lord Mansfield in 4 Burr, 2500, as to the statutes 12 Rich. 2d,
c. 2, and 5 & 6 Ed. 6, c. 16, that being positive regulations of
police, they are not adapted to the circumstances of a new Colony,
and therefore no part of the law of England which every Colony,
from necessity, is supposed to carry with it at its first plan
tation.'
The statute of frauds has been held not to extend to Barbadoes or
Bermuda, for tlie reason that they were settled before the pas
sing of that Act, 2 P. Wm. 75, 8 Ves. 487.—For the like reason
it was held in the Pennsylvania Courts in 1754, not to extend there.
1 Dallas 1.
His Honor the Chief Justice has already referred to some in
stances of the adaptation of English statutes to our Provincial es
tablishments ; I will mention one or two others.
Exemplifications of the King’s letters patent under the Great
Seal of the Province, are of daily occurrence in the Courts, yet
exemplifications are not evidence at common law, but made so by
3 & 4 Edw. 6, c. 4, and 20 Eliz. c. 6, which speak only of the
Great Seal of England.
By stat. 34, Ed. 3, c. 16, traverses of offices found before escheators and certified into the Chancery shall be tried in the Court
of King’s Bench ; yet it can hardly be doubted that the Supreme
Court has authority to try such traverses in this Province.
The stat. 29 Car. 2, c. 5, for issuing commissions to take affi
davits is in terms to the Judges of the Courts of King’s Bench,
Common Pleas and Exchequer, and expressed to be for the greater
ease and benefit of all persons in the taking of affidavits, to be
made use of and read in Elis Majesty’s Courts of King’s Bench,
Common Pleas and Exchequer, at Westminster. Yet this is the
only original authority for the commissions issued by this Court,
the validity of which has never been questioned, indeed has been
repeatedly recognised by the Legislature. Commissions to take
bail stand precisely on the same footing, depending on the statute
4 W. & M. c. 4.
The stat. 5, Eliz. c. 26, empowering the Queen’s Courts in the
Counties Palatine to make inrollments was referred to by the
Plaintiff’s Counsel, for the purpose cf shewing the limited exten
sion of the stat. 27 Hen. 8, c. 16, but will not, I think, bear out
his argument; for these were Courts of local jurisdiction within the
realm in existence at the time the statute passed, and the Act not
having mentioned them, was considered not to embrace them, on
the same principle which decides that Statutes passed after the
settlement of a Colony do not extend to it, unless named therein.
The
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The statute of Car. 2d. for commissions to take affidavits, was
in the same manner extended to the Courts of the Counties Pala
tine, by specific enactment.
Another branch of the argument rested on this being a mortgage
deed; but as this is not a proceeding to recover the amount se
cured on the mortgage, but to obtain possession of the land ; I do
not very well see how the proviso inserted in the deed of bargain
and sale, for the benefit of the mortgagor, is to give it a more ef
fectual operation to pass the estate, than if no such proviso were
inserted and the deed were absolute. The statute of inrollments
does not make the deed void qua deed, but merely says that lands
shall not pass by bargain and sale, unless by deed indented, sealed
and inrolled. Lord Ellenborough in 3 East. 442, says,—J a deed qua
“ deed certainly requires no inrollment to give it validity, that is
“ not a thing which arises from, or is connected w ith the nature of
“ the instrument itself.” So had this mortgage contained a co
venant for the repayment of the money, without doubt an action
thereon would be maintainable without registry or inrollment: but
beside that, it is by no means clear that this is a case between
mortgagor and mortgagee, to which the maxim could properly ap
ply ; and allowing even the parties to stand in that relation, the
Plaintiff does not fail in this case by reason of a better or prior
title to the mortgage deed, set up by the Defendant, but in con
sequence of his own omission he has brought his ejectment before
comDleting his legal seisin.
If satisfied as to the law, it is not for Courts to regard conse
quences ; but the only effect of our decision this day wifi probably
be to enforce the registry, and not the inrollment cf conveyances,
and in that respect cannot fail to have a salutary operation. As
there must be a new trial on this point, I shall decline at present
saying any thing on the other, not being quite satisfied that I
clearly comprehend the purpose for which the parol evidence was
tendered.
Rule absolute.
N. Parker, E. B. Chandler and W. Chandler for the Plaintiff.
J. A. Street and Weldon for the Defendant.
READ v. SMITH AND OTHERS.
A plea in trespass justifying an entry upon land to re take timber of the
Defendant, carried there by a sudden rise of water, in a river in which it
was being floated ind carried to market, —Held bad, because it was not
shewn that the Def< ndants were not in fault, by having used their best en ■
deavours to prevent the timber coming upon the Plaintiff’s land.
Semb.—An entry for such purpose and an injury to the herbage, and a
subversion of the soil occasioned by the hauling and removal of timber, are
acts
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acts which cannot be justified by any averment of care and diliger:'-.* t»
prevent the timber getting on the Plaintiff’s land.

Trespass.—Tlie Plaintiff declared that tlie Defendants, &c. on,
&c. broke and entered a certain meadow of the Plaintiffin Bathuist,
&c. and with feet in walking, and with cattle trod down, crushed
and spoiled the grass and herbage—and cast and threw divers logs
thereupon, and with the said cattle and the said logs tore up and
subverted the soil, &c.
The Defendants pleaded,
1st. The General issue—and each Defendant separately plead
ed the following special plea, viz.—
Actio, non, &c.—because he says, that he, the said Benjamin
D. Smith, before and at the said several times when &■ was
seized and possessed cf and of right entitled to a quantity of pine
timber and other timber lying in the big Nepisiguit river, above
the said meadow, or close in which, &c. which said timber the said
Defendant Benjamin D. Smith, was about bringing or floating
down the said Nepisiguit river to Bathurst to market, when the
said river became very much flooded by an unusual flow of wa
ter, which sudden flood or rise of water in the said river, with the
winds and natural current of the said river, caused the said timber
to be floated and driven about, and the said close or meadow being
also inundated and overflooded by the said great rise or flood of
water in the said river, the said timber was against the will of him
the said Benjamin D. Smith, and to his great injury and damage,
floated and driven by the said flood, wind, and current, from the
possession of the said Benjamin D. Smith, in, and upon the said
close or meadow of the said Plaintiff, the said meadow being then,
and ever since unfenced and unenclosed ; and the said timber was
there left upon the said meadow of the said Plaintiff’, by the reced
ing of the waters of the said river, without the power of the said
Benjamin D. Smith to prevent it; and the said Benjamin D. Smith
having occasion for the said timber, and being under the most ur
gent necessity of taking the said timber to market to fulfil his
contracts and engagements, and having no other means or way of
obtaining or removing the said timber from off the said meadow or
close, and knowing that the said timber would be much more in
jurious to the said close or meadow by remaining tliereon, than
by being removed from the said close or meadow, at the said seve
ral times when &c. entered into the said close or meadow, in the
said declaration mentioned, and with only so many oxen as were
necessary for the purpose, and with as little damage as possible to
the said close or meadow, removed, and caused to be removed and
hauled from off the said close or meadow, the said timber of the
said Benjamin D. Smith, which had been so floated and driven
thereon
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thereon as aforesaid, as he the said Benjamin D. Smith lawfully
might for the cause aforesaid ; and in so doing, he the said Benja
min D. Smith, with his feet in walking, and with the said oxen
unavoidably a little trod down, trampled upon, consumed, and
spoiled the grass then growing, and being in the said close in
which, &c. and subverted, damaged, and spoiled a little of the soil,
sod, and sward of the said close or meadow, and the said oxen, at
the said several times, when, &c. in passing and re-passing along
the said close in the act of hauling off the said timber, by stealth
and morsels, and against the will of the said Benjamin D. Smith,
ate up, and depastured a little of the grass there then growing
on the said meadow or close, which are the said several supposed
trespasses in the said declaration mentioned, and whereof the said
Plaintiff hath above thereof complained against the said Benjamin
D. Smith, and this he the said Benjamin D. Smith is ready to
verify, wherefore he prays judgment, if the said Plaintiff ought to
have or maintain his aforesaid action thereof against him.
To this special plea the Plaintiff demurred generally, and the
Defendants severally joined in demurrer. The cause was argued
in last Hilary Term.
End in support of demurrer:—
The Defendants by their plea admitted the freehold and posses
sion of the close to have been in the Plaintiff,—they admitted also
the act of trespass, and justified the acts complained of, because
their timber had been against their will, floated by a sudden rise
of the river upon the close of the Plaintiff—and because they were
under urgent necessity of taking the timber to market, and because
the close would have been more injured by the timber remaining
there than by its removal.
This plea could only be supported as an excuse arising by ine
vitable necessity ; see 20 Vin. Abr. 526. The Defendants assert
ed that their timber which they had placed in the river to be car
ried to market, had been floated upon the Plaintiff’s land, but
they had not averred that they were able to take care of their pro
perty even under ordinary circumstances, and having placed it in
the river they were bound to take care of it, and prevent injury to
others even by accident. It was not averred that the Nipisiguit
was a navigable river,—7 E. 207; 3 Bl. Com. 210.
[Parker J.—referred to Anthony Hanney, 8 Bing. 186.]
The Solicitor General in support of the plea :—
The question was whether the fact stated in the plea did not
justify the Defendants going on the Plaintiff’s close,—the neces
sity was inevitable. The plea stated that the timber was carried
by a sudden and violent flood. The Defendants, it appeared, were
unable to prevent its being carried on the Plaintiff’s land ; and
had
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had they suffered it to remain there, after they could have remo
ved it, the owner of the close would have had a right of action
against them. Com. Dig. Tit. Pleader ; 8 Bing. 186.
Berton, in reply :—
There was a distinction between an unavoidable accident and
accident occasioned by carelessness or want of attention ;—it was
the act of the Defendants which placed the timber in the river, and
they should have averred their endeavours to prevent its going on
the Plaintiff’s land, and their ability, under ordinary circumstances,
to have done so ; and even had all that been averred, it might be
doubted if it would have been a justification, or if it would not
rather have been a fact in mitigation of damages ;—their plea ad
mitted a subversion of the soil. Had the Plaintiff opposed the en
try of the Defendants, they could not have justified using force.
Had the timber floated across the Plaintiff’s land, to land in the
rear, could the Defendants have justified passing across from the
Plaintiff’s land with oxen and teams, and thereby tearing up and
destroying his meadow to save and retake their timber ?
The Defendants should have tendered amends for the injury
they had done, and if the Plaintiff had refused such amends, the
circumstances would have been for the consideration of a jury, un
der the general issue, in mitigation of damages.
In this Term the Court gave judgment in favor of the de
murrer.
Chipman, Chief Justice:
This is a case of demurrer to a plea—the action is trespass quare
clausum fregit. Each of the five Defendants has pleaded separate
ly the same plea in justification,—
To which several pleas the Plaintiff has demurred. The de
murrer raises the question as to the right of one man to enter upon
the land of another, for the purpose of taking his own property,
being upon such land. The late case of Anthony v. Haney, 8
Bingham, 186, decides, that such an entry cannot be justified singly
from the fact that the goods were upon the land, but that the cir
cumstances must be shewn, under which the property came upon
the soil of another. The validity of the justification will of course
depend upon the nature of these circumstances. I have not found
any modern cases upon this point. I cite the following from 20
Vin. Abr. 506
“ If A take my horse and carry him to the land of B, it is not
“ lawful for me to enter into the land and take him. But if A
“ feloniously steals my horse and carries him into B’s land, then
“ I may justify my entry into the land and retake him.” 2 Rolls.
“ Rep. Higgins v. Andrews.”
“ If
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“ If A takes wrongfully the goods of another and carries them
“ into his own land, the owner may take them thence, but not out
of the land of a stranger.—lb.”
“ If trees are thrown down by the wind, it is no trespass to en“ ter the land into which they are thrown down to take them.
“ Lat. 13, per Crew, C. J. in case of Miller v. Hawery.”
“ But if a man cuts trees on his own land which fall into ano“ ther man’s land, and goes and he takes them, trespass lies.”
Per Crew, C. J. Lat. 13, citing 6 Edward 4, 7.”
“ If trees grow in my hedge hanging over another man’s land,
“• and the fruit of them falls into the other’s land, I may justify
“ my entry to gather up the fruit, if I make no longer stay there
“ than is convenient, nor break his hedge. Lat. 120, per Dode“ ridge, J.”
“ It is not lawful to do a tort to another to ease myself—per
Jones, J. M. Miller v. Hawery. Lat. 120.”
From the case of the trees blown down by the wind, and the
fruit falling from a tree overhanging another’s land, it is to be in
ferred that if the goods come upon the land of another by mere
accident, without any fault in the owner of the goods, the owner
may justify an entry to take his goods. There is a case of an
estray cited in Espinasse’s treatise on the law of nisiprius, to the
same effect.
“ Trespass will not lie against the owner of an estray, for taking
“ him off the lands of the lord of the manor who had seized him,
“ without paying for his keeping, for the owner had the property,
“ and the lord may have case for the keeping, though he might
“ have detained him till paid. Lady Hutton v. Coles, Cumber“ land, Sum. Ass. 1667,”
In Com. Dig. title “ Pleader,” 3 M. 31, it is laid down as
follows—
“ It is no plea if the accident was by a voluntary act or neglect
“ of Defendant—as if a man lets a falcon go at a pheasant in his
“ own land, and pursues it into the land of another, trespass lies
“—Lat. 13. If he cuts down a tree which falls into another’s
“ land, and he enters to remove it. Lat. 13.”
So in Popham 161, as cited in 8 Bing. 190, the case of the
lop ,ings of the trees, is put upon the same principle. “ Per
Crew, C. J. A man cuts thorns, and they fall into another
“ man’s land, and in trespass he justified for it, and the opinion
“ was that notwithstanding this justifical on, trespass lies, because
“ he did not plead that he did his best endeavours to hinder their
“ falling there.”
From these authorities I think it is clear, that where there has
been
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been any fault or neglect on the part of the owner of the goods,
he cannot justify entering on the soil of another to take them, and
he is bound to shew that there has been no such fault or neglect
on his part.
The plea in the present case states—“ that the said river became
“ very much flooded by an unusual flow of water, which sudden
“ flood or rise of the water in the said river, with the wind and
“ natural current of the said river, caused the said timber to be
<£ floated and driven about, and the said close or meadow being
“ also inundated and overflowed by the said great rise or flood of
“ water in the said river, the said timber was against the will of
“ the said Defendant, and to his great injury and damage, floated
“ and driven by the said flood, wind and current, from the pos“ session of the said Defendant, in and upon the said close or mea“ dow of the said Plaintiff, the said meadow being then and ever
“ since unfenced and unenclosed,” which last circumstance of the
meadow being unfenced is in the present case quite immaterial.
The pleas do not state that the Defendants used any endeavours
to guide the timber as it floated on the water, and to keep it with
in the channel of the river, and away from the Plaintiff’s land.
They appear to have bestowed no care upon it, but to have aban
doned it altogether to the action of the winds and water. This is
a fault on their part, which under the authorities I have cited, I
think, is of itself decisive that they cannot justify their entry on
the Plaintiff’s land to take the timber—and on this ground I think
the several pleas are certainly bad. I am not indeed prepared to
say that even without this fault on their part, they could have jus
tified the trespasses complained of, in entering upon the Plaintiff’s
land without liis will, and hauling the timber off with oxen, which
upon their own shewing, necessarily subverted and injured the soil.
There should in such a case, have been a previous request to ent”r
and they must at all events have been liable for auy damage done
to the land ; for if the timber came upon the land without the fault
of the Plaintiff, be should not suffer any loss thereby, and it being
the Defendant’s property, it was their affair to take it away with
out doing wrong to the Plaintiff, for “ no man shall do a tort to
another to ease himself.’’ In Anthony ffl Haney, 8 Bing. 186.
L. C. J. Tindal expresses himself as follows:—
“ If the occupier of the soil refuse to deliver up the property or
“ to make any answer to the owner’s demand, a jury might be
“ induced to presume a conversion from such silence, or at any
“ rate the owner might in such case enter and take his property,
“ subject to the payment of any damage he might commit."
But however different circumstances might vary the rights and
remedies of the parties, 1 am of opinion that it is sufficient for the
decision of this case, that the Defendants have not shewn that they
were
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were not in fault, by having used their best endeavours to prevent
the timber coming upon the Plaintiff’s land, and that upon this
ground, there must, upon these demurrers, be judgment for the
Plaintiff.
BOTSFORD, J. concurred.

Carter,

J.:

The judgment of the Court of Common Pleas in Anthony v.
Haney, 8 Bing. 186, seems to me to establish that there may be
circumstances which will justify a man’s entering upon the land
of another to take thence his own property. That case further
establishes, that every plea which attempts to justify a trespass on
such ground, must state the peculiar circumstances on which the
party rests his right to enter. In all cases where such a justifica
tion is pleaded, it behoves the Court to look very narrowly into the
circumstances stated in the plea, and to take care, lest (in the
words of C. J. Tindal,) “ too wide a door be opened for parties to
attempt righting themselves without resorting to law.”
It seems to me that in a plea of this description it should clearly
appear on the face of the plea, that this coming of the Defendant’s
property on the Plaintiff’s land, was, not only not caused by any
act on the part of the Defendant, but was owing to circumstances
against which he could not have been reasonably expected to take
precaution. Now this plea does not state that any precaution was
taken to secure this timber, or that it was under the care or charge
of any person ; it merely states, that the timber was lying in the
big Nipisiguit river, (which river is not stated to be a navigable
river, nor one in which the Defendant’s timber might rightfully be.)
If we were to decide that the owner of timber allowing it to lie
in a river, (which is of course subject to a rise of water, at parti
cular seasons,) without taking any precaution to prevent his tim
ber from floating on another’s land, may after the timber has been
so deposited on that land, and without the permission of the land
owner, enter and recover the timber, I tlunk we should be estab
lishing a principle not warranted by law, and which would have a
bad effect throughout the country.—This principle I think we
should establish, if we held this plea sufficient, and I am there
fore of opinion, that the Plaintiff must have judgment.

Parker,

J.:

To what has been already said on the defect apparent in the
pleas in this case, which is the main ground of the judgment
pronounced by their Honors the Chief Justice and Mr. Jus
tice Carter, I shall add nothing except my perfect concurrence in
the doctrine, that to a justification of the nature of the present, it
is an essential allegation that the Defendant did all in his power
to prevent the property getting on the close of the Plaintiff; but
Y
there
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there is another, and what appears to me a more material ground
of objection coming fairly up for the consideration of the Court
on this demurrer, on which I shall take the liberty of making a
few remarks.
I would premise by saying, that the only foundation I can find
in any direct decision of the Courts for the general doctrine stated
in the text writers and digests, and occasional dicta of Judges as
to the right of one man to enter without permission on the lands
of another in order to recover his goods, which have accidentally
get there, are in two ancient cases of the time of Edward 4th ;
those which have already been referred to from Viner’s abridg
ment, viz. that cited from the year book, 6 Ed. 4, 7, by Crew
C. J. in Miller v. Fawdry, Latch 13, of the tree blown down;
mentioned also in Brock’s abridgment, pl. 310, as cited in
20 Vin. Abr. 437 ; and the case of the fruit falling, quoted
also in Viner, as an opinion of Doddridge, J. in Miller v.
Hawery, Latch 120; but which appears by the report of the same
case in Popham, 161, to be a case in the year book, 8 Ed. 4, and
to which there is this qualification given in Latch, that the hedge
must net not be broken.
We have not in this Province the year books to refer to, but
probably the abridgments (the cases are cited also in Cornyn and
Bacon) contain all that is material. It would appear indeed from
Bac. Abr. Tit. Trespass F. that Miller v. Fawdry, decided the
right of entry to take the fruit, but that is not so; that was not an
action of trespass quare clausum, fregit, but trespass for chasing
sheep in which the nice question was discussed, whether your dog
in chasing your neighbour’s sheep off your land could go an inch
beyond the line without making such chasing a trespass; the case
of the fruit is certainly referred to by the Judges as good law.
With respect to the two decisions In the year books, it must be
observed that they are both in terms confined to a right, which I
may without impropriety style a reciprocal right, between two ad
joining proprietors to be exercised each on the border of his neigh
bor’s land; that they have not been expressly affirmed or even
much considered in any recent case, and that no direct decision has
extended the common law principle, beyond that which is neces
sary to their support. It is not, however, material to the present
case, that it should be so limited in its application, for we are not
bound now to decide whether the mere entry for a purpose like that
before us would or would not be a trespass, if the accident had been
unavoidable, and the entry unattended by damage; although that
seems by the margin of the demurrer book to be the point which
the Plaintiff was mainly desirous of raising on this argument.
The declaration complains of real damage sustained by subversion
of the soil and sward, and destruction of the grass ; and the pleas,
admitting
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admitting the damage, attempt to justify the acts complained of,
and assert a right to enter on the close, though such entry neces
sarily and unavoidably occasioned damage to the Plaintiff, and
this Without any previous notice, request or demand, any tender
of amends, or liability to make compensation for the damage actually
done. Now no case has been cited, nor can I believe, be found
where a justification has been sustained to this extent. The
plea in the late case from 8 Bing, was considered clearly bad on
very general grounds, and it will be noted that judgment was
there given immediately without hearing Counsel in support of the
demurrer ; but I can see nothing in hyiiat fell from the Court on
that occasion to justify an eptry producing actual damage ; indeed
the concluding expression of Lord C. J. Tiudal, that the owner
might enter to take his property, when the occupier Refused to de
liver it, subject to the payment of any damage he might commit, is
rather against than in favor of the position ; for if he is liable to
this payment, how is it to be recovered but in an action of tres
pass ? The Plaintiff would not surely be put to his action on the
case, and no contract could be presumed. The Defendant in the
case before us must go the whole length of contending for the light
to do damage without making compensation, for as was said in the
case of Ball v. Herbert, 3 T. R. 253, if the right were but a qua
lified onej, the plea should have been adapted to it. That was an
action of trespass, in which the Defendant justified under a gene
ral claim of right to tow on the banks of a navigable river, on which
the Plaintiff’s land bounded ; Lord Kenyon then said—“ The De“ fendant claims a common law right without making any com“ pensation ; if he has only a qualified right he should have adapted
U his plea to it; for if he were to obtain judgment it would ascer“ tain his right to the extent claimed on this record, namely, a ge“ neral right without making any compensation.'’'’ Ashurst, J.
gave his opinion to the same effect ; though on this particular
point Mr. J. Buller reserved his opinion, concurring, however, in
the general judgment of the Court ,pgainst the right.
It will I think tend to elucidate this case when the ground on
which a way of necessity depends is considered; it lias been ar
gued as if necessity gave a way, but it is clear from the note of
Mr. Sergeant Williams, to Pomfret v. Rycroft, 1 Saund. 322,
that a way of necessity must arise from prescription or grant; this
is fully recognized in 2 Bing. 83, 2 Peak, 153, 8 T. R. 50.
Two cases are mentioned in 3 Com. Dig. p. 58, of a right of
way to a wreck,.-of which a man has a grant, and to a navigation ;
but the first of these stands evidently on the King’s prerogative,
and the latter it has been expressly decided, is not a right at com
mon law, but warranted only by particular custom.
In the case of Ballard zj. Harrison, 4 M. & S. 387, confirming
that
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that of Taylor v. Whitehead, Doug. 745, it was decided that if a
private way, which was the only road to the land were impassable,
it would not justify going on the land adjoining, for (as was then
said) “ it does not follow that a man can go over his neighbour’s“ land, because he hath no otherway to his own.” There is ano
ther case in 1 Siderfih. 251, cited by Sir John Strange, in argu
ment in 1 Wils. 107, which tends to shew how very unstable a
ground that which is called necessity is—it is as follows—“ where
<41 a man has a right of common, and the soil happens to be so over“ flowed that he cannot enjoy it, without digging trenches to drain
“ T, yet if he does dig trenches to drain it, the owner of the soil
“ may bring trespass.” The case in Wilson is worth noting in
support of the position that, though the right of entry may exist
yet breaking the soil will be a trespass, and that compensation for
the damage is properly recoverable in an action of trespass, where
there is no contract or agreement. I have also here much pleasure
in recommending to the attention of any persons who may be
placed in a similar situation with the Defendants, the very good
advice given by Mr Chitty in his late work on the general prac
tice of the law, vol. 1, p. 568 ; hb does not, as will be seen, treat
the right of entry as so clearly ascertained, even in a case of pure
accident, as to recommend the unqualified assertion of it, but
points out a much more prudent course of acting. As to the ne
cessity of a previous demand or request, there is a case from Fritz.
Abr. cited in Com. Dig. (the new edition of Hammond) which
has not I think, been mentioned, 6 Com. Dig. Tit. Pleader, 3 M.
39. “ It is not a good justification that J. S. was possessed of a
“ piece of timber which was placed in the locus in quo by a tem“ pestuous wind, and that Defendant entered as a servant to carry
“ it away, because it does not appear but that the timber might
“ have been purposely exposed to the wind in such a manner as to
“ make the wind blow it into the Plaintiff’s close ; because it does
“ not appear to have been fetched away at a proper time, because
“ it does not appear that the timber belonged to J. S. when it was
blown over, and because it does not appear that Plaintiff was
i requested to permit the removal.—2 F. 183.”
On the whole I am of opinion that the acts complained of in
his case could not be justified, had the pleas even averred that
the utmost care and diligence were used to prevent the Defen
dant’s timber getting on the Plaintiff’s land; and I entertain so
nluch doubt as to the mere right of entry in a case like the pre
sent, as to wish the subject may come under the consideration of
the Legislature, who in establishing a right (if it be essential to
the business of the com dry that such should exist,) may put the
exercise of it under proper restrictions. The provision in the statute
of limitations 21 Jac. 1, c. 16, s. 5, as to involuntary trespasses
may
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may afford a useful precedent for their consideration. There is,
I should observe, a special Act in the State of Massachusetts
passed in the year 1793, which then included the present neigh
bouring State of Maine, authorizing the owner to remove timber
which has been floated on the lands of another, on paying or ten
dering such reasonable damages as may be occasioned by the re
moval ; which is also deserving of attention.
For the reasons above assigned, I concur in opinion that Uhere
must be judgment for the Plaintiff on these demurrers.
End and Berton for Plaintiff.
The Solicitor General, J. A. Street and Kerr for Defendants.
CURRY & ORR, Administrators of CADWALLADER
CURRY v. HIBBARD.
In assumpsit on promises to intestate, a note made by him, and after his
death indorsed by the payee to Defendant, cannot be pleaded as a set oft’;
no mutuality between the Plaintiff’s claim and Defendant’s set off existed
in the life time of intestate.

Assumpsit on promise to intestate in his life time.
Pleas.—1st. Non Assumpsit.
2d.—Actio non, because he says that the said Cadwallader Curry
in his life time, to wit, on, &c. at, &c. made his certain promissory
note in writing, bearing date, &c. whereby he, the said Cadwalla
der Curry, in his life time, then and there promised to pay on de
mand to one John Copely, or order, the sum of £25, and interest,
for value received, and which said promissory note, he, the said
John Copely, afterwards and after the death of the said Cadwalla
der Curry, and before the commencement of this suit, to wit,
on. &c. at, &c. indorsed and delivered to the said Defendant.
To the second plea the Plaintiffs demurred, and the Defendants
jc ..red in demurrer.
Parker, in support of the demurrer :—
The Provincial statute of settoff, 26 G. 3, c. 18, enacts—“that
“ where there are mutual debts between the Plaintiff and Defend“ ant, or if either party be sued as Executor or Administrator
“ where there are mutual debts between the testator or intestate,
“ and either party, one debt may be set against the other.” The
Defendant’s plea must rest upon this act, and the only question is,
if the facts stated by the Defendant come within its terms—evi
dently they do not—the act applies to mutual debts between the
testator and intestate. Here the Defendant has stated that the
promissory notes sought to be set off were indorsed to him by the
payees after the death of the intestate.
Berton,
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Berton, for Defendant
The debts sought to be set off have not arisen or been created
since the death of the intestate. Their-arose in the life time of the
intestate, by his making the promissory notes mentioned in the
Defendant’s second plea ; a debt existed then between the intes
tate and the payee of those notes. The indorsement to the present
Defendant created no new debt, but transferred the existing debt,
and placed the present Defendant for all purposes in the place of
the indorser.
Parker, in reply, was stopped by the Court.

Per Curiam.
The Act of Assembly is clear and explicit, and in actions by
administrators, extends only to mutual debts between the intestate
and the Defendants ; by the Defendant’s ave rment in his plea, he
became possessed of the promissory notes pleaded as set off, after
the death of the intestate. No mutuality existed between the
Plaintiff’s claim and the Defendant’s, in the life time of the intes
tate ; the plea is therefore bad, and there must be judgment for
the Plaintiff on the demurrer.
N. Parker for Plaintiffs.
J. W. Chandler and Berton for Defendant.

TRINITY TERM, 6th Wm. 4th.
1836.

It is Ordered, That the notice to appear in ejectment shall not
he made in future for the return day in the second week of the
Term ; but for the Term generally, on the Tuesday or Saturday
in the first week.
WARD CHIPMAN,
W. BOTSFORD,
J. CARTER,
R. PARKER.

♦
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Exparte.

GOVE, a Concealed Debtor.

The Court has no power under 26 Geo. 3. c. 13, to grant a supersedeas
of a warrant of attachment, issued against the goods of a concealed debtor,
unless it appear that all the creditors consent thereto.

Proceedings were taken under the Act of Assembly, 26 Geo.
3, c. 13, against Gove, as a concealed debtor, in August last, and
a warrant of attachment issued, under which his books and effects
were seized.
D. L. Robinson applied, by consent of the petitioning creditors,
for a supersedeas of the warrant; the object was to enable the
debtor to get possession of his books, and collect the debts due to
him.
Chipman, Chief Justice :
Does the Act give the Court power to supersede a warrant in
such a case ? It does not appear that the parties consenting are
all the creditors ; the Court derive their authority from the Act of
Assembly, and can only exercise the powers thereby vested in
them. The Act is very defective ; it requires the debtor applying
for a supersedeas to settle with all his creditors, and points out no
means of ascertaining them.
Rule refused.
REX v. THE SHERIFF OF GLOUCESTER.
Where a capias is issued against two, if the Sheriff returns “ cepi corpus.”
it shall be taken to apply equally to both Defendants. Delay sufficiently
accounted for is not a cause for setting aside an attachment against a Sheriff’
if he have not been prejudiced by such delay. A rule nisi was granted
without opposition, which was however immediately afterwards discharged
on cause being shewn ; and the Court allowed costs.

In the case of Call v. Murphy & Butler,-—the following circum
stances appeared from the affidavits produced in this cause.
A writ of capias ad respondendum to the Sheriff of Gloucester
was sued out in this cause, returnable in Trinity Term, 1835,
2
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indorsed for bail, for £35.—-The Sheriff arrested Butler. Murphy
never was arrested. The writ was returned “ Cepi Corpus, fees
£1 13s. 3d.C In October following a rule was served upon the
Sheriff to bring in the bodies of the Defendants. Bail was there
upon put in for Butler, and he was rendered in discharge of his
bail. In Hilary Term an order was obtained in the cause for an
attachment against the Sheriff “ for not bringing into Court the
body of Matthew Murphy, one of the Defendants, at the suit of
Anthony Call.” The attachment was not sued out in Hilary Va
cation ; the Coroner who resided near to the residence of the She
riff having removed from the County, and there being no other
within fifty miles of the County Town. In Trinity vacation, ano
ther Coroner having been appointed, a writ of attachment was issu
ed in pursuance of the order made in Hilary Term, returnable at
the present Michaelmas Term.
Notice was given to the Plaintiff of a motion for a rule nisi, to
set aside the attachment for irregularity and surprise, and copies of
the affidavits were served.
The Solicitor General moved for a rule nisi to set aside the at
tachment for irregularity ; the application was made by the Sheriff,
and at his expense for his own indemnity, and without collusion
with either of the Defendants.
1 st. It was irregular to issue an attachment against the Sheriff
after so long a delay. A party applying for and issuing an attach
ment should be in all respects correct. The rule it appears was
Issued in Hilary, and no proceedings were taken thereon until af
ter Trinity, upwards of five months ; Rex v. Sheriff of Surry, 9 E.
467. A party armed with the process of the Court to enablte him
to enforce payment from the Sheriff was bound to proceed with rea
sonable dispatch. Rex v. Sheriff of London, 3 Bos. and Pul.
151, 7 T. R. 452.
2d. The Sheriff’s return of cepi corpus being in the singular
number, applied only to one Defendant, instead of ruling the She
riff to bring in the bodies of the Defendants.
Berton, for the Plaintiff, stated, that he appeared to shew cause
against the rule nisi, instanter ; but suggested that the rule should
be entered in order, that if discharged, the Plaintiff should be enti
tled to his costs.
(The rule nisi was entered to set aside the attachment for
irregularity.)
Berton, for the Plaintiff, contended that the delay in issuing the
writ of attachment was fully explained. The cases cited in ob
taining the rule were not analagous to the present. In the cases
cited from 9 E. and 7 T. R. the Sheriff was damnified by the de
lay, and in the case in Bos. and Pul. the Plaintiff had negotiated
with
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with the Sheriff’s officer; besides, circumstances in this
country and in England differed materially, and much greater
delay was justifiable here than would be permitted there. In
England, rules to plead were four day rules, here twenty days
were given.
The Sheriff could not protect himself by an ungramma
tical return. He was directed to take the Defendants ; his re
turn should be held to apply to each individually, and if he did
not so intend it, but had acted under a mistake, he should have
applied to the Court for relief, when served with the rule “ to bring
in the bodies.”

Per Curiam. ,
Cepi corpus is a very informal return. The Sheriff should
have made his return in English, “ I have taken the body of But
ler, or the bodies of the Defendants, as within I am commanded.”
The return must be intended a complete return, and must be taken
to apply equally to both Defendants.
There is quite sufficient reason shewn for the delay in issuing
the attachment, the Sheriff not having been prejudiced.
The Solicitor General urged that the Plaintiff was not entitled
to costs ; he appeared, having received notice and copies of the
affidavits, and should be considered as having opposed the motion
in the first instance, and was not therefore entitled to costs.—
Merrifield’s Atty, on Costs, 295.
Chipman, Chief Justice :
The party has a right to ask the Court if the applicant has made
out a sufficient prima facie case ; if the Court think not, they re
fuse the rule, and the party takes nothing by his motion. But I
can see no reason why the rule nisi should not be entered and ar
gued instauter. In the present case the Defendant obtained the
rule on argument,—it is discharged, and must follow the usual
course.
Parker, J.:
I think the object of giving notice and copies of affidavits is to
enable the party to come forward in the first instance and oppose
the application ; and there can be no reason for a party to bo d the
affidavits in his hand until a rule be granted, and then ask leave
to shew cause instanter. I fully concur, however, that as the rule
nisi was entered to set aside the proceedings for irregularity, and
has been discharged, it should be with costs.
Rule discharged with costs.
Weldon and Berton for the Plaintiff.
The Solicitor General and Carman for the Defendants.
ROBERTSON,
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ROBERTSON, Assignee of CAMPBELL, Sheriff of
Charlotte v. CURRIE, WYER & J. CAMPBELL.
In an application of obligors of a limit bond to tlie Court for relief upon
the ground that the Defendant left the limits, agreeing with the Plaintiff to
pay all costs—it must expressly appear that Defendant complied with the
agreement by first paying the costs.

In this action, which was on a limit bond against the Defend
ant Currie, the principal, and Wyer & Campbell, his sureties, for
an escape of the former,—the Solicitor General applied for relief
on behalf of the sureties, to the equitable jurisdiction of the Court
under the Act of Assembly, 6 Wm. 4, c. 41, s. 13, inter alia,
providing that “ the Court where the action is brought, may by
“ rule or rules of the same Court give such relief to the obligors in
“ the said bond as is agreeable to justice and reason, and that the
“ said rule or rules of the said Court shall have the nature and
“ effect of a defeasance of such bond
the motion was founded on
the affidavits of the sureties, stating that Currie had been taken in
execution for <£600,—Defendants were his sureties,—that a settle
ment was negociated, and that Currie left the limits under a full
belief that the execution was settled and discharged—that property
had been assigned to Parkinson & Roberts, agents of Plaintiff, and
that the said agents had placed the same in Plaintiff’s hands.
\Chipman, C. J.—Does not the Act provide that the sureties
may render their principal ?]
Solicitor General—It is doubtful if that can be done after a
breach of the bond.
It was further alleged that there was collusion between Plaintiff,
Parkinson and Roberts ; that Plaintiff had instructed Parkinson
and Roberts, if a certain bill of lading of deals were given them, to
discharge Defendant on his paying all costs ; that such bill of la
ding had been given, and that the Plaintiff held property of the
Defendants for more than the debt, but it was not expressly stated
that the costs were paid.

Per Curiam.
Why have the sureties not Currie’s affidavit that the costs were
paid ? The presumption is, that he could not swear to that;—the
sureties then have not made out a case for the equitable jurisdiction
of the Court— it is not agreeable to justice and reason, that where
the principal and his sureties are all I’ ble together, the latter
shor d be discharged when the principal himself does not swear
that he has complied with Plaintiff’s offer by paying tlie costs.
The Solicitor General took nothing by his motion.

JARVIS
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JARVIS v. MILLER.
Where the Sheriff levies on real property, and omitting to advertise the
same, and offer it for sale, returns that “ the lands remain unsold for want
of buyers,” such omission is a breach of duty on his part, and the return a
false return. The Sheriff is bound to proceed on a fieri facias, and is not
at liberty to wait for a Venditioni exponas. Although no actual damage be
shewn, the Sheriff is, nevertheless, liable for his breach of duty in not pro
ceeding under the writ,—but the Plaintiff is entitled to nominal damages
only, unless ■actual injury be proved.
This was a special action on the case against the Defendant,

as Sheriff of County’bf York, for a false return of a writ of .’/®|
facias, and for a breach of duty in the Defendant, in not having
sold land levied upon, and in not having advertised lands levfied
upon for sale.
At the trial before Parker, J. at the Saint John Circuit in Ja
nuary last, it appeared (by exemplification), that in Trinity Term,
5, Geo. IV. the Plaintiff obtained judgment against one Flaglor,
for £17 12s. 4d. An award of fieri facias, refundable in Hilary
Term following, with the return thereto of nulla bona, and conti
nuances afterwards by vicecomes non misit breve were entered on
the roll.
An exemplification was also in evidence of a JI. fa. upon said
judgment, dated in Trinity Term aforesaid, and returnable in Hi
lary after; returned nulla bona. Also of another writ of fidri
facias issued on the 20th August, 1834, returnable in Hilary,
1835. On this was indorsed by the Sheriff (the Defendant), “ Re
ceived 2'5th August, 1834,” and the following return, “ Levied on
lands and tenements which remain unsold for want of buyers.”
The Solicitor General objected that the continuances on the
roll were not sufficient; the executions awarded should have been
produced or exemplified also. It appeared also that the Sheriff
was directed to proceed under the execution, at which time, he
stated that the land was mortgaged to its full value. No evidence
of the value of the land was given.
Parker, J.:
Ruled that the evidence could not be rejected : he considered
the allegations on the record which had been exemplified were
binding on the Court as to the facts therein stated ; and moreover
that it did not lie in the Sheriff’s mouth to dispute the regularity
of the writ which he had received and returned.
At the close of the Plaintiff’s case, a nonsuit was moved for on
the following grounds :—
1st. In order to maintain the action the Plaintiff should shew
that the Sheriff’s return was false. In this case, there was not
sufficient time between the issuing and return to have sold the
lands, and therefore the return was proper, that the lands were le
vied upon and remained unsold, and even if there had been, yet,
2d.
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2d. An action would not lie against the Sheriff for not selling
under a fieri facias,—he was not bound to sell until compelled
a venditioni exponas, and
3d. No action would lie for not advertising; supposing the Sher’ff
bound to sell under fieri facias, no action would lie against him
until after the lapse of sufficient time to have enabled him to sell.
The learned Judge was of opinion, that as the declaration ex
pressly averred the return of the Sheriff to have been made on the
return day of the execution, and charged him with not selling the
land, and returning the proceeds at that time, the Plaintiff could
not recover on that part of the allegation, there not being sufficient
lime to make the sale. He was also inclined to think for the same
reasons the action would not lie for the false return ; but he con
sidered that the Sheriff had been guilty ol a breach of duty in not
advertising the land for sale, as directed by the Act of Assembly ;
that he was bound to proceed on the fieri facias without waiting
for a venditioni exponas, even though the sale could not be com
pleted before the return day ; and that there was a sufficient sub
stantive cause of action to entitle the Plaintiff to a verdict, although
he had failed in making out his whole charge. The learned Judge
was also of opinion that the Plaintiff had not made out a case for
more than nominal damages ; and he recommended to the parties
to consent to a verdict being entered for the Plaintiff for one shil
ling, with leave to the Defendant to move to set it aside and enter
a nonsuit on any of the points which had arisen. This was at
length assented to, and a verdict taken accordingly ; the Plaintiff
having leave also to move to increase the damages to the full
amount of the execution, if the Court should think him entitled
thereto.
In Hilary Term, the Solicitor General moved for a rule nisi to
set aside the verdict, and to enter a nonsuit :—
The execution put in evidence ; and upon which the Sheriff
was charged was a first writ of fieri facias. The judgment was
signed in 1824, the execution issued in 1834 ; and appearing a
first writ on a judgment of ten years standing, this was not a mere
irregularity, but the writ was absolutely void. The law presumed
a judgment satisfied if no execution be issued within a year and a
day, and Plaintiff had no right to issue execution until he had
sued out scire facias, and ootained judgment thereon. There
was nothing to support this execution ; if the Plaintiff depended on
the execution issued at the time of signing the judgment, then
this should have been an alias or pluries. By the record it ap
peared that if any other executions were issued they had not been
returned, the continuances were vic. non mi. breve; it was irregugular to issue a second or subsequent execution until the former
was
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was returned. The Plaintiff in seeking damages for a false re
turn, should shew that he had a right to issue the execution of the
false return to which he coniDlains. Roscoe’s Ev. 537 ; 2 Tidd’s
Pr. 1055 ; 2 Chit. R. 203; Star. Ev. 1344.
The return made by the Sheriff was a good and proper return.
Supposing the Sheriff bound to sell property levied upon under a
fieri facias, yet in the present case there was not sufficient time
between the issuing and return of the execution, to have enabled
him to do so. The Province law regulating the sale of lands un
der execution, required the property to be advertised six months
before sale ;—time was necessarily expended in seeking for and
levying on the property ; he was bound to return the execution on
the return day—if he had proceeded to advertise the land for sale,
the day of sale would have been subsequent to the return day, and
the execution might have been taken from him.
The Sheriff was not bound to sell under a fieri facias—he had a
discretionary power either to proceed under the fieri facias, or
wait the issuing of a venditioni exponas.
[Chipman, C. J. The Act of Assembly directs that every Sheriff to
whom any writ of fieri facias or other writ sliallbe directed, shall, for
want of personal estate of the debtor, “ seize, sell, and dispose of the
real estate
the question is, if this Act does not intend that the
Sheriff shall seize, and sell, and complete the execution under the
writ.]
[Carter J.—Is it not as compulsory to sell as to seize ?]
The Sheriff was only bound to act according to the exigency of the
writ, the practice in regard to which was not altered by the Act
of Assembly. The Plaintiff could have proceeded to compel a
sale under a venditioni exponas. Keightley vs. Birch, 3 Camp.
520—Clullerbuck vs. Jones 15 E 78. 3 B & Aid. 204. Impey’s
Sheriff 342. 1 Star. R. 381.
The allegation as to the Sheriff not having advertised was, that
the Sheriff “ did not proceed to advertize and sell, and had not the
money at the return of the writ.” The question arose upon this,
if the Plaintiff could in this maintain his action for a part of his
breach, viz: the not having advertised. lie contended that the
Plaintiff could not in any case, so sever a distinct allegation, but
in the present case, even if the allegation could be so divided’; it
gave the Plaintiff no right of action—if he was not bound to sell
under a fi. fa. clearly he was not bound to advertise; but even
although bound to sell, he was not liable to an action previous to
the expiration of six months after his levy, for not having adver
tized. The notice of sale was for the benefit of the debtor—it
might be that he had secured to the Sheriff the payment of the
money, or had consented to the sale of the land at the expiration
of six months from the levy; could the Sheriff then be liable in
the
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the mean time for the not doing an act which might thus have
been rendered unnecessary. No right of action accrued to the
Plaintiff until he was injured, and he sustained no injury by the
mere circumstance of the Sheriff not having advertised the lands
for sale. Another point was also attempted to be taken, that as
it appeared that Flaglor had only an equity of redemption in the
lands levied upon, which was not liable to execution, the Sher
iff could not proceed to sell; but the Court considered the Sheriff
estopped by his return, from setting up this excuse ; which rested
merely on his assertion, and had been proved at the trial.
Cause was shewn in Trinity Term.
F. A. Kinnear, for the Plaintiff:—
The only levy on real property was the advertisement for sale.
Proof therefore of not having advertised was also proof of not hav
ing levied.
If there was not time to have sold before the return day, the
Sheriff should have made a special return, or have applied to the
Court to enlarge the time for returning the writ. Under a ft. fa.
the Sheriff was bound to proceed to sell, and had no right to wait
fora venditioni exponas. Jacobs r. Humphries, 2 Cr. & Mee.
413 ; Bales V. Wingfield, 2 Nev. & Man. 831. The return was
evidently false—before a sale the Sheriff was bound to advertise—■
he had not advertised, how then could he say the property re
mained unsold for want of buyers, 1 Ch. Pl. 428 ; 7 B & C. 489 ;
9 Bing. 745. The Sheriff admitted that he had not advertised
the land for sale, and stated his opinion as to ther mortgages upon
it—the admission should be taken most strongly against the De
fendant—the qualification by his opinion was for the consideration
of the jury. The return implied that the land levied upon was
of the value of the execution.
As to the executions, they were regularly continued on the roll;
if there was any irregularity in the writ under which the Sheriff
levied, an application might have been made to set it aside, but it
was not competent to the Defendant to set up such irregularity as
a defence. 2 Arch. Prac. 88.
Solicitor .General.—If the Sheriff had improperly delayed to
proceed, he might be liable, but he had a discretionary power, and
if he properly exercised that, the mere fact of not having sold pro
perty would not subject him to an action ; the only question, as in
Bales v. Wingfield, was, if the Defendant had acted bona fide ;—
the circumstances here shewed the exercise of a sound discretion.
Curia advisari vult.
In this Term the Court delivered their opinions.
Carter, J. :
This is an action on the case against Defendant as Sheriff of the
County
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County of York, for a false return to a writ offieri facias de bonis
et terris, issued by the Plaintiff on a judgment recovered by him
against one Flaglor. It appeared in evidence that the period of
six months, necessary under the provisions of the Act of Assembly,
for the completion of the sale of lands by a Sheriff under a fieri
facias, could not have elapsed between the delivery of the writ and its
return—and it further appeared by his own admission, that the
Sheriff had not advertised the land for sale, as directed by the Act of
Assembly—but that he had levied on land and stated it remained
unsold for want of buyers. Under this state of the facts, the ques
tion which arises for decision is whether this return is in point of
law false. It seems to me that by the provisions of the 26 G. 3,
c. 12, it is the duty of the Sheriff to advertize the lands taken in
execution under a wit of fieri facias. I think in this case, the
Sheriff by neglecting to do this act, has been guilty of a breach of
duty. It does not however, become necessary to decide whether
for that neglect of duty he is liable under this declaration, because,
under the circumstances of the case it is clear to me, that the re
turn is false. One position advanced by the Defendant’s Counsel,
viz.—that it is discretionary with the Sheriff, to sell under ‘s fi. fa.
and that the writ of venditioni exponas, is the only comnulsory writ
for that purpose, is wholly at variance with the judgment of Lord
Ellenborough, in Doe v. Donston, 1 B. & Aid. 230, and with that
of Bayley, B. in Jacobs v. Humphrey, 2 Cr. & M. 413, where he
says, “ The Sheriff ought to act without a venditioni exponas, and
that writ is only to give him alacrity”—another argument advan
ced for the Defendant was, that tire Sheriff could not be bound to
advertize in this case, because he could not complete the sale of
the land before the return of the writ. This might possibly have
some weight, if the Sheriff had no power to sell after the return of
the writ—from the case of Doe v. Donston, already cited it would
seem that the Sheriff might have sold after the return of the wr it.
I rest the decision of this case on the ground of the Sheriff having,
by his own admission, made a false return ; having neglected to
take any step pointed out by law towards making a sale of the
land—he returns that he has levied, and that the lands remain un
sold for want of buyers. This return is in terms false according
to the facts proved, and is certainly false in substance. As to the
hardship on the Sheriff, no argument can be raised on that, as it
was open to him to have made a special return of the circumstan
ces, or to have applied to the Court for relief. I think the verdict
for nominal damages was right, and that therefore, this rule should
be discharged and the verdict should stand.
Parker, J.:
I have thought a good deal on this case since the trial, and con
tinue of opinion that none of the objections which have been urged
Al
can
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can avail to deprive the Plaintiff of the verdict which was then
entered for him. It appears to me that there is a sufficient grava
men alleged; sufficient provided; and that, although the proof
may not have come fully up to all parts of the allegations, enough
is proved to entitle the Plaintiff to recover in this form of action.
As to the legal liability, and the duty of the Sheriff, I think it
abundantly clear from a number of cases—
1st. That the Sheriff is in general liable to an action if he ne
glect his duty, though no specific damage may be proved ;
2d. That the Sheriff is bound to proceed on a fieri facias; and
is not at liberty to wait for a venditioni exponas. If he seize real
estate, it is his duty to advertize it for sale, as directed by the Acts
of Assembly. In support of the above stated points, it is enough
to refer to the following cases:—
Barker v. Green, 2 Bing. 317 ; Airetonu. Davis, 9 Bing. 740;
Ca: lisle v. Parkins, 3 Stark. 163 ; Jacobs v. Humphrey, 2 C. & M.
413; Bales v. Wingfield, 2 N. & M. 831 ; Smith v. Johnson,
2 C. M. & R. 350; Godfrey v. Jay, 7 Bing. 413.
In the last cited case, Lord C. J. Tindal thus expresses himself
—“ It has been thrown out on behalf of the Defendant that no action
“ lies for negligence unless the Plaintiff shew special damage; but
“ that proDOsition is wider than the law warrants, for in an action
“ of tort arising out of a breach of contract or neglect ofa duty which
“ the law imposes, nominal damages are sufficient to entitle Plain“ tiff to judgment: this is the rule of law, and it has been recently
“ recognized and acted on in Marzette v. Williams, 1 B. & Ad.
“415.” In one case indeed, that of Moreland v. Sheriff of Lon
don, 1 Stark. 388, it was held that the Plaintiff could not recover
against the Sheriff for not levying on fieri facias—but the reason
distinctly assigned is, that the writ had not been returned. Lord
Ellenborough then said,—“ The Sheriff should have been ruled to
“ return the writ which the Court would have required to be a
“ legal return, and if false the Plaintiff would have been entitled
“ to his action.”
3dly. I am of opinion, that although there was not between the
delivery of the writ to the Sheriff, and its return, a sufficient time
to enable him to sell real estate; this circumstance did not justify
him in not advertizing, and certainly would not warrant the return
that the lands were unsold for want of buyers ; although it might
have afforded a good excuse for his not returning the writ till the
expiration of the six months required for advertising; or justified
an application to the Court for an extension of time ; or indeed the
Sheriff, if he had advertised, might have returned the exact truth.
He was not in fact called on for the return until the period had ex
pired, although the averment in the declaration is, that the return
was
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was made on the return day, which appeared to me unnecessarily
to narrow, though it did not entirely subvert, the Plaintiff’s ground
of action. On this point, the cases collected in the note of Mr.
Sergeant Williams to 2 Saund. R. 47. 1. may be referred to.
In
Jeanes v. Wilkins, 1 Ves. Sen. 195, one question arose as to the
validity of a sale, and conveyance made by a Sheriff of leasehold
premises under a fieri facias, subsequent to the return day, which
is expressly treated by Lord Chancellor Hardwick as a question of
law—he says, “ I am of opinion that it did convey the estate of
“ this term to the purchaser, although the sale was made after the
“ expiration of the return of the writ, and no necessity for a writ
“ of venditioni exponas, which, though a proper writ is not of ne“ cessity, being rather to compel the Sheriff, when guilty of laches,
“ to do what he has authority to do, than to give him a new au“ thority.” His Lordship then cites Ayre v. Aden, Cro. Jac. 73,
and subsequently adds, “ the sale, though after the expiration of
ft the return was good, and the common course of proceeding shews
“ this ; the Sheriff not being bound to make a return of the writ
“ of execution unless the party requires it.”
The opinion expressed by Lord Ellenborough in Doe v. Donston,
1 B. & Aid.’230, and that of Lord Holt in Clark v. Withers, there
cited, may also be referred to.
4th. I think as the Sheriff received the writ and made a return
to it, he is liable to an action if that return be false ; and that the
return here was in fact false as the Defendant (whatever reasons
he may have had) was not warranted in returning, that the land
was unsold for want of buyers, when he had never advertised and
offered it for sale. The case of Bernard v. Leigh 1 Stark. N. P.
C. 43, which was not cited at the trial, is very much in point.
That was an ac on against the Sheriff for a false return of goods
remaining unsold pro defectu emptorum. Lord Ellenborough there
held the Sheriff liable, not because he had not a good excuse for
acting as he did ; but because the return he made was not true in
fact. “ The Sheriff,” he says, ih might have applied to the Court
“ for time to make his return on account of the special and un“ foreseen circumstances of the case, and the Court would proba“ bly under such circumstances have enlarged the time, but here
“ he has returned what is not true, that the goods remained in his
“ hands for want of buyers ; the sum offered indeed was not ade“ quate to their value, but they remained unsold not for want of
“ buyers, but because they had been put into the hands of a rogu“ ish broker.”
5th. Although in neither of the counts is the breach specifically
confined to the not advertising or false return, but states also, that
the 'sheriff did not proceed to sell, (which for want of time he
could not do before the return day) yet it appears to me the alle
gation
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gation is divisible, and proof of either would sustain the count.
The general doctrine laid down in the best writers, particularly
Mr Starkie, (1 St. Ev. 382,) deducible from several cases, which
I need not enumerate, is that part may be rejected in this form of
action, if enough remain to embrace the substance and legal essence
of the charge, which there certainly does in the present case.
6th. With respect to the point which was reserved at the trial as
to the regularity of the fieri facias, I am quite of opinion, on look
ing into the books of practice, and the decided cases on the sub
ject, that the fierifacias here was regularly issued, although seve
ral years had elapsed since the judgment; a fieri facias having
been duly issued, returned and filed, within a year after the judg
ment ; and that continuances by vic. non misit breve were properly
entered on the roll, and were not controvertible ; and that the very
nature of these continuances shews that it is not necessary, as was
contended by the Solicitor General, to have intermediate writs
actually issued and returned. It would further seem settled that
even if this fieri facias had regularly issued, the Sheriff could not
dispute the regularity of it, especially after having received and
acted on it. 1 Sell. Pr. 515, 2 lb. 189, 2 L. R. 1096, 1 Salk. 273,
6 Esp. N. P. C. Ill, 4 Bing. 278, 2 M. & S. 565, 2 B. & Ad. 257.
The only point remaining for consideration is whether the Plain
tiff’s rule to increase the damages should be made absolute ; and I
cannot think he is entitled to this, as he gave no evidence of actual
damage ; or of the value of the property seized. I stated my opi
nion that a case was made out for nominal damages only ; Bales
v. Wingfield, which I have already cited from 2, N. & M, 431,
has confirmed me in that opinion. It is true the amount of da
mages was a question for the jury, and had it been left to them,
they had the power to give more than a mere nominal sum, but
some of the jury were reluctant even to give a verdict for the
Plaintiff at all, after the parties had assented to my proposition.
The Plaintiff’s counsel did not indeed wish to rest on the esti
mate of the jury, except that estimate were fixed at the amount of
the execution, and the jury directed accordingly, which I could not
assent to. There is an obvious difference between a seizure of
goods which the Sheriff takes into his possession, and of real
estate under the Acts of Assembly, of which he has no possession,
though it is hardly necessary to advert to this, for even in the case
of goods, some evidence has generally been given of the value in
order to fix the amount of damages.—7 here was nothing appa
rently to prevent the Plaintiff giving evidence of the value in the
present case.
I entirely concur in thinking that as well the Plaintiff’s ride to
increase the damages, as that of the Defendant to set aside the
verdict and enter a nonsuit, must be discharged.

Chipman,
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Chipman, Chief Justice :
Not having been present during all the arguments in this case,
I have given precedence to my brethren, in whose opinions I fully
concur, and I will only add a few words to shew what I think is
the true import of the Act of Assembly now in question.
This Act (26 Geo. 3, c. 12, sec. 2) among other things pro
vides, “ that every Sheriff or other officer, to whom any writ of
“ fieri facias or other writ shall be directed, &c. shall seize, sell
“ and dispose of so much of the houses, lands, real estate, and
“ hereditaments of the Defendant or Defendants as shall be suffi“ cient to satisfy the monies from him or them due, and on such writs
“ payable.” It is clear from the express terms of this enactment
that the duty of selling and disposing under the writ, is as impe
rative on the Sheriff as the seizing, and that he is bound to sell the
lands, under the same writ by virtue of which he seizes them.
The next section provides, “ that before any sale shall be made
“ by any Sheriff or other officer, of the houses, lands, real estate,
“ or hereditaments of any person or persons, he shall first advertise
“ the time and place of such intended sale, at least six months before
“ he shall make the same, &c. and then shall sell the same to the
“ highest bidder.” This section prescribes regulations as to the
manner of selling. By it the Sheriff is bound to advertise the
property seized, and also the time and place of the intended sale,
in order to give buyers notice of it. In the present case the Sheriff
never advertised at all, nor even offered to sell the land ; how then
could he return that it remained unsold for want of buyers, when
he never gave them an opportunity to come in and purchase ? It
was his duty to advertise and offer the land for sale in the manner
pointed out in the law, and in that manner only—by neglecting so
to advertise and offer for sale the property seized he was guilty of
a breach of duty, and the return, that “ the lands remained unsold
for want of buyers,” was in point of law a false return. As to the
damages, every person on whom the law casts a duty is liable for
a breach of it, but if no actual damage be shewn, he is liable only
to nominal damages—here the Plaintiff has given no evidence of
damage. I think, therefore, that as well the rule for increasing the
damages as that for entering a non-suit ought to be discharged.
Rule discharged.
F. A. Kinnear for Plaintiff.
Solicitor General for Defendant
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Note.—Botsford, J. was absent during this Term.

DOYLE v. TAYLOR AND ANOTHER.
■ Where goods in the possession of B, in which A has an undivided inter
est, have, without A’s authority, been delivered by B to C, who retains the
possession of them,—Held that A cannot maintain assumpsit against B, for
goods sold and delivered, nor money had and received, to recover the value
of A’s interest in such goods, there being no proof of a sale from B to C.
Semb.—If a sale had taken place, though without A’s authority, A might
afterwards affirm the contract and maintain assumpsit against B, for his
share of the proceeds; and in such case the produce of the sale is the cri
terion of value.

This was an action of assumpsit tried before Carter, J. at the
sittings after last Hilary Term.
The following facts appeared in evidence :—The Plaintiff had
acquired by purchase from the makers, Dunn & Groves, a quan
tity of timber lying in the woods ; a part of this he hauled into the
river Tobique—he also made at the same place a further quantity
of timber. In 1834-5, one Gill was engaged to haul the timber
remaining in the woods on shares, receiving one half the timber he
should haul for his labour, and it was agreed that in order to dis
tinguish the timber hauled by Gill, from that which was already
hauled, he (Gill,) should mark each stick he hauled with a notch.
The timber remained on the brow, and in the stream, during the
year 1835, and the following winter the Plaintiff and Gill worked
together again ; Plaintiff making and Gill hauling the timber;
during this winter the latter was to have fifty-five tons out of every
hundred for hauling.
In the spring of 1836, the timber came down the stream. At
the mouth of the Tobique, the old timber which Gill had hauled,
(distinguished by the notches upon it) was separated from the un
notched, and the whole was put into joints containing from twentyfour to twenty-eight sticks each. At this time the whole was
seized
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seized by the Crown Officer for non-payment of tonnage duties,
and was brought down to Fredericton—there were sixteen joints
of old and eight joints of new timber, containing 741 tons; six
joints of the old were unnotched : the duties having been paid, the
timber was given up by thejCrcwn to the Piaintiff and the De
fendants, (the latter, as entitled to Gill’s share,) to be divided be
tween them according to their just rights ; the Plaintiff received
out of the whole quantity 3481 tons, the remainder was taken to
St John, and there delivered for Defendants to Rankin, a merchant,
whose mark was subsequently seen upon the timber. The timber
was worth 23s. per ton. The Plaintiff claimed as his separate
property one quarter of the whole, as contained in the six joints of
old unnotched timber, half of the remainder of the old timber, and
forty-five tons for every hundred of new timber.
The Solicitor General, for the Defendants, moved for a nonsuit.
There appeared no privity of contract between the Plaintiff and
the Defendants—no contract between them could be implied; Gill
and Doyle were tenants in common, and the timber the Defendants
got, they received as G 'Il’s share; there was no proof of a sale of
the timber, er of mopey received by t’^e Defendants ;—if the Plain
tiff could support an action, he should have sued in trover.
The learned Judge overruled the motion for a nonsuit, and di
rected the jury.—
1st. That if in the timber the Defendants got, was included
any the sole property of the Plaintiff, he was entitled to recover
the value thereof, as goods sold and delivered.
2d. If Taylor got more than Gill’s share, and sold it to Rankin,
the Plaintiff was entitled to half the value of the excess in money
had and received.
A verdict was given for the Plaintiff for £43 : 12:6.
In last Trinity Term the Solicitor General moved for and ob
tained a rule nisi to set aside the verdict: he argued—
1st. If the Plaintiff were entitled to recover, he should have
brought trover for any quantity that came to his possession. A
party could only waive a tortp^and bring assumpsit where a con
tract could be implied. Here that could not be the case, the De
fendant claimed Gill’s share, and he received the timber as Gill’s
—if, therefore, he had got more than Gill was entitled to have—
the Plaintiff, after a demand, might perhaps, be entitled to recover
in trover, but could maintain assumpsit only against his co-tenant
Gill; and in order to do so, he must prove an actual sale, and mo
ney paid, which had not been shewn in this case.
2d. The Plaintiff claimed for his separate property, and a pro
portion of his joint property; he had received more than the amount
of his separate property iu Fredericton. It did not appear whether,
what
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what he so received was his sole property or not; he had not
shewn the quantity of timber he claimed, but sought to spell it out
from the number of joints, and the contents of the whole twenty
four joints. There was not evidence to go to the jury in the
way the cause was left—the rights of the parties could only be
determined in equity. 1 Ch. Pl. 112, et seq.—Lee v. Shore, 1 B
& C. 91, Cowper 419, 3 Taun. 274; Bull N. P. 131, 1 Bing,
new cases, 198.
Cause was shewn in Michaelmas Term, by N. Parker and
Berton;—
The Plaintiff claimed the value of liis separate property as
goods sold, and the value of his proportion of the joint property
of Gill and Doyle, of money had and received. Gill & Doyle
were tenants in common, and when Gill assigned to the Defend
ants, the Plaintiff and Defendants stood in the same relative situ
ation. The rights of tenants in common were distinguishable
from those of joint tenants or partners ; the latter were seized per
mi et per tout, but tenants in common had each a separate right in
his own share, over which his co-tenant had no controul. It was
an established princinle, that if a tenant in common destroyed the
common property, his cc-tenant might maintain trover. And the
opinion expressed by Chief Justice Wi’les, (Willes R. 209,) re
cognized by Lord Kenyon, in Martin v. Knowlis, 8 T. R. 146, es
tablished the further principle, that if a tenant in common sold the
common chattel, money had and received would lie by his cotenant. The principle was the same as between strangers, the
seller disposed of that over which he had no right, his co-tenant’s
undivided share. The co-tenant therefore was entitled either to
dispute the sale, and seek his goods, or to affirm the contract, and
require the money received for them by bis co-tenant. Applying
these principles to the present case, the Plaintiff had shewn the
whole quantity of the timber—he had shewn- the proportionate
amouut of his several claims and rights therein; he had shewn
further what amount he had received—that the remainder of the
whole quantity was taken by the Defendant, carried to market and
disposed of, and he had shewn the value It was not necessary
for the Plaintiff to shew whether in the timber he received was
contained his separate property or a portion of his joint property ;
the value of his separate property was recoverable as goods sold—
the whole was recoverable as money had and received.
[Parker J.—Can you, by shewing Rankin’s mark, presume a
sale, and then proving the va’ue, presume a’so the price.]
Tnat point had been submitted to the jury by the learned Judge,
and was determined—it had not been taken by the Solm to- Ge
neral. The evidence was sufficient to go to the jury. T
orf
E1
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for money had and received was an equitable action, Wells r. Ross,
7 Taunt. 403, and the sale having been established by the verdict,
it was not necessary to prove the actual receipt of the money by
the Defendant—he must be presumed to have sold for the value of
the timber in money, and proof of the value was evidence to fix
the amount. The verdict was according to equity and good con
science, and therefore a new trial should not be granted.—Graham
on new trials, 398, Wilkinson w. Payne, 4 T. R. 468.
The Solicitor General replied :—
To support the declaration it was necessary to prove an express
contract, or circumstances from whence a contract could be im
plied. The Defendants had nothing to do with the timber until
it came to Fredericton—what they got they received as Gid’s
share therein—that was all they claimed or desired to have.
If a tortious holder should sell property it was true the owner
had a choice of remedies, either by action of trover for the wrong,
or waiving the tort, by money had and received—but to maintain
the latter, he must adopt the contract and prove a sale, and the
price for which the goods were sold.
In this Term the Court delivered their opinions.
Chipman, Chief Justice:
I think that in this case there must be a new trial. There is
not, I think, sufficient evidence to support the verdict, either on
the count for goods sold and delivered, or on that for money had
and received; as to the count for goods sold and delivered, there
does not appear to me, to be any ground to infer a sale from the
Plaintiff to the Defendants, of any part of the timber in question
in this case. As to the count for money had and received, al
though there is no doubt, that if the Defendants, even without
authority and wrongfully, sold the timber, which was the exclusive
property of the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff may waive the tort, and
elect to consider the Defendants as his agents in selling the timber,
and, upon this principle, may maintain an action for the money
into which his goods have been converted; (IBing. N. C. 215T
Cowp. 419.) And although it be admitted that as to any timber
in which the Defendants may have acquired an interest as tenants
in common with the Plaintiff, if the Defendants sold such timber,
the Plaintiff may also maintain an action for his share of the price,
as for money had and received to his use; (Willes, 209, 8 JT. R.
146.—See also 5 Greenl. (Maine,) R. 356.) Yet I apprehend,
that in either case, there must be proof of the Defendants having
made the transfer by sale of the Plaintiff’s property ; and the na
tural course would also be, to prove the price for which the timber
was sold, and the actual receipt of that price by the Defendants.
It was, however, held, in the case cited at the bar, (Weils Ross, 7
Taunt
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Taunt. 403,) that when a sale has been proved, it will be in
ferred that the sale was for money, and that the seller received
the money, but even in this case, it would seem that the price of
the goods was in evidence as a necessary ingredient of the sale.
In the present case it was not proved that the Defendants made
a sale to Rankin & Co. of the timber in question, but the tenor of
the argument on the part of the Plaintiff was, that such a sale
might be implied from the facts which were proved, of the timber
having been delivered to Rankin & Co. and its having been seen
with their private mark upon it—which latter circumstance, (that
of the timber having the mark of Messrs. Rankins upon it,) it
may be observed would not probably have arisen from the act of
the Defendants, but from that of Rankin & Co., and to give it
any weight, the light under which this mark was put upon the
timber, should have been proved under oath. I do not think that
these facts, standing alone, are sufficient for the Plaintiff’s pur
pose. I do not perceive that there could have been any difficulty
in producing direct proof of a sale to Rankin & Co. with the price
agreed upon, and the other circumstances attending the sale; but
instead of furnishing direct proof, it is a sequence of inferences,
that the Plaintiff has chosen to rest his case upon ; first lie infers
a contract of sale between the Defendants and Rankin & Co.
from the bare circumstance of the timber being in the hands of the
latter, and upon the result of this inference he builds the further
inference of the receipt of money by the Defendants. A very
material objection is, that no contract of sale being in proof, there
is no evidence of any stipulated price. Now the principle upon
which the action in this form is maintainable is, as has been be
fore stated, that the Plaintiff waives any right to damages for the
wrongful act of the Defendants, and adopts the sale as if it had
been authorised by him, and claims on y the amount which the
Defendants actually have received, or are entitled to receive by
virtue of the sale, as the proceeds of his property. I bear in
mind, that the point as to the sale to Rankin & Co. was left by
the learned Judge to the jury, upon the evidence as it stood ; still
I cannot think that the evidence is sufficient to warrant the find
ing of the jury. No case has been cited which goes the length,
now contended for, in implying the receipt of money by a Defend
ant to the Plaintiff’s use, and I do not think it would be safe to es
tablish such a precedent. In the present posture of the evidence
therefore, I am of opinion that the verdict cannot be sustained on
the count for money had and received. Where a verdict is set
aside for being contrary to evidence, it is usual to require the party
which seeks a new trial to pay the costs of the former trial. In
the present case, as the jury may have been influenced by what
fell from the learned Judge, I do not think it would be right to
impose
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impose this condition. I think it will meet the justice of the case,
to let the costs abide the event of the suit.
Parker, J.:
I entirely agree in the opinion pronounced by His Honor the
Chief Justice, and the reasons on which it is founded. Whatever
may have been said at the trial, it was hardly contended on the
argument that the Plaintiff could recover on the count for goods
sold and delivered. Nothing like a contract of sale was expressly
proved, and the existence of such a contract cannot be inferred
from the circumstances of this case ; no transfer of the Plaintiff’s
property to the Defendants appears to have been contemplated in
the arrangement made for carrying the timber to St. John.
The question whether a wrongful conversion of a party’s goods
could be turned into a contract for goods sold and delivered, was
expressly raised in Bennett v. Francis, 2 B. & P. 550. Though
it was not necessary to the decision of that case to determine it, the
opinion of Lord Alvanley, who delivered the judgment of the Court,
can hardly be mistaken. He sneaks thus:—“ When the case
“ came before the Court, a wide field of argument was entered
“ into on the question, namely, whether, in all cases, when a party
“ has converted goods of another to his own use, it is competent to
“ the Plaintiff to change the transaction into a contract for goods
“ sold and delivered ? We thought it right to stop the Counsel for
“ the Defendant, being of opinion that the case would not turn on
“ that point; and I do not now intend to give a positive opinion on
“ it, but thus far I will say, that it does appear to me monstrous to
“ carry the cases to any such extent as that which has been con“ tended for, and that they do not warrant the conclusion which
“ has been drawn from them: the cases cited were Hambly v.
“ Trott, Lindon v. Hooper, and Feltham v. Terry
Lord Mans“ field, in the case of Hambly v. Trott, confines the doctrine to
“ the case of money had and received.”—The reason for this is
given, which I will refer towhen I come to mention this case again.
This case must then stand or fall by the count for money had
and received; and on this point there is no question on the fact
that no authority was given by the Plaintiff to the Defendants to
dispose of his interest; and the law is clear that without such
authority the Defendants could not rightfully dispose of the Plain
tiff’s interest; though after such sale, wrongfully made, the Plain
tiff, instead of look g for his interest in the timber, may waive the
tort, affirm the contract entered into by the Defendants, and recover
in assumpsit. And as he proceeds for money had and received, he
is to make out by express proof or reasonable inference, that his
share or interest in the timber has been converted into money.
Now there are three things material to be shewn:—
1st.
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1 st. That a sale was in fact made at all by the Defendants to
Rankin.
2d. That such sale covered the Plaintiff’s interest in the timber.
3d. The produce of such sale.
If a sale of the timber had been in fact proved, I quite agree
that such sale would be prima facie taken to cover the Plaintiff’s
interest, unless it appeared to have been made with a reservation
of the Plaintiff’s right; but we are wholly in the dark as to the
bargain between the Defendants and Rankin.
The case of Wells and another v. Ross, 7 Taun. 403, was cited
to shew that under certain circumstances a sale would be presumed;
and also that the sale was for money, so as to entitle the Plaintiff
to recover on the money count. The issue in that case was on a
plea in abatement for the nonjoinder of a joint contractor, and that
a sale really took place was not contested ; besides, there was the
material fact of an express authority to sell, the goods being sent
to the Defendant for that very purpose, so that in that case a sale
and disposal of the goods were in performance of the Defendant’s
duty. In the case before w such sale and disposal would be in
violation of the duty of the Defendants.
It is not contended that it was out of the Plaintiff’s power to
give evidence of the real transaction between the Defendants and
Rankin, but that such proof ought to come from the Defendants,
and in default thereof we are required to infer a sale, and then, in
ignorance of the particulars of such sale, that it covered the Plain
tiff’s interest, and was made for money.
But allowing, if we can, the Plaintiff’s right to recover, how is
the extent of damages to be ascertained? Not, I conceive, in the
way the Plaintiff has taken,—but by shewing the price paid by
Rankin, namely, the produce of the sale. Upon this the argument
of the Solicitor General is fully borne out by numerous cases, and
in all which I can find on the subject, an actual sale seems to have
been clearly established.
In regard to the case cited from Brook’s Abridgment, probably
the earliest recorded, that of the horse belonging to A. & B. and
sold by A. without B’s. authority ; Willes, C. J. observes, in his
Reports, p. 208, “that by a sale and turning the thing into money,
“ the joint interest was gone, and each had a separate interest for
“ a sum certain.” There was no dispute there as to the sale or
the amount.
Lamine v. Dorrell, 2 Ld. R. 1216, is one of the earliest reported
cases in which the right to waive the tort and recover in assumpsit
had been established ; Powell, J. there says, “ when the act that is
“ done is in its nature tortious, it is hard to turn that into a con“ tract, and against the reason of assumpsit, but the Plaintiff may
“ dispense with the wrong, and suppose the sale made by his
“ consent
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“ consent, and bring his action for the money they were sold for,
“ as money received to his use.”
In Cowp. 419, Lord Mansfield, citing Feltham v. Terry, says,
“ The Plaintiff by bringing his action for money had and received,
“ could only recover the money for which the goods were sold.”
Tim next case in order of time is that which I have before cited
from 2 B. & P.—Lord Alvanley, as a reason for allowing a tortious
conversion to be turned into an action for money had and received,
says, “ In the case of money had and received, where nothing
“ more than the money actually received can be recovered, no
“ injury can arise to the Defendant.” He adds afterwards, “ All
“ that is to be collected from the cases is this, that if the goods be
“ converted into money, the Court will allow the Plaintiff to waive
“ the tort and bring an action, in which he can recover nothing
“ more than the sum actually received.”
Liglitley v. Clouston, 1 Taunt. 113.
Notley v. Buck, 8 B. & C. 160.
Oughton v. Seppings, 1 B. & Ad. 241.
Young v. Marshall, 8 Bing. 43.
Marsh v. Keating, 1 Bing. N. C. 198, and
Clark v. Gilbert, 2 Bing. N. C. 343, may be cited to the same
effect.
The language of Tindal, C. J. in Clark v. Gilbert, in 1835,
probably the latest case on the subject, is very clear and decisive :
he says,—“ If then the assignees might have maintained an action
“ of trover, they may, according to a well known class of cases,
“ waive the tort and bring an action for money had and received;
“ such waiver being a benefit to the Defendant, as it limits the
“ damages to the amount of the proceeds of the tortious sale."
In all these cases, the fact of the sale was clearly proved : no
where can I find that the Plaintiff has recovered in this form of
action for a wrongful conversion of his goods, without shewing the
sale and what the sale produced.
It is for want of such evidence, that I think the Plaintiff was
not entitled to recover in this action. The evidence has, however,
satisfied the jury that the Defendants have a further account to
render of this timber, and it is to be hoped an amicable arrange
ment may take place.
I was certainly disposed at first to have required the Defendants
to pay costs on obtaining a new trial, but on the whole, accede to
the opinion of his Honor, that the costs shall abide the event.
Carter, J. concurred.
Rule absolute.
N. Parker and Berton for Plaintiff.
The Solicitor General for Defendants.
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HENN1GAR, a Confined Debtor.

When a confined debtor applies for a discharge on the ground that he has
been confined a year, such application can only apply to the suit in which he
has been confined a whole year, and the fact must be explicitly stated.

Berton moved in this Term for the Defendant’s discharge, on an
affidavit, which stated that he was in custody on four several suits
-—that he had been arrested in one of them on a particular day, and
had since been in custody during a period of sixteen months. From
the statement in the affidavit, it was inferable that he had assigned
his property for the payment of his debts, and had been in custody
in all the suits over a year. It was contended that the Defendant
having been confined for a year in one suit, was entitled to his dis
charge in all; but if not, yet he should be relieved from the one
for which he appeared to have been confined a year.

Per Curiam.
The Defendant can only apply to be discharged from custody in
the cause for which he has been confined a year, and it does not
sufficiently appear that he has been confined in all a year. He
might have stated the fact explicitly, but has not done so, and the
Court will not presume in his favour. His affidavit speaks of a
deed of assignment, the nature or legal effect of which is not be
fore us ; and without knowing what the effect of that instrument
is, the Court will not interfere.
MERRITT v. QUINTON.
A, under a claim of right, enters on land, at the time within the enclo
sure, and in the actual possession of C, but without C’s privity or assent;
A surveys and marks off a part of the land within C’s enclosure, and puts
up fences, but does not remain thereon; the fences are within a night or
two pulled down. A again enters and puts them ap, and they are again
immediately pulled down. A enters and puts them up a third time, when B
declaring that A is trespassing on the land, pulls the fences down and des
troys them, which is the alleged trespass. At the trial, A failed in proving
his title,—Held that A, failing to shew any title to the land, or the expul
sion of C therefrom, had not sufficient possession to maintain trespass, qu.
cl. fr. against B.
It is a question for the Judge whether the jPLaintiff has made out a suffi
cient possession to entitle him to go to the jury.

This was an action of Trespass quare clausum fregit, on land
situate in the Parish of Lancaster, in the County of St. John,
tried before Parker J. at the Circuit for that County, in January,
1836.
The Plaintiff opened a case of title derived from one Roden, to
the Plaintiff’s father, David Merritt, who de used to the Plaintiff;
he claimed the locus in quo, as comprised within the bounds of
three
r
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three contiguous lots, Nos. 100, 101, & 102, in the ten acre
grant, so called ; one of which Roden held under the grant, and
the other two by purchase.
The Plaintiff failed in proof of his title, and the learned judge
being of opinion at the close of the case that, in the absence of title,
the evidence did not shew a sufficient possession of the locus in
quo, to entitle him to recover, directed a non-suit; but the Plain
tiff refusing to acquiesce, the case went to the jury, who, contrary
to the direction of liis Honor, found a verdict for the Plaintiff with
six-pence damages.
The facts of the case are so fully detailed in the arguments of
the Counsel, and in the judgment of the Court, as to render it un
necessary to state them more fully here.
Parker, for the Defendant, applied for a rule nisi in Trinity
Term last, to set aside the verdict, as being contrary to evidence
and the Judge’s charge :—The party must recover either by title to a distinct allotment, or
by a clear and exclusive possession of the locus in quo. 1st. Was
there a distinct allotment ? 2d. Was the fence on the lines of the
allotment ? 3d. Was Merritt in the actual and exclusive posses
sion of the lands when the alleged trespass was committed ?
As to the title to a distinct allotment; the Plaintiff opened his
case on title from the crown—the grant referred to a plan which
which was not annexed nor in evidence. The grantees were te
nants in common, a severance was then to be shewn—the deed
offered was clearly inadmissible, the case *cf title therefore broke
down, until the lease from Merritt to Craft and others : it was ne
cessary for the Plaintiff to have shewn an allotment between the
parties—a survey.'was made by Timothy Wetmore, and there was
a report the lots were divided,—the plan of the survey by Wetmore
was absolutely essential. This is the more apparent from the cir
cumstance that no two lines ran the same courses. A.S to Minette’s
survey, he ran by a plan stated to have been given him by the late
Thomas Wetmore, Esq., but that document was not produced, yet it
was in existence—it was not put in evidence—was not accounted
for—and without it there was no legal evidence of a severance.
There was not any evidence that the line on which the fence
stood, was a correct one.
Having shewn no separate allotment, what is the evidence of
possession ? The only thing spoken of was the fishing by Roden
in front, from 1790 to 1795, and by his son as late as 1796—but
it did not appear that any possession had been exercised between
the river and the road. Craft applied to Jessie Quinton for certain
lots, he replied, get lots 100, 101, 102, and I will exchange,—
there was no evidence what part of the large enc’osure of Clark
and others was designated by Nos. 100,101, 102. The land was
in
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in tlie possession of another person—there was, therefore, no evi
dence of Plaintiff’s possession in this case; it was upon this ground
that the Judge at nisi prius nonsuited the Plaintiff.
The Solicitor General shewed cause last Term :—
The question here is not whether all tlie facts in evidence were fully
proved, but was there any evidence to go to the jury of those facts ?
i there was any evidence, the jury have but exercised their right in
judging of its sufficiency, and giving their verdict as they did. (See
Carpenters Company v. Hayward, Douglas, 374.) Few cases
have come up in questions of real property where so much evi
dence lias been given, and although loose, yet it contains so many
circumstances that it was proper to put it to the jury to say if these
circumstances did not maintain a possession. A grant was put in
evidence shewing all the grantees to be tenants in common,—evi
dence was given of a division more than thirty years since. It
was also proved that there were two marks supposed to be boun
daries, a rock above, and Lord’s stores below, the place in question.
The testimony of Minnette also proved that tlie lines were run by
the late T. Wetmore’s survey. Hence, there was some evidence
of a division; it was then the province of the jury to determine
upon the sufficiency of it. Roden, Knapp and Blair owned the
three lots in question—a purchase was spoken of, and after that
they were always called the Roden Lots. No adverse possession
of the lots appeared after Roden went away, but Davi I Merritt
came in claiming under Roden, and continued in possession up
wards of sixteen years back. How did Jesse Quinton occupy the
land or get possession ? By a bargain with Meritt’s tenants. He
thereby held as an under tenant to the Plaintiff—the fence spoken
of along the road was not a fence of one in possession, but merely
to keep cattle from going down to the beach, for there is the ex
press declaration of Jesse Quinton, that there were no division
fences. It is clear that David Merritt received the rent until his
death, and died in the actual possession of tlie locus in quo. After
liis death the tenants declined taking a new lease ; subsequent to
this a man named Lord, who owned below had been encroaching
and got up a fence, but he is not the Defendant. When the
Plaintiff after his lines were run, entered on the land and caused
his fence to be put up, Lord made no objection, nor in any wray
interfered with him. The' presumption therefore is irresistible,
that the Plaintiff took possession of his land with Lord’s consent,
and the jury have found accordingly.
In Smith v. Page, (2 Salk. 644) Goslin v. Wilcock, (2 Wil
son, 306) Wilkinson v. Paine, (4 T. R. 468) and other cases—it
has been expressly decided that where the jury have found a ver
dict for the Plaintiff upon a presumption contrary to evidence, the
Court will not grant a new trial, if the Plaintiff w'ere entitled to
cl
recover
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recover in conscience and equity. Taking all the facts and circum
stances of the case together, it appears clear that the Plaintiff has
at least an equitable right to the land in question—a better one
than the Defendant; but the objection urged is, the non-production
of the plan—it appeared that it had been in the possession of the
Defendant’s attorney—he was regularly called on but could not
remember having it—these were circumstances for the jury topre
sume it still in the attorney’s possession, and that the Plaintiff
having dene all he could to obtain it, was entitled to give the next
best evidence, viz. the testimony of Minnette, who swore the lines
were run by the plan in question
evidence sufficient to satisfy
the jury’s mind of the Plaintiff’s right to recover.
So in 2 Salk. 644, though the verdict may be against evidence
and the strict rules of law, the Court will not give a second chance
to an unconscionable defence—here the defence is unconscionable.
The Plaintiff enters upon the land and puts up his fence, the De
fendant without any claim whatever, either in his own right or un
der another, does a malicious injury tc the Plaintiff by destroying
his fences, and when the jury find against him he attempts to avoid
their verdict by the non-production of the plan.
The present case is even stronger than those above cited. As
therefore there was some evidence for the jury, and the honesty of
the case with the plaintiff, and unconscionable defence resorted to
by the Defendant were apparent, he contended that the verdict
should be sustained.
Saunders and Parker, contra:—
Plaintiff should have shewn a title or a previous occupation—at
the trial he not only failed in shewing title in himself, but in fact
shewed it in another—he now rests his case entirely on his previous
occupancy—there is no evidence of the land designated as lots 100,
101, 102. The occupation only extended to the fishing ground.
Suppose the Plaintiff is owner of the lots in question ; has he a
right to go upon a large unenclosed space, and mark off what he
calls 100, 101, 102, and then put up fences and claim exclusive
possession thereby ? The Plaintiff’s argument shews and admits
a plan in existence. If Plaintiff came in by Lord he ought to have
shewn it; in addition to this the Judge at nisi prius, declared h's
opinion that there was no evidence to go to the jury, therefore the
Court will not support the verdict. The Defendant rested on his
Honor’s decision, and went into no evidence.
Curia advisari vult.
And now in this term the Judges delivered their opinions.
Chipman, Chief Justice :
This is a motion for a new trial. The action is trespass, qua.
cl. fregit, and was tried at the Saint John Circuit in Jan. 1836.
The Plaintiff opened a case of title to the land on which the alleged
trespass
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trespass was committed, which land, as claimed by the Plaintiff,
compriseslots nos. 100, 101, and 102, ;n the ten acre grant, so
called, in the Parish of Lancaster, in the County of Saint John.
This grant was given in evidence it was a grant under the Great
Seal of Nova Scotia, dated lltli August, 1784, to a number of
grantees, including one William Roden, of a tract of land divided
by metes and bounds, containing 1120 acres, habendum to each of
the grantees in severalty ten acres a-pie'ce. There was evidence
that at an early period after the grant, a survey of this tract, and
a division thereof into lots was made by Timothy Wetmore, and
that a plan and survey of this division were also made. It appeared
that William Roden held one of the above mentioned lots, in his
own right, under the grant, and division, and the other two by
purchase ; and that he had all three in possession more than thirty
years ago, and that his son William Roden had possession of the
same lots after his death.—The plan was not produced; it was
spoken of in some of the testimony, as having been seen of late
years. The Plaintiff endeavoured to make out a case for admitting
secondary evidencsTof this plan, but failed in shewing sufficient
grounds for such admission. The Plaintiff also failed in deriving
the title to the lots in question from the Rodens to David Merritt,
his father; the learned Judge having ruled that a deed tendered in
evidence for this purpose was inadmissible. The Plaintiff proved
an indenture of lease of a specified part of the three lots in question
from David Merritt to John Craft and others, dated 16th of April,
1821, for seven years from the 1st of May, 1821, at the annual
rent of £3.—The part of these lots which was thus leased, was
what the Plaintiff claimed as including the locus Kn quo in this ac
tion ; regular receipt of rent under this lease, by David Merritt, in
his life time, was proved. It was proved that David Merritt died
about seven years ago ; his will was given in evidence by which
he devised the'three lots to his son, the Plaintiff. This is the sub
stance of the evidence in relation to the Plaintiff’s title. Now,
even if the lease from David Merritt, and his receipt of rent under
it, could, under the circumstances, be considered as evidence to go
to the jury of a seisin in fee in him ; still the defect remains, that
the Plaintiff did not shew the boundaries of the lots which he
claimed, under the division which he set up as a part of his case,
and therefore could not shew that the locus in quo was within
these boundaries; and this defect it is which in the present
state of the evidence, must at all events defeat the Plaintiff’s
title to the particular parcel of land in which the alleged trespass
was committed, and must cause him to be considered as a mere
stranger with regard to this parcel of land.—It was further shewn
in evidence that the Plaintiff in the month of September, 1S35,
went with a surveyor to the land, and caused what he claimed as
the
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the lines of the lots 100, 101, and 102, to be run out, and fences to
be erected on these lines so run by him. These fences were bro
ken down within a night or two after they were put up; it came
out from the Plaintiff’s witnesses that they were pulled down and
burnt by John Quinton, the Defendant; and this was the trespass
for which the present action was brought. This last destruction
of the fences took place about a fortnight after they were first put
up ; it came out from the Plaintiff’s witnesses that at the time the
Plaintiff thus caused the lines to be run and fences erected, the
land was in the occupation of one Henry Lord, having been for
some years within his enclosure, and cultivated and enjoyed by
him. Whether there was any connexion between the Defen
dant and Lord in this occupation, did not distinctly appear.
These being the facts, with regard to the Plaintiff’s possession,
the learned Judge was of opinion that there was not sufficient evi
dence of possession to entitle him to recover, and directed a non
suit, to which the Plaintiff declined submitting, and went to the
jury. The Defendant called no witnesses, and the Judge charged
t ie jury, that, in his opinion, they should find for the Defendant.
The jury nevertheless returned a verdict for the Plaintiff. And
the question now is, whether this verdict can be sustained ;—that
question depends upon this, whether a mere stranger, by a bare
entry into land, in the actual occupation of another, can gain such
a possession of the land as will enable him to maintain trespass.
It is true, that he who has the right to land, may, by entering
thereupon, with an intent to take possession, acquire by such entry
the lawful possession, although another person may be in actual
possession of the land at the time ; and the rightful owner, having
thus entered, may maintain trespass even against the person thus
in possession at the time of his entry, should such person wrong
fully continue upon the land.—Butcher v. Butcher, 7 B. & C. 399.
See also Argent v. Durrant, 8 T. R. 404 ; Taunton n. Caster, 7
T. R. 431 ; Turner v. Meymott, 1 Bing. 158.—And this may
well be, for it is also a clear principle of law, that when two per
sons are in the possession of land, claiming under different titles,
the law will adjudge him to be in the possession who hath the
right.—Coke Iatt. 36, 2 Salk. 423.—But I conceive that this
operation of a bare entry upon land, to work a change of the pos
session from the person in actual occupation of the land to the
person so entering, must be confined to cases where the person
making the entry has the right to the land. In a case like the
present, where a Plaintiff fails in the proof of title, and must, there
fore, in order to succeed in the action, depend upon possession
alone, he must shew a clear and exclusive possession.—Revett v.
Brown, 5 Bing. 7.—But when a man enters upon land in the ad
verse occupation of another, it is evident that in point of fact he
cannot
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cannot acquire an exclusive possession, unless he effects an expul
sion of the person'-actually in possession. It is expressly held,
with regard to disseisin, in 1 Salk. 246, that “ a bare entry on
another without an expulsion, makes such a seisin only that the
“ law will adjudge him in possession that hath the right, but it
“ will not work a disseisin or abatement without actual expulsion.”
S. P. Co. Litt. 181, a. 1 Burr. 79.—In the present case, I am of
opinion, that the Plaintiff not having shewn a right to enter upon
the locus in quo, did not by his entry divest Lord of his possession
thereof, and did not under such circumstances acquire such a pos
session as will enable him to maintain th’s action. There is no
evidence of Lord’s having acquiesced in the acts of the Plaintiff,
or having in any manner yielded up or abandoned his possession.
Indeed, it is manifest upon the testimony as it stands, Lord might
have maintained trespass against the Plaintiff for his acts in enter
ing upon the land, and erecting fences, and that the latter must,
in such case, have failed in liis justification, and been dealt with as
a wrong doer. It would be attended with the most mischievous
consequences to hold, that a man entering without right into land
in the occupation of another should, by such entry, oust the occu
pant of his possession.
But it is said that this was a question for
the jury, and not for the Court; now I apprehend that this ques
tion falls exactly within the predicament of a question for the
Court: certain facts are proved? and the question is, whether these
facts are sufficient in point of law to oust the actual occupant of
the land of his possession, and to transfer that possession to the
Plaintiff. Surely this must be a question within the province of
the Court alone. The case referred to by the learned Judge who
tried the cause, (Revett w. Brown, 5 Bing. 7), is directly in point.
—In that case it was left to the jury to say, whether the Plaintiff
was sufficiently in possession to maintain trespass, and subject to
this question which was also reserved for the Court, the jury found
a verdict for the Plaintiff. The Court however held that there
was not sufficient evidence of possession to go to the jury, and
ordered the verdict to be set aside, aud a nonsuit to be entered.
I am of opinion that this rule for a new trial must be made absolute.
Carter, J.:
The first question which it is necessary to determine in this case
is, whether the possession which is sufficient to enable a person to
maintain trespass against a wrong doer, is a question of law for the
decision of the Court, or a question of fact, in all cases to be de
cided by the jury ? If it be clear that the latter proposition is
correct, it would seem to me useless to send this case to another
jury, it having been already decided by one. After a careful pe
rusal of the cases, I cannot come to such a conclusion. I grant
that in most cases this question of possession will have to be deter
mined
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mined by the jury—because, whether there has been a possession
or not, will depend on the existence of circumstances, and of facts,
which the jury can alone determine. This, however, will be only
in cases where taking certain facts as proved, a possession will be
established, sufficient in point of law to sustain an action of tres
pass against a wrong doer. The question, whether, taking all the
evidence as true, such a possession has been established, seems to
me to be one for the decision of the Court.
. This view of the question is warranted by the case of Revett v.
Brown, where Park, J. after stating the facts of the case says,—
“ This is not sufficient evidence of possession to go to the jury.''—
To the same effect is the case of Topham v. Dent, 6 Bing. 515, (3.)
Taking it for granted, therefore, that it is the province of the
Court to determine, whether upon the facts as proved, a possession
has been made out sufficient to enable the Plaintiff to maintain
trespass; let us consider whether in this case such a possession
was established. It is abundantly evident from all the cases on
this point, that the possession which will entitle a person to main
tain trespass, must be a clear and exclusive one. What evidence
have we in this case of the Plaintiff’s possession ? It does not
appear that he ever was in the locus in quo.-or eVer exercised any
act of ownership upon it till September, 1835, when he employed
a surveyor to run a line and put up a fence—the breaking down
of which fence is the trespass complained of; and it is certainly
somewhat singular, that the very witness produced by the Plaintiff
to prove this trespass, states positively, that the land, at the time
the trespass was committed, so far from being in the dear and ex
clusive possession of the Plaintiff, was in the possession of another
person.
It was argued for the Plaintiff, that it might be fairly presumed
that Lord’s possession was consistent with Plaintiff’s property, and
that the Plaintiff put up the fence with his consent. If that were
so, I am far from thinking that sucli a state of facts would enable
the Plaintiff to maintain trespass ; but the answer to that argu
ment is clearly this : If it were so, the Plaintiff might and should
have proved it by evidence ; for I cannot find any case in which
the Court has presumed a possession, which has not been clearly
proved, nor do I think It at all desirable tc extend the law in fa
vour of mere possession beyond its present ascertained limits.
What the effect of the lease made by Plaintiff’s father in 1821,
and the occupation of Defendant under that lease, by means of the
exchange with Craft, might have been, had it been proved that
the locus in quo was part of the land included in that ’ease, I am
not now prepared to decide. It is sufficient for the decision of this
case, that no such proof was given. That lease only included lots
100, 101 and 102 of the ten acre grant. The grant itself made no
division
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division into lots. No plan by which any subsequent division had
been made, was in evidence, and the only evidence we have of any
division line is in September, 1835, when a surveyor, taken by
the Plaintiff for the purpose, states he ran a line according to what
he called the old plan, of which plan we know nothing. From
these considerations it appears to me there was no evidence what
ever that the locus in quo was part of lots 100, 101 or 102 of the
ten acre grant, and therefore any thing which might have availed
the Plaintiff by means of the lease of 1821, utterly fails.
On the whole, therefore, I am of opinion that the ruling of the
learned Judge at the trial was correct—that there was no evidence,
either of title or possession, wdiich could entitle the Plaintiff to a
verdict—that the verdict being entirely against the evidence, the
rule for a new trial must be made absolute.
Parker, J.:
I see no reason for changing the opinion wdiich I formed at the
trial, that the Plaintiff had not established such a possession as
would justify the judge in leaving the case to the jury. I am very
glad to find that opinion so fully supported by the judgments of
their Honors tlie Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Carter; for the
more I reflect on the case, the more satisfied I am of maintaining
the distinction between an unauthorized entry upon laud in the oc
cupation and within the actual enclosure of another ; and a posses
sion, the disturbance of which would entitle the party to maintain
trespass. The Plaintiff in fact, on his own opening, did not intend
to rest on a mere possession, but set up a right, wdiich, fit may be
unfortunately, as some of the documents offered in evidence were
necessarily excluded,) he could not support.
After the judgments already pronounced, it is superfluous to say
more ; the parties wdll have an opportunity of going to another
trial, fully aware of the grounds on which they stand; and the
merits wdll then probably be more fully investigated.
The rule for a new trial must be made absolute.
The Solicitor General for Plaintiff.
N. Parker for Defendant.
This cause was again tried at the Saint John Circuit in August, 1837, before
His Honor the Chief Justice, when the Plaintiff made out a more •complete
case of title and boundary, and the cause was left to the jury, by the learned
Chief Justice, upon the evidence:—the jury found for the Plaintiff, and the case
was not afterwards moved.

LEDDEN v, RUSSELL AND ANOTHER.
This Court .rill not grant a mandamus to the Justices of an Inferior Court
of Common Pleas, requiring them to enter up judgment for the Plaintiff in
an action on a recognizance of bail in that Court; when such Justices had,
in
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m the exercise of their discretion, set aside the Plaintiff’s judgment, and
allowed <» render of the principal; although their proceedings might not
have conformed to the rules or practice of this Court.
Send).—The Inferior Courts of Common Pleas have the same controul
over recognizances of hail as this Court; and are not bound by the rules of
this Court.

J. A. Street moved in this Term for a mandamus to compel the
Justices of the Inferior Court of Common Pleas of the County of
Northumberland to grant judgment in this case against the De
fendants, who had been sued on a recognizance of bail. It ap
peared by affidavit, that judgment had been entered in the suit by
default in vacation ; which judgment, the Court at the ensuing
Term had set aside, on the ground of a render of the principal;
which render, however, the Plaintiff contended was not warranted
by the rules or practice of this Court, which must be binding on
the Court below. He cited 5 Bac. Abr. 270, and exparte Morgan,
2 Chitty’s Rep. 250, to shew that the Supreme Court, having su
perintendence of all Inferior Courts and Magistrates, would oblige
them to execute that justice which the party is entitled to, and
could command them to give judgment in a matter fit and proper
for their cognizance, &c. The Court below have considered the
bail discharged by render of the principal.
[Parker, J.—Proceedings on a recognizance of bail depend upon
the practice of the Courts : the Court of Common Pleas in Nor
thumberland may have rules of their own, and may have acted in
conformity with those rules ; if not, the question would come up,
how far this Court can interfere ? Can the Superior Courts in
England, in points of practice, interfere with an Inferior Court ?
Could not this Court have done just as the Court below has done ?
The rules of a Court are in restraint of its discretion—all Courts
exercise a discretion over recognizances of bail.]
[Chipman, C. J.—If this is not an attempt to interfere with the
practice of the Inferior Court, I do not know what would be.]
The Court granted judgment below, and it has set that judg
ment aside ; it is competent for this Court, and is within the gene
ral rule, to grant a mandamus for general purposes. The practice
in the Courts below has been to pursue the practice of the Supreme
Court. This Court has granted a mandamus to compel judgment
on verdict.
[Chipman, C. J.—There is a wide distinction between cases
depending on pc'nts of practice and those which are governed by
the general rules of law.]
\Parker, J.—There is a great distinction between cases of re
cognizance of bail and other cases. The Common Pleas decidedly
have the same power in regard to bail as we have. We have limited
our
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our discretion, and it has a right to limit its discretion, but can
not enlarge its jurisdiction.]
There may be a question as to the right of the Inferior Court to
set aside a judgment already given ; upon looking into the autho
rities, it appears that this Court has the power of setting aside a
judgment of an Inferior Court for irregularity.
Chipman, Chief Justice :
This is an application to compel proceedings in another Court
in a matter which rests in the d' scretion of thai Court, and in
which we have no control over the exercise of that discretion.
Mandamus refused.
J. A. Street for Plaintiff.
Berton for Defendant.

SPENCE v. STUART AND THOMPSON.
Debt on recognizance of bail, in a suit brought in the Inferior Court of
Common Pleas for the County of Charlotte, in which the judgment set out
against the principal was for
: 17 : 0. Plea, no ca. sa. duij sued out
against the principal. Replication set out a ca. sa. for X'81 : 16 : 10- duly
issued on the judgment, and retwmei prout patet per recordam. Rejoinder
nut tiel record, on which issue being joined to the Court, it was found for
the Plaintiff,—Held that the variance apparent on the record between tbe
judgment and the ca. sa. in the Inferior Court, was no ground for arresting
the judgment in the action against the bail.
Semi.—Such variance is an irregularity which may be amended or waived,
and not a defect to make void the writ.

Chipman, Chief Justice:
THIS is an action of debt against bail upon their recognizance.
The declaration sets forth a udgment against the principal in the
Inferior Court of Common Pleas for the County of Charlotte, in
which Court the original action was brought and bail given. The
Defendant pleads in his third plea “ that there was no writ of ca.
sa. duly sued out upon the said judgment. ” The Plaintiff replies
to this plea “ that Plaintiff sued out a writ of ca. sa. upon the said
“ judgment, by which said writ,” &c. &c. (setting forth the writ);
the Defendant rejoins “ that there is not any record of the said
“ supposed writ of ca. sa. in manner and form, as the said Plain‘‘ tiff hath in his replication alleged.” The Plaintiff in his sur-rejoinder alleges, “ That there is such a record of the said writ of
“ ca. sa.” &c.
Upon a trial by the record, on these pleadings, the Plaintiff
had judgment that he had perfected his record; and this motion is
now made in arrest of final judgment, upon the ground that the
writ of ca. sa. set forth in the pleadings, does not follow the judg
ment upon which it purports to be founded. The discrepancy
complained
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complained of is that the judgment set forth is for a debt of <£567
19s. 2d. and the writ ofc«. sa. recites a judgment for debt of £72
Os. 9d. The Defendant in his third plea, have rested his defence
upon the point that no writ of ca. sa. had issued upon the judg
ment set forth in the declaration—and the Plaintiff in his replica
tion to this plea, having alleged that such a writ had been sued out
upon the saidjudgment, which writ he sets forth, and the Defen
dant having in his rejoinder further put his defence upon the single
point of the non existence of the writ set forth by the Plaintiff, by
pleading nul tiel record of the said supposed writ, which the Plain
tiff had alleged, had been sued out on the judgment, must be held
to have admitted on the record that the writ set forth, if such a
writ in point of fact had existence, was sued out upon the judg
ment set forth by the Plaintiff in his declaration—and this
is the pith of the objection, that the execution does not follow the
judgment. I give no opinion upon what would have been the re
sult if the question had been brought upon demurrer, but the court
is extremely cautious how they arrest a judgment after verdict. (1
Sellon’s Prac. 499, citing Burr. 1725) and a pleading of nul tiel re
cord where the Plaintiff shews the record, is held to be as strong
as if the Defendant had traversed the title of the Plaintiff—and
this had been found against him by verdict. (18 Vin. Abr. 181.)
It is stated in the books (Tidd. 918, 19 Ed.) that, in former times,
it was the practice for the party, on his day in Court after verdict,
to plead any exception he might have in arrest of judgment, which
differed from moving in arrest of judgment, this being done by one
as amicus curite when the party was out of Court; and in a case
in which it was held, that a party could move in arrest of judgment,
after a judgment upoii demurrer (1 Str. 425) the Court said,
“ the parties cannot be said to come as amici curite, nor shall any
“ body tell us that the judgment we gave on mature deliberation is
“ wrong.” So here I would say that no one shall come in, and
tell us, that the execution was not founded upon the judgment,
when the party himself by his own c ourse of pleading, has admitted
that it is. As to the merits of the objection, the bail having ad
mitted upon the record in this action, that the execution was sued
out upon the judgment, have had that notice, which the law re
quires they should have, that the Plaintiff in the original action
against the Defendant’s person. And even with regard to the error
in the execution, in its differing from the judgment in the statement
of the sum recovered, this defect would have been amendable in the
writ itself, by the Court from which the writ issued. (1 Chit. Rep
349, Stevenson v. Castle, and the cases there cited.) But upon
the ground which I have already stated, I think this rule for ar
resting the judgment must be discharged.

Carter,
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Carter, J.:
I am also of opinion that the rule for arresting judgment in this
case should be discharged ; without giving any opinion on the point
that the Defendant is precluded by his admission on the record. 1
found my opinion on the general rule laid down on this subject by Mr
Tidd, p. 919, 949. “ The parties cannot move in arrest of judg“ ment, for any thing that is aided after verdict at common law,
“ or amendable at common law, or by the statutes of amendments ;
“ or cured as matter of form by the statutes of jeofails.”
Now a variance between the judgment and execution in the sum
recovered, is one which is clearly amendable, as is shewn by a late
case of M‘Cormack. v. Melton, 1 Ad. & El. 331, (note.)
It is true that in this case, this Court has no power to make the
amendment—but if this rule would hold good in a case where the
whole proceedings had been in this Court, where this variance
would have been amendable, and therefore the judgment would not
have been arrested, I think it will follow that where, from the pro
ceedings having been in another Court, we have no power to amend
them—still we should hold that this variance is not a sufficient
ground for anesting the judgment,
Parker, J.:
In this case the Defendants who were bail in the original action
of the Inferior Court, after joining issue with the Plaintiff as to the
existence of a certain ca. sa. specifically set out in the pleadings ;
now, after it has been proved that such ca. sa. was issued at a pro
per time, in the proper County, and duly returned, call on the
Court to arrest the judgment, on the ground of a variance in tli?
amount between the ca- sa. and the judgment. It is this single ob
jection to which our attention is nvited, and after a full considera
tion I agree in thinking it cannot now avail.
Examining this record by the rules of pleading, it appears to me
established that the ca. sa. (such as it was,) was duly issued on the
judgment and was duly returned before the proceedings were taken
against the bail; and that the bail consequently had that notice
which the law requires to make them liable on their recognizances.
By the course they have adopted they have, in my opinion,
waived any benefit of the objection, supposing it to be open to them
at all, which I much doubt, for as was said by Heath, J. in the
case of Donnelly v. Dunn, 2 B. & P. 45r “ It does not follow that
“ the bail are to have all the advantages to which the principal is
“ entitled. Suppose in an action on a judgment there be mani“ fest error in the record, the bail cannot avail themselves of that
“ error though the principal may.”
The case cited from Keble was that of a ca. sa. appearing by
the record to have been issued before the judgment, as is fully ex
plained
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plained by Lord Holt, in Cholmondeley v. Bealing, 2 Ld. R. 1096,
6 Mod. 304.
In Dudlow v. Watchom, 16 East. 40, the ca. sa. was issued in
to a wrong County ; and therefore did net give the notice to the
bail which the law required. The remarks on this case in Sandon
v. Proctor, are well worth noting: neither the decision in Keble,
nor that in 16 East, affect the present case.
In 2 Sell. Pr. 62, a case is cited from Burr. 1187, Campbell v.
Cumming, that a defect in the return of the ca. sa. (though it
might render the ca. sa. liable to be set aside on motion,) could
not be taken advantage of by bail on a general demurrer. It is
said the Court were clearly and unanimously of that opinion.
In Ball v. Manucaptors of Russell, 2 Ld. R. 1176; fully recog
nized in Sandon v. Proctor ; to a plea of no ca. sa. the Plaintiff
replied, setting out a capias which had only five days between
teste and return, and therefore irregular as against bail. On de
murrer the Court agreed that it was an irregularity, but said the
Defendant’s course was to have moved the Court to set it
aside ; and they gave judgment for the Plaintiff.
The question then appears to me to resolve itself into this:
viz. whether the mistake in the ca. sa. is such as would make it
absolutely void, or only an irregularity which might be waived or
amended ; and I think it abundantly clear, lrom the following cases,
that a variance between the sum for which the judgment is given,
and the ca, sa. is only an irregularity
Laroche v. Wasbrougli, 2 T. R. 737.
Stevenson v. Castle, 1 Ch. R. 349, and the cases collected in
the note there.
Arnell v. Weatherby, 3D. P. R. 464.
M‘Cormack v. Melton, 1 Ad. & Ell. 331.
The reason for the issuing a ca. sa. in order to found proceedings
against bail, and the law on that subject are well laid down in the
judgments of Bayley, Abbott, and Holroyd, J. in Payne v. Spen
cer, 6 M, & S. 231.
The objection after all is a mere formal one, if the sum menti
oned in the ca. sa. is all the plaintiff seeks to recover ; and would
at all events, have been endorsed as the direction of the Sheriff.
Should the Plaintiff on this present judgment against the bail take
out execution for a greater sum, the Court may perhaps have
power to relieve on motion ; but that must be a matter of after
consideration—it is clear that the present rule cannot be sustained.
Rule discharged.
F. A. Kinnear for Plaintiff.
J. W. Chandler and Berton for Defendants.

HILARY TERM, 7th Wm. 4th.
1837.

I. Whereas it is deemed improper that any Clerk in the office
of the Pleas of this Court should act as an agent of any Attorney,
with or without remuneration or gratuity : It is ordered, that
henceforth no Attorney of this Court do employ any such Clerk as
his agent, in any suit or matter pending in this Court, or in the
transaction of any business in the office either of Clerk of the
Crown or Clerk of the Pleas, and that the Clerk of the Pleas do
not allow or suffer any Clerk or other person employed in his office
to act as such agent, under any pretence whatsoever.
II. It is further Ordered, That from and after this present Hi
lary Term, every Attorney of this Court enter the return, and file
the writ or process in all actions which have not, at or before such
return, been settled or discontinued ; and make and file with the
Clerk a docket of all such returns and rules, on or before the last
return day of the Term at which such writs are returnable, or
within thirty days thereafter : And that the Clerk do not in future
receive or file any docket, or enter any such rule after the said
thirty days, without the special order of the Court, or a Judge, to
be made on affidavit or affidavits, properly accounting for the delay.

III. It is further Ordered, That the party applying for the
examination of a witness or witnesses de bene esse, under the Act
26 Geo. 3, c. 20, or for an order for such examination, or for the
issuing a commission under the Act 5 W. 4, c. 34, do state in the
affidavit or affidavits upon which such application is founded, the
nature of the action, the venue, and the state of the pleadings at
the time of such application, also the name of the opposite Attorney
or agent: And do also whenever time will permit, give notice of
such application, together with a copy of the affidavit or affidavits
to such Attorney or agent.

IV. It is further Ordered, That no judgment be signed upon
any warrant authorizing any Attorney to confess judgment, with
out such warrant being delivered to and filed by the Clerk.
V
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V. It is further Ordered, That every Attorney of this Court
who shall prepare any warrant of Attorney to confess any judg
ment which is to be subject to any defeazance, do cause such de
feazance to be written on the same paper or parchment on which
the warrant of Attorney shall be written, or cause a memorandum
in writing to be made on such warrant, containing the substance
and effect of such defeazance.

VI. It is further Ordered, That no Sheriff, Bailiff, or Sheriff’s
officer, shall presume to exact or take from any person' or persons,
being in his custody by arrest, any warrant to confess judgment,
but in the presence of an Attorney of the Defendant, which At
torney shall then subscribe his name thereto : and that no Attor
ney do acknowledge or enter any judgment by color of any war
rant given by any Defendant being under arrest, otherwise than
as is aforesaid.

WARD CHIPMAN,
J. CARTER,
R. PARKER.

f’ASKS

T3mfY TEItli,
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LIVINGSTONE v. POWELL, RITCHIE & WHEATON,
Executors of POWELL, Deceased.
A beqeathed a legacy to B, to be paid to C in trust, to be put at inte
rest until B should attain the age of 18 years, and then principal and inte
rest to be paid to B. The legacy was not paid to C, B attained the age of 18
years, and brought an action of debt against the Executor,—Held main
tainable.

Debt. The Plaintiffs declared that the Testator on the 23d day
of December, 1817, by his last will and testament, in writing did,
amongst other things, give and bequeath unto Isabella Livingstone,
one of the Plaintiffs by her then name of Isabella Powell Wneaton, daughter of the Testator’s friend John Wheaton, the sum of
£40, to be paid to her father in trust for her, as soon as conveni
ently might be after the testator’s death, by him to be put to in
terest for her use, until she attained the age of 18 years, and then
the amount of principal and interest to be paid to her; and in case
of her decease before attaining that age, then the amount of that
legacy to be equally divided between her sisters Jane and Ann
Wheaton : that the testator appointed the Defendants Executors
of his said will, and died on the 10th day of May, 1819—that the
Defendants took upon themselves the execution of the will—that
assets more than sufficient to pay the debts, legacies, &c. of the
testator came into the hands and power of the Defendants—that
the Defendants did not as soon as conveniently might be pay the
said £40 unto the hands of the said John Wheaton, and although
the said Isabella on the 29th day of September, 1828, attained the
age of 18 years, yet the Defendants did not pay to her while sole,
or to the Plaintiffs, since their intermarriage, the said sum of £40,
and interest amounting in all to a large sum of money, to wit, <S’c.
whereby and by force of the Act of Assembly in such cast made
and provided, an action accrued, &c.
To this declaration the Defendant demurred generally,- and sta
ged the following grounds of demurrer:
1.
El
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1. That the action was brought in the name of the cestui que
trust, instead of the trustee in whom the legal interest, if any,
vested.
2. That tlie action involved a question of trust, cognizable only
in equity.
3. That if an action at law could be maintained, debt was not
the proper form.
4. That the legal interest in the legacy, vested in John Whea
ton, one of the Defendants, and the declaration charging assets in
the hands of the defendants, disclosed a right of action, if any, in
the Plaintiff, against Wheaton alone, for non-performance of his
trust.
The cause was entered in the special paper for argument in last
Hilary Term.
Berton in support of the demurrer:—
Ev the common law a legacy was only recoverable in equity,
but by the Act of Assembly, 26 Geo. 3, c. 11, a remedy at law
was given for the recovery of legacies ; it could not however be
intended to give a remedy to two distinct parties at the same time ;
but to the person in whom by the will the legal interest vested.
By the will stated in the declaration, the legal interest was vested
in John Wheaton; the right of the Plaintiff was strictly an equita
ble one, to which the statute could not be intended to apply. As
to the general principle of law upon the subject of the right of
trustee and cestui que trust he cited 2 Saun. Uses and Trusts,
222; Holts, N. P. Cases, 641; 7 T. R. 666; 1 East. 497;
5 East. 137.
As to the form of action, if the party had any remedy at law, it
was created by the statute, and must be pursued according to the
forms of it; the 9th and 11th sections which gave the remedy spoke
onlyofthe action of accountwhich the Plaintiff should have pursued,
and if the party was not confined to the action of account, assump
sit was the proper remedy. 1 Ch. on Plead. 116.
The fourth point was abandoned, it did not appear by the record
that John Wheaton the Defendant was John Wheaton the trustee
named in the will.
E. B. Chandler contra,
Argued that the rights of the trustee existed only while the
cestui que trust was within the age mentioned m the will, but when
she attained that age the trust was at an end and the legal right
vested in himself under the 9th section of the Provincial statute.
That section prescribed no form, but gave a right of action for any
certain legacy ; the action of account spoken of in the 11 th section
applied only to actions by co-executors and others mentioned
therein, but did not apply to the present case. In Cowper’s Rep.
289, Lord Mansfield said “ an executor who has received assets
is
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is under every kind of obligation to pay a legacy.” It is admitted
on the record that the executors had assets, and that Wheaton had
not received the money. Toller on Ex. 219; Riddle v. Sutton,
5 Bing. 200; 4 M. & S. 119; Salk. 415; Bac. Abr. Tit. Stat.
In this Term the Court gave judgment for the Plaintiffs.
Chipman, Chief Justice:
This is a case of demurrer to the declaration. The action is
debt for a legacy, bequeathed to the Plaintilf, Isabella Livingston,
while unmarried. The declaration contains three counts; the two
first are very much alike, and each contains an allegation of a
sufficiency of assets having come to the hands of the Defendants.
The third count is substantially the same as the two first, excepting
that there is no such allegation of assets. The demurrer :s general
to the whole declaration. The clause of the will, wlr ch contains
the legacy in question, is set forth in the declaration in the follow“ ing terms : “ I give and bequeath to Isabella Powell Wheaton,
“ daughter of my friend John Wheaton, forty pounds, to be paid
“ to her father in trust for her, as soon as conveniently may be
“ after my decease, by him to be put to interest for her use, until
“ she attains the age of eighteen years, and then the amount of
“ principal and interest to be paid to her; and in case of her decease
“ before attaining that age, then the amount of this legacy to be
“ equally divided between her sisters, Jane and Ann Wheaton.”
The points entered in the margin of the demurrer book, as those
to be insisted on argument in support of the demurrer, are the
following :—
1st. That this action is brought in the name of the cestui que
trust, instead of the trustee, in whom the legal interest, if any, is
vested.
2d. That this action, being not only for a legacy, but also in
volving a question of trust, is only cognizable in equity.
3d. That if any action can be maintained at law, debt will not
lie, the case not being analagous to actions brought against execu
tors to recover amounts due from their testator in his life time.
4th. That the legal interest in the legacy, for recovery of which
this action is brought, clear'y vested in John Wheaton, and the de
claration charges, that he, together with the other Defendants, re
ceived assets sufficient to pay the just debts, legacies, &c of the
testator, thus disclosing a right of action, if any, against the said
John Wheaton alone, for non-performance of his trust, instead of
any right of action against the present Defendants.
The fourth point was abandoned at the time of the argument,
as there is no allegation in the declaration that John Wheaton, the
person named as trustee, is the same person with John Wheaton
the executor, and one of thf Defendants. The two first points
may
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may well be considered together. In doing so, I will, in the first
place, remark, that whatever may have been the juriso)btion which
the temporal Courts of common law in England exercised in mat
ters of legacy in ancient times, it is clearly settled by modern de
cisions, that no action will lie at law for a legacy, [Deeks v.
Strutt, 5 T. R. 690,]; and the Jurisdiction of the Courts of common
law in this Province in these matters is derived altogether from the
act of the Provincial Legislature on the subject. The Provincial
enactments are as follows:—26 Geo. 3, c. 11, s. 9. “ And be i,
“ enacted, That when any certain legacy is or shall be be“ queathed, and given by any person in his or her last will and tes•' tament, as also when any residuary or uncertain legacy is or
“ shall, by the account of any executor, be reduced to a certainty,
“ every such legacy or legacies as aforesaid, may be sued for and
“ recovered at common law, any law custom or usage to the con“ trary notwithstanding.”
Ibid, s. 10. “ And any executor being a residuary legatee, may
“ bring his action of account against his co-executor or execu“ tors of the estate of the testator in their hands, and may also sue
“ and recover his equal and rateable part thereof, and any other
“ legatee, or residuary legatee, shall have like remedy against the
“ executors.”
By virtue of the ninth section, every certain legacy may be re
covered in a Court of common law, and it may be stated as a clear
posiuon, that the right of suing therefor at common law, can ex
ist only in the person in whom is vested the present right to hold
or to possess the legacy. The question to be considered therefore,,
under the two first points of argument, will be whether, in the
present instance, there is such a vested right in the Plaintiffs. It
is alleged in each count of the declaration, and it is therefore ad
mitted by the demurrer, that the Plaintiff, Isabella Livingston, has
attained the age of eighteen years ; can there be any doubt then
as to the person in whom the present right to hold this legacy is
vested, when we advert to the express terms of the legacy, which,
after an absolute gift of the sum bequeathed to the legatee, Isabella
Powell Wheaton, declares, that when she shall have attained the
age of eighteen years, “ the amount of the principal and interest
shall be paid to her
There is indeed a trust vested in the father
of the legatee, to be executed in the time intervening between the
death of the testator and the legatee’s attaining the prescribed age
of eighteen years, and that trust is to receive the amount of the
legacy and to put it to interest for her use ; but the time for exe
cuting this trust having elapsed, the trust itself no longer exists,
and there becomes an absolute vested right in the legatee to re
quire payment of the legacy, and to use and enjoy the same as she
pleases ; and this being a chose in action of the wife, the husband
and
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and wife properly join in suing for it. If it were possible to hold,
that under the facts of this case the present right of action for re
covering this legacy was in John Wheaton the trustee, such right
of action must be exercised not for the purpose of enabling him to
execute the trust reposed in him, for doing which the time has
elapsed, but solely for the purpose of subjecting himself to the
right of action which the present Plaintiffs now indisputably
have for reducing the legacy into t.lu-ir final possession in order
to enjoy it. Although this point seems to be thus clear upon prin
ciple, it is nevertheless satisfactory to find a case very much in
point lately decided in the Arches Court of Canterbury, by Sir
John Nichol. I refer to the case of Grignion v. Grignion, re
ported in 1 Hag. Ec. Rep. 538, A. D. 1828. In that case the
legacy was in the following terms, “ And as to the said sum of
“ £120, and the said last mentioned fourth pa t of the rest resi“ due and remainder of my personal estate and effects, and the
“ stocks, funds and securities in or upon which the same shall or
“ may be so placed, laid out and invested, my will and mind is,
“ and I do hereby declare, that the said Isaac Webb, and my said
“ son Claudius, their executors and administrators, shall and do,
“ from and immediately after the decease of my said son Israel,
“ stand, be and continue possessed thereof, in trust for all and
“ every the child and children of my said son Israel, equally to be
“ divided between them, share and share alike, to be paid and trans“ ferred to them when and as they respectively shall attain the age
“ of twenty one years.” The suit was brought by one of the re
siduary legatees who had become of age, against the executor, for
recovery of his part of the legacy, and was sustained in the Eccle
siastical Court upon the express ground that there remained no
longer any trust for a Court of equity to act upon ; in giving judg
ment, Sir John Nichol expresses himself as follows :—“ These
“ trusts are now all at an end. Israel is dead, leaving three children—
“ all have attained the age of twenty one—each is entitled to his
“ third—there is no resulting trust to be executed—each has a
“ vested absolute interest in his legacy, to receive it and do what
“ he pleases with it. Nothing remains to be done but to enforce
“ payment. The executor, though not expressly called a trustee
“ in the will, (a fact that makes no real distinction,) has had both
“ characters—his function as trustee has be^n finished—his duty
“ as executor remains—namely, to pay the legatees. This seems
“ to be the substantial, good sen$e and plain reason of the matte’-,
“ stripped of refinement and fiction, and technicality. As execu“ tor he is sworn to pay the legacies. This is a legacy now be“ come absolute and due—simply to be paid—the executor sub“ tracts it—he refuses payment; has this Court then the juris“ diction to enforce the duty which, when the office was commit- i
“ ted to him, he swore to this Court to discharge ? or is it clear
“that
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“ that a Court of equity would grant an injunction to restrain
“ the Court from proceeding.
“ The general proposition is, that Courts of Equity have the
“ exclusive jurisdiction of all trusts ; the answer is, here is no trust
“ remaining—here only remains the duty of an executor—the pay“ ment of a legacy absolutely vested in the legatee. When there
“ is a trust, or when the Ecclesiastical Courts cannot do justice,
“ as happened, while the demand for security to refund was the
“ practice of the Court of equity; or where a married woman is
to be protected—or where there are proceedings in account to
“ ascertain assets—or where there is anything in the nature of a
“ trust to be executed, an injunction wi'l go ; but not as I under“ stand, when there is the bare duty of an executor to perform—
*■ to pay legacies ; for that would in all cases give an exclusive
“ and not a mere concurrent jurisdiction.” It is true that the pre
sent case in which the husband and wife are suing for a legacy
due to the wife, is the very case put by Lord Kenyon, (5, T. R.
692; 7, T. R. 667,) as conclusive against the Courts of com
mon law in England having jurisdiction over legacies, because these
Courts cannot compel the husband to make provision for the wife
before he shall receive the benefit of her property; it is true also
that this is a case in which it appears from the judgment of Sir
John Nichol, which I have cited, that the Ecclesiastical Courts in
England would not be permitted to entertain a suit for a legacy for
the same reason. The answer to any objection that might be
raised on this score, is to be found in the positive enactments of the
Provincial Statute, which give a general jurisdiction to the Courts
of common law in this Province for the recovery of legacies, with
out any exception, notwithstanding any law usage or custom to the
contrary. The Provincial Legislature have thus expressly de
termined, that the English rule which denies this jurisdiction to
Courts of common law, shall not prevail in this Province. It has
also made express provision for the distinct cases of certain, and of
residuary and uncertain legacies. This leads me to the third ob
jection, which is, that the action of debt will not lie in the present
case. Tire ninth section of the A.ct of Assembly which relates to
legacies, which are, or have been rendered certain, does not pre
scribe any form of action ; it therefore leaves the form of action to
be settled upon the general principles which govern this matter.
Serjeant Stephen, in his book on pleading, page 14, says, that
“ The action of debt lies where a party claims a debt, i. e. a li“ quidated or certain sum of money alleged to be due to him.” I
do not deem it necessary to cite the numerous authorities which
may be found to support this position. Applying this principle to
the present case, it does appear to me, that, so far from there
being any objection in point of form to the action of debt, for re
covering
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co vering a pecuniary legacy of a certain or ascertained amount, it is
the peculiarly appropriate remedy. The eleventh section, which gives
the action of account, is intended to provide for cases of residuary
and uncertain legacies, and decidedly does not in any manner li
mit or controul the remedy given in the ninth section, io cases of
legacies, which are certain in themselves, or have been reduced to
a certainty.
I entertain doubt as to the third count in the declaration, which
does not contain any allegation either of assets in the hands of tlie
Defendants, or of their assent to the legacy; but the point was
not made at the bar, and even if there be a defect in this one
count, it will not affect the judgment on this demurrer to the
whole declaration, which I think for the reasons I have stated,
must be for the Plaintiff.
Botsford, J. concurred:
Carter, J.
This case comes before the Court on a demurrer to a declaration,
in an action of debt, brought by the Plaintiffs Henry Livingstone
and Isabella his wife, against the Defendants, as executors of one
Jacob Powell, deceased, for a legacy bequeathed by the will
of the said Jacob Powell, in the manner following, as set
forth in the declaration, “ unto Isabella Powel Wheaton, daughter
of my friend John Wheaton, the sum of £40, to be paid to her
father in trust for her, as soon as conveniently may be after testa
tor’s death, by him to be put to interest for her use, until she at
tained the age of 18 years, and then the amount of the principal
and interest to be paid to her ; and in case of her death before at
taining that age, then the amount of that legacy to be equally
divided between her sisters Jane and Ann Wheaton.”
From the course of the argument, it appeared that the grounds
of demurrer were reduced to two material ones:
1. That the form of action was wrong.
2. That the Flaintiffs were the wrong parties to have sued, in
as much as the legal interest in this legacy was vested in John
Wheaton, and he was the party who Should have been Plaintiff.
On the first point, viz. that the form of action is wrong, it was
contended that the action of debt will not lie against an executor.
This however will apply only to cases of simple contract, where
the cause of action occurred in the life time of the testator—and the
reason assigned is, that in such a case the testator might have
waged his law, a mode of defence from which his executor would
be precluded. That reason cannot clearly apply to the present
case, where the cause of action has accrued against the executors
alone, and where it is clear the defence by wager of law could not
apply.
The
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The 9th section of 26 G. 3, c. 11, on which this action is founded,
giving no particular form of action, it appears to me that debt is
the peculiar and proper form of action to be used on the general
principle laid down by Mr. Justice Bailey in Tilson v. Warwick
Gas Light Company, 4 B. & C. 962, “ where an Act of Parlia“ ment, casts upon a party an obligation to pay a specific sum
“ of money to particular persons, the law then enables those
“ persons to maintain an action of debt.” In Bac. Abr. (Title
Debt, A.) it is said that an action of debt lies by the Sheriff on
28 Eliz. c. 4, for his fees given him by statute for an execution
served by him, though the statute does not say that he shall have
his fees in any action for them, but only says that he shall not take
for any execution served any consideration or recompense, besides
that thereafter mentioned by the Act.
It was further contended that the 11th section of the Act gave
the action of account as the form, and only form of action by which
legacies were to be recovered under the Act. That section ap
pears to me to go no further than to give to the parties the power
of suing in that form of action, when circumstances render it an
appropriate and convenient form. The first part of it which ena
bles any executor being a residuary legatee to bring his action of
account against his co-executor, was intended, I imagine, to give
that convenient form of action in a case where, by the common
law. it was not allowed—in Selwyn’s N. P. Title Account, it is
said “This action does notlie by one executor against another.” It
would indeed seem absurd that the action of account, which from
its nature cannot apply to a debt finally ascertained, and which is
said in Bac. Abr. (Account C.)*ZZiBmoZ for a thing certain,”
should by the 11 th section be prescribed as the only form of action
for recovering—that which is described in the 9th section to be
'■'■any certain legacy,” or “any residuary or uncertain legacy
“ which is or shall be by the account of any executor reduced to
“ a certainty. For these reasons I am of opinion that the form of
action adopted by the present Plaintiffs is correct.
On the second point, I am of opinion that the present Plaintiffs
are the persons in whose names this action should have been
brought. It is admitted by the demurrer that the legacy has not
been paid to John Wheaton the father—that the legatee attained
the age of 18 before action was brought. The marriage of the
Plaintiffs is also admitted. By these admissions, therefore, the
legacy being unpaid, and the Plaintiffs having not only a vested
interest in the legacy, but being entitled to the immediate posses
sion of it, I cannot entertain any doubt of their being the proper
parties to sue for it, under the 9th section of the Act. We must of
course be bound by legal principles in deciding this case, and I
am glad that in so doing we are enabled to promote that which is
the
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the obvious object of the Act to such parties—the delay and expence
of recourse to a Court of Chancery. Had we felt ourselves bound
to decide that this action should have been brought by John Whea
ton rj in the event of any difficulty in his paying it over to the
present Plaintiffs, they would then have had recourse to a Court
of Equity, so that in such case the operation of this Act of Assem
bly would have been to them worse than useless. On the whole I
am of opinion that j udgment should be for the Plaintiffs.
Parker, J.:
I also am of opinion that the Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment
in their favor on this demurrer; I cannot see any thing in the
terms of this bequest which will deprive them of the right of action
at Law, given by the Act of Assembly to Legatees. The legacy
is to the daughter Isabella, payable on the contingency of her
arriving at the age of eighteen years; if she died before that period
it is to be given to others ; the only trust created by the will is for
the security and accumulation of the sum bequeathed until the time
arrived for paying it. The Defendants have not carried into effect
this direction, but themselves retain the amount until the tune has
come in which the daughter, and not the father, is entitled to the
possession of it. This being the case they are, I think, liable to
her directly. To hold the father entitled to recover it now would
fulfil no intent of the testator ; to give him a present control over
it would be setting up a new trust, and not that of the will.
On the other point as to the form of action, I think the Act
very plain ; and that though the action of account is given by the
11th section, it cannot be considered ascontrolling the general
words of the 9th section, which clearly gives an action of debt.
The action of account would be well suited to certain cases where
the contest was between the executors, or the bequest concerned
the residue, or otherwise required a previous account in order to
ascertain the amount to be recovered ; but would be inapplicable
to the case of a legacy made certain by the will, or by the admitted
account of the executors.
The action of account is so limited in its application by the
Common Law as already to have required several English statutes
to extend it, and without the express enactment of the 11th section
it could not, I think, have been resorted to in the cases there con
templated.
I agree also with His Honor the Chief Justice, to leave un
touched the question on the third count of the declaration, not
mooted at the bar, and not necessary to be now decided.
Judgment for the Plaintiffs, on demurrer.
E. B. Chandler, for Plaintiffs.
Berton for Defendants.
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DOE EX DEM DISBROW v. FEN.
Service of a Declaration in Ejectment on the daughter of the tenant on
the premises,—Held insufficient.

J. M. Bobinson moved for a rule msi for judgment against
the casual ejector on an affidavit which stated the service of the
declaration on the daughter of the tenant on the premises, sought
to be recovered.
The Court considered the service insufficient and refused the
rule.

<’A!SE!'i I>r MICHAELMAS rE»MIN THE

FIRST YEAR OF THE REIGN OF VICTORIA.

Note.—Botsfobd, J. was absent during the Term.

PARENT

AND ANOTHER v. CORNELISON AND
OTHERS.

Trespass quare clausum fregit by A. against B.
In one count of the declaration the locus in quo was described by abut
tals as being part of Lot No. 135 ; in another count it was described more
generally as the close of A. in the Parish of Prince William.
Held that B. the occupant of an adjacent Lot, No. 134, could not justify
an entry on any part of the 'and in A’s. possession, in order to contest the
true boundary between the Lots, under a mere verbal agreement with J. K.
the owner of Lot No. 134, for the purchase thereof, neither B. nor J. K.
having actual possession, and there being no command nor distinct authority
from J. K. to B. to make such entry.
Although the weight of evidence may have shewn the locus in quo to be
within the true bounds of Lot No. 134, and the boundary be the principal
matter in contest at the trial, yet A. will be entitled to recover on the general
count for disturbance of his possession against B., having no title nor com
mand from the owner, unless it clearly appear that A. intended to confine
himself specifically to the trespass on the Lot No. 135.
A Defendant in trespass may justify his entry by the command, but not
by the mere permission or license, of the person entitled to the possession.
Possession is necessary in order to constitute a tenancy at will.
Trespass for breaking and entering Plaintiffs’ close m Prince

William, in the County of York. Plaintiffs declared in the first
count setting out abuttals, and in the second count for breaking
and entering generally.
Plea—general issue.
This action was brought principally to try a question of boun
dary in dispute between the parties. At the trial, before Chip
man, Chief Justice, at the York sittings, after last Michaelmas
Term, it appeared in evidence on the part of the Plaintiffs that in
1825 they became the owners of Lot No. 135, in the Parish of
Prince William, by purchase from one Foreman, the original
grantee, and as such had been in the possession thereof until May
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1836, when the Defendants (one of whom lived on the adjoining
•Lot No. 134,) came, accompanied by several others, threw down
the boundary fence and commenced ploughing &c. on the land
within the Plaintiffs’ enclosure.
For the Defendants it appeared that Lots No. 135 and 134 had
been laid out at an early period, but no grants had passed; that
William Cornelison, the father of one of the Defendants, had lived
on Lot 131 in 1797 and 98; that he left it, but in 1820 or 21
returned and re-occupied the Lot and continued there up to the
time of action brought. It was likewise proved that in December
1830, a grant from the Crown of Lot 134 to the said William Cor
nelison was made; that William Cornelison, by deed of bargain
and sale bearing date 10th March, 1832, conveyed the said Lot
134 to one George E. Ketchum, in fee, and that George E.
Ketchum, by like deed of bargain and sale bearing date 26th
February. 1835, conveyed the upper two third parts (I. e. the parts
adjoining Lot 135,) to one James Ketchum, in fee ; and that
James Ketchum, by like deed of bargain and sale dated 26th day
of August, 1836, (after this action was brought, the bill having
been filed the Term previous,) conveyed the said upper two third
parts to Charles Cornelison, one of the Defendants in fee, by whom
and under whose authority the alleged trespass was committed.
A Witness (Isaac Cornelison,) proved that about two years
previous a verbal bargainor contract had been entered into between
Ketchum, the then owner, and Charles the Defendant, for the pur
chase of the said Lot No. 134, and that the latter had occupied by
virtue of this barga’n or verbal purchase, and had lately got a deed
of it.
The principal witness called to prove the boundary on the part
of the Plaintiffs was one George West, who stated that he had run
the line contended for by the Plaintiffs, at their request, about
nine or ten years before, and that Charles, the father, and several of
the sons were along with him, who appeared to make no objection.
Evidence was also given that until a short time before the De
fendants had worked up to West’s line, and had not gone beyondit.
Old Cornelison was called to give evidence of the boundary
sought to be established by the Defendants, who among other
things stated that he had never agreed to the line of West, and
that one of the Plaintiffs had come to the Defendant’s house the
past winter and desired to have the line run ; one George Moreliouse was likewise called, who proved a line run by himself while
old Cornelison resided on the land, at a time previous to West’s
line, which the learned Judge considered the more correctone ; but
the case turned on a different ground, for it wasobjected on the trial
that the Defendants at the time of the trespasses had no title to the
land, nor any authority from the owner to commit the trespasses
complained
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complained of, (and Bulwer vs. Bulwer, 2 Stark 71, Dodd
vs. Kyffin 7, T. R. 354, 8 T. Rep. 403 were cited,) and of this
opinion was the learned Judge who told tlie jury that as the evi
dence stood the question of boundary could not begone into. But
he thought the cause must turn upon another point, namely, that
as the Plaintiffs had shewn a clear possession of the locus in quo
the Defendants were bound to shew a title to, or proper authority to
enter upon the land in question. This the Defendants had failed
in doing, having shewn that when the trespass was committed the
title was in James Ketchum, and not having, as he thought, shewn
that by tlie command of James Ketchum, they entered on the
Plaintiffs’ possession, and accordingly directed the jury to find for
the Plaintiffs ; the jury however brought in a verdict for the De
fendants. In Hilary Term last a rule nisi was obtained to set
aside the verdict, on tlie grounds of its being contrary to evidence
and the Judge’s charge.
Last Term Parker and Wilmot shewed cause :—
It was essential to ascertain where the line between Lots Nos.
134 and 135 ought to be. If that point could be determined,
the matter would be set at rest. The question was not merely
whether the verdict was contrary to the opinion of the Judge, but
was it contrary to right ? for if opposed to tlie former, yet in
accordance with the latter it might well stand. Was the main
object of the trial gained ? Had the Plaintiffs succeeded in estab
lishing—or had they not entirely failed in establishing the line for
which they contended ?. It appeared that by the most correct
method of survey, and one approved by His Honor the Chief Jus
tice at the trial, that the line proved by the Defendants, and not
that sought to be maintained by the Plaintiffs, was the more cor
rect line ; there was evidence that old Cornelison always asserted
his right up to the old boundary, and that at a time prior to the com
mitting of the alleged trespasses Parent went to Charles Cornelison
and expressed a desire to have tlie line run, and dealt with him
as if the land were liis own ; all these circumstances clearly shewed
that the Parents had no established line. As to the Defendants’
right to enter, a party justifying in trespass must defend, in his own
right, or justify under that of another; here the Defendants did the lat
ter, under Ketchum the owner. Charles Cornelison was either tenant
at will to Ketchum, or the agreement of purchase was tantamount
to a command to enter. Ketchum the owner might have entered
on the premises and every part thereof, and the tenant holding
under him had an equal right. Bulwer vs. Bulwer, 2 Stark 71,
cited by the other side at the trial, proved nothing more than that
if the Defendant there had shewn an authority from the owner
might have justified; in this case the authority was shewn by the
agreement of purchase. In Dodd us. Kyffin 7, T. R. 354, the
Court
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Court were clearly of opinion that the Defendant ought to have
been permitted to give evidence of title and right of possession
under the general issue ; that case was equally like the one before
the Court, and was confirmed by all the Judges in the subsequent
case of Argent v. Durant, 8 T. Rep. 403, and was not opposed by
any other in the books. If Charles Cornelison in this case had
pleaded the tenancy at will specially, it would have been a good
defence; so according to the authorities in 7 T. Rep. 354 and8, T.
Rep. 403, it was a good defence under the general issue. In 1
Chitty on Pleading 538, it is said “ any title whether freehold or
possessory in the Defendant, or a person under whom he claims,
may be given in evidence under ‘ not guilty,’ if such title shew
that the right of possession is not in the Plaintiff but in the De
fendant, or the party under whom he justifies.”
It was the opinion of His Honor the Chief Justice at the trial
that the line contended for by the Defendants was the more correct
boundary; it was likewise proved that the adjoining land belonged
to James Ketchum, consequently the land in dispute between the
lines and the right of possession belonged to James Ketchum. It
was also proved that the Defendant Charles was claiming the land
under Ketchurn\>\r virtue of a contract of purchase,—the Defendants
therefore shewed that the right ofpossession of the disputed land
was not in the Plaintiffs but in the Defendant or James Ketchum,
under whom he justified. In Right on the demise of Lewis v.
Beard, it was held that one who was put in possession unon an
agreement for the purchase of land, could not be ousted by ejectment
before his lawful possession was determined by demand of posses
sion or otherwise, 13 Eas. 210. The possession of the De
fendant here being undetermined, he could not be disturbed by the
owner himself; the Defendant therefore for all purposes of possession
was in the owner’s stead, as the owner Ketel im might have
entered, so could the tenant. The same doctrine as in the case
last cited was held in Doe ex. Dem Newby v. Jackson, 1 B. &
Cres. 448, in which it was also held that an occupation under an
agreement of purchase creates a tenancy; here there was an agree
ment of purchase, of consequence a tenancy; that tenancy must nave
begun by an entry under the authority of James Ketchum, tanta
mount to his command,—therefore an entry by the command of
James Ketchum. Doe ex. Dem Hall v. Miller, 5 Can. & P.
595, & Bink v. Wright 1 T. Rep. 378 were to the same effect.
The deduction from all the cases was, that a tenant in lawful pos
session stood in the place of his landlord.
The Solicitor General, with whom was Berton, in reply con
tended—
If a party were in the peaceable possession of land and another en
tered upon that possession it was a trespass, but the latter might
justify
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justify by shewing thotitle in himself, or an entry under the command
of another; the proof of either he admitted would be a sufficient
defence, but in the trial of this cause the Defendants failed in both.
They failed in proving a documentary title and then attempted to
set up a possessory one.
[Chipman, Chief J.—They applied it to the question of boun
dary.]
The end of it was, that instead of making out the defence set up
they neither proved any title in themselves nor any command from
the owner to commit the trespass, but on the contrary it appeared
that as mere wrong doers they entered on the land in the posses
sion of aud worked by the Plaintiffs for seven or eight yaars.
It has been contended on the other side that although the De
fendants had no title in themselves, yet under the agreement of
purchase they might justify. They must shew that they commit
ted the trespass complained of, by the command of Ketchum the
owner, and make him a party to the trespass; if not Ketchum
would say “ I never gave any command to commit the trespasses
complained of.” Neither the Defendants nor old Cornelison
opposed the line run by West, but shewed their concurrence by
working up to an d never going beyond it. Another ground taken
by the other side was. that although they are wrong in law, yet
that the object of the trial had been gained, and the verdict should
stand; but the real question had not yet been settled, and a new
trial was necessary for the purpose of determining it. It had been
attempted to be shewn that Clmrles Cornelison was tenant at will,
but the authorities did not bear out the position contended for ; the
Defendant C harles could not be treated as tenant at will, for he
was in the possession of the Lot No. 134 when Ketchum became
the purchaser; how then could he be considered tenant at will ?
The authorities on tenancies at will did not come up to the present
ease, nor did they appear to apply to it at all, for Ketchum was
never in possession. When a party conveys a piece of land he
conveys the property as he holds it and no more. When old Cor
nelison obi inert a grant from the Crown he took so much only as
he had in possession, and that was up to West’s line; when he
conveyed away his right no more passed than was possessed by
him. If the Defendantshad a title let them bring their ejectment.
It had been contended that there was nothing in the case that
demanded a second trial :• —was this not a case in which the parties
had a right to say, let our rights be determined according to law ?
It was most important that another trial should be had.
In tnis Term the Court made absolute the rule nisi for a new
trial.

Carter,

J.:

This was an action of trespass, quure clausum fregit.
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The declaration contained a count for a. trespass on the Plaintiffs'
close, described as Lot No. 135 and set out by,,abuttals; and there
were also general counts for trespass to Plaintiffs’ close, without
description or abuttals. The Plaintiffs shewed title in themselves
to Lot 135, as described in the first count of the declaration, by
proving a conveyance to them of that Lot from James Foreman,
the original grantee of the Crown.
It was also proved on the part of the Plaintiffs that a line had
been run between Lots 134 and 135 by West, a surveyor, in the
year 1825, and there was clear evidence that from the time that
line had been run to the time when the alleged trespass was com
mitted, the land as far as that line had been in the actual posses
sion and occupation of the Plaintiffs.
On the part of the Defendants it was proved that Defendants
were in the occupation of Lot 134—that in 1820 a line had been
run by Morehouse, a surveyor, between Lots 134 and 135,
which would leave the locus in quo in Lot 134—that in 1830
Lot 134 was granted by the Crown to William Cornelison, who
in 1832 conveyed to George E. Ketchum—that in 1835 the
upper two thirds of Lot 134 (which would include the part adjoin
ing Lot 135,) were conveyed by George E. Ketchum to James
Ketchum. A verbal agreement for the sale of this upper two
thirds was proved between James Ketchum and the Defendant,
Charles Cornelison.
On this evidence His Honor the Chief Justice, who tried the
cause, told the jury, that the Plaintiffs having proved an actual
occupation of the jand in question, and the Defendants having
failed in shewing title, the Plaintiffs were entitled to a verdict.
The jury however found a verdict for the Defendants, to set aside
which a rule was obtained last Hilary Term, and the case was last
Term very fully and elaborately argued.
It was then contended by the Defendants’ Counse1 that this ver
dict should stand, inasmuch as there was evidencq to shew that
Morehouse’s line was the true dividing line between the Lots, and
title to Lot 134 having been shewn in James Ketchum, the verbal
agreement between him and Charles Cornelison either amounted
to a permission to the latter to enter on the land, or it made him a
tenant at will.
On the first point, I am clearly of opinion that this case cannot
come within the general principle laid down in the books, that a
Defendant under the general issue in trespass to land, may prove
that the freehold and right of possession were in a third person, by
whose command he entered. In such case it is laid down that the
command must be proved. Now it can hardly be contended that
the verbal agreement between Charles Cornelison and James
Ketchum, upon the sale of the upper two thirds of Lot No. 134,
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GILCHRIST v. WYER AND OTHERS, TRUSTEES OF
THE CHARLOTTE COUNTY SAVINGS BANK.
The rules, orders and regulations of a Savings Bank, established under
the Act of Assembly, 6 G. 4, C. 4, together with the Institution to which
they relate, must be subject to, and under the superintending control of the
provisions of the Act.
The persons to whom the management of such Institution is entrusted,
and who are invested with the property belonging thereto, will be consi
dered the Trustees under the Act, although the rules and regulations do not
provide for their appointment under that name, but as President and Di
rectors.
Such President and Directors duly elected for one year, and filling the
office of Trustees, remain in office after the year until others are duly
chosen in their place.

THIS was an action of debt, brought by the Plaintiff against the
Defendants, as the Trustees of the Charlotte County Savings
Bank, to recover a sum of £50 deposited by the Plaintiff in the
said Bank.
At the trial before Mr. Justice Carter, at the last Charlotte As
sizes, a verdict was found for the Defendants, under the direction
of the Court. In Trinity Term last a rule nisi was obtained by
N. Parker, for the Plaintiff, to set aside the verdict, and for a new
trial on the ground of the misdirection of the learned Judge who
tried the cause.
It appeared in evidence at the trial that a Savings Lank was
instituted in August, 1830, in Charlotte County, under the provi
sions of the Act of the Assembly, 6 George 4, C. 4, passed the
17th March, 1825,—the following rules, orders and regulations
for the management of such Institution having been entered, depo
sited and filed pursuant to the directions of the said Act:—
Rales for the Management of the Charlotte County Savings
Bank.
I. The Charlotte County Savings Bank is formed for the pur
pose of affording a secure investment to Trades-people, Mechanics,
Servants, Labourers, and other persons of either sex, for such sums
of money as they may wish to deposit: Provided however that
no person shall at any one time be entitled to receive interest on
Hl
any
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any sum exceeding fifty pounds ; and provided also and neverthe
less that any benevolent or friendly society mav through their Trea
surer, Steward, or other proper officers, duly authorized thereto,
deposit their fund, not in any case to exceed one hundred pounds,
at interest in the funds of this Institution, and may leave therein
any excess above the sum of one hundred pounds for safe custody.
II. The Bank shall be under the management of a President
and eight Directors, who shall meet on the first Monday in each
month, at eleven o’clock in the forenoon, with power of adjourn
ment, or at any other hour and day of the month that they shall
hereafter find more convenient, and may be summoned at any
other time by desire of two of said Directors, three to be a quorum.
III. That the President and Directors be annually chosen by
ballot out of the members, on the first Monday in May in each
year.
IV. That all persons subscribing and paying ten dollars or
upwards at any one time, or one dollar annually for the benefit of
the Institution, shall be considered members thereof, and entitled
to vote at the annual election.
V. The President and Directors shall not receive any salary or
remuneration for their services, but they shall be at liberty to
appoint a Cashier for the conducting of the business of the Insti
tution, and to pay him such salary as shall be adjudged sufficient.
VI. That the President and Directors shall have power in case
of vacancies occurring by resignation or otherwise, to elect other
persons to fill such vacancies until the next annual election.
VII. That in addition to the security of the Provincial Govern
ment, the President and Directors shall be responsible to Deposi
tors for any sums invested in the Bank, and such interest as may
become due thereon.
VIII. Deposits of sums of not less than one shilling shall be
received, and when the smaller deposits shall amount to twenty
shillings, interest shall be allowed thereon at the rate of five per
cent, per annum, that is one penny per calendar month for one
twenty shillings, and so for every twenty shillings deposited under
the following regulations. Interest shall be recovered from the
first day of every month, and from no other period, and no interest
shall be allowed for any fractional part of twenty shillings, or of
any fractional part of a month, and the interest shall be added to
and become principal at the end of each year.
IX. That at the end of each year the surplus of the income of
the Bank, if any, shall be at the disposal of the President and
Directors, for the genera, .nterest of the Depositors.
X. Depositors shall be repaid the whole or any part of the sums
they shall have lodged, together with interest due them, on giving
one -week's notice.

XI.
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XI. The President and Directors shall regulate that one or more
of their number with the Cashier, if found necessary, shall attend
at the office on the appointed days and hours to receive deposits,
and pay such sums as the depositors may wish to withdraw.
XII. The deposits shall be entered at the time they are made
in a book or books kept in the office, in presence of the Depositor,
and also a duplicate entry made in a book or on a slip of paper to
be kept by the Depositor, and which must be brought to the office
every time any further sum is deposited or drawn out: The Pre
sident and Directors to have power to make such regulations to
protect against error or fraud as from time to time they shall find
necessary.
XIII. The President and Directors shall have a right to close
the account of any Depositor, on account of him or her not con
forming to the Rules ol the Institution, or behaving in an unbe
coming manner toward it or any other ground, first paying the
sum that may be due to him or lier on the books of the Bank, and
no new account shall be opened for such person unless the Presi
dent and Directors shafi agree thereto on special application.
XIV. The President and Directors shall be empowered to make
all such further regulations for the carrying out the objects of this
Institution as they shall find necessary, provided such regulations
be not at variance with the spirit and intention of the foregoing
rules.
JOHN DUNN, President.
GEORGE MILLER, Cashier President.
It appeared that there was an election of President and Direc
tors in the year 1830, when the Defendants were chosen for that
year; that no other election of President and Directors was ever
liad ; that although no election took place at the expiration of the
first term of office, for one year, there was evidence to prove that all
the Defendants either continued to act as Directors, or acknow
ledged themselves as such, with the exception of Kerr, with respect
to whom there was no evidence of his having acted as a Director
after the expiration of the year, for which he had been at first
elected,—he having about that time left the Province. There was his
acknowledgment, that he had then been elected, and his name was on
the books of the Institution as one of the Directors. It appeared that
the deposit had been made by the Plaintiff on the 5th of March,
1832, who then received a deposit note, signed by Peter Stubs,
the Cashier of the Bank, for £50 ; and upon which there were
receipts for the interest, indorsed to the year 1835, and that previous
to bringing the action the Plaintiff had given the notice required
by one of the rules of the Institution.
On shewing cause in last Michaelmas Term, the Solicitor Gene
ral and George D. Street, for Defendants, contended, that by the
rules
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rules and regulations of the Charlotte County Savings Bank the
President and Directors were required to be chosen annually; that
no election having taken place subsequently to the suit in the year
1830, when the Defendants were elected, their authority ceased at
the end of the year, beyond which they had no power to act:
that consequently at the time the deposit was made, there were no
Directors. Admitting that an action might be maintained against
those persons who acted as Directors, or acknowledged themselves
to be such, after the expiration of the year for which they had been
elected, it would not lie against Kerr, against whom there was no
such evidence, and who could not be considered as a Director at
the time the deposit was made. It was also contended that no
election having been made of a President and Directors at the
expiration of the first year, pursuant to the rules and regulations of
the Institution, the same was dissolved. In support of this Rex v.
the Mayor and Burgesses of Tregony, (8 Mod. 127), the case of
the Corporation of Banbury (10 Mod. 346,) and Passmore’s case
(3 T. R. 199,) were relied upon. It was also objected, that
the Defendants were not liable inasmuch as the deposit was not
paid by the Plaintiff to the Cashier in the presence of one or more
of the Directors, as is required by the eleventh rule. Another
ground of objection was, that the President and Directors were not
Trustees within the meaning of the Act of Assembly.
In reply, it was urged by N. Parker for the Plaintiff, that the
President and Directors having been elected in 1830, they would
continue in office until others were chosen; that the rule requiring
them to be elected annually was only directory, and he cited the
case of Foot n. Prowse (1 Stra. 625), as an authority in point;
that the rule requiring the deposit to be made to the Cashier in
the presence of one or more of the Directors was merely directory,
and could make no difference when the money had been actually
paid to, and received by the Cashier of tire Institution; that it
was of no consequence by what name the officers of the Institution
are called : in the 5th section of the Act they are named Mana
gers ; the moment they received any deposit they were in fact
Trustees for the management of the same. It was also contended,
that as the names of the Defendants remained on the Books as the
only President and Directors that at any time had been elected,
there was sufficient evidence, had it been left to the jury, for them
to have presumed them to be such, wnen the right of a third person
was concerned.
Botsford J.:
In the view that I have taken of this case, I think the question
must depend upon the construction of the seventh section of the
Act of Assembly, 6. G. 4, C. 4. Whatever may be the nature of the
rules, orders and regulations of any Institution or Savings Bank,
as
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as to the mode of election and the length of service of the officers
who are to have the management of the deposits, when such rules,
orders and regulations have been duly entered, deposited and filed
in the manner required by the said Act, and for the purpose of
taking the benefit of the same, such rules, orders and regulations,
together with the Institution to which they relate, must become
subject to and be under the superintending control of its provisions.
By the seventh section of the Act it is enacted, “ thatall monies,
“ goods, chattels and effects whatsoever, and all securities for
“ money or other obligatory instruments, and evidences or nmni“ ments, and all other effects whatever, and all rights or claims be“ longing to or had by such Institution, shall be vested in the Trustee
“ or Trustees of such Institution for the time being, for the use
“ and benefit of such Institution, and of the respective Depositors
“ therein, their respective executors or administrators, according to
“ their respective claims and interests; and after the death or
“ removal of any Trustee or Trustees, shall vest in the surviving
“ Trustee or Trustees, for the same estate and interest as the former
“ Trustee or Trustees had therein, and subject to the same trusts
“ without any assignment or conveyance whatever.”
No reference is made in this Section or regard had to the time for
which the Trustees are appointed, under the rules, orders and regu
lations of their respective institutions, but the Act vests the moi.les
and effects belonging to such Institutions in the Trustee or Trustees
until death or removal. It is clear that a removal from office by
the appointment of another or others in his or their stead was
intended, otherwise the word succeeding would not apply. I am
therefore of the opinion, under this construction of the Act, that
the Defendants having been appointed, and having acted as the
President and Directors of the Charlotte County Savings Bank,
continue in office until death, or until others are appointed in their
stead.
By the rules, orders and regulations of the Charlotte County
Savings Bank, the President and Directors are to have the manage
ment of the Institution, and are made responsible for the deposit
money and interest, and are clearly Trustees within the meaning
of the 7th section of the Act..
I think the rule in this case should be made absolute for setting
aside the verdict, and for granting a new trial.
Parker, J.:
Three questions arise in this cause.
1st. Do the persons chosen to be President and Directors under
the rules of the Savings Bank, fill the office of Trustees under the
Act of Assembly, by virtue of which this and other similar Insti
tutions have been established ?
2d. Did the persons elected in May, 1830, under the third rule,
remain

254

CASES in HILARY TERM,

remain in office for one year only, or were they to be considered as
continuing in office until others were duly chosen to succeed
them ?
3d. Supposing the Defendants to have become Trustees on their
election in May, 1830, and to continue in office after the year, are
they jointly liable to this action at law of debt for the money depo
sited by the Plaintiff in the Savings Bank ?
As to the first question—It is, I think, impossible for any one to
read attentively the Act of Assembly, 6 G. 4, c. 4, passed to
encourage the establishment of Banks for savings in the Province,
without feeling satisfied that the office of Trustee is essential to the
existence of any Institution established in conformity thereto, and
entitled to the privileges thereby conferred ; neither in my opinion
can any one compaie the 3d, 5th, 7th and subsequent sections of
the Act with the 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 7tli, 9th, 11th, 12th and 13th
rules made and filed under the express direction of the Act, and
entertain any doubt that the President and eight Directors, under
whom the management of the Bank was to be, answer fully to the
description of the Trustees contemplated by the Act.
The Act does not specify any particular number of Trustees
nor the mode of their appointment,—this therefore requires to be
provided for by rule; but it does distinctly vest in them all the
monies, goods, chattels and effects whatever; and all securities for
money, and all rights or claims of the Institution, for the use and
benefit of the Institution and the Depositors : it gives them to a
certain extent a corporate power as to carrying on and defending
suits; it declares that they shall derive no benefit from the deposits;
it enables them to pay money into the Treasury upon debentures,
under certain regulations and restrictions which Trustees alone
could comply with ; it enables them to demand payment or renewal
of such debentures; it also authorizes them to loan the money
deposited in the Institution or other securities, and gives direction
as to the repayment of monies to the Depositors, and the distribu
tion of sums belonging to the deceased Depositors.
The 3d and 17th sections of the Act speak of Trustees or Mana
gers, where it is evident the terms are identical.
By looking at the rules we find that it is the President and Di
rectors who are to have the-management of the Institution ; they
are to be at liberty to appoint a Cashier,—they are to have the
disposal of the surplus income for the general interest of the Depo
sitors,—they are to attend with the Cashier (who is the only other
officer named, and who could not answer to the description of
Trustee because he was allowed to receive emolument from his
office,) to receive and pay deposits.
It is not pretended that any other officers were ever appointed
or thought of in the character of Trustees, and if any doubt could
«
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remain it would be removed by finding that the duty required of
the Trustees under the Act had been constantly performed by the
President and Directors, or the Cashier, who was the officer of
their appointment. The Pre-sident and Directors were uniformly
considered by the Deputy Treasurer at Saint Andrews as the
Trustees with whom he was to deal, under the provisions of the
Act, and they or such of them as attended to that part of the busi
ness in their transactions with the Deputy Treasurer used the very
name of Trustees.
In fact it is impossible that the persons elected as President and
Directors, could perform the duties required of them by the rules
and regulations, unless they were clothed with the power and
authority vested in the Trustees by the Act.
Under all these circumstances I must confess I see no weight in
this objection, which was urged in shewing cause to the rule, and
which appears also to have been made at the trial, but overruled
by the learned Judge who tried the cause.
The principal objection to the action, and that on which the
verdict has proceeded, undoubtedly arises on the second question,
and I have considered with much attention the argument of the
Counsel and the authorities which have been cited.
It would probably strike any one on first reading the 3d rule, as
it did the learned Judge at Nisi Prius, that the Defendants were
Trustees for the year only; but I think on full consideration, and
having regard to the nature of a Trustee’s office, both reason and
authority will bear out the argument of the Plaintiff’s Counsel,-—
that having been duly elected they remained in office until others
were chosen in their place, on whom the rights, authority and
responsibility would devolve.
The 7th section of the Act, already cited by Mr. Justice Botsford, clearly contemplates that the office of Trustees should be
always full, and that the property and funds of the Institution
should not pass out of the Trustees in whom they are once vested,
until there are others to take their place.
The rule relative to the election of the officers is as follows:—
cc Rule 3. That the President and Directors be annually chosen by
a
ballot out of the members, on the first Monday in May in each
ii
year.”
There are no negative words restricting them to the year only,
or directing that they shall not continue after the year. In the
absence of these or of any positive words stating that they are to
continue until others are appointed, we must look to analogous
cases to see what construction has heretofore been given to similar
provisions, or under like circumstances.
The case of a Mayor of a Corporation whose office is held to
cease with the year for which he is chosen, unless there are express
words
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words of continuance in the Charter, has been a good deal pressed
on us, but I think the determinations have proceeded on the nature
of the Mayor’s office, which in England is almost invariably an
annual one; and is to be taken rather as an exception to the gene
ral rule than the rule itself.
Mr. Kyd, in his work on Corporations, 2d vol. 6th page, says: “It
“ has been seen that when there is no clause enabling the Mayor ex“ pressly to hold over, that power is not incident to his office : in
“ this respect he differs from those officers who are usually chosen
“ for life, but may be directed to be chosen annually ; for in this
“ case if there be no election at the end of the year, the former are
“ to continue till others are chosen.”
He refers to the case of Foote v. Prowse, 1 Str. 625, and 2 Br.
P. C. 289, cited in the argument, which is a case of the highest
authority ; the judgment of the Court of Exchequer Chamber,
deciding that in the case of Aidermen “ the words annuatim ele“ yen di were only directory, and that an annual election of them
“ was not necessary to make an election in their presence good,”
(reversing that of the King’s Bench,) was affirmed in Parlia
ment, so that the case must have undergone the fullest consideration.
In an American work of much repute, Angelland Ames on Cor
porations, 75, a case more nearly analagous to the present is cited as
having occurred in the Supreme Court of New York, viz: the
People v. Runkin, in which it was held fl that the Trustees of a
“ Religious Society who go out of office at the end of the year,
“ hold over until others are appointed.” This is supported by the
high authority of Chancellor Kent, who carries the doctrine even
beyond the English cases.
The cases also of the Constable and the Town Clerk, cited from
,10 and 12 Mod. Rep. confirm the view of the rule. If the reason
given in the Constable’s case, who has nothing to do with the ap
pointing, be good, that he is not discharged till the new one is
sworn because the Parish cannot be without an officer, with how
much greater force may such a reason be urged in the present
case, when we consider the consequences which would ensue from
holding that the office of the Defendants ended with the year, and
when we bear it in mind that it was their duty, a3 the managers of
the Institution, to take care that the annual election was held ?
There is a well recognized distinction in construing Statutes be
tween what is imperative and what is only directory. See Dwarris
on Statutes, 613, and the cases there referred to.
By Statute 43, Eliz. c. 2, the Overseers of the Poor are to be
nominated yearly in Easter week, or within one week after Easter,
yet the Court held an appointment after the month good, and
observed particularly on the want of any negative words—Rex v.
Sparrow, 2 Str. 1123.
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can be construed into a coi imand given by Janies Ketchum to the
Defendants to enter on the locus in quo, and do the acts complained
of as a trespass in this action.
On the other point, that a tenancy at will was created by this
agreement, I had very great doubts whether such a tenancy
could, under the circumstances of this case, have been created as
to any part of the land, but it certainly could not have been created
as to the land in question, which not only had never been in the
possession of the lessor or lessee but in the actual adverse possession
of the Plaintiffs. For these reasons I think the Defendants had
failed in their grounds of opposition to the rule for granting a new
trial. It was also urged that the Court would not be inclined to
grant a new trial in this case, even though there might be legal
grounds for it, because it appeared that the verdict was agreeable
to the justice of the case ; I cannot come to such a conclusion. The
view of the case taken at the trial when the points afterwards
raised by the Defendants in support of the verdict were not
mooted, was one which rendered the decision by the jury as to the
dividing line between the Lots unnecessary, and if that be the
question on which this case should mainly rest, it would be highly
necessary that that question should be decided by a jury when it
was properly put to them, accompanied by the observations of the
Judge as to the manner in which the evidence and facts of the case
would bear on it.
I think the justice of this case requires that it should again be
submitted to a jury.
Parker, J.:
The objections which have been urged by the Defendant’s Coun
sel against making the rule for a new trial absolute, may be re
solved into the three following:
1st. That the Plaintiffs failed in making out any case against the
Defendant.
2d. That the Plaintiffs have not made out that particular case
with which they set out.
3d. That if they have made out a case, it is under such circum
stances as will induce the Court not to interfere with the verdict
As to the first, it is not contended that the Defendant did not
enter and commit acts on land in the Plaintiffs’ possession, which
would be trespasses if not justified; neither is it denied that these
acts were not in point of law justified, unless the Defendant was
owner or acting under the authority of the owner of the soil. Thau
neither of the Cornelisons was owner at the time is clear by their ■
own shewing ; the documentary evidence offered by them exhi
biting a title to the part of the Lot No. 134 in which the locus in
quo would fall (if within the line of that lot at all,) in one James
Ketchum; and there is a total absence of proof of any command,
G1
authority
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authority or assent by Ketchum to the acts of the Defendant.
But it is said that a verbal agreement was proved for the sale by
Ketchum to Defendant, of Lot No. 134, under which the Defendant
was in possession ; that this agreement made him tenant at will to
Ketchum, and that this tenancy at will authorised the acts. If
the Defendant were not tenant at will the ground must fail, and I
have no hesitation in saying that as to the locus in quo, which at
the time of the grant from the Crown to William Cornelison, and
of the suosequent assignments to Ketchum, and at the time of the
parol agreement between Ketchum and Defendant, was not in
possession of either, but in the actual possession of the Plaintiffs,
claiming it as theirs, Defendant could not be considered as tenant
at will; neither can I well conceive how a man can be tenant at
will without being tenant in possession.
The evidence was full and clear, not merely of the running of a
line by West, but of the actual erection of a fence on that line, and
the occupation and cultivation by the Plaintiffs of the locus in quo
up to the time of the acts complained of.
But when Cornelison’s right to enter is so broadly asserted, it
becomes proper to examine the foundation of it a little more closely;
and in this view let us see what a Defendant may plead in justifi
cation of an action of trespass q. c.f. He may plead soil and free
hold in himself, or soil and freehold in A, and that he entered by
command of A ; he may plead lease or license from the Plaintiff,
but I do not find it any where stated that he may plead soil and
freehold in A, and lease or license from A;— a command from
the owner is necessary, and the allegation of such command
is traversable, and the party who sets up title in a third person
must shew that he had the command, not merely the permission of
such third person. If therefore the Defendant in this case would
justify under Ketchum, he must shew such authority as will make
Ketchum responsible for his acts.
We come then t the second and perhaps the main ground on
which the Defendant relied, which is this :—That the Plaintiffs
are confined to shewing that the entry was made on the Lot No.
135 ; that there was conflicting evidence as to the true boundary
between that Lot and Lot No. 134, upon which the jury have
decided in favor of the Defendant, thereby establishing that the
entry was made on Lot No. 134, and not on Lot 135.
If the effect of our decision this day in favor of the Plaintiffs
could be considered as conveying an opinion that the true division
line between the Lots was that which was fixed by West’s and
not Morehouse’s survey, I should hesitate much to interfere
with the verdict; but as the Plaintiffs have proved a tresspass
commi tted by Defendant on land in their possession, to which Defend
ant had neither the right of property nor possession, we should be
fully
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fully satis: ii(l that they have confined themselves in the manner
which the Defendant asserts, and that the case in that view of it
was Droperly left to the jury.
When we look to the record we find that the Plaintiffs have, in
addition to the specific counts, inserted a count for trespass gene
rally on their close in the Parish of Queensbury. The Plaintiffs’
Counsel have on the argument denied expressly that they intended
to confine themselves as the Defendant alleges, although much was
no doubt said about the boundary. We are left then to determine
from the course of proceedings at the trial.
There does not, I would first observe, appear to have been any
surprise on the Defendant; both parties came to trial fully aware
of the acts complained of and the place which was entered upon. It
is evident that the Plaintiffs did call and claim their place as part of
Lot No. 135, and that the Plaintiff’s opening did not mislead the
Defendant as to the real place on which the trespass was alleged
to be ; neither does the mode of defence adopted by the Defendant
support what he now contends for; for if the true and single point
at issue was whether the locus in quo was or was not included in
Let No. 135, without reference to the title of No. 134, would the
Defendant’s Counsel have opened a defence resting mainly on the
ownership of Lot No. 134 ? Whereas if the present objection be good
it is wholly immaterial whether that Lot were owned by the De
fendant or not.
Neither did the learned Judge who tried the cause take that view
of it, for the two points on which the case would then rest would be
those which His Honor stated to the Jury for the very purpose of
withdrawing them from their consideration, telling them that the
case would not turn on those because the Defendant had failed in
making out any title to Lot No. 134. Under these circumstances,
to which I have given a very careful consideration, I think the
second objection cannot be maintained.
The third and last question is whether, supposing the Plaintiffs
to have made out a case yet taking all the circumstances together,
justice requires that there should be a new trial. Cases have been
cited to support this ground, but none I think which come quite
up to the present.
It is said that the jury have by their verdict decided the two
points stated at the trial, though not expressly left to them ;—they
must certainly be considered so .to have done, and I will not say
the conclusion they came to was a wrong one, but it is evident
both in regard to the surveys and the acquiescence, there was a
good deal of evidence and matters which would call for much obser
vation from the Judge to direct tlie minds of the jury in making up
their verdict. The jury, as I have already said, had not the benefit
of the Judge’s remarks on these points for the reason stated, neither
does
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does it appear that the Judge was requested by the Defendant’s
Counsel to review his charge, which perhaps might have been
done in reference to the first count of the declaration. Had the
distinction been then taken as to the counts, it might have led to
an abandonment of the first count, or to the difference between
them being pointed out.
Under all the circumstances I concur in thinking that the case
should go to another trial.
Chipman, Chief J ustice:
Said that he had heard nothing which induced him to alter the
view he had taken of this cause at the trial, and that as the subject
had been so fully gone into by the other Judges he would only add
that he concurred with them in opinion that there must be a new
trial.
Rule absolute for a new trial.
Solicitor General and Berton for Plaintiffs.
Parker and Wilmot for Defendants.
QUEEN v. WETMORE.
An attachment will not be granted for not obeying a subpoena where the
pai'ty is in custody at the time of service.

Botsford shewed cause against a rule obtained by G. D. Street
in last Trinity Term, calling on the Defendant Wetmore to shew
cause why an attachment should not issue against him for not
obeying a subpoena served upon him, requiring his attendance at
the last April Assizes in Charlotte; and it appearing from the affi
davits produced that Wetmore was in custody of the Sheriff at the
time of the service of the subpoena, and had stated this fact to the
person who served him,—
The Court discharged the rule with costs.

IN THE SUPREME COURT.
Michaelmas Term, 1st Victoria, Anno Domini,

1837.

ffcMJEKAA MUMS.
I. Whereas it is expedient, That every person desirous of being
admitted as an Attorney of this Court, should, before such admis
sion, be examined as to his fitness and capacity to act as such At
torney : It is Ordered, That the Judges of this Court, together with
four Barristers of not less than five years standing, to be for that
purpose appointed by rule of Court in Hilary Term in every year,
or any two of them, whereof a Judge to be one, shall be competent
to conduct the examination of any person who may have made
application for admission as an Attorney of this Court in the form
hereafter mentioned; and that from and after the last day of next
Hilary Term, subject to such appeal as hereafter mentioned, no
person shall be admitted to be sworn as an Attorney of this Court
without the production of a Certificate signed by such examiners,
testifying his fitness and capacity to act as an Attorney.
II. It is further Ordered, That the said examination shall be
held at such times and places respectively, and under such regu
lations as the Judges, or any three of them, may from time to time
appoint.
III. It is further Ordered, That in case any person shall be
dissatisfied with the refusal of the examiners to grant such Certi
ficate, he shall be at liberty to apply for admission, by petition in
writing to the Judges ; which application shall be heard by not less
than three of the Judges, at such time and place as they may
appoint.
IV. It is further Ordered, That every person who may desire
to be admitted an Attorney shall, on or before the Thursday in the
first week of the Term immediately preceding that at which he
shall propose to be admitted, make application by Petition to the
Court, in the form hereunto annexed, or to the like effect, which
Petition shall be accompanied by the requisite certificates of the
age, moral character, and service of the applicant; and the certi
ficate of moral character shall be full, positive and explicit,
and shall contain particular testimonials to the sober and temperate
habits of the applicant, and the Court, if satisfied with the certifi
cates, will, during such Term, make order for the examination of
such applicant.
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V. It is further Ordered, That the foregoing rules touching
examination, shall extend to persons who may apply for admission
upon certificates from any other part of Her Majesty’s dominions,
as well as to persons who may have pursued their studies in this
Province; and any person coming from any other part of Her
Majesty’s dominions shall produce a certificate from the Court
in which he may have become a practitioner, or one of the Judges
thereof, that he has conducted himself with credit and reputation
since his admission there.
VI. It is further Ordered, That no Attorney of this Court who
shall have been absent from the Prov ince, or have discontinued the
practice of the Law for the space of five years together, shall here
after be permitted to commence or resume practice as an Attorney
until he be re-admitted and re-sworn.
VII. It is further Ordered, That every Attorney who may de
sire to be re-admitted shall apply by Petition to the Court, stating
therein the place or places in which he may have resided, and the
business, profession or employment in which he may have been
engaged or concerned since his first admission, which Petition shall
be verified by the affidavit of the Petitioner, and shall be presented
to the Court on or before the Thursday in the first week of the
Term, immediately preceding that at which he may desire to be
re-admitted.
VIII. It is further Ordered, That every apnlicant for re-admis
sion shall be examined as to his fitness and capacity to act as an
Attorney, in the same manner as if applying for a first admission,
unless the Court shall see fit in any case to dispense with such
examination, and shall make order accordingly.
IX. It is further Ordered, That from and after the present Mi
chaelmas Term, no Attorney of any other part of Her Majesty’s
Dominions shall be admitted as an Attorney of this Court unless he
shall have entered as a Student with one of the Attornies of this
Court, having the rank of Barrister and resident and practising in
the Province, and shall have continued as such Student for one
year; the entry of every such Student to be registered with the
Clerk as in the case of other Students ; and a certificate of such
year’s study from the Barrister with whom the same may have
been performed shall be one of the testimonials necessary for the
admission of such applicant.
X. Whereas it is desirable that arguments on rules for ‘new
trials or the like, made in causes tried at the Sittings for the
County of York, should be heard and disposed of more speedily
than can be done under the present practice of the Court: It is
Ordered, That in future any party intending, after the trial had
at the said Sittings, to move the Court for a rule to shew cause
why a new trial should not be wanted, or for any rule of a like
description
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description, do give notice to the opposite party of such his inten
tion, together with a note in writing, specifying the general grounds
of the intended motion thirty days before the ensuing Term; and
that Rules Nisi granted on such motions be made returnable in the
same Term, unless the Court should see fit, with the consent of
parties, or for other good reason, to extend the time for shewing
cause to the ensuing Term.
WARD CHIPMAN.
W. BOTSFORD.
J. CARTER.

Form of Petition for admission as an Attorney.
To the Honorable the Chief Justice and Justices of the Supreme
Court.
The Petition of A. B.
Humbly Sheweth,
That your petitioner was born in
on
[state the place and day of birth\, as by the accompanying certifi
cate or affidavit will appear. That on
he entered as a
Student in the office of C. D. Esquire, a Barrister of this Court, at
in this Province, and has continued as such from that
time hitherto; during which time he has not absented himself
without the permission of the said C. D. nor been engaged in any
other profession, business or employment.
[If the applicant have studied part of the time with any other
Barrister, or been absent without permission, or engaged in any
other profession, business or employment, since commencing his
studies, he must state fully the reasons therefor, the particular
time and length of such other study, or absence, or engagement in
other pursuits, together with such other particulars as he may
think advisable, explanatory of his conduct. If the applicant have
not studied in this Province he must state the particular grounds
on which he applies for admission, the place or places in which he
may have resided and ^practised since his admission by any other
Court; and if he have been engaged bn-a ny other profession,
business or employment, he must state the particulars of the
same with any other matters explanatory of his conduct and
pursuits as he may deem necessary or advisable*}.
That your Petitioner is at present resident at
and is
desirous of being admitted an Attorney of this Honorable Court at
the ensuing
Term, and prays that your Honors will
make such order touching his examination or admission as by the
rules of the Court are required, or as to your Honors may seem
meet.
Dated the
18 .
• Noth.—If the Petitioner’s full time of study has not expired at the time or
application, he must further state his intention to continue a Student in the Bar
rister’s office until such time expires, and will he required to produce an addi
tional certificate to that effect at the ensuing Term.
Parker, J. was prevented by indisposition from attending the Court during
the latter part of this Term.
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words of continuance in tlie Charter, has been a good deal pressed
on us, but I think the determinations have proceeded on the nature
of the Mayor’s office, which in England is almost invariably an
annual one; and is to be taken rather as an exception to the gene
ral rule than the rule itself.
Mr. Kyd, in his work on Corporations, 2d vol. 6th page, says: “It
“has been seen that when there is no clause enabling the Mayor ex“ pressly to hold over, that power is not incident to his office : in
“ this respect he differs from those officers who are usually chosen
“ for life, but may be directed to be chosen annually ; for in this
“ case if there be no election at the end of the year, the former are
“ io continue till others are chosen.”
He refers to the case of Foote v. Prowse, 1 Str. 625, and 2 Br.
P. C. 289, cited in the argument, which is a case of the highest
authority ; the judgment of the Court of Exchequer Chamber, (
deciding that in the case of Aidermen “ the words annuatim ele“ gendi were only directory, and that an annual election of them
“ was not necessary to make an election in'their presence good,”
' (reversing that of the King’s Bench,) was affirmed in Parlia
ment, so that the case must have undergone the fullest consideration.
In an American work of much repute, Angell and Ames on Cor
porations, 75, a case more nearly analagous to the present is cited as
having occurred in the Supreme Court of New York, viz: the
People v. Runkin, in which it was held “ that the Trustees of a
“ Religious Society who go out of office at the end of the year,
“ hold over until others are appointed.” This is supported by the
high authority of Chancellor Kent, who carries the doctrine even
beyond the English cases.
The cases also of the Constable and the Town Clerk, cited from
10 and 12 Mod. Rep. confirm the view of the rule. If the"reason
given in the Constable’s case, who has nothing to do with the ap
pointing, be good, that he is not discharged till the new one is
sworn because the Parish cannot be without an officer, with how
much greater force may such a reason be urged in the present
case, when we consider the consequences which would ensue from
holding that the office of the Defendants ended with the year, and
when we bear it in mind that it was their duty, as the managers of
the Ins1 tution, to take care that the annual election was held ?
There is a well recognized distinction in construing Statutes be
tween what is imperative and what is only directory. See Dwarris
on Statutes, 613, and the cases there referred to.
By Statute 43, Eliz. c. 2, the Overseers of the Poor are to be
nominated yearly in Easter week, or within one week after Easter,
yet the Court held an appointment after the month good, and
observed particularly on the want of any negative words—Rex v.
Sparrow, 2 Str. 1123. -
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It is satisfactory to know that in arriving at the conclusion that
the Defendants continued in the office to which they were elected
after the year, we are only giving effect to the view which they, or
at least all those who contest the suit, took of the office them
selves.
It is not disputed that all the eight Defendants, together with
Elisha Andrews, since deceased, were duly elected in May, 1830;
and that all of them with the exception of William Kerr, who was out
of the Province, and therefore could not act, have been proved to
have acted subsequent to the year, and the three Defendants who
join issue in the suit up to the latest period.
3d. The third and last question is, whether the Defendants as
Trustees are liable to this action.
It was clearly proved that the Plaintiff duly deposited the sum
of £50 at the Bank with the Trustees, or the Cashier, their agent
and officer for this purpose. The deposit was made on the 5th
March, 1832, and interest was paid thereon for the three following
years. We are not called upon now to decide on the respective
liabilities of different sets of Trustees, should there be any doubt on
that point, as the Defendants were Trustees at the time of the
Deposit, and have so continued ever since; neither are we bound
to decide whether, under the Act of Assembly alone, the Trustees
would be liable to actions at law at the suit of Depositors, for in
the published code of rules and regulations, (the authority of which
is not questioned,) it is expressly provided, that in addition to the
security of the Provincial Government the President and Directors
should be responsible to Depositors for any sums invested in the
Bank, and such interest as may become due thereon.
The Defendants have there received the Plaintiff’s money under
an agreement to be responsible for the repayment thereof, when
duly demanded, and this in truth is the only effectual security
which the Depositors had. There is no Provincial security to
which they could resort; it was optional with the Trustees whether
they would invest the monies in Province Debentures; they do
not shew that there are any such available for the Plaintiff’s
claim, and if there are the Defendants and not the Plaintiff are
entitled to receive and appropriate the amount. It was no doubt
with the view of satisfying the Depositors that their monies would
be safely kept, or that there would be responsible persons to whom
they could, if necessary, resort, that the rules are required to be so
public that Depositors could always have access to them.
Sec. 6 of the Act provides that “ if the officer entrusted with
“ the receipt or custody of the money subscribed or deposited for
“ purposes of the Institution, shall be required by the rules and
“ regulations of such Institution to become bound with sureties for
■“ the just and faithful execution of such office, such security shall
11
and
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“ and may be given by bond or bonds to the Clerk of the Peace
“ for the time being, for the County where such Institution shall be
“ established ; and in case of forfeiture it should be lawful for the
“ persons authorized for that purpose by the rules, regulations and
“ orders of such Institution, to sue upon such bond or bonds in the
“ name of the Clerk of the Peace.”
It would doubtless have been a proper precaution to have re
quired security from the Cashier, whose default it is said has occa
sioned the present difficulties, but it was left optional by the Act
to require security or not, and we find that although it is provided
for by the rules that the President and Directors shall be at liberty
to appoint a Cashier for the conducting of the Institution, and to
pay him such salary as shall be judged sufficient, it was not
deemed fit to require him to give any securityThe President and Directors hold themselves responsible for
him, for the 7th rule must be considered as applying to a case like
the present, or their responsibility would be of little avail to the
Depositors.
On this pledge the Plaintiff has relied in making his deposit, and
to this he now resorts, as it appears to me he was clearly entitled to
do; and the President and Directors being, as I conceive they were,
the Trustees of the Bank under the Act, and sued in that capacity
for money deposited in the Bank ; this action is I think maintain
able, and the Plaintiff was entitled to a verdict.
In regard to the English Savings Bank case cited from 2 Bing.
394, the express ground of that decision was, that the only Statute
in force at the time, 9 G. 4, c. 92, made arbitration the only
remedy and ousted the jurisdiction of the Courts of Law. That
Act repealed the former Statutes from which our Act of Assembly
was copied, and introduced several new provisions, one making it
imperative on the Cashier or Treasurer to give security, and
another (S. 9,) expressly enacting “ that no Trustee or Manager
“ shall be personally liable except for his own acts and deeds, nor
“ for any thing done by him in virtue of his office in the execution
“ of this Act, except in cases where he shall be guilty of wilful
“ neglect or default.”
The observations of Lord Ch. J. Tindal are certainly strong
as to the inconvenience of subjecting Trustees of Savings Banks to
actions at law, but could not be intended to apply to cases where
their responsibility was voluntarily pledged ; they were probably
made with a view of shewing the reasonableness and propriety of
the new enactments, and may be worthy the attention of the
Legislature should the subject be again brought under their notice.
I concur with Mr. Justice Botsford,in thinking that the rule for
a new trial must be made absolute.

Carter,
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Carter J.:
I assent to tlie opinions given by my brethren. The only doubt
1 had was under the seventh section of the Act, whether the rule
could make Trustees personally liable, but my doubts are not suf
ficiently strong to induce me to dissent from the judgment given
by the rest of the Court.
Chipman, Ch. J. gave no opinion, being himself President of
the Saint John Savings Bank.
Rule absolute.
N. Parker for the Plaintiff.
The Solicitor General and A. L. and G. D. Street for the De
fendants.

GRANT v. AIKEN AND SHAW.
When A. delivers goods to B. upon an understanding that other goods
were to be given by B. in exchange, but subsequently A. renders an account
to B. of the same, which B. acknowledges to be correct and promises to
pay, A. may recover therefor under an account stated, notwithstanding in
his bill of particulars he has given the items of the account as the ground of
his demand.
A bill of particulars which gives substantial information of the Plaintiff’s
demand and does not confine the claim to any particular count, or mislead
the Defendant, is sufficient to let in evidence under any count to which the
same may be applicable.

Assumpsit for goods sold and delivered, tried before CARTER J.
at the Charlotte Circuit in April last.
On the part of the Plaintiff it was proved that an account of the
goods was rendered in 1834 to Shaw, who admitted it to be cor
rect and promised to pay the amount. On the part of the Defend
ant it was contended that the goods were a consignment to be sold
on commission, and evidence was also given of an agreement to
deliver otter goods in exchange. The learned Judge directed the
jury that if the goods were a consignment to the Defendant to be
sold on commission the Plaintiff must fail, but if the bargain was
that the Defendant should deliver other goods in exchange, the
Plaintiff was entitled to a verdict. The jury found for the Plain
tiff, damages £47.
Kinnear for the Defendant in Trinity Term obtained a rule
nisi to set aside the verdict, on the ground that the learned Judge
had mis-directed the jury to find for the Plaintiff, if the goods were
delivered in exchange for other goods.
Cause was shewn in Michaelmas Term by N. Parker.
Curia advisari vult.
In this Term the Court discharged the rule.
Chipman, Ch. J.:
It was contended on the part of the Plaintiff on shewing cause
against
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against the rule nisi for a new trial which had been obtained in this
case, that the Plaintiff was at all events entitled to retain his ver
dict, as the evidence given at the trial supports the count in the
declaration for money due on an account stated. I am of that
opinion and therefore I do not think it necessary to discuss the
ground upon which the rule was originally granted. It was
proved that the Defendant Shaw had admitted the correctness of
the account given in evidence, and said that he would pay it,
which is sufficient evidence to support the count on an account
stated. But it w’as contended on the part of the Defendant that
the Plaintiff had estopped himself by the particulars which he had
given of his demand from recovering on this count. The bill of
particulars is in the following form:—“ Messrs. Aiken & Shaw,
To Alexander Grant,
Dr.
£19 0 0
1 piece Oxford Cloth, 19 yards @ 20s.
1 do. Olive Do.
15 15 0
1 do. White Flannel,
2 9 6
1 do. Brown Holland,
2 13 5
7 13 0
1 do. Bombazette,

£47 10 11”
Subjoined to this bill is the following statement:—
“ The above are the particulars of the Plaintiff’s demand in this
“ action, and the Plaintiff intends insisting upon each and every of
“ the counts in the declaration in this cause for the recovery of the
“ same.”
It is to be observed that the bill of parcels, furnished as the bill
of particulars, as above set forth, does not limit the demand to any
count in the declaration. There is a very late case, Fisher v.
Wainwright, (1 Tyr. & Gr. 606, 1 Mees. & Weis. 480.) which
shows that a bill of particulars, which gives substantial information
of the Plaintiff’s claim, and does not confine the claim to any par
ticular count, or otherwise mislead the Defendant, will be sufficient
to let in evidence under any count to which the evidence may be
applicable, even without any express notice that the Plaintiff
means to avail himself of every count in his declaration; but when
such an express notice is given, as in the present case, it excludes
all doubt. The case of Sideways v. Todd, 2 Starkie, N. P. C.
402, is a case where a siiHilar notice was given. If it were neces
sary to cite an authority for supporting a verdict on a count which
had not been adverted to at the trial, the case of Brown v. Hodgson,
4 Taunton 189, furnishes such an authority. This case also sup
ports the general doctrine, in regard to bills of particulars, which I
have before stated. In every point of view therefore, there is ex
press authority for retaining this verdict upon the count for an
account
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account stated, and I am of opinion that tlife rule for a new trial
must be discharged.
BOTSFORD, J.:

I am of the same opinion. There is no question that the verdict
can be supported upon the evidence on the account stated, and
therefore there is no occasion to consider the charge of the Judge.
Parker J. not having been present at the argument in this
cause, gave no opinion.
Rule discharged.
N. Parker, Berton and Whitlock for Plaintiff.
Kinnecir, Wilmot and J. Chandler for Defendants.

MERRITT v. WOODS.
In an action by the payee against the maker, a promissory note is admis
sible in evidence on the common money counts, although it is in the body of
it made payable at a particular place; the right of recovery, however, is
suspended until presentment be made at the place, on or after the time of
payment.
This was an action of Assumpsit.

The Plaintiff’s declaration contained one count on a promissory
note made by the Defendant, payable to the Plaintiff at his, the
Plaintiff’s store, in Saint John, but without any averment of a
presentment for payment at the place specified, after the note be
came due. There were the common money counts also, and the
account stated. The Plaintiff’s bill of particulars stated three notes
payable at certain times therein mentioned, at the Plaintiff's store.
At the trial before Parker J. at the sittings after last Hilary Term,
on the note set out in the first count of the Plaintiff’s declaration
being given in evidence, Berton for the Defendant objected, that
this being a note payable at a particular place, it was material for
the Plaintiff to shew that the note when due had been presented
at that place for payment; that in order to admit such proof, the
Plaintiff should specially have averred a presentment in his decla
ration. In the absence of such averment the proof was inadmissi
ble, and the Plaintiff therefore was not entitled to recover the
amount of the said note. Two other notes stated in the bill of
particulars were also offered in evidence, to which it was objected
that be’ng payable at a particular time and place, a presentment
for payment was a condition precedent to the Plaintiff’s right to
recover, and that the Plaintiff should have declared specially on the
notes and have averred the presentment.
Saunders and Wright, for the Plaintiff, admitted generally the
necessity of presentment of a note payable at a particular place,
but contended that the notes offered in evidence being payable at
the Plaintiff’s store, a presentment was not necessary,—it would be
but
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out a presentment to the Plaintiff himself. They contended,
moreover, that although the Plaintiff might fail on the special
count for want of the averment of presentment, he was entitled
to give all the three notes in evidence under the money counts, and
to shew a presentment thereof at the time and place appointed.
The learned Judge rejected the notes offered under the common
counts, as he could see no distinction between a note payable at
the Plaintiff’s store, and a note payable at any other place. He
was of opinion that a presentment at the place was necessary to
entitle the Plaintiff to recover, and that this ought to have been
specially averred. Whereupon the Plaintiff was non-suited.
A rule nisi was obtained in Trinity Term by Solicitor General
and Wright, for Plaintiff, to set aside the non-suit and grant a new
trial.
Cause was shewn in Michaelmas Term, by Wilmot, for De
fendant, and in this Term the Court made absolute the rule.
Chipman, Chief Justice:
The original character of promissory notes was that of evidence
of money lent. It was an additional privilege conferred on them
by the Statute 3 & 4 of Anne, c. 9, that they might be declared
upon as special instruments. [Clerke v. Martin; 2 Lord Raym.
758; Carter v. Palmer; 12 Mod. 380; Grant v. Vaughan; 3 Burr
1525; Story 0. Atkins, 2 Lord Raym. 1430; Harris v. Hub
bard, 1 Burr 373 ; Morgan v. Jones, I Tyrr. 28; 1 C. & J. 162.]
And it is said by Bolland B. in Morgan v. Jones, that the form
of promissory notes was the same before the Statute, that it is
since.
Why is a promissory note evidence of money lent? Because it
binds the maker to pay money at all events, and therefore the pre
sumption fairly arises, that the reason for the maker so binding
himself is, that he had received upon loan money which he had
thus undertaken to repay. Bayley B. in Morgan v. Jones, ex
presses himself to this effect: “ If this had been” says the learned
“ Baron, “ an ordinary promissory note to pay money at all events,
“ I should have agreed with the opinion of Lord Holt, (in Clerke
“ v. Martin,) and with the dictum of Lord Mansfield, (in Grant v.
“ Vaughan,) that a note is prima facie evidence of money lent by
“ payee to maker ; but as this sum is only payable at the end of
“ nine years, in the event of the return of David Morgan not
“ taking place, or the certificate of his death in the interim, the
“ presumption that the security was given for money lent does not
“ arise, for the borrower of money is bound to repay at all events."
There is nothing in the circumstance of the undertaking being
to pay, at a particular time and place, which rebuts the presump
tion of money lent, as the undertaking to pay upon a contingency
does. The undertaking is absolute when the time elapsed, and a
demand has been made at the appointed place.
In
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In the present case the presentment was sufficiently proved, or
the Plaintiff was ready to prove it, by shewing that the notes were
exhibited to the Defendant at the appointed place after they be
come due, and I am quite of opinion that the promissory notes in
question should have been received as evidence of money lent by
the Plaintiff to the Defendant. I therefore think that there must
be a new trial upon this ground, without adverting to the other
grounds upon which the application was made.
Botsford, J.:
The authorities are clear, that when the place of payment is
mentioned in the body of the note, it is part of the condition on
which it is made payable, and presentment for payment must be
made at that particular place.
The question whether, as between the payee and the maker, a
promissory note, payable at a particular time and place specified
in the body of the note, and not set out in the declaration, can be
given in evidence on the money counts, is one in which I have met
with much difficulty in coming to a decision, as no authority is to
be found precisely in point. In Carter v. Palmer, 12 Mod. 380,
which was an action on a note made by the Defendant and paya
ble to the bearer, and in which the Plaintiff grounded his action
upon the custom of Merchants, as if it were a Bill of Exchange,
it was said by Ilolt, Ch. J. “we will take such a note prima
•"■facie for evidence of money lent, and though they have declared
“ on the custom, yet we must take care that by such a drift the
“ Law of England be not changed, by making all notes Bills of
“ Exchange.’1’
In Clerke v. Martin, 2 Lord Ray, 757, one count w’as upon a
general indebitatus assumpsit for money lent; another count was
upon the custom of merchants as upon a Bill of Exchange, and
shewed that the Defendant gave a note for a sum of money paya
ble to the Plaintiff or order. Holt, C. J. said, “ that the con“ tinuing to declare upon these notes, upon the custom of mer“ chants, proceeded from obstinacy and opinionativeness, since he
“ had always expressed liis opinion against them, and since there
“ was so easy a method as to declare upon a general indebitatus
“ assumpsit for money lent.” The doctrine as laid down by Lord
C. J. Holt, in the above cited cases, is recognized by Mr. Justice
Wilmot in Grant v. Vaughan, 3 Burr. 1526, where he says:
“ even before the Statute 3 & 4 Anne, Lord C. J. Holt himself
“ thought that an indebitatus assumpsit for money lent, or for
“ money had and received, might be maintained upon such a note.”
In Story v. Atkinson, Strange 725, it was held by Raymond, C.
J. that the Statute 3 & 4 Anne “ only gives an additional remedy
“ upon promissory notes, but does not take away the old one.”
In Morgan v. Jones, 1 Cromp. & Jer. 169, ft was said by Bolland
B.
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B. “ long before the Statute the practice had prevailed amongst
“ traders of sending these instruments into the world, and Courts of
“ Justice entertained and acted upon them. They stood before
“ the Statute on exactly the same footing as at present, as to being
“ evidence on the money counts.”
From an examination of the above cited authorities, I am led to
the conclusion, that before the Statute of 3 & 4 Anne, c. 9, notes
payable to bearer, or order, were admitted in evidence on the
money counts, as between the payee and the maker,—Lord C. J.
Holt having, in the most complete manner, expressed himself
against the method of declaring upon them, upon the custom of
merchants, as being an innovation upon tlie rules of the Common
Law; and that the Statute of 3 & 4 Anne, did not take away the
old remedy upon promissory notes, but that they now stand on the
same footing with respect to being evidence on the money counts,
as they did before the passing of tlie Statute.
I am therefore, upon the whole, of opinion that the notes offered
in evidence by the Plaintiff at the trial of this cause were ad
missible, and ought to have been received as evidence on the
money counts.
Carter, J.:
I am entirely of the same opinion, and founded upon the same
authorities. These notes should have been- received in evidence
under the common counts.
Parker, J.:
No case being discoverable in which a promissory note made,
payable in the body of it at a particular place, had been received in
evidence under the common counts, and it being so clearly laid
down that in declaring on such a note it was necessary even in an
action against the maker, to aver as well as prove presentment at
the place; a marked distinction also being made between notes in
which the place of payment is stated in the body and at the foot of
the instrument; I was certainly induced to think at the trial that
the notes ought to have been specially declared on, and a present
ment at the place averred.
But on full consideration I am not able to discover any good
reason for saying that while a promissory note, though payable at
some time after the date, shall be evidence prima facie under the
money counts for the sum by such note payable, yet that the addi
tion of a place of payment shall render the note less evidence of
the consideration. In the first case though the note imports so
much money lent or received, and the promise is to be implied at
the time the note was given, [3 B. & Ad. 513,] yet the right of action
is suspended until the time of payment specified in the note is past;
in the latter there is a further suspension of the action until payment
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is demanded at the place, on or subsequent to the day of pay
ment. In a case like the present no formal demand is necessary ;
it would be sufficient to shew that the note was at the place of
payment, where the promissor could receive it on paying the
amount. I would observe that the case of Sanderson v. Bowes, on
which much reliance was placed at the trial, was that of a note
payable to R. N., oi bearer, and the action brought by the bearer,
consequently not between the original parties ; it differs therefore
irom this case in that very material particular. Roche & Camp
bell, 3. Camp. 247, was between indorsee and indorsor, and there
fore the common counts could not then be resorted to.
As it was proved in the case before the Court that the two notes
were lying at the store of the Plaintiff, where they were made
payable, at a day subsequent to their becoming due, when the De
fendant was present, and that they remained unpaid, I think I
ought to have received them in evidence under the common
counts.
On the other points, namely, the reception of oral testimony to
prove the contents of an account or memorandum in existence,
and in the Plaintiff’s possession, on which it was attempted to
found an admission for the Defendant, I should like to have heard
the Counsel again, though I do not conceive it was very material
in this case as the witness did state that the Defendant in fact
made no admission. The authorities for admitting such testimony
certainly go further than I thought; I have not however examined
them with much attention, agreeing with the rest of the Court on
the first point, that the rule for setting aside the non-suit must be
be made absolute.
Rule absolute
Saunders and Wright, for Plaintiff.
Berton, for Defendant.

CAMPBELL

WILSON.

In an action brought in this Province for the value of goods sold and deli
vered in England, the Plaintiff is entitled to recover such a sum currency
as would be equivalent to the demand in sterling, according to the actual
rate of exchange between this Province and England at the time of the trial.
The jury having allowed in the estimate of damages, a sum sufficient to
cover the difference of exchange, to which it appeared that the Plaintiff was
clearly entitled, the Court refused to reduce the amount of verdict by striking
off this allowance, on the mere ground that the bill of particulars did not
contain such a specific charge ; the account set out in the particulars being
dated at Liverpool, and made up in sterling money.
Such an allowance may be recovered under the common count, for goods
sold and delivered without any specific averment that the debt was contracted
in sterling money, or any allegation of the relative value of sterling and cur
rency, this is matter of evidence.
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The place where the debt is payable, when not necessary to support the
right to recover but only to regulate the amount, need not be alleged in the
declaration.
This was an action of Assumpsit, tried before Chipman Chief

Justice, at the last Circuit Court in Saint John.
The Plaintiff resided in England, the Defendant in New Bruns
wick. The Plaintiff’s claim was for goods sold and shipped to
Defendant, to be paid for by him in England. A verdict was
entered for the Plaintiff for £818 19s. 8<Z., which amount included
an allowance for premium of bills on England at 121 per cent., to
be deducted from the amount of the verdict, if the Court should be
of opinion that the Plaintiff was not entitled to such an allowance.
A rule nisi was obtained in last Michaelmas Term by A. Parker,
for Defendant to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial, or
reduce the damages by the amount of the premium allowed by the
jury. The learned Counsel urged that in no case between a cre
ditor in England and a debtor in this Province had the Court
entertained a claim for premium, and there was no alteration in the
circumstances which would justify the introduction of a new prac
tice in the Province. Secondly, the Plaintiff had not declared on
any special contract, nor had he alleged in his declaration that the
debt was payable in any particular place. His bill of particulars
charged a specific amount, without stating whether in sterling or
currency, and contained no claim for premium on bills.
Cause was shewn at this Terra by the Solicitor General and
''William, B. Kinnear.
The Court confined the attention of the learned Counsel to the
objection to the premium on bills. They considered the bill of
particulars to be in sterling money, because from the various mat
ters appearing on the face of it and in evidence, the Defendant
could not have been misled as to Plaintiff’s claim ; and as to the
want of a special count to authorize the recovery of the premium,
that the true question was, whether the amount claimed in cur
rency, including the premium, was not the value of the sterling
money claimed by the Plaintiff. The learned Counsel argued that
every contract must be construed and have its full effect according
to the law of the country where it is made ; but the manner of re
covering according to the law of the country where the action is
brought. The full effect of the contract in the present case enti
tled the Plaintiff to recover as much here as would give him the
full amount of the debt due him, in the country where the debt was
contracted. The place of contracting the debt was the place of
payment, unless there was some special agreement to the contrary.
This principle was fully recognized in Scott v. Beaven, 2 Barn &
Ad. 78. The learned Counsel also cited Story on Conflict of
Laws, 254.
A. Parker, was heard in support of the rule.

Chipman,
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Chipman, Ch. J.:
I consider the case of Scott v. Bevan, 2 B. & Ad. 78, as quite
decisive of the main question in this case, that is, the right of the
Plaintiff to retain his verdict for the allowance made by the jury
for the premium of Bills on England. Lord Tenterden in deliver
ing the judgment of the Court in that case expresses himself as
follows: “ The practice has probably been in favor of the Plaintiff,
but there is no case that decides the question. Upon the whole
“ we think the Defendant’s mode of computation approximates most
“ nearly to a payment in Jamaica, in the currency of that Island,
“ though speaking for myself personally, I must say that I still
“ hesitate as to the propriety of the conclusion. ## It is true,
“ undoubtedly, that if the Plaintiff should wish to send the money
“ which he may receive under the judgment of this Court, to Ja“ maica, where the money was originally due, the mode to be
“ adopted according to the most general and practicable, if not the
“ only usage, would be to get some person resident in that Island
“ to draw upon him for the amount of the sterling money recovered
“ here, and this might be done by bills drawn at the Exchange, on
“ which the Defendant relies, and which is at the rate of more than
“ £140, namely, about £160 currency to £100 sterling, so that a
“ less number of hundreds ofpounds sterling, than in the propor“ tion of £140 to £100, wouldplacehim in the situation ofreceiving
“ his principal and interest, to wit, £1,836 10s., currency in the
“ Island of Jamaica. The rule therefore must be made absolute
“ for a new trial.”
This judgment establishes the principle, that when a debt origi
nally due and payable in one country is recovered in another
country, the amount to be paid to the creditor in the country
where the debt is recovered should be such a sum as will enable
him to realise the amount of the debt, without either increase or
diminution in the country where the debt was originally payable;
and it further determines that a computation, founded on the rate
of exchange between the two countries, will most nearly approxi
mate to the true measure of justice between the parties founded
upon this principle. The verdict in the present case has been
made up on this principle, and by this mode of computation, and
although it will introduce a new practice in this Province, as it
seems the case of Scott v. Bevan did in England, it is a practice
so obviously just that I have no hesitation in adopting it.
Then it is objected that the Bill of particulars in this case does
not contain a claim for a premium on bills. But I conceive that
the bill of particulars does virtually include this claiim inasmuch
as the whole tenor of it shews that the debt which the Plain tiff was
seeking to recover was due and payable in England. Neverthe
less, as this is a case in which the rule heretofore acted upon by
the
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the Courts in this Province was sought to he changed, if the De
fendant had shewn by affidavit that he was actually misled, and
was not prepared to meet such a demand at the trial, I should have
been inclined to yield to the objection. There being no such affi
davit the bill of particulars must have its unrestrained operation.
It was further objected, that in order to let in such a demand it
is necessary that the place where the debt is payable should be
alleged in the declaration. This might be necessary if the place
were material to support the right to recover at all, but where it
is only material for regulating the amount which is to be paid, it
must be matter of evidence only, and it cannot be necessary to
allege it in the declaration.
For these reasons I am of opinion that this rule for reducing the
verdict cannot be supported on any of the grounds which have
been urged in favor of it, and must be discharged.

Botsford,

J.:

I am of the same opinion. The debt for which this action was
orougnt was contracted by the Defendant at Liverpool, in England,
where the Plaintiff resides, and by the terms of the contract, no
doubt, was to have been paid there. Had the Defendant per
formed his part of the agreement, by remitting the amount in
specie, or bills of exchange, the remittance must have been made
by him according to the current rate of exchange between sterling
money and the currency of this Province, and would not only have
included the usual exchange, but the premium upon bills. Now
would it not be unjust that the Plaintiff, who has been obliged to
pursue his remedy in this country against the Defendant for the
recovery of his debt, should be compelled to take a less sum than
would be sufficient to procure a remittance, equal in amount and
value to the debt at Liverpool, where the same was payable ?—it
certainly would, and I think the jury have done right in making
the premium a part of their verdict.
Had the Defendant been misled by the Plaintiff’s bill of parti
culars, I think that there would be something in the objection.

Carter

J.:

I had doubts if the omission of the charge of premium in the
Plaintiff’s particulars were not fatal, and on a slight affidavit I
would so have considered it; but in the absence of any statement
that he was misled, I must consider the particulars as sufficient.
It is a new rule which is now introduced ; the allowance of pre
mium is not justified by the former practice of the Court, but is
founded in equity and justice, and is fully supported by the case of
Scott v. Bevan.

Parker J.:
There can be no question as to the justice of the claim of the
English
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English creditor, who is compelled to seek for payment of Lis debt
in this country, to recover as much of the current money of the
country as is really equivalent to sterling money in England ; and
I should regret much if we were precluded by any technical rule of
changing sterling into currency from allowing it.
I am aware that the Court here has made objection to the allow
ance of more than the 9tli, which was at the earliest settlement of
the Province considered the fair difference, making the rate of the
dollar at 4s. 6ff. sterling; but the point has never I believe been
solemnly argued, and the application was made prior to the case of
Scott v. Bevan, 2 B. & Ad. 78, in which the subject is fully dis
cussed.
I never could reconcile myself to the decision of the Court here,
which certainly had the effect of giving a direct premium to those
who withheld payment of their debts until legal proceedings were
taken in the Province, and must have had, to some extent, an in
jurious effect on the commercial relation between the two countries.
Supposing the goods to have been shipped either at an agreed
price, or the quantum valebant, and the invoices to be made out
with the charges in sterling money, the intention and meaning of
the parties is fully understood. The English merchant does not
mean that an item charged in his invoice at £9 sterling, is to be
taken as £10 currency of New Brunswick, neither does the mer
chant here so understand it. The pound currency is (as was said
in Scott v. Eevan,) an imaginary coin. If that case is to be neld
good law, and as laying down the rule to govern the Courts in Eng
land, let us see what the effect here would be, of our deciding in
favor of the Defendant.
The judgment of the Plaintiff would be for £727 19s. 9<Z, only,
as equal to £654 3s. 1 Id. sterling, yet if the Plaintiff were obliged
to have recourse on this judgment in England, he would not re
cover the £654 3s. 11 d. sterling, but only so much sterling as
£727 19s. 9d. currency would be equal to at the current rate of
exchange.
There is another circumstance worthy of remark in the present
case, that in the items in the bill of particulars are sums paid other
persons for the articles sent, is the Plaintiff to recover 12 per cent,
less on the goods sent to the Defendant than he has actually him
self paid for them ? yet this must be the consequence of adopting
the Defendant’s rule of computation.
I have not felt much difficulty on the record; on the bill of par
ticulars I have entertained some doubts, and were there reason to
suppose that the Defendant was misled, or suffered the least injus
tice by the rate of premium allowed, I should have been disposed
to accede to the present application, but nothing of the kind ap
pears. The heading of the account states the residence of the
Plaintiff
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Plaintiff as Liverpool, which, wnen coupled with the circumstance
of the interest being all calculated at the English rate of five per
cent., and the whole complexion of the account, could not well lead
to any misconception as to the nature of the demand.
Besides as the rate of exchange was constantly fluctuating, and
was to be taken as it was, not at the time of bringing the
action or delivery of the bill of particulars, but at the trial, the par
ticulars could not well contain the exact amount of this charge,
though it might have been as well had they noticed it.
As however nothing would have been easier than for the De
fendant to have produced an affidavit to that effect if he was
unprepared for such a charge, and as we are called on not to grant
a new trial where the matter ought again to be investigated, but
to disallow the charge altogether, I concur in thinking that suffi
cient ground has not been shewn for so far interfering with the
verdict.
Rule discharged.
Solicitor General and Kinnear for Plaintiff.
Parker for Defendant.

CHANDLER u. BECKWITH.
A accepted a Bill in favor of B, payable at a particular time and place,
and delivered it to C to be delivered to the payee on the execution of cretaiu bonds, which were duly executed and delivered. The bill became dueon the 3d November.
Held 1. That the bill was in the hands of C. as an escrmiL. it had ex
istence as a paper-writing, but not as a binding contract until the execution
of such bonds ; when that condition was performed it became a binding con
tract, according to its full tenor and effect.
2. The decision in the case of Rowe i>. Young, 2 B. & B. 165, is binding
in this Province, the law not having been altered here by Legislative enactrni nt, therefore an acceptance payable at a particular place, is a qualified
acceptance.
3. Plaintiff averred a presentment for payment on 2d November. Held
he was not bound to prove the precise day, the objection could only avail on
special demurrer; the material fact to be proved was a presentment when
the bill Lad become due.
4. The bill was presented on 2d November to the Defendant, at the place
of payment, and the bonds before spoken of left with him; on the 3d, at the
same place, he returned the bonds, and said the bill would not be paid.
Held that although the bill was not there exhibited, yet the express refused to
pay was a waiver of any objection on that ground.

THIS was an action on a bill of exchange, drawn by W. J.
Layton on the Defendant, in favor of the Plaintiff, for the sum of
£251 5s. which was accepted by the Defendant in the following
words: “ accepted, payable at my office.” The bill became due
on the 31st October, and the 3d November, 1836, was the last
day of grace.
At
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At the 1 -ial before Parker J. at the Kent Circuit, in August,
1837, it appeared that the acceptance was given by the Defendant
to Joseph Cunard, to be delivered to the Plaintiff as the conside
ration for the purchase of certain lands, on the execution by the
Plaintiff of certain bonds for the conveyance of such lands to the
Plaintiff. The acceptance remained for some time in the hands of
Cunard. The Plaintiff and the drawer of the note met at Cunard’s
office, and there Layton the drawer, who had, as the agent of the
Defendant, agreed for the purchase of the land, protested against
the Bill being delivered to the Plaintiff, and insisted that the con
tract was at an end. Cunard, in pursuance of his instructions said
that if the bonds were given he must deliver the acceptance, and
on a tender of the bonds by the Plaintiff he delivered the bill to
him. Some evidence was given on behalf of the Defendant of a
mutual agreement to rescind the whole contract, but not very satis
factory.
On the 2d day of November Starritt, an agent for the Plaintiff,
called upon the Defendant and presented the bill for payment,
which Defendant refused; he left with Defendant at the same time
the bonds which had previously remained in the Plaintiff’s posses
ion. On the following day he again called and got the bonds, he
did not on that day present the bill, but Defendant when he re
turned the bonds said the bill would not be paid. Payment was
not required on the third day. The learned Judge reserved the
point as to the allegation of presentment, and directed the jury that
the acceptance was not conditional; but merely qualified, and that
the Plaintiff was entitled to recover on proof of presentment at the
place unless the jury should think that both parties had agreed to
rescind the contract, which would be a matter for their considera
tion on the evidence ; he considered the evidence of presentment
was sufficient to enable the Plaintiff to recover. The jury found
for the Plaintiff. On the second count of his declaration, in which
count he averred a presentment to the Defendant, for payment at
the office of the Defendant in Fredericton on the 2d day of
November. In Michaelmas Term J. A. Street, for Defendant,
obtained a rule nisi to set aside the verdict on the following
grounds:
1st. That the Plaintiff, in opening his case, stated that the ac
ceptance was a conditional one, as set out in' the first count of the
declaration, and having failed in proving the performance of the
condition, could not set it up as merely a qualified acceptance.
2d. That there was no consideration for the acceptance.
3d. That no presentment for payment after the bill became due
was averred or proved.
The learned Counsel contended that the acceptance being condi
tional, it was necessary to aver the condition and performance. It
appeared
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appeared that when certain bonds were executed, Cunard was autho
rized to give up the bill. This rendered it a conditional accept
ance—Chitty on Bills, 331 ; 4 Camp. 176 ; 1 Marsh 176.
At the time of making the acceptance no consideration had
passed, and before the delivery of the bill by Cunard the agree
ment was repudiated by the Defendant.
The Plaintiff was not entitled to recover upon the second count,
inasmuch as the presentment was alleged and proved to have been
made before, and not after or when the bill became due. The
party was not liable to pay at the time of the presentment.
Cause was shewn by Chandler, for the Plaintiff, in this present
Term.
Layton was employed to purchase property for the Defendant.
He purchased from Plaintiff and drew on the Defendant for the
amount of the consideration. Defendant accepted the bill abso
lutely, but gave Cunard, by whom the bill was presented for
acceptance, verbal instructions not to deliver the bill to payee
until certain bonds were placed in his hands. The instructions to
Cunard formed no part of the acceptance, but merely restrained
the delivery of the bill until the performance of the act required,
and then became, an absolute acceptance. This was the grand
distinction between the present and the cases cited on the other
side. In those cases the acceptances were delivered, and a condi
tion formed part of the contract of acceptance. If the Defendant
intended a qualified acceptance, he should so have expressed it on
the Bill.
•
[Chipman, Ch. J.—The Court are of opinion that it is not
necessary to trouble you further on the first and second points.]
As to the third point the acceptor of a bill of exchange is ordi
narily as the maker of a promissory note, ar.d if a bill be accepted
or a note made payable generally, no presentment need be averred,
or if averred unnecessarily may be treated as surplusage. This is
a general acceptance ; to make it a special acceptance it should
have been payable at a particular place, and “ not elsewhere.”
But even if this should be treated as a special acceptance, the
averment was good, and the evi lence under it sufficient. The
general principle is, that in alleging time the precise day is not
material, except in stating the day of the demise in ejectment, in
prosecutions under the usury laws, or in the description of a written
instrument when the exact day is professedly set out, as in describ
ing a bill or note bearing date on a particular day. Stevens on
Pleading, 292. Chitty on Pending, 287, 8, 2 Campbell, 307, 8.
In an action against an acceptor of a bill payable after sight, an
allegation that it was accepted on the day of the date will be sus
tained by proof of an acceptance on a subsequent day, 1 Star. N.
P. C. 46. So in an action on a bill or note it is not necessary to
describe
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describe the instrument as bearing date on the exact day, 6 M.
&. S. 75.
Even in cases of usury, where time is the very gist of the ac
tion, it has recently been doubted whether the precise day need be
proved as laid, Fox v. Keeling, 2 Adol- & El. 676. Matter
of description must be literally proved ; matter of substance sub
stantially—Purcelle v. M‘Namara, 9 East. 60; 2 B. & C. 4.
3 B. & C. 4. An allegation of acceptance is not a matter of
description, 4 B. & C. 313; Rose. Ev. 50. A mistake in the
allegation of the day of presentment is of no consequence
even on special demurrer—1 Bing, 23.
In Fenton v. Goundry 13 E. 460, a bill was drawn payable four
months after date, and a presentment was alleged on the day it
was dated, being four months before it was due. On demurrer it
was held that the exact day was not material. The words “ duly
presented” and the averment that payment was duly required,
were the substance of the allegation—6 M. & S. 210; 3 Bing.
475. Then as to the proof, under this averment the Defendant,
on the third day of grace, declared that the bill would not be paid.
Therefore, even considering the acceptance to be special, the refu
sal of the Defendant relieved the Plaintiff from the necessity of any
further presentment.
J. A. Street, in reply:—
The Plaintiff ii. his second count averred the performance of
certain acts—he recovered entirely on that count—he averred a
presentment on the 2d November, and the breach complained of
was the non-payment on that day, when in fact the bill was not
due.
[Parker J.—How do you get over the case Bynner v
Russell, 1 Bing. 23 ?]
There the averment was of a presentment after the bill became
due and payable.
[Parker J.—The Court held the day immaterial, being stated
under a videlicet^
The precise day is not material, but it must be a day subsequent
to that on which the bill became due.
[Chipman J.—In Fenton v. Goundry it was held immaterial on
general demurrer. I have not any doubt on the subject.]
As to the acceptance being conditional, it is true the acceptance
is not on the face of it conditional, but the Plaintiff has treated it
as such. He so opened his case and so put it to the jury, and
gave evidence to shew the condition performed.
[Parker J.—It might have been a defence to have shewn the
acceptance improperly delivered.]
[Chipman C. J.—The declaration has several counts—the evi
dence spoken of applied to other counts—the second count does
Ll
not
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not treat it as a conditional acceptance, and the question is, can
the Plaintiff support his verdict under that count ?]
As to the consideration, a failure of consideration will avoid a
hill. When this acceptance was made there was no bond in exist
ence.
[Chipman C. J.—The bond was made before the bill was deli
vered ; the condition being performed has relation to the date of
the instrument.]
Before the delivery of the bond the Defendant had a right to
repudiate the contract—Chitty on Con. 11 & 12. This»agent did
repudiate the contract before the bonds were given or tendered,
and Cunard’s authority to deliver the acceptance was thereby at
an end.
As to the presentment, if the averment be sufficient, there was
no proof of a presentment on or after the last day of grace, and the
Defendant’s declaration was not sufficient to do away with thu
necessity of such presentment. He did not see the bill after it
became due. Had it been presented he might have repented of
his determination and paid the bill.
On a subsequent day the Court delivered their opinions.
Chipman, Ch.idi ■ i
This was an action on a bill of exchange drawn by W. J. Lay
ton on the Defendant, in favor of the Plaintiff, for £251 5s. at
thirty days sight, and accepted by the Defendant in the following
terms: P Accepted, payable at my office, F. E. Beckwith, 1st
October, 1835.” The bill thus accepted was lodged in the hands
of Joseph Cunard, and the following memorandum in the hand
writing of Mr. Cunard, and signed by him, were given in evidence:
“ The enclosed acceptances for £251 5s. (the bill in question in
“ this cause,) and £50 5s., are to remain in my hands until Mr.
“ Chandler shall have duly executed a bond for the property on
“ which they are a payment, J. Cunard, 1st October, 1835)11
Mr. Cunard proved that a bond was tendered to Layton, as the
Defendant’s agent, about three weeks after the acceptance was
given, and that he thereupon delivered the bill in question to the
Plaintiff.
‘
Under these circumstances the bill was clearly put in the hands
of Cunard as an escrow. It had existence as a paper writing, but
it did not exist as a binding contract until the condition was per
formed by the execution of their bond, but when that condition
was performed it became a binding contract according to its full
tenor and effect. It was also upon a sufficient consideration, that
consideration being the very performance of the condition upon
which the instrument was to be clothed with its legal force, namely,
the execution of the bond. It was open to the Defendant to inva
lidate lhe consideration, or to shew that the condition upon which
the
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the bill was to be delivered to the Plaintiff had not been performed,
by shewing that the bond was not what it ought to have been
according to the agreement of the parties; but this was not at
tempted.
It was then contended that as in the second count in the decla
ration, upon which count the verdict was taken, the Plaintiff had
alleged the presentment for payment to have been on the 2d No
vember, which was the day before the bill became due, he could
not be permitted to prove a presentment on the day on which the
bill became due.
Without doubt the final decision of the House of Lords in the
case of Rowe v. Young, 2 B. & B. 165, is binding here, the law
not having been altered in this Province by Legislative enactment.
The acceptance in the present case, therefore, must be deemed a
qualified acceptance as to place, and to render the acceptor liable,
there must have been a presentment at the place specified in the
acceptance. I cannot yield to the distinction which was made by
the learned Counsel for the Plaintiff, that in order to bring the case
within the decision of Rowe v. Young, the acceptance must import
that the bill should be paid by a third person at a different place
from the acceptor’s residence or place of business. The essence
of the qualification is, that the acceptor charges himself to pay the
bill at a particular place which he specifies, whether that place be
connected with his own establishment or that of another person.
If there be any doubt as to the particular place intended, that must
be a matter to be settled by the jury on the evidence ^ibut I do
not think that under the allegation in the declaration, the Plaintiff
was bound to prove the precise day. If a wrong day were alleged
the objection might have been available on special demurrer, but
no further. The material thing at the trial was to prove a pre
sentment at a place specified at a time when the bill had become
due, and this, it seems, might have been done without any allega
tion of presentment in the declaration; for in the case of Dickenson
v. Bowes, 16 E. 110, where the action was brought against the
maker of a promissory note payable at a particular place, in which
there was no averment of presentment ,in the declaration, the
Plaintiff was allowed to give evidence of the presentment, and
thereupon to recover.
This brings the present case to the point whether a sufficient
presentment was proved. The bill became due on the 3d November,
—on the 2d November it was presented at the place namedin the
acceptance, and the bond was left with the Defendant by the
Plaintiff’s agent. The next day the Plaintiff’s agent called
again, and the Defendant at that time expressly refused to pay the
bill. It did not appear that the bill was on this day exhibited to
the Defendant, but the Defendant’s refusal to pay the bill clearly
rendered
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rendered it unnecessary to present it again, and must, I think, be
deemed a waiver of any objection on this ground. For these rea
sons I am of opinion that the rule for a new trial must be dis
charged.
Carter, J.:
I entirely agree in the opinion expressed by His Honor the
Chief Justice. I only doubted as to the fact of the presentment
being sufficiently established, but on reflection I consider that the
conversation which took place between the Plaintiff’s agent and
the Defendant was a waiver by the latter of the necessity of any
further presentment.
Parker J.:
The only point on which I have entertained much doubt is that
which related to the averment of presentment, which at the trial
appeared to me a very strong one against the Plaintiff, though it
might have been a proper case for amendment of the record, had
an application been made under the late Statute. No such
amendment, however, having been made, we are called on
to determine whether or not the averment is defective in not
alleging a presentment of the bill for payment at or after the day
on which it became due. As the action is against the acceptor, it
would not have been necessary to allege or prove a presentment at
all, unless the acceptance had made the bill payable at a particular
place.
Now it will be remarked that in declaring on the bill the place
is, but time is not, of the essence of the contract; it was necessary
to aver and prove a presentment at the place, but the time was
wholly immaterial, provided the bill had then come to maturity;
and this makes the difference between this and the cases cited
again st indorsers, where an averment and proof of presentment on
the precise day is essential, because the liability of the indorser is
conditional onlv.
The acceptance here is not a conditional but a qualified one, and
the right of action is merely suspended until payment is demanded
at the place.
Had the declaration in this case contained the usual words, viz.:
“ afterwards to wit &c. when the said bill became due and payable,
&c.,” it is clear by recent authorities that the mistake would not
be material, and Mr. Ch'tty seems to think the omission of these
words unimportant. The point, however, has not, so far as I am
aware, come up for express adjudication, unless indeed in Fenton
v. Goundry, 13 East 459, which would seem to decide that it is
an objection only available on special demurrer. On the whole I
can see no good reason to dissent from the opinion expressed by
Mr. Chitty.
As to the objections on which the Defendant’s Counsel mainly
relied.
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relied, I considered at the trial, and still think, that the acceptance
was given in the nature of an escrow, and that the Defendant
would have been at liberty to shew, if he could, that the Plaintiff
had not given the consideration agreed on, as specified in Mr.
Cunard’s memorandum—Jefferies v. Austin, 1 Str. 674.
As to the want of consideration, a bond or agreement for a
conveyance, on which the party in default would be liable
to an action, is certainly a sufficient consideration for a bill of
exchange. The law is thus clearly laid down by Mr. .Sugden:
—“ The -vendor cannot bring an action for purchase money
“ without having executed the conveyance or offered to do so,
“ unless the purchaser has discharged him from so doing: but
“ if the purchaser give a bill of exchange or other security for
“ the purchase money, payable at a certain day, he must pay it
“ when due, and cannot resist the payment even in the case of a bill
“ of exchange, on the ground that there was no consideration for the
“ drawing of the bill because the seller has refused to convey the
“ estate according to the agreement: but he will have his remedy
“ on the agreement for the non-execution of the conveyance.”
Here a bond to convey the land was duly executed according to
the agreement, and tendered to the Defendant’s agent, whose own
fault it is if he is not in possession of it.
BOTSFORD, J. gave no opinion in this cause.

Rule discharged.

E. B. Chandler, for Plaintiff.
J. A. Street and Berton, for Defendant.
MITCHELL v. CUPPAGE & WHITE.
An affidavit by the Attorney, of the absence of a material witness, and of
the Attorney's belief that the testimony would be procured at the next Cir
cuit, not sufficient to oppose a rule for judgment, as in case of a non-suit,
for not proceeding to trial pursuant to notice, without stating the grounds
of his^belief, or that any thing had been done to procure the attendance at
the first Circuit; but the Court allowed time for further affidavits.

J. A. Street movtd for judgment, as in case of a non-suit, for
not having proceeded to trial pursuant to notice.
Kerr, contra, produced an affidavit of the Plaintiff’s Attorney,
which stated the absence of a material witness, without whose tes
timony the Plaintiff could not safely proceed to trial, and the belief
of the Attorney that the testimony of the witness would be pro
cured at the next Assizes.

Per Curiam.
The affidavit is not sufficiently specific ; it does not shew that
any effort was made to procure the attendance of the witness at
the Circuit, or what prospect there is of getting him at the
next Circuit; the Attorney appears to have sworn merely to bring
himself
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himself within the words of the Statute. The matter may stand
open to enable the Plaintiff to shew further cause during^the Term.
On the last day of the Term, no further cause having been
shewn, the Court granted a
Rule absolute for judgment.
SAMUEL v. SAUNDERS.
By the practice of this Court a Plaintiff is bound to try at the first Cir
cuit after issue joined, unless issue is joined at the Term immediately pro
ceeding.
An affidavit stating the temporary mental derangement ofa witness, and his
subsequent recovery, is sufficient to discharge a rule for judgment, as in
case of a non-suit, upon a peremptory undertaking and payment of costs.

J. A. Street moved for judgment, as in case of a non-suit, for
not proceeding to trial according to the practice of the Court.
Issue was joined in Trinity Term, 1836. The venue wras laid
in Northumberland ; no Circuit was held in that County in that
yearpEa Circuit took place in September, 1837.
James H. Peters, for Plaintiff, contended that the Court should not
entertain the application until after two Circuit Courts had been
held, at which the Plaintiff might have tried his cause. He cited
Prentice v. Block, 2 Bing, 360 ; Hall v. Buchanan, 2T. R. 734;
Simonds v. Folkenham, 1 Cr. & Jer. 573 ; 3 Dowl. Pr. Ca. 184;
2 Tidd’s Prac. 825.
It was mentioned at the bar by the Solicitor General and IV.
B. Kinnear, that the practice had been not to move until after the
second Circuit, unless notice of trial had been given. It was also
said that the practice of entering the issue had not been acted upon
in this country.
J. A Street, in reply, urged that the Plaintiff was bound to give
notice of trial at the first sittings after the second Term after issue
joined, and failing to do so, the Defendant was entitled to move
without waiting for a second Circuit.

Per Curiam^
The rule appears to be that the party is bound to try at the first
Circuit after issue joined, unless the issue is joined of the Term
immediately preceding. It was no reason for not giving notice of
trial in 1837, that there was no Circuit held in 1836.
J. H. Peters put in an affidavit, which stated that a witness had
been deranged in mind, which prevented the Plaintiff from proceeding
to trial in 1837 ; that the witness had subsequently recovered and
become capable of giving testimony, and contended, on the authority
of Hall v. Buchanan, in 2 T. R. 734, that this was sufficient
to discharge the application without a peremptory undertaking,
and that the Plaintiff, not having been in fault, ought not
to pay costs.

Per
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Per Curiam.
In the case you cite, it was shewn, that the witness could not
give evidence at the coining Circuit, and therefore a peremptory
undertaking was notrequired; but your affidavit shews that the disa
bility which prevented you from procuring the testimony of the
witness at the last Circuit is removed, and that his testimony may
be procured at the next Circuit; the Defendant is not in fault
either—he was entitled to make his application and the Plaintiff
must pay the costs.
Motion discharged on peremptory undertaking and payment of
costs of the application.
James H. Peters, for Plaintiff.
J. A. Street, for Defendant.

POLLOCK AND OTHERS v. SHORT.
Where the bail had been prevented from surrendering the Defendant by
the Plaintiff’s procuring his absence from the Province, the Court allowed
an emoneretur to be entered on the bail piece ; although it appeared that
the bail had received an indemnity.

J. A. Street moved to discharge the special bail and enter an
exoneretur on the bail-piece, on the ground that the Plaintiffs had
given Defendant notice to go away ; that he had subsequently
gone out of the Province, and thus by the Plaintiffs’ own procure
ment the bail had been prevented from discharging themselves by
surrendering the Defendant. He cited West v. Ashdown and
another, 1 Bing, 164.
Barberie, contra.
The only grounds of collusion on which Courts had dis
charged bail were where the Plaintiff and Defendant had
colluded to enable the Plaintiff to recover judgment for more
than was due; but here the whole case was a mere motion to the
Defendant to go away, without which he could as well have gone
as after receiving it. He produced affidavits to shew that the bail
were indemnified by a security on the property of the Defendant,
and that the Plaintiffs were prevented by such security from levying
on the property, but did not deny that the Plaintiffs had been
instrumental in procuring the Defendant’s absence in order to pre
vent a surrender.

Per Curiam.
There is no doubt in this case; it is clearly shewn that the
Plaintiffs’ Clerk, by direction of the Plaintiffs, gave notice to the
Defendant to go away, and that he went away to Canada, and
thus prevented the nail from surrendering him.
It is a present right of bail to discharge themselves by the ren
der of the principal, and if a Plaintiff by his act prevents the bail
from
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from rendering, the bail are entitled to be discharged. The Plain
tiff has not denied but has confessed and avoided the fact, and
endeavored to justify by reason that the bail are indemnified.
This is a case which will not admit of justification ; if the Plain
tiffs have caused Defendant to go away, there is no state of ante
cedent or concomitant circumstances which can amount to a justi
fication.
*
J. A. Street asked to have the costs of the application, but the
Court were clearly of opinion that he was not entitled to costs.
Rule for entering an exoneretur on the bail piece.

WILSON v. KERR AND CAMPBELL.
Submission at Nisi Prius to the pwanl of A B and C, or any two of
them. They agreed on an award which was drawn up and signed by A and
B, who handed it to C for his signature and delivery to the parties : C dis
covered a mistake which he pointed out to A and B, to which they assented.
The award was corrected and signed by all three, but not within the time
limited. The Court refused to give effect to the erroneous award, although
the amended one could not be sustained.

J. A. Chandler moved for leave to enter the award of arbitra
tors on the postea. The cause was referred at the Charlotte Cir
cuit to three arbitrators ; two of them executed the award within
the tnne limited by the rule, and handed it to the third to be deli
vered to the parties; he discovered a material mistake, and after
the expiration of the time limited the award was altered and the
mistake rectified.
Chandler contended that the award was completed, and the duty
of the arbitrators ended when they executed the award, and that
any alteration afterwards made would not affect it.
G. D. Street, contra, was stopped by the Court.

Per Curiam.
The Court will not give effect to that as an award which appears
to have been manifestly erroneous, by reason of a mistake which
all the arbitrators agreed to correct before the award left their
hands. As however the corrected award has not been made within
the time limited by the submission, it may of course be set aside.
The present motion must be dismissed with costs.

M'DONALD v. MTNTYRE.
Where Plaintiff, after giving notice of trial, was induced by the Defendant
to submit the cause to reference, the Court dismissed a motion for judgment,
as in case of a non-suit, with costs.

Kerr, for Defendant, moved for judgment, as in case of a non
suit for not having proceeded to trial pursuant to notice.
The Solicitor General, contra, shewed for cause, that the
Defendant
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Defendant applied and requested that the cause might not come on,
and proposed a reference which was acceded to, and the parties
entered into arbitration bonds, whereupon the Plaintiff did not
proceed to trial. He cited Jenkins v. Charity, 2 Dowl. Pr. Ca.
197 ; Doe v. Lord, 2 Dowl. Pr. Ca. 419.

Per Curiam.
There is no ground for this application. The Defendant re
quested that the cause might not be tried, and now asks for judg
ment because the Plaintiff compli id with his request
Let the motion be dismissed with costs.
HILL v. RIND,
Where Defendant has obtained an order to stay proceedings until secu
rity for costs be given, after sufficient time has elapsed and no further pro
ceedings taken by the Plaintiff in the cause, the Court will order an exone
retur to be entered on the bail piece.

The Solicitor General moved to discharge special bail and enter
an exoneretur on filing common bail for the Defendant.
The process was returnable in Hilary, 1837 ; special bail was
entered in March, 1837, and declaration delivered. In May,
1837, the Defendant obtained an order to stay proceedings until
security given for costs. Security had not been given and no pro
ceedings had been taken.
The Solicitor General cited Boulcot v. Hughes, 1 Ch. R. 279,
and contended that if the Plaintiff did not proceed he was not en
titled to hold the bail.
Wilmot, for Plaintiff, did not oppose the motion.

Per Curiam.
The application is reasonable ; the Plaintiff has had ample time
to go on with his cause ; two sittings have passed. at either of
which the cause might have been tried and disposed of, and the
bail charged or discharged.
Rule accordingly.

STEVENSON v. DOUGLAS.
Where a surplus remains in the hands of the Sheriff from the sale of
goods taken under an execution against A, at the suit of B, the Court will
not order the Sheriff to pay the same over to the Coroner upon an execu
tion in his hands against A at the suit of C, notwithstanding the Sheriff had
received notice not to pay the same to the Defendant A, and notwithstand
ing the Coroner had levied upon the same goods (though withou the
Sheriff’s knowledge,) between the times of levying and sale by the Sheriff.

A rule was obtained in this cause, calling on the Shei ff of the
County of Charlotte to shew cause why he should not pay over to
the Coroner of that County a sum of money in his hands, being
Ml
the
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the surplus of the proceeds of certain timber sold by the Sheriff
under executions in bis hands against the Defendant. This rule
was granted on an affidavit of the Plaintiff, stating that after the
timber had been levied on by the Sheriff, and before the sale, it was
again levied on by the Coroner under the execution in this suit,
and was afterwards sold by the Sheriff under the executions in his
hands, and that the sale had been made not in parcels but in one large
lot; but it did not appear by the affidavit that the Sheriff had any
notice of the levy by the Coroner prior to the sale. Notice had
been given to the Sheriff after the sale not to pay over the surplus
in his hands to the Defendant.
G. D. Street now shewed cause, and urged that in no case will
the Court interfere to order money in the Sheriff’s hands to be
applied to a subsequent execution ; but in this case, at all events,
he contended it could not be done, and produced an affidavit from
the Sheriff explaining the reason why he had sold all the timber
in one lot, and stating that he had not received notice of the
present application until after he had paid over the money to the
assignees of the Defendant.
Parlier, contra, contended that this was a case of extreme
hardship; the Plaintiff would get no benefit from his execution
unless he received this money, as it appeared the Defendant had
no property. The Sheriff no doubt has been indemnified before he
paid over the money.

Chipman,

Ch. J.:

I do not think the Court can interfere. If a second execution
conies into the Sheriff’s hands after he has sold under a former
one, he has no right to apply any money remaining in his hands
towaids the second execution. Here it does not appear that the
Sheriff had notice of the levy by the Coroner until after he had
sold and received the money.

Botsford,

J.:

Here the Plaintiff first gave notice to the Sheriff that he would
apply to the Court of Common Pleas; he does not do this and
afterwards, before receiving any notice of this application, the
Sheriff pays over the money to the Defendant’s trustees for the
benefit of the creditors generally. It would be hard to make the
Sheriff now personally responsible for the money.

Parker

J.:

I think in this case the Court cannot interfere, and T regret it;
the Plaintiff appears to have suffered from the manner in which
the goods were sold by the She; :ff under the execution in his hands.
A difficulty has arisen from one Plaintiff directing his execution to
the Sheriff and another to the Coroner against the same Defendant.
Does the practice require that any other than the jury process
should be directed to the Coroner where the only objection to the
Sheriff
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Sheriff is, that he is a relation of the Defendant, or has the Plaintiff
an option in such a case ? There should be a uniformity in the
practice, or collisions between the officers may frequently occur.
The costs of the motion were applied for but refused under the
circumstances.
Rule discharged.

LAWRENCE AND HILL v. M‘DOWALL.
Where the respective owners of adjoining lands agree by parol to a
survey and marking of their division line, the Court in an action of
trespass quare clausum fregit, by one against the other, held that
such agreement was not within the Statute of Frauds, not being for the
transfer of any interest or title to lands, and that the Plaintiff i night recover
notwithstanding the trespass was committed on a part of the premises which
the Defendant had, previous tu said survey, actually occupied according to
a boundary which had existed for a number of years between the Plaintiff
and Defendant.
This was an action of trespass, quare clausum fregit, tried

before Carter, J. at the April Circuit for the County of Charlotte,
in the year 1837. The facts of the ease and the points reserved
for the opinion of the Court are fully stated in the judgment of Ilis
Honor the Chief Justice.
In Trinity Term last a rule Nisi for a new trial was obtained by
N. Parker, for the Defendant, upon the points reserved at the trial.
Cause was shewn in Michaelmas last by G. 1). Street, Counsel
for the Plaintiff, and at this Term the Court delivered their
opinions as follow:—
Chipman, Ch. J.:
After a careful consideration of this case, I am of opinion that
the application for a new trial cannot be sustained upon either of
the points which have been so ingeniously raised and urged by the
learned Counsel for the Defendant.
It appears in evidence that the Plaintiffs and the Defendant were
respectively in possession of two contiguous lots; that there was
an actual boundary of their respective possessions which had
existed for a number of years, part of which boundary consisted of
a stone wall erected by the Defendant; that in the autumn of
1834 Hathew'ay, a Surveyor, at the instance of the Plaintiffs, came
to the land to run the dividing line between these lots; that after
a good deal of discussion the Defendant stated that he was willing to
have this line run parallel to the other side line of his own lot, which
latter line had been run by Mahood, a Surveyor, some years before;
that Hatlieway ran the line according to this proposition and
agreement of the Defendant, and set marks upon it, and was
assisted in so running this line by the Defendant; that this
line so run cut off from the Defendant’s lot a considerable piece of
land
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land which had been included within the former actual boundaries
of his possession, and had been cleared and cultivated by him.
The trespass for which this action was brought was for the act of
the Defendant in cutting the grass in the year 1835 between the
line so run by Hatheway, and the stone wall which formed part of
the former boundary. There was no question as to the title of the
parties to theii respective lots. The points made on the part of
the Defendant which I shall presently advert to, were reserved by
the learned Judge for the opinion of the Court. He stated to the
jury that if they were fully satisfied of the Defendants having con
sented to the line run and marked by Hatheway, this consent would
be sufficientto givethe Plaintiffs possession of the land up to that line,
and such possession would ena i e them to sustain this action. It
was acknowledged by the Defendant’s Counsel that the necessity
of the jury being entirely satisfied of the full and free consent of
the Defendant to this line run by Hatheway, before they could find
for the Plaintiffs, was put by the Judge to the jury in the strongest
possible manner. The jury found a verdict for the Plaintiffs.
The present argument turns upon the points reserved at the
trial.
It was in the first place urged on the part of the Defendant that
this transaction was in substance and effect a conveyance from the
Defendant to the Plaintiffs of the land which lay between the for
mer actual line of boundary and Hatheway’s line, which land the
Defendant had previously in his possession, and that to permit
land to be conveyed by parol in this manner, would do away with
the salutary rules which the Law has prescribed in regard to the
conveyance of land, and particularly with the provisions of the
Statute of Frauds. But such, it seems to me, was not the cha
racter and import of this transaction. There was no question of
title between the parties, but merely a question of boundary.
Each party acknowledged the title of the other to the lot of which
he was in possession, and the intent of running the new line and of
setting the marks upon it, was to designate by mutual agreement
the limit to which the title of each party extended. There was no
intention in either party to pass or transfer any estate or interest
in the land, and the Defendant by consenting to Hatheway’s
line did no more than acknowledge that his right and title did
not extend beyond that line, and the conclusion to which the
jury came, that this consent of the Defendant to this line was
in point of fact a relinquishment and transfer of his pre-existing
possession in the locus in quo to the Plaintiffs, does not convey
with it an implication that any estate, even a tenancy at will,
thereby passed from the Defendant to the Plaintiffs. It was a
delivery to the Plaintiffs of the possession of what was acknow
ledged to be their own, simultaneous with the acknowledgment of
their right to it.
I

in the

First Year

of VICTORIA.

285

I have not found any English authority directly bearing upon
this point; but I have met with a case in the Supreme Court of
the United States, in which it was expressly held that an agree
ment with regard to a boundary did not import a conveyance of
title. I extract this case from 3d Davie’s, Abr. of Am. Law,
402. It is there cited from 5 Wheaton’s Rep. 513, Boyd’s
Lessee v. Graves, and is abridged as follows : “ A boundary may
“ be fixed by parol agreement, survey and 21 years possession.
“ As when in Kentucky in 1793, two adjacent owners of land dis“ puting the boundary line between them, agreed by parol to run
“ the line, and had it run by a surveyor and marked and possessed
“ and sold by it for more than 20 years before the suit. Held
“ this line, as marked on the plat, was legally established and con“ clusivelv; that it is not affected by the Statute of Frauds ; ‘ it is
“ ‘ not a contract for the sale or conveyance of lands,’ it has no
“ ingredients of such a contract; there is no quid pro quo, and the
“ Court do not consider it as a conveyance of title from one person
“ to another.”
I quote this case, not as an authority which governs my judg
ment, but as shewing the opinion of a learned Court in a foreign
country, on the point in hand.
The second point made by the Counsel for the Defendant was
that the transaction in regard to Hatheway’s line, if binding on the
Defendant, was so binding on no other principle than that of
estoppel,—that the Plaintiffs were tenants in common with other
persons of the lot of which they were in possession that estoppels
must be mutual and reciprocal; that the estoppel in the present
instance would not be binding on the co-tenants of the Plaintiffs
and therefore it ought not to be binding upon the Defendant.
“ An estoppel is when a man is concluded by his own act or
“ acceptance to say the truth.”—Coke Lit. 352. The parties to
an estoppel and their privies are bound by it, and although the cotenants of the Plaintiffs should not be deemed either parties or
privies to an estoppel created by an act of the Plaintiffs, a point
which I do not think it necessary to stop to consider, it would not
absolve the Plaintiffs, who were parties to it, from their obligation,
and the mutuality of the estoppel as between the Plaintiffs and
the Defendant would still exist. The point whether the Defendant
was conclusively estopped by his consent to Hatheway’s line so
that it would not have been open to him, if he could have done so,
to shew that there was mistake or deception in this line and that
it was not the true boundary, does not appear to have arisen; as
it has not arisen it is not necessary to discuss it. The conduct of
the Defendant was at all events most cogent evidence against him,
and if he has lost his vantage ground by agreeing to quit the walls
and fences which formed the limits of his former occupation, and to
hold by a new line, it is his own fault.
The
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The third objection made on the part of the Defendant wap on
a matter of fact and not of law, and was predicated on the assump
tion that the possession had been changed; but it was contended
that the possession had been transferred to one M‘ Gowan and not
to the Plaintiffs. M‘Gowan held under a lease which had been
ratified by the Plaintiffs, by their accepting rent under it. The
description of the premises in this lease was very loose and indefi
nite, being “all that part and portion of his lands lying to the
“ eastward of bis the said James M‘Culloch’s House, comprising
“ and commonly called the Ridge.”
Evidence of the actual possession taken under this lease would
under any circumstances, probably be deemed to be the best evi
dence of its specific limits. Now it was distinctly proved by
M‘Gowan himself that he never was in possession of any land
beyond the stone fence ; he was therefore never in possession of
the locus in quo, and this is conclusive where the matter of actual
possession alone is concerned.
The points made on the part of the Defendant being thus dis
posed of in a manner satisfactory to my mind, the case reverts to
the point which was left by the learned Judge to the jury, whether
the acts of the Defendant had changed the possession which he
had formerly held, and had vested it in the Plaintiffs. The jury
with a full view of all the circumstances of the case have decided
they did so ; and there I think this cause must rest, and the rule
for a new trial be discharged.
Botsford, J.:
In the absence of evidence to prove the existence of the line said
to have been run twenty five years ago by M‘Donald, between old
Lawrence, the father, and the Defendant, or a twenty years pos
session under that or any other dividing line between their respec
tive lots—on the contrary it appearing that the possession of the
Defendant up to the stone wall did not go farther back than eight
or nine years,—I am of opinion thatthe possession of the Defendant
was not such as to have required a deed to transfer his right to the
Plaintiffs. It does not appear by the evidence that M‘Gowan
was at any time in possession of the stone wall, or of the ground
to the south of it; his lease only extending to so much of the ridge
as he could improve. This case will therefore depend upon the
question whether the line run by Hatheway between the lots, and
agreed to by both parties shall be binding and conclusive. It is a
question of some importance, and, from the recent settlement of the
country, one that is likely to be of frequent recurrence.
There are many instances where the dividing lines between
lots have never been ascerta: ned by the respective owners, owing
to the land being in a state of wilderness, and of low value ; in
some cases, even where the side lines have been traced by the
surveyors
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surveyors on the original surveys, no farther than was sufficient
to mark their respective courses. Public policy, as well as private
convenience, require that every facility should be given to the
settlement and adjustment of such boundaries. It appears to me
therefore, that when a dividing line which was before uncertain
and undetermined has been established and mutually agreed upon
by the owners as the boundary between the respective lots, without
fraud or circumvention by either of the parties, that such line
should be conclusive and binding.
In the present case both the parties were present, and assenting
to the line run by Hatheway,—expressed themselves as satisfied
with the line established by him, and set up stakes along the same
as the boundary of their respective lots. The transaction appears
to have been a very fair one, and I think the parties are bound
by it.
Carter, J. concurs.
Parker, J. gave no opinion, being interested in a mortgage of the
Defendant’s lot.
Rule discharged.
G. D. Street, for Plaintiffs.
N. Parker, for Defendant.

STRANG v. BELL.
Riem en arrear is not a good plea in an action for double value.
After demurrer is argued the Court will allow the plea to be withdrawn
upon payment of the costs of demurrer.
The declaration contained three Counts; the two first were for

the double value of the premises, the last was for use and occu
pation.
The Defendant pleaded rien en arrear, to which plea there was
a demurrer and a joinder in demurrer.
At this Term W. B. Kinnear was heard in support of the
demurrer :—
The plea rien en arrear is no answer to the first and
second counts, 2 Ros. on Real Property, 478 480. The
action is brought for the double value, the tenancy having been
terminated by notice to quit given by the landlord. After such
termination the Defendant is in fact treated as a trespasser. Rien
en arrear is a good plea only when the action is brought for the
rent reserved—Stev. on Pl. 188 ; 1 Chit, on Pl. 552.
Wilmot, contra.
The plea is good as it answers the whole action. A set off'
could have been pleaded, and for the same reason rien en arrear.
Warner v. Theobald, Cowp. 588; Cobb. v. Stokes, 8 Eas 358.
Kinnear, in reply, was stopped by the Court.
Per
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Per Curiam.
The plea is clearly bad, being no answer to the action for the
double value.
Wilmot then applied for leave to withdraw the plea of rien en
arrear, which the Court allowed on the payment of the costs of
the demurrer.
W. B. Kinnear, for Plaintiff.
L. A. Wilmot, for Defendant.
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DOE EX DEM COLE AND OTHERS, v. HARPER AND
WIFE.
Where A, a feme sole, was, previous to her coverture, in the actual occu
pation, conjointly with her brother, of lands which descended to them from
their father, and upon her marriage left the possession in her brother, who
occupied it for more than forty years, paying, during that period, all taxes
and charges thereon, and receiving all the rents and profits; in an action of
ejectment brought by her heirs on the death of A and her husband, the
Court held, that under the 14th Section of the Act of Assembly 6, Wm. 4,
c. 43, which provides that if, at the time of the Act coming into operation,
the possession were not adverse the right should not be barred for five years,
the question of adverse possession should be left to the jury to determine,
and that it should be decided according to the law as it stood when the said
Act came into operation.
This was an action tried before Parker J. at the last West

morland Circuit, in September 1837. The facts of the case are
fully stated in the following report of the learned Judge before
whom the cause was tried:—
This was ejectment to recover certain undivided parts of the
real estate of John Grace, deceased, in the Parish of Sackville,
being two marsh lots, Nos. 25 and 18, each containing 10| acres,
now in the possession of the Defendant. John Grace died seised
on the 7th March, 1788, intestate, leaving a widow and three
children, Michael, Martha and John.
John Grace, the son, died 26th September, 1792, intestate, and
without issue.
At the death of John Grace, the elder, his widow and children
were in possession of the land, and continued to occupy it together
until the marriage of Martha and death of John ; after which time
it was in the sole occupation of Michael Grace.
Martha Grace married Ebenezer Cole about 1789, and died in
1809, leaving seven children, the six younger of whom are the
lessors of the Plaintiff, or standing in their rights, who claim their
several shares of their mother’s portion, viz. one fourth, of John
Grace, Senior’s estate, as one of his immediate heirs, and one third
of one fourth as one of the heirs to her brother, John Grace. Junior.
N1
Ebenezer
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Ebenezer Cole died in 1826, more than ten years before br:ngmg
this action.
AH the lessors of the Plaintiff, except one, were of age when
their father, Ebenezer Cole, died.
Michael Grace died on 5th January, 1836. He was three times
married, leaving issue by the first marriage, who still survive, and
leaving a widow in possession of the land in question, who has
since married Christopher Harper, and who are the Defendants in
this suit, he coming into possession on his marriage.
The widow of old John Grace lived with her son Michael until
her death in 1813.
It was proved by the cross-examination of Plaintiff’s witness, that
from the time of Michael Grace being left in the sole occupation
until his death, he claimed it as his own, and was never disturbed;
that he paid the dyke bills to the Commissioners of Sewers, and
was annually assessed as owner, and no other person paid any part
of the charges ; he took all the produce.
The Defendants called no witnesses, but contended that although
the possession of Michael Grace was not at first adverse, his sister
being a tenant in common or coparcener; yet that
1 st. There was sufficient evidence to presume an ouster, she
having had no possession from 1789, nearly fifty years.
2d. That a conveyance from Ebenezer Cole, and Martha his
wife, might be presumed.
3d. That supposing Martha Cole’s coverture to enure as a dis
ability, an entry ought to have been made within ten years of her
death.
4. That although the children could not enter in consequence of
Ebenezer Cole’s intervening estate as tenant by the courtesy, they
should have entered within ten years of his death, at least all who
were then of full age.
That consequently this action was barred by the Statute of Li
mitations on all the demises, or on all except that of Martin Cole,
who was not of full age within ten years.
Ad. on Ej. 52, 53, 72, 54, 56. Fairclaim v. Shackleton, 5
Burr, 2607; 2 Bl, 1692 ; Doe d. Fisher v. Prosser, 1 Cowp. 217.
To this it was answered by the Counsel for the Plaintiff; that
Michael Grace’s possession was not adverse ; he came into posses
sion with Martha, who had a joint possession until she married.
That she being under the disability of coverture, no actual ous
ter or disseisin could be presumed against her.
That although the Lessors of Plaintiff inherited her estate in
1809, their right of entry did not accrue until their father’s death
in 1826, he being tenant by the courtesy.
That sufficient time had not elapsed since his death to warrant
the presumption of actual ouster as against them,—nothing short
of

in the

First Year

of

VICTORIA.

29 i

of twenty years would be sufficient; that, at all events, Martin
Cole was not barred.
That Martha Cole could only convey with her husband by deed
duly acknowledged and registered under the Act of Assembly,
and that such a deed would not be presumed,—no ground for such
presumption in this case; Ebenezer Cole could not convey his
children’s right.
It was stated in the Plaintiff’s opening that Michael Grace had
held by purchase from Ebenezer Cole, but this fact was not proved.
In charging the jury I stated that the Plaintiff was entitled to
recover, unless the lessors were barred by the Statute of Limita
tions. That whether they were so barred depended altogether
upon the presumption of an actual ouster by Michael Grace, of
Martha Cole or her children; as I did not think a conveyance
could be presumed in this case. That whether such presumption
could be made was a fact for them to determine, Or rather an in
ference which it was their province to draw from the circumstances,
but I thought it the duty of tlie Judge to state his opinion to them.
That in myopinion, although a great length of time had elapsed,—
still considering Martha Cole’s coverture, her joint possession until
her marriage, and Ebenezer Cole’s life estate, wrho had died only
in 1826,—the circumstances w’ere not sufficient to induce the
inference of an actual ouster. I recommended them, therefore, to
find for the Plaintiff, saying to them, that if I was wrong in stating
my opinion to them, or in the opinion I had formed, it would be a
ground for setting aside the verdict and granting a new trial.
The jury found for the Plaintiff.
Chandler, in Michaelmas Term, 1837, after full discussion of the
points mooted at the trial, obtained a rule nisi for a new trial.
In Hilary Term last, cause was shewn by G. Botsford, for
the lessors of the Plaintiff.
When ouster can be presumed the parties must have been in
such a situation as to have availed themselves of their right, or to
have acquiesced in the adverse claim. As at the time of Martha
Grace’s marriage she and her brother, Michael Grace, (through
whom the Defendant’s claim,) were co-heirs and tenants in com
mon, both by right and by actual possession, Ebenezer Colp,1' her
husband, became invested eo instanti by the marriage with the im
mediate right of possession, and had a life estate in the same, and
Martha lost all present control over the property, and an ouster could
not be presumed against her; she having no power to take advantage
of her right, or to acquiesce in the adverse claim, consequently her
children could not be affected by the possession sought to be set up.
No length of possession of a third person could give an estate as
against Martha and her heirs, as the law would presume such pos
session to be consistent with her husband’s life estate, or at most
but
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but adverse to it and ilis rights. In the case cited from Cowp. 217,
there was no disability to help the lessors of the Plaintiff. Pos
session for any length of time is not evidence of ouster—Doe d.
Fairclain, v. Shackleton, 5 Burr, 2607.; Doe u. Pike and another;
r> B. & Ad. 738. In the latter case the Court held that 35 years
possession in the parties should be referable to a presumed agree
ment, and would not presume an ouster. So far as regarded Mar
tha’s estate her brother’s possession would not be considered ad
verse, but in fact, under the authority of the last case cited, would
be properly referable to a presumed transfer from Martha’s husband
of his right. By the learned Counsel for the Defendants it had
been urged, that the length of possession and receipt of profits
would prove an actual ouster, but the cases did not bear out this
doctrine. “ If two tenants in common enter and afterwards one of
“ them take all the profits, this does not divest the other without
actual ouster or disseisin”—Cq. Lit. 200 & 373; Hob. 120 ; Com.
Dig. Tit. Parcener A3. In Fairclaim v. Shackleton, the Court
says when there is no adverse possession, no actual keeping out of
possession, but one tenant receives all the rent without accounting
there is no ouster.
In Reading v. Rawsterne, L. Raymond, 830, it was decided that
the taking of profits by one heir for a number of years did not bar
the right,—it was necessary that there should be an actual disseisin.
The Act of Assembly 6 Win. 4, c. 43, §. 3, which fixes the
time when a right shal 1 be deemed to have accrued, uses these
words: “ when a party shall have been dispossessed or have discon“ tinued such possession &c.” Now as the possession of Michael
Grace was the possession of Martha, the mother of the lessors of
the Plaintiff, there was no dispossessing of or discontinuingof pos
session by Martha in the contemplation of the Act. The case of
Doe d. Corbyn, v. Bramston, 3 Adol. & Ell. 63, which was cited
and much relied on by the Counsel for Defendant, differed from
the present in this material point,—in that the possession was left
vacant, but in this in a co-heir and tenant in common and thus
accorded with Lord Denman’s declaration, “that if there were any“ thing to shew a unity of possession it could not be held adverse.”
An Act of Assembly which affected the right of property like the
Statute of Limitations, should be construed strictly. The 12th
section of the Act of Assembly was not intended to operate except
as between co-heirs or co-tenants, and not to deprive a party
Plaintiff of the right to resort to the entry of his co-tenant to shew
a possession in both as against a stranger. The entry of one co
parcener operates in favor of both; also the entry of the mother as
guardian to one co-parcener, operates for both—7 T. R. 396.
Under the 14tli section of the Act the lessors of the Plaintiff at all
events were entitled to recover. It rested with the Defendant in
this case to prove an actual ouster, and as by the laws of this
Province

in the

First year of

VICTORIA.

293

Province a method of conveying a feme covert’s property was pro
vided, that method must be proved to have been strictly followed.
No presumption can arise in this case, aspindependent of such
proceedings, the wife has no power to make a deed, and all pre
sumption, if any, must attach to a transfer by Martha’s husband
of his life estate, as it legally might.
Parker, contra:—
This case presents a party who was in quiet possession nearly
fifty years, and was regularly assessed for dyke ratbs and poor
taxes, which were paid by him individually, and no demand was
ever made upon him for rent &c. It was not a case of wilderndSs
land, but of productive and valuable property, and the parties under
whom the lessors of Plaintiff claim, resided in the neighbourhood
and never demanded their right or contributed to the expense. It
is a naked claim of'possession, and the policy of the Act as regards
Michael Grace and those who claim under him, goes as far to pro
tect liis possession as it does the right of the lessors of the Plaintiff.
The Stat, of J he. I. has been extended to guard against every pos
sible case under which a very long possession might, by any possi
bility, be disturbed. This is a new country and the policy of the
Statute applies with double force. It has been contended that the
combined effect of a tenancy in common and a disability, is greater
than either would individually be entitled to. Now as a simple
case, and disembarassed, suppose Michael Grade’a perfect stranger
to Martha, and she a feme sole, Michael’s pefesession would have
given him a perfect title febut it is contended that here the cir
cumstances of the tenancy in common and Martha’s coverture
make a difference, but they cannot be blended. Taking then the
question of tenancy in common, wholly divested of the question of
disability, I dissent from the position that the Act of Assembly was
intended to operate only between tenants in common, parceners,
&c. No longer ago than in the case of Merritt and Quinton, the
distinct and decifled possession of one tenant in common was con
sidered such a possession as ousted a co-tenant.
[Parker J.—There was no proof of any actual possession in
Quinton.]
The grant was to all, and by act of law the possession of oue
is as much the possession of all as in the case of livery of seisin.
[Parker J.—The grant was to each of so many acres.]
So here the land depended in equal proportions to the children
of old John Grace. As to the case of a former Rector, to which
this case has been compared, no claim of any right of way &c.
could be set up against a subsequent Rector, because as no grant
could be made nene could be presumed, nullum tempos occurrit
ecclesioe. This case has been argued on the point of disability, and
if the Plaintiff cannot bring himself within the provisions thereof
the
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the tenancy in common will not help him. The character of pos
session is not affected by the consideration that the claimant is a
minor orfeme-covert, or undgrany other disability. The question of
the possession being adverse and its commencement as adverse
was for the jury, and they might fairly presume that some informal
conveyance had been made by Martha Cole, and that from thence
the possession of Michael was adverse. In a late case Doe v.
Nepean, ,5 13 & Ad. 86, of presumption of the death of a party not
having been heard of for seven years, the Court said it was .not a
presumption that he died at the end of the seven years j so in the
case in Cowper 217, the presumption of adverse possession was
not held as commencing at the end of the 36 years. If the jury
had a right to carry back the possession, then in 1809 Defendant
had 20 years possession ; and allowing for the estate of courtesy
which then accrued, in 1819 the ten yearg, expired which the Act
of Assembly might have given; but in 1826 all disability ceased,
and ten years elapsed to 1836, during which the lessors of Plaintiff
made no claim whatever.
[Carter J.—This argument resets on the presumption that the
jury had a right to find the possession adverse from the time of
Martha leaving.]
Chipman, Ch. J.—The point to determine is when the ouster
was, and that must be when Martha discontinued possession ; if
that took place on her marriage 40 years have elapsed.]
The 16th section over-rides the provisions of the 14th, but
if protected by disability the Act gives ten years after it
ceases; and whether the disability ceased in 1809, as there
can be no succession of disabilities, or expired with theestate of
courtesy in 1326, ten years only remained, either from 1809, or
at all events from 1826.
[Chipman, Ch. J.—It would seem the 12th section of the Act
intended to get rid of the presumption of ouster, by excluding the
presumption of possession.]
To support themselves by the 12th section it must be argued
that there was no ground of presumption for a jury during the
whole course of Michael (trace’s sole occupancy up to the time of
this action brought. In the previous sections there are provisions
restricting the operations of the 12th section ; these commence
with the words “provided always,’’ ; the 16thsection commences
with the words “ provided nevertheless,” and controling the pre
vious restrictions, fixes 40 years as the ultimate period at which
any claim can be set up, and this from public policy and to quiet
possessions. The 3d and 12th sections of the Act afford a crite
rion to judge of the commencement of a right. By the former of
these sections, when the party has been once in possession, the
period at which his right shall be deemed to have accrued is to be
taken to be the time of the discontinuance of such possession; and
by
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by the latter section the possession of one tenant in common is not
to be deemed the possession of his co-tenant. To get the benefit
of the 14tli section it must be contended that there never was
adverse possession. Now if it could be shewn that there would be
no adverse possession gained, as against a party while under dis
ability, then there might be some wight in the argument; but the
case of Doe d. CoMyn,H. Bramston, clearly shews that the disabi
lity of the wife’s coverture will not prevent her discontinuance* of
possession as operating"under the statute. If a f-’me covert could
not con vey, then this and the case! of a Rector would be analagous,
but there was nothing to prevent a conveyance by Martha and her
husband. In Doe v. Pike, the ftreesliTr eiitered and so did the
lessor of the Plaintiff within 20 years, and that was the express
ground of the judgment of the Court. In Doe d. Corbyn v.
Bramston, the Court fully supported the doctrine 'df 40 years pos
session, and refused to enter into the circumstances.
E. B. Chandler follows:—
Tlje case of Fisher v. Proper shewed that it did not require an
express denial to raise a presumption of ouster, nor is there any
case to support such doctrine ; but it is sufficient to entitle the jury
to presume an ouster that the party has been in undisturbed pos
session for a number of years. In Fairclain v., Shackleton it was
not made a point. In the argument the lessors in this case were
considered as reversioners, but the case of Corbyn v, Bramston
sets at rest this idea; and again, the wife’^ estate exists in such a
way as might be enforced by herself and husband, but a rever
sioner can bring no action. The Statute of Limitations is gene
rally applicable to all who are not particularly excepted.
Curia advisari vult.
In this Term the Court delivered their opinions.
Chipman, Ch. J., after reading the report of the learned Judge
who tried the cause, proceeded as follows j—
Such was the case at the trial.—In arguing this motion for a
new trial the learned Counsel for the Defendants have placed their
principal reliance on the 16th section of the new Provincial Statute
of Limitations, 6 Wm. 4, c. 43, and have called our attention to
the case of Doe d. Corbyn v. Bramston, 3 Ad. & Ellis. 63, which
was decided upon the corresponding section of the Imperial Statute
3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 27. The 16tli Section of the Provincial Act is
as follows:—“ Provided nevertheless and be it further enacted,
“ That no entry or action shall be made or brought by any person,
“ who, at the time at which his right to make an entry or to bring
“ an action to recover any land shall have first accrued, shall be
“ under any of the disabilities hereinbefore mentioned, or by any
“ person claiming through him, but within forty years next after
“ the time at which such right shall have first accrued, although
the
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“ the person under disability at such time may have remained un“ der one or more of such disabilities during the whole of such
“ forty years, or although the term of ten years from the date at
“ which he shall have ceased to be under any such disability, or
“ have died, shall not have expired.” It is contended on the other
side that the beneficial operations of the 14th section of this Act
will extend to the lessors of the Plaintiff; that section provides
“ That when no such acknowledgement as aforesaid shall have
been given before the time appointed for this Act to take effect,
“ and the possesion or receipt of the profits of "the land shall not,
“ at the time of this Act taking effect, have been adverse to the
“ right or title of the person claiming to be entitled thereto, then
“ such person or the person claiming through him may, notwith“ standing the period of twenty years hereinbefore limited shall
“ have expired, make an entry or bring an action to recover such
“ land at any time within five years next after the time appointed
“ for this Act to take effect.” If this were a simple case of disaability, I should have great difficulty in applying to it the protec
tion of the 14th Section in opposition to the positive enactment of
the 16th section, and should consider the case of Doe d. Corbynv.
Bramston, as conclusive on the point. But the distinguishing fea
ture of the present case is the circumstance which exists in it, of
a co-tenancy ; it is a compound case of disability and of tenancy in
in common ; and if the lessors of the Plaintiff have a Zocms Wawrfz un
der the Statute independent of the circumstance of disability, the
disability of Martha Cole, unde /whom they claim, ought not to pre
judice them. What then is tlfe case apart from the.circumstance
of disability ?' that when','’’according to the provisions of the
3rd section of the Act, the title of Martha Cole first accrued in
regard to the respective interests claimecf in this suit, that is to
say, at the respective times of her quitting possession on her mar
riage, and of the death of her brother John Grace, her brother and
co-tenant in common, Michael Grace,, was in possession, and he
afterwards continued to hold possession. Now there is no one
principle of law more clear than that, previously to the late Statute
of limitations, the possession of one tenant in common was to be
deemed the possession of his companion. This constructive pos
session in avoidance of the Statute of Limitations, is now indeed
done away with by the I2th section of the Act. The case of Doe
d. Fisher v. Proper, Cowp. 217, was relied upon on the part of the
Defendants, to shew that an undisturbed possession and receipt of
profits for a great length of time in one tenant in common is a suf
ficient ground for presuming an ouster of his companion ; but this
is a presumption for a jury and not for the Court to make, and
without this presumption it is clear, that according to the law as it
stood at the time of the passing of the Act, the possession of
Michael Grace and those claiming under him was not adverse to
the
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the title of Martha Cole and those claiming under her. In a very
late case Doe d. Jones r. Williams, 5 Ad. and Ellis. 291, it was
decided, that in determining what was adverse possession under
the section of the Imperial Statute which corresponds to the 14th
section of the Provincial Act, the law must be taken as it stood at
the time of the passing of the Act. Can then this Court, without
the finding of a jury, say, that at the ti ne when the Provincial
Act took effect the possession of those who held under Michael
Grace was adverse to the title of Martha Cole? Under the facts
of the case the Court, I think, cannot say this. If indeed, under
the authority of the case of Doe d. Fisher v. Prosser, the circum
stances of long possession would alone have been conclusive topre
sume an ouster of Martha Cole, had it not been for her coverture
I should have had more difficulty. But the opinion of Lord Tenterdenwith regard to the case of Doe d. Fisher v. Prosser, as given
in the case of Doe v. Phillips, 3 Bar. & Ad. 761, is that the deed
of partition between Mary Taylor, one of the tenants in common,
and the husband of the other for his life, and not merely the fact of
undisturbed possession was much depended upon as indicating that
the possession of the tenant in common was adverse to that of her
companion. As the husband in his own right is entitled to the
profits of his wife’s estate, and in this right may claim them, it
does not strike me that the mere circumstance of the coverture is
of so great potency to avoid the presumption of an ouster if that
presumption would have arisen from long possession and receipt of
profits alone, if there had been no coverture. Upon the whc e, I
am of opinion, that as this action was commenced after the Pro
vincial Act 6 Wm. 4, c. 43, came into operation, it must be
governed by the provisions of it; and that this Act will be a bar to
the act’on unless the lessors pf the Plaintiff are protected by the
14th section, for it has been decided in a very late case under the
Imperial Act, Nepean d. Doe;w. Knight, 2 M. & W. 911, that the
second and third sections of this Act, 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 2i, have
done away with the doctrine of non-adverse possession, and ex 
cept in cases falling within the 15tli section of the Act, (which cor
responds with the 14tli section of the Provincial Act,) the question
is whether twenty years have elapsed since the right accrued,
whatever be the nature of the possession. In order to ascertain
whether this case will fall under the protection of tlie 14 th section
of the Provincial Act, it must, I think, be sent to another jury for
the express purpose of determining whether the possession of the
land by the Defendants, or those under whom thejr claim, on fhe
first of January, 1837, the day on which the Act took effect, was
adverse to the title of the lessors of the Plaintiff; and I think the
costs of the former trial should abide the event of the suit.

Botsford
01
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It is a general rule of law, that the possession of any one copar
cener, joint tenant, or tenant in common, is the possession of the
others of them, so as to prevent them being barred by the Statute
of Limitations. The examination of some of the principal cases
will shew the application and effect of this rule of law, and under
what circumstances its operation may be prevented and controlled.
In Fairclaim v. Shackelton, 5 Burr, 2604, the lands were in the
possession of a tenant who had paid the rent for the whole premi
ses for about twenty six years, to a tenant in common of one undi
vided moiety. It was contended on the part of the Defendant,
that the taking of the profits for so long a time was an ousting of
the other tenant in common, and that the Plaintiff was bound by
the Statute of Limitations. It was laid down by Lord Mansfield,
“ that there must be an adverse possession in order to enable the
Statute to run ; there must be disseisin, and a disseisin strictly
proved.” In Dee v. Bird, 11 East. 49, it was objected that as the
Plaintiff and Defendant were tenants in common, the ejectment
could not be maintained, without proof of actual ouster. At the
trial the Plaintiff proved a demand of possession of the premises
by letter, under a power of Attorney, to which demand a refusal
was returned by the Defendant, who stated that he claimed the
whole ; and this was thought by the learned Judge sufficient evi
dence of an. actual ouster. On a motion for a new trial it was said,
per curiam, “ one tenant in common in possession, claiming the
whole and denying possession to the other, is beyond the mere act
of receiving the whole rent, which is equivocal; this was certainly
evidence of an ouster of his companion.”. In the case of Doe v.
Taylor 5 Ba. & Ad. 575, where there were several coparceners,
and one only in actual possession, a feoffment executed by her, and
livery of seisin to a stranger, under a’fine levied by her with pro
clamations of the whole premises to him, was held to operate asan
ouster and disseisin of the other coparceners, as to the whole pre
mises. This case is contrary to that of Ford v. Grey, 1 Sal. 285,
where it was ruled by the Court: “ If one joint tenant levies a
fine it severs the jointure, but does not amount to an ouster of his
companion;” and also to Peaceable v. Reed, 1 Ea. 568. I come
now to the case of Doe v. Prosser, Cowper 217, which has been
much relied upon by the Counsel for the Defendant, and which
appears to establish the doctrine, that a sole and uninterrupted
possession of forty years by one tenant in common, without any
demand or claim by the other, and without any payment to him
during that time, was sufficient to prove an adverse possession and
ouster. There was a circumstance, however, in that case, which
in Doe v. Phillips, 3 Ba. & Ad. 761, was adverted to in the fol
lowing manner by Lord Tenterden: “ Doe v. Prosser,” says his
Lordship,
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Lordship, “ is a very different case ; there there had been a deed
of partition between Mary Taylor, one of the tenants in common,
and the husband of the other for his life, and the.husband enjoyed
under that for twenty nine years ; liis widow, the other cotenant,
after his death, enjoyed for nearly forty years; that was considered
an adverse holding, equivalent to an actual ouster.” It is clear
that in the opinion of his Lordship the deed of partition connected
with the long possession of the widow under it, distinguished the
case of Doe v. Prosser. In this case of Doe v. Prosser, it is natu
ral to suppose that the partition made between the sisters was an
equal and just division of the property, and though it was in the
first place limited by the life of Stevens, the husband of one of
them, yet from the continuance of his widow in the possession for
so long a time after his death, that it had been intended by them
to remain a permanent one. Lord Mansfield, in giving his opinion
upon the motion for a new trial, appears to have assimilated the
case to one where there had been a holding over after the expira
tion of a particular estate ; and it is to be inferred from the way in
which he put the question, viz. “ whether the possession in this
case after the death of Stevens, in the year 1734, that is after the
particular estate ended, was a possession as tenant in common, eo
nomine or adverse, that he must have considered the w’ low of
Stevens not in the light of a tenant in common, but as holding over
after the expiration of the particular estate created by the deed of
partition ?”
From an attentive consideration of. the above authorities, and
there being no case to be found in which a quiet and uninterrupted
possession by one tenant in common, alone and unaccompanied
with any controlling circumstances, has been adjudged an ouster
of the other cotenant, I have come to the conclusion, that in the
present case the possession of Michael Grace of the premises in
question, was the possession of Martha Cole, the other cotenant,
and since her death the possession of the lessors of the Plaintiff as
the heirs of the said Martha.
That subsequently to the death of Michael Grace, in 1836, the
possession of his widow was the possession of his infant son, as
his guardian in soccage, pursuant to the doctrine as laid down by
Lord Ch. J. De Grey in Goodtitle v. Newman, 3 Wils 527; that
with respect to the objection that the lessors of the Plaintiff are
barred by the 16th section of the Act of Assembly 6 Wm. 4, c. 43,
I am of the opinion that the possession of the son of Michael
Grace at the time of passing the Act, was the possession of the
lessors of the Plaintiff as tenants in common, and was not adverse
to their claim, consequently they are within the exception con
tained in the 14th section of the Act.
This, in my opinion, being the law, the question of ouster under
the
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the peculiar circumstances of the case, is one for a jury to deter
mine, and should, I think, he submitted to the consideration of
another jury.
Parker J.:
. I quite agree with the rest of the Court, that the rule for a new
trial must be made absolute, as the only inquiry at the former
trial was, whether or no an ouster should be presumed twenty
years before the action, so as to make an adverse possession of that
extent, I also agree in thinking that on the state of facts exis
ted at the trial, this action is barred by the late Act of Assembly,
6 Wm. 4, c. 43, unless the lessors of the Plaintiff can bring them
selves within the benefit of the five years given by the 14th section
of that Act.
I do not, however, accede to the position taken by the learned
Counsel for the Defendants at the argument, that because Martha
Cole discontinued possession more than forty years before action
brought, and was then under the disability of coverture, the lesssors
of the Plaintiff claiming through her are necessarily barred by the
16th section, and therefore cannot avail themselv.es of the 14th.
If they are unable to make out their right without the aid
which the 15th section gives to the disability arising out of their
mother’s coverture, then indeed it would seem difficult to evade
the positive enactment of the 16th( for this latter section certainly
controls and limits the operation of the 15th, but I do not think it
can have any such general effect as has been contended for.
To render the 15th and 16th sections applicable, there must
have been a long adverse possession, whereas the 14 th section is
intended only for cases where no adverse possession had commen
ced when the Act took effect. I shall endeavor to explain this by
a few remarks.
Section 13 has no bearing on the case, and the words of refe
rence thereto, used in the 14th, may be omitted without altering
its sense in its present application. The 14tli section will then
read thus: “ Provided always and be it further enacted, That
when the possession or receipt of the profits of the land shall not,
at the time of the Act taking effect, have been adverse to the
right or title of the person claiming to be entitled thereto, then
such person, or the person claiming through h'm may, notwith
standing the period of twenty years hereinbefore limited shall have
expired, make an entry or bring an action to recover such land
at any time within five years next after the time appointed for
this Act to take effect.”
The question here arises, whether the possession of the Defend
ants was or was not adverse at the time of the Act taking effect,
namely, on the 1st January, 1837. If it be said that this question
does not arise because there was a forty years possession in the
Defendants
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Defendants and Michael Grace, under whom they claim, I reply
that by such a construction of the Act the les^irs of the Plaintiff
are placed in a worse situation, because th'-ir mother, through whom
they claim, was under disability, than if she had been under no
disability, for the 16th section applies only to persons under disa
bility, and those claiming through them.
The fallacy of the argument of the Defendant’s Counsel on this
point, consists either in the taking it for granted that there was a
twenty years adverse possession proved against Martha Cole and
her heirs under the old law, and that the1 right of those claiming
through her to make an entry depended on thl additional ten years
given by the 15th section; or in considering that the time at which
the right of entry first accrued is at all events to be ascertained by
the standard of the new Act. But what are the facts ?
Martha Cole entered before her coverture, and was at the time
thereof seised jointly with Michael Grace, they being tenants in
common. After her marriage she ceased to occupy, but prima
facie Michael Grace’s possession was her possession, it would not
become adverse until there was an ouster. Proof of actual ouster
there was none, but the circumstances, it is said, are such as would
warrant the presumption of an ouster; this however is but a pre
sumption to be made by a jury, not the Court, though the jury on
this, as well as on other matters, may be guided by the opinion of
the Court. The fact of adverse possession cannot therefore here
be assumed, it must be found, and we cannot now say that the
possession was adverse when the act took effect.
It may be argued on behalf of the Plaintiffs, that true it is forty
years have passed since Martha Cole, through whom we claim, left
Michael Grace in possession, but we deny that his possession, or
that of the Defendants, was adverse; neither does our right to
maintain our action necessarily depend on our shewing that Mar
tha Cole was under disability, for supposing she had been under no
disability, and we were enabled to prove verbal admissions or
other matters sufficient before the late Act to negative any pre
sumption of ouster arisjjjg out of the length of possession, our
right of entry would have existed when that Act took effect, and
we should be entitled to the five years in which to bring our action,
although the possession would be esteemed adverse, and although
the admissions would not have saved the right of entry according
to the provisions of the 3d, 12th & 13th sections of the new Act.
The question as to the fact of an adverse possession such as
would briiig a party within the 14th section, must be determined
as it would have been if the Act had never passed. The Act can
admit of no other meaning, and the English decisions under the
late statute, from which our Act is copied, are clear on this point- —
Doe d. Jones v. Williams ; 5 Ad. & E. ^91 ; Doe d. Burgess v.
Thompson, lb. 533.
In
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In the case from 3 Ad. & E. Doe v. Bramston, so much relied
on at the argument, Lord Denman qualifies his general expressions
in this way : “ If the persons actually in possession could be shewn
to have held under him through whom the Plaintiff claims, the
possession of the former might be regarded as the possession of the
latter.” In that case there was no doubt of the adverse possession
when the Statute took effect, in fact there was no privity whatever
between the Plaintiff and Defendant.
Should the jury on a new trial find that the possession of Har
per and his wife on the 1st January, 1837, was adverse to the les
sors of the Plaintiff, their right would, under the existing state of
facts, be barred, but I conceive they are entitled to have that
point distinctly put to the jury, accompanied by such observations
from the Judge as the case may require, and ought to recover if
that be established in their favor.
As to the question which arose at the trial, I quite concur with
Mr. Justice Botsford, in thinking that the circumstances of this
case upon the evidence there given would not warrant the jury in
presuming an actual ouster of Martha Cole.
The judgment of Lord Kenyon in Peaceable v. Read, 1 East
568, states very clearly the ground on which such presumptions
are made pritna facie^’ says his Lordship, “ the possession of
one tenant in common is that of another ; every case and dictum
in the books is to that effect. But you may shew that one of them
has been in possession and received the rents and profits to his own
sole use, without account to the other, and that the other has ac
quiesced in this for such a length of time as may induce a juryunder all the circumstances, to presume an actual ouster of his com
panion, and there the line of presumption ends. *** All the cases
mentioned go upon the ground of acquiescence in an adverse hold
ing, in order- to presume an ouster*^*without an ouster be found
by the jury, the possession of one tenant in common must be taken
to be the possession of all.”
If the presumption rests on tlie acquiescence of the party entitled,
how could there be an acquiescence to bind Martha Cole wdiile she
was sub protestate viri, or to bind her children until they had a
right to enter ?
It was opened at the trial that Michael Grace held under a con
veyance of Ebenezer Cole, and notice had been given to produce
the conveyance, though not, it appeared to me sufficiently soon
for the admission of secondary evidence; as this may be supplied
at a new trial, it may be well to consider what effect such a state
of facts would have on the question of ouster. A conveyance by
Cole seized in sight of his wife would put an end to the tenancy in
common, but not by ouster or disseisin which is a wrongful act,
but by a rightful vesting of Cole’s life estate in Michael Grace.
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By the Common Law Cole’s conveyance of the fee would have
operated as a discontinuance, but by the Statute 32 Hen. 8, C.
28, a feoffment, or other act of the husband alone, of the inheri
tance or freehold of his wife, shall be no discontinuance, nor preju
dice the entry of the wife, her heirs, or any claiming after her
death. Fines levied by the husband and wife (whereunto the said
wife is party or privy,) are only excepted.
By our Act of Assembly 32 Geo. 3, c. 2, the husband and wife
are enabled to convey the wife’s estate of freehold and inheritance
by Deed, duly executed and acknowledged, the conveyance to
have the same operation in that respect as a fine.
If Michael Grace then was holding not adversely to, but under
a conveyance of Ebenezer Cole, the right of entry as against him
would not have accrued until Cole’s death, when the estate which
he could lawfully convey to Grace would cease, and here the 5th
section of the Act may be applicable.
See 3. Com. Dig. 430; Discontinuance A. 3.
Litt. 8, 594, 605, Co. Litt 326.
2 Com. Dig. 385.
1 Bac. Abr. 727.
Runnington on Ej.
I make these suggestions, though now somewhat extrajudicial,
for the purpose of calling the attention of the parties to them before
a new trial, as the mention of them now may perhaps save expence
and delay hereafte-.
For the reasons before assigned, I agree that the rule for a new
trial must be made absolute.
As the point on which the new trial is granted was not taken at
the last trial, the Plaintiff is at least entitled to have the costs
abide the event.
Rule absolute.

RANKIN v. CLARKE.
Action on the case. The declaration contained counts for libel, malicious
prosecution and oral slander. Some of the evidence given by the Plaintiff
would not have been admissible on the slander counts. The Plaintiff aban
doned the counts for malicious prosecution, and went to the jury on the
libel and slander counts. The Judge in his summing up left the case open
to the jury on the slander counts, to which a justification had been pleaded,
but directed them to find for the Defendant on the others. The jury however
found for the Plaintiff on the whole declaration, with general damages.
The Plaintiff not having requested the verdict to be corrected before the
jury were discharged, the Court refused now to allow the verdict to be en
tered on the slander counts only, not being satisfied that the jury had limited
their damages to those counts.
In an action for oral slander, an affidavit of the Defendant made before
a Magistrate as the foundation of a criminal proceeding against the Plaintiff,
which is still pending, is not admissible in evidence to shew malice in the
Defendant.
In granting a new trial the Court directed the costs to abide the event.
This
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This was all action on the case. The declaration contained
seven counts.
The first count was for a libel • the second and third for libel
lous matter contained in an affidavit of the Defendant made Jjefore
two Justices of the Peace; the fourth and fifth bounts were for a
malicious prosecution; the sixth and seventh for oral slander.
The defendant pleaded, first the general issue, and secondly as to
the sixth and seventh counts, a justification of the words spoken.
Replication de iitptria, tyc.
At the trial before Botsford J. at the last Northumber
land | Circuit it appeared in evidence that Defendant said
to a witness, that the Plaintiff had taken a boy whom he found
stealing nuts at his store, and thrown him off his wharf into the
river, where the water was two or three fathoms .deep, and that
the boy would have been drowned if he had not been taken out of
the water by two men in a canoe, who caught him just as he was
in the act of sinking a second time. That at the request of the
Defendant, Ilea, a witness, drew up a statement in pencil which
he gave to Defendant. An affidavit, sworn before two Justices
procured from the files of the Court, was put in evidence. This
affidavit was brought to the Justiqes by the Defendant, and was
sworn before them, Defendant was recognized to appear as a wit
ness, and the affidavit'and recognizance were filed with the Clerk
of the Circuits. Hea, the witness, stated that the affidavit was
materially the same as the memorandum he had drawn up in pen
cil from the Defendant’s statement.
Wilmot, for Defendant, moved for a non-suit, on the grounds—
1 st. That the affidavit stated in the three first counts, being
made in course of justice, was no libel.
2nd. That no prosecution was shewn, or proved to be ended.
3rd That the words charged in the two last counts were quali
fied by other words proved, and that the evidence disproved
malice.
The fourth and fifth counts were abandoned; as to the other
counts the learned Judge ruled, that the Defendant had proceeded
in an extraordinary manner, professing duty, a desire to discharge
liis conscience, a record for the authorities to proceed on, and
having applied to a third person, instead of a Justice of the Peace,
the ground of objection failed. As to the sixth and seventh counts,
the question of malice was for the consideration of the jury.
The Defendant went into evidence to support his plea of justi
fication.
The Plaintiff had a verdict for £100 damages.
In Michaelmas Term Wilmot, for Defendant, obtained a rule
nisi to set aside the verdict on the following grounds :—
1st. That words qualifying those charged were omitted to be
stated in the declaration.

in the

First Year

of

VICTORIA.

305

2nd. That the words were spoken in a course of justice.
3rd. That the verdict was against evidence, the plea of justi
fication having been proved.
Cause was shewn in Hilary Term, by J. A. Street, and N. Par
ker for Plaintiff; and
Wilmot, for Defendant, was heard in support of the rule.
At the close of the argument the Court permitted the Plaintiff’s
Counsel to take out a rule nisi to enter the verdict on the sixth
and seventh counts of the declaration, and that if that rule should
be made absolute the argument should be considered as closed.
In Trinity Term, J. A. Street and Berton argued in support of
the rule, that where a verdict at Nisi Prius in libel contained
seventeen counts and seventeen special pleas of justification, the
Court permitted an amendment, saying it was impossible in such
a case to hold Counsel bound in the confusion of Nisi Prius—13
Price^499. Almost anything would be presumed to support a
verdict. In Richardson v. Mellish, 3 Bing. 334, the Court in
quired, first, w’as there evidence to support the count on which the
Plaintiff sought to rest ? and secondly, was all the evidence given
applicable to that count? In the case before the Court all the
evidence was admissible under the two last counts. Those counts
were for words spoken, but it was competent for the Plaintiff to
give in evidence any words spoken or written, as well as any act
of the Defendant, to shew quo animo he spoke the words—Russel
v. M'Quister, 1 Camp. 49, [Note.] In Mead v. Daubigny, 1
Camp. 49, Lord Kenyon, in an action for a libel, allowed other
papers in evidence which were themselves libels. In Tote v.
Humphrey, 2 Campbell, 73 in an action for words of perjury to
shew the quo animo, the Plaintiff offered a bill of indictment pre
ferred by the Defendant against him and returned ignoramus ; on
motion to set aside the verdict, it was held that the evidence was
properly admitted.
\Botsford J.—I was surprised you did not ask to enter the ver
dict upon the two last counts, if you had asked I certainly should
have permitted it.]
Counsel are not bound to elect at the time, but could' elect after
wards. Lee v. Muggeridge, 5 Taun. 40. The post6a was
amendable at any time, even after final judgment—3 T. R. 749.
Wilmot contra.
The grand objection was, that the evidence on the three first
counts was inapplicable to the two last, and those three counts
were pressed to the jury as containing a substantive charge of libel.
In 13 Price all the counts Were for the same libel, all the evidence
was applicable to any one count; here the Plaintiff’s Counsel put
the libel strongly to the jury, urging the cool deliberate malice of
the Defendant. The distinction was if a good count, to which all
Pl
the
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the evidence was applicable, were joined with a bad count, in
the following Term Plaintiff might amend ; but there was no case
where the Court had permitted an amendment, unless the evidence
were so applicable.
Chipman, Ch. J. :
In this case the verdict is for general damages. Before permit
ting an amendment we must be satisfied from all the proceedings
that we are carrying into effect the intention of the jury. At the
trial the Pla itifi proceeded for damages for a malicious prosecu
tion for a libel, and for oral slander. As to the first, the counts
relating thereto were abandoned at the trial. and there can be no
question that they were not considered. As to the second, the
Plaintiff went to the jury for damages for the libel as a substantive
cause of action. The learned Judge directed the jmy not to find
for the libel; they found a verdict for general damages. Then
unless the Plaintiff felt that he could support the verdict, be should
have ascertained the intention of the jury ; and I think under the
circumstances of this case, it is not competent for the Plaintiff to
ask for a liin'ted verdict. It is contended that the evidence was
applicable to the two last counts to shew quo aninuo tlffi words
were spoken. But is there any case to shew that for such a pur
pose a party may give in evidence a judicial proteediitg that ex
pressly excludes malice, and therefore cannot be evidence of it?
Again, if intended for that purpose it should have been so offered,
and the Judge would then have excluded it as a ground of dama
ges, and have di'-ected the jury only to find on the substantive
charge. If this be so, can. we say that the jury with this evidence
pressed on them by the talent and eloquence of Counsel, were not
affected by it? and unless it appeared clear that the jtuy intended
their verdict only on the two last counts, I cannot accede to the
application.
Botsfoud, J.:
The libel is here stated in the record; the jury had that before
them, and considered it not as evidence quo auMUM of the speaking
of the words. I flunk this application is too late, it should have
been made at the time of the trial.
The Cotlrt then called upon the Counsel for the Plaintiff to
shew cause against the rule nisi for a new trial.
The learned Counsel argued that the first count was supported
by the evidence of the contents of the pencil memorandum made
by Hea, and that the affidavit in the second and third counts was
not made for the purpose of a judicial proceeding. The Defendant
prepared a statement in writing and went and swore to it, saying
he should like to leave a record of the facts. The affidavit was
not sworn with an intent to prosecute, and if not, no subsequent
act would throw round it the protection Mtended to judicial pro
ceedings.
Chipman,
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Chipman, Ch. J.:
The Jibel stated was an affidavit made in the usual course of
justice, and the deponent was bound over to prosecute, and there
fore the parly was not amenable to justice for the publication of a
libel. The Plaintiff took the verdict on these counts at his peril;
Botsford, J.:
I am of the same opinion. The party might have taken bis
verdict on the two last counts, and even then the damages were
more than perhaps the occasion called for.
Parker, J.
It is impossible for us to say that ihe juiy in their award of
damages did not take into consideration the libel as well as the
slanderous words. The libel in tmtli was the main ground of the
action, and dwelt upon very much by the Counsel in the summing
up to the jury, and although Ibejuy were directed by the learned
Judge to find for the Plaintiff on the slander counis only, still their
verdict was general, qnd tae Plaintiff would not avail himself of
an opportunity afforded him by the Judge to ascertain distinctly
upon what they found, and to have the mistake, if such it was,
corrected in the verdict before the same was recorded and the jury
discharged.
Had the action been confined as it should have been to the slan
derous words, the affidavit before the magistrate would not have
been let in ; but as the Plaintiff has inserted counts for a malicious
prosecution as well as libel, it rendered the defence very embar
rassing and evidence was admitted which we are all quite satisfied
ought not to have been received when the real state of the case
was apparent. The prosecution was still pending when the ac
tion was brought it was perfectly clear then that the count for
malicious prosecution could not be sustained; and without the pro
duction of the pencil memorandum written by Mr. Hea, or account
ing for its non-p’oduclton, in order to let in secondary evidence,
the count charging that as a libel could not be supported.
We are bound, I think, to send this case down lo a second trial,
and the Plaintiff ought, it appear^ to me, to be prepared to state
what is the particular offence which be complains the Defendant
lias charged him with, in order that the jury may distinctly under
stand the nature of the complaint, and the facts which lead to it,
in determini jig how far the evidence substantially supports the
special plea of justification. I have read the two slander counts
with much attention, and have called on the Counsel to explain
them, but have not, to the present moment, received any satisfac
tory answer to my question whether they pre intended to allege a
charge of felony or misdemeanour. I hope the record wifi be taken
down to a new trial, dismembered of the counts which are net sus
tainable, and that the case may undergo a full, fair and final con
sideration on its real merits.
The
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The Court took time to consider as to the question of costs, and
on a subsequent day determined that, although the verdict was
against the direction of the Court, and in such cases the rule was
usually silent, yet the whole question of costs being in the discre
tion of the Court, under all the circumstances of this case, it would
best meet the ends of justice to order that the costs of the last trial
should abide the event of the suit.
Rule absolute accordingly.
J. A. Street, A. Stewart, N. Parker, G. Kerr, and Berton for
Plaintiff.
Wilmot and W. Carman for Defendant.
JOPLIN v. DAVIDSON.
Where the Sessions, under an authority to appoint for an unlimited time,
displaced an officer without a reasonable cause, and appointed another in
his stead, the Court held that the former was entitled to his action for
money had and received against the latter, for the profits received subse
quent to his removal.
An appointment without limitation is an appointment for life.
This was an action of Assumpsit, for money had and received,

tried before BOTSFORD J. at the Northumberland Circuit, held in
September last.
If appeared in evidence that W. Abrams held the situation of
Harbour Master for the Port of Miramichi until August, 1835,
when he resigned the same. Upon his resignation Plaintiff was
appointed by the Court of General Sessions for Northumberland,
under the Act of Assembly 3 G. 4, c. 28, and continued to receive
the fees of office from that time until March, 1836, when Plaintiff
was displaced by the Sessions, and Defendant appointed in his stead.
It also appeared from a resolution, moved at the General Sessions
by the Defendant himself, (who was one of the Magistrates,) and
passed, that the ground upon which the Plaintiff was displaced
was, that at the time of his appointment no notice had been given to
the public. The Plaintiff sought to recover the amount of fees
received by Defendant since the time, as he contended, he was ille
gally removed. A verdict was found for Defendant.
N. Parker, in moving for a new trial in last Michaelmas Term,
took three grounds :
1st. That an appointment without limitation was an appoint
ment for life.
2nd. That the Sessions had grounded their appointment on a
want of notice, and that no notice was required by the law.
3rd. That no power was given to the Sessions to displace, ex
cept in cases of neglect or misconduct.
The learned Counsel contended that the Plaintiff was an officer
fairly appointed under the law of the land, and as such had been
displaced
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displaced without any sufficient cause, and illegally deprived of
the profits and emoluments of his office ; that there was no limita
tion in the Act as to the time that Harbour Masters should act,
and no power was given to, or arbitrary right conferred upon, the
Sessions, either by the Act or at the Common Law, to remove
Harbour Masters at their mere whim or caprice, without any rea
sonable grounds of charge for neglect, incapacity or mal-conduct.
The Sessions had declared the situation vacant, because no notice
hal been given to the public previous to the Plaintiff’s appoint
ment. By the Act of Assembly no notice was required, and
Plaintiff was appointed when a competent number of Magistrates
were present. It was for Defendant to have shewn that notice
was requisite, especially as he was the mover of the resolution
which declared the situation of Harbour Master to be vacant, and
which was so declared vacant in order that the Defendant himself
might succeed to the appointment. If the appointment had been
made for one year, the Plaintiff could not have been displaced
within the year ; he was therefore entitled to bring his action for
money had and received—1 Sei. N. P. Asst. p. 79 ; Tomlin’s
Law Diet. Tit. Office.
Ch. J.—No1 objection is raised to the form of action;
an appointment without 1’nitation must be considered as an ap
pointment for life.]
The learned Counsel cited Rex v. Guardians of Poor, St.
Nichols, 4 Maule & Sei. 324 ; Queen v. Corporation, Durham 10,
Mod. 146; 16 Vin. Abt. 110, 130; Co. Lit. 233, a. b. Croke
Car. 59.
In Hilary Term J. A. Street, for Defendant, shewed cause.
The learned Counsel contended that the number of Harbour
Masters for each Harbour were not limited by the Act of Assem
bly, but that the Court of General Sessions might, in their discre
tion, appoint as many as they thought proper. The terms of the
Act were as follows :—“ That it shall and may be lawful for the
Justices of the Peace in the several and respective Counties, in
General Sessions, to appoint Harbour Masters for such Harbours
as may be found to require the same.” Plaintiff was appointed
without any notice, and in March the Sessions, considering the
appointment to be incorrect, declared it vacant, and Defendant
was duly installed therein. The question isj- whether the De
fendant is Harbour Master or not ? if so, be is clearly entitled to
the fees and emoluments appertaining to the office. Again, if not
being such, having performed the duties, has he not in equity and
good conscience, aright to retain the fees ? Davidson was legally
appointed ; the Sessions have a right to displace, but even if they
have not, the correctness of Defendant’s appointment does not
depend upon the correctness of Plaintiff’s removal.
‘ Chipman,
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[Chipman, Ch. J.—I very much doubt if the Court of Sessions
can appoint more than one; the Act declares it to be the duty
of the Harbour Master to enforce the directions and regulations
of the Sessions, and it appears from the whole tenor of the Act,
that one Harbour Master was intended for each port.]
[Botsford, J.—I left it the jury, under the impression that the
Court might have appointed more than one under the Act.]
This action was for money had and received ; Davidson was not
a usurper in the office; he was regularly appointed and acted and
performed the duties in pursuance of that appointment, and the
profits roust clearly enure to his benefit.—bmith v. Latham, 9
Bing, 692.
There is no case where it has been determined that a party ap
pointed to a new office under and by virtue of an Act of Parlia
ment, shall be considered to hold during good behaviour.
N. Parker, contra:—
As to the first point,that the Sessions may appoint more than one
Harbour Master, no serious question cau be raised. The true
construction of the Act is, that one Harbour Master shall be ap
pointed to each Harbour ; the fees are payable to, and certain regu
lations are to be enforced by the Harbour Master, and if more
than one were appointed both could not recover. The two ap
pointments were not intended to be concurrent; that of David
son’s was evidently intended to supersede Joplin’s, and makes the
three exceptions in Smith 3 Latham completely analagous. The
appointment of a person to an office held during pleasure is an
effectual revocation of a former appointment; and although this
may be considered a new office, yet the objection of the learned
Counsel would apply to almost every situation in a new colony.
The office under different names is well known.
[Chipman, Ch. J.— The nature of the office must depend
entirely on the Statute ; it is not an ancient or common law
office.]
Curia advisari wilt.
In this Term the Court delivered their opinions.
Chipman, Ch. J.:
This case depends entirely on the question, whether the Plain
tiff still continues to be the legal Harbour Master for the River
and Harbour of Miramichi, under his appointment to that office by
the Justices of the Peace for the County of Northumberland, in
General Sessions, in the month of September, 1835, or whether
the subsequent proceedings had for the purpose of displacing him,
and of appointing the Defendant to the said office, are valid and
effectual for that purpose. The proceedings of the Justices in re
lation to this matter were given in evidence in the following ex
tracts from the minutes of the Court of General Sessions of the
Peace for that County.
“ At
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“At a General Sessions of the Peace of our Lord the King, held at
the Court House at Newcastle, in and for the County of Nor
thumberland, on Friday the 4th day of September, in the year
of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and thirty five
PRESENT.

Alexander Davidson,N
/-".Joseph Cunard,
John Nesmith,
<
K George Henderson,
John 'I'. Williston, T Esquires, 1 William Joplin.
Dudley Perley.
£ Justices. A John J. Doualds,
'Phom as C. Allan, \
/ Henry B. Allison,
Robert Leslie,
J
braiiam Mooers.
William Abrams, Esquire, appears by George Kerr, his Attor
ney, and tenders the tollowing resignation of the office of Harbour
Master
To the Justices of the Peace for the County of Northumberland.
I hereby resign and give up the office of Harbour Master for
the River and Port of Miramichi, at present held by me by virtue
of your appointment.
(Signed)
WILLAM ABRAMS,
By George Kerr, his Atty.
On motion of John T. Williston, Esquire, that William Joplin,
Esquire, be appointed Harbour Master for the River and Harbour
of Miramichi, the Court divided as follows, viz. :—
Against the motion.
For the motion.
Mr. Justice Nesmith,
Mr. Justice Cunard.
Williston,
Allison,
Perley,
Henderson,
Allan,
Moores,
Donalds.
Therefore Ordered, That William Joplin, Esquire, be appointed
Harbour Master for the River and Harboitt of Miramichi, and
that the Clerk notify him of such appointment.”
“ At a General Session of the Peace of our Lord the King, held at
the Court House at Newcastle, in and for the County of Nor
thumberland, on Saturday the nineteenth day of March, in the
year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and thirty six.
PRESENT.

Alexander Davidson,/-John Fraser,
John Nesmith,
J
V George Henderson,
Dudley Perley,
f Esquires, 7 Donald M;I<ay,
Robert Leslie,
£ Justices. £ Alexander Goodfellow,
James Gilmour,
*
> Robert Doak,
John T. Williston, /
VWilliam Joplin.
Moved by Alexander Davidson, Esquire—Whereas on the last
day of the sitting of the Court of General Sessions of the Peace,
held
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held in and for this County in August and September last, Wil
liam Abrams, the then Harbour Master of the Port and River of
Miramichi, then and now absent in Great Britain, did by his Attofnef, George Kerr, give in his resignation and relinquishment of
the office of Harbour Master of said Port and River of Miramichi,
which wa^ accepted by the said Court; And whereas the said
office of Harbour Master of the said Port and River of Miramichi,
there, was immediately thereafter filled up by the appointment of
William Joplin thereto, and without any notice being given to the
public that such office had been vacated,—Resolved, That it is
now expedient that the said office be declared vacant by this
Court, and it is accordingly hereby declared vacant, and that this
Court willf elect, on Tuesday tliq 22d March ne.\t, a fit and proper
person to fulfil the duties of the office.
For the motion—Mr. Justice Nesmith, Fraser, M‘Kay, Leslie,
Henderson, Doak, Gilmour, Goodfellow, Davidson.
Against th^lnotion—Mr. Justice Williston and Perley.”

‘•'TUESDAY MORNING, March 22, 1836.
PRESENT.

Alexander Davidson, John Fraser, Joseph Cunard, John T.
Williston, Donald M‘Kay, Alexander Goodfellow, James Gilmour,
John Nesmith, Robert Doak, Dudley Perley, Abraham Moores,
William Joplin, John J. Donalds, Robert Leslie, George Hender
son, Esquires. Justices.
On motion of Mr. Justice Leslie, that the Resolution passed on
Saturday last, relative to the appointment of a Harbour Master, be
read.
Mr. Justice Cunard tenders a protest against the proceedings
and requests that it may be entered on the minutes, which motion
is seconded by Justice Williston ; on which the question of the
Court being taken it is_docided in the negative.
Mr. Justice Cunard, Perley, Moores, Donalds and Williston ten
der a second protest, which is also moved to be entered on the
minutes, and the question being taken it is decided in the negative.
Moved by Mr. Justice Leslie, that Alexander Davidson, Esq.
be appointed Harbour Master for the River and Harbour of Mira
michi, which is Seconded by Mr. Justice Goodfellow.
Before the question taken on the motion, Mr. Justice Cunard
tenders a third protest, and moves that it be entered on the
minutes, which is seconded by Mr. Justice Williston, and on the
question being taken it was decided in the negative.
Mr. Justice Fraser in the.Qhair.
On motion, that Alexander Davidson, Esquire, be appointed
Harbour Master for the River and Harbour of Miramichi, the
Court divided as follows:—
For
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For the motion.
Against the motion
Mr. Justice Nesmith,
Mr. Justice Cunard,
Goodfellow,
Williston,
Henderson,
Donalds,
M‘Kay,
Joplin,
Perley,
Leslie,
Doak,
Moores.
Gilmour,
Justice Davidson retires from the Chair before the question, and
Justice Fraser, as Chairman declines voting.
Therefore Ordered, That Alexander Davidson, Esquire, be ap
pointed Harbour Master for the Paver and Harbour of Miramichi.”
The authority of the Justices in this matter is found in the Act
of Assembly, 3 Geo. 4, c. 28, s. 4, which is as follows:—“ And
be it further enacted, That it shall and may be lawful for the Jus
tices of the Peace in the several and respective Counties, in Gene
ral Session, to appoint Harbour Masters for such Harbours as
may be found to require the same, and shall also have power and
authority to regulate tne ballast births, and also the manner in
which vessels coming into such Ports or Harbours shall anchor
and moor, which directions and regulations it shall be the duty of
the Harbour Master to enforce ; and the master or commander of
any ship or vessel who shall refuse or neglect to obey or conform
to the directions of such Harbour Master, shall forfeit and pay the
sum of five pounds for such refusal or neglect; and it shall and
may be lawful for such Harbour Master to ask, demand and re
ceive from the master, commander or consignee of every ship or
vessel (coasters excepted,) the sum of five shillings for all vessels
above fifty tons and net exceeding one hundred tons, and ten shil
lings for all vessels above one hundred tons, a3 Harbour Master's
fees, which Harbour Masters shall furnish copies of all regulations
made for the respective Harbours to tlie pilots appointed for such
Harbour, one copy of which regulations such pilots are hereby
required to give to the master or commander of every vessel they
may take in charge, for his information; and it shall be the duty
of the Harbour Masters to prosecute all breaches of this Act.”
The question then will turn upon what is the true legal
construction of this Act of Assembly, with regard to the duration and
tenure of the office of Harbour Master. It is much to be regretted
that the intention of the Legislature, with respect to appointments
which are to be made by the various Benches of Magistrates in
the several Counties of the Province, should not have been ex
pressed at large in such explicit terms as not to require a reference
to judicial interpretation for the purpose of determining the true
meaning of the Act. The Justices by whom the Plair.tiff was
displaced,
Ql
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displaced, have evidently assumed that it was in the power of the
Justices in General Sessions to declare the officp of Harbour Mas
ter to be vacant whenever they might deem it expedient so to do,
and to reappoint to it, thus making the tenure of the office to be
absolutely at the will of the Justices; for it was not, and could not
for a moment have been contended, that the reason assigned by
the Justices for vacating the original appointment of the Plaintiff
was a sufficient reason for that measure. How precarious such a
tenure of office would be, is shewn by the present case, in which
it is seen to depend on the shifting majority in a numerous body of
Magistrates, actuated, it is to be feared, from what appears on the
face of these proceedings, very much by party motives. If the
principle be admitted there is nothing to prevent a change in the
office at every succeeding General Session, without limitation or
restraint, according as management or accident might produce a
majority on one side or the other. The evil of such a state of
things would be grievous and palpable, and would require the im
mediate interposition of the Legislature to give some certainty to
the tenure of an office, of which the functions are so important in
the maritime districts of the Province. Whilst the inconveniences
which would arise from this office being held at the will of the
Magistrates, afford so cogent an argument to negative such a con
struction, there is, on the other hand, a positive rule of law for in
terpreting the Act, as conferr'ng a power of appointment for life ;
that rule is, that grants which convey an estate without any limi
tation as to time, are held to convey an estate for life. Applying
this rule to the present case, I am of opinion that the words of the
Act by which the Justices are authorized to appoint “ Harbour
Masters for such Harbours as may be found to require the same,”
confer upon the Justice’s a power to make such appointment for
life, and not revocable at their pleasure, there being nothing in
any other part of the Act which requires a different construction of
these general and indefinite expressions, and the appointment is
actually made by the Justices in the general terms of the Act.
The office will indeed be held upon the condition which the law im
plies with regard to all offices, viz. that the duties of it shall be dili
gently and faithfully discharged, and 1 conceive that the same body
which has power to appoint, must necessarily have power to remove
for inefficiency, unfaithfulness or negligence; in other words that the
tenure of the office is during good behaviour, which is but another
expression for an office for life. The application of the rule I have
mentioned to appointments to office*is expressly recognized in
Dighton’s case, Vent. 84, where the Court say, if the Letters Pa
tent in question in that case “ hail been to choose a Town Clerk
generally” it had been for his life.” The same principle is ad
verted to by Lord Holt in the case of Harcourt v. Fox, reported
very
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very much at large in 1 Shower, 506, and the application of it to
offices is, I apprehend, constant and clear. In the case of Smith
v. Lathan 9, Bing. 692, cited by the learned Counsel for the De
fendant, the Court held that the object of the Act of Parliament in
question there, could not be carried into effect unless the power to
appoint, vested in the Lords of the Treasury, should be held to be
during their pleasure. But the inference from that case undoubt
edly is, that if it had not appeared on the face of the Statute,
which the Court take great pains to shew, that this was the neces
sary construction the general expressions of the Act giving power
to appoint, without limit, as to the duration of the office, would in
their ordinary import be construed to confer a power of appointing
for life, and not at will. In the case now before the Court, the
opinion that the tenure of the office is during good behaviour, is
strongly corroborated by the provision in the Act which establishes
certain permanent fees as the emoluments of the office. It would
tend to constant abtisjes if an office of profit of this description were
held at the fluctuating pleasure of a numerous body of mdn.*
In ,answer to the objection made at the Bar that it would be in
congruous that Justices, who hold their own offices only during
pleasure, should have power to make a permanent appointment, it
is to be rema ked, that when the Justices have fulfilled their func
tions under flip ‘Act by making the appointment, the appointee is
1 under the Act^ and will hold the office by virtue of the Act, and
not by virtue of any estate or interest that lias passed from them
to him. It was also argued that, as the Justices had the power of
appointing Harbour Masters only for “ such Harbours as may be
found to require the samq/’ they had power to put an end to the
office altogether, which would involve the power of dismissing the
officer at their pleasure.
But the one power is by no means a necessary consequence of
the other. In determining in what Harbours it may be expedient
to have the services of a Harbour Master, it is the intendment of
the law that they would be guided only by considerations of the
public good, and if circumstances should arise which would render
it unnecessary to keep up the office in any place where a Harbour
Master may have been appointed, it may very properly be implied
that they have power, upon grounds of public expediency, to put
an end to the,office, but this is very different from an arbitrary
power to dismiss the officer while the office is continued. It was
further argued, that if the Justices were to be the judges of the
insufficiency or misbehaviour of the Harbour Master, the tenure of
the office would still be at their discretion ; but here agSin the law
presumes, that they would be faithful and impartial in the discharge
of this duty, and they would in this, as in other cases, be amenable
to the superintending authority and jurisdiction of this Court.
A
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A distinct ground of argument was taken up by the learned
Counsel for tlie Defendant, and it was contended that there was no
limit in the Act to the number of Harbour Masters, and that the
Justices might appoint as many as they saw fit. It might be
answered to this argument, that this is not the principle upon
which the parties have proceeded in the present case,—they de
clared the appointment of the Plaintiff to be vacated, before they
proceeded to make the appointment of the Defendant, and their
act and intention clearly were, to make the latter appointment,
not concurrent with, but exclusive of, the former. But the Act of
Assembly cannot possibly, as it seems to me, bear the construction
which is thus attempted to be' given to it.
It is, I think, clear, both from the reason of the thing and the
enactments of the Statute, that there ban be but one Harbour Mas
ter for any one Port or place. Tlie general duty of the officer is
to regulate the movements and anchorage of the shipping resorting
to the Port, and it would tend to endless conflict and confusion if
the shipping were made subject to the different orders of different
Flarbour Masters. The positive provisions of the Act also forbid
such a construction. The Harbour Master is to enforce the regu
lations of the Sessions, and a penalty is imposed upon the master
or commander of any vessel who shall not conform to the directions
of ‘e such Harbour Master.” If there were two Harbour Masters
and they were1 to give different directions, which of them would
the ship master be bound to obey ? 1 “ Such Harbour Master” is
also authorized to demand and receive the Harbour Master’s fees.
If there were two, which of them would be entitled to the fees ?
which fees, be it remembered, are evidently intended to serve as
the compensation for the performance of the general duties of the
office, and not for any specific service in regard to each vessel.
Again, if there were two Harbour Masters to one Port, of which
of them would it be the duty to furnish copies of regulations to
pilots, and to prosecute for offences against the Act ?
Upon the whole, I am of opinion that tlie Plaintiff, having been
rightfully appointed to the office of Harbour Master for the River
and Harbour of Miramichi, and this appointment not having been,
in point of law, vacated by the subsequent proceedings of the Jus
tices, remahis still possessor of the office, and that the fees in question
in this case, having been wrongfully received by the Defendant,
the Plaintiff is entitled to recover the same in this action, and that
therefore the rule for a new trial must be made absolute.
BOTSFORD, J. concurred.

Parker

J.:

Allowing that a power to remove the Harbour Master is neces
sarily incident to the power to appoint to a certain extent, it can
never be contended that a power to remove at the will and pleasure
of
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of tlie Sessions without any just caAse, must bo so incidental.
I should incline to think that for insufficiency or misbehaviour, a
power of amotion would be vested in the Sessions1,: but it is unne
cessary to decide that point at present, it being quite sufficient for
this case to determine that they icannot exercise that power at
their mere will and pleasure, for no sufficient cause has been as
signed or suggested in tire present case. I would rerhark also, that
the appointment has,,been made generally without specifying any
limitation; therefore it might be said, that supposing they had the
power to make it an office at pleasure^ they have not so done.
Instances sre given in the Books where, by a Charter, a Corpora
tion might appoint either for life or during pleasure.
In considering the Act of Assembly and the nature of the office,
I cannot think it was the intention of t ie Legislature to give any
such arbitrary authority to the Sessions", particularly when I see
in what distinct language they have spoken when it was thought
proper to give that power, namely, in the case of the County Trea
surer.
The several Acts relating to the appointment of Firemen also give
a power to remove at pleasure in express terms.
In making the Act now in question the Legislature had before
them the other Acts in which an appointing power is given to Jus
tices in Session; most of the officers by them appointed are ex
pressly ffwrawafglthat of the County Treasurer is expressly during
pleasure. Having made this office of Harbour Master neither one
nor the other, I think they must have intended it to be during
good behaviouh!1 *
I do not think anything could be made of the point that the
Sessions had a right to appoint more than one 'Harbour Master ;
the act appears to me clearly to mean one Flarbour Master for each
Harbour. But the question does not arise in this'1 case, for the
Defendant has been clearly appointed the Harbour Master for the
Port of Miramichi in the place of the Plaintiff, who is first dis
placed from the office before the Sessions proceed to appoint the
Defendant. If they had the powrer of appointing more than one it
must be in separate districts, as two Harbour Masters could not
each have concurrent jurisdiction over the whole Harbour; and al
though there may bd different towns on its banks, yet the Harbour
does not derive its name from any of them, but retains the appel
lation which it had distinct, from indeed prior to the existence of
any town there, namely, the Port or Harbour of Miramichi.
On the other point in this case it is abundantly clear from a
whole series of cases, that if the Sessions had not the power to re
move in the present instance, the Plaintiff remained the legal offi
cer, and as such was entitled to the legal fees, and that the Defen
dant can claim no right to retain them although he did discharge
the
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the duties of the office, he not being legally invested there
with. Cases of seemingly much greater hardship than the present
have been decided in England on this point, by the authority and
reason of which this Court must be governed.
I am authorised by Mr. Justice Carter to state that he fully
concurs in this judgment of the Court.
Rule absolute for a new trial.
N. Parker. for Plaintiff.
Street Jr Kerr, for Defendant.

ROGERS « PECK AND OTHERS.
In an action on the case for special damage, the Court will not disturb a
verdict for the Defendant where no permanent rights are bound by it, unless
the evidence is all on one side, or very greatly preponderates.
The words privileges and appurtenances in a deed do not create a right of
way.
Where A, the owner of a milland of the stream from the mill to navigable
waters, sells the mill and some land, including a part of the stream, to B, the
right to use the stream through A’s land for the purpose of taking logs to
and from the mill, will not pass to B by the words privileges and appm/rlenances, nor as incident to the mill, although A, previous to the sale, had
used it for that purpose.
The Court will not entertain a motion for a new trial, on the ground that
nominal damages should have been given when the point was not raised at
the trial.
This was an action on the case by the Plaintiff, as owner of a

saw mill situate on a creek flowing into ths Shepody River, for
consequential damages occasioned by the erection by the Defend
ant of a gallows dam further down the stream, whereby the pas
sage of lumber to and from the Plaintiff’s mill was obstructed, and
for specific damages occasioned to the Plaintiff by forcing back the
water above the gallows dam.
The declaration contained six counts; the 1st stated the
stream to be a public navigable river ; the 2d and 3d to be a pub
lic highway ; the 4th and Sth to be a private way ; the 6th alleged
special damage to Plaintiff’s mill from the back water occasioned
by Defendant’s dam.
The cause was tried before PARKER J. and a special jury at
the last Westmorland Assizes. Part of the jury had before been
on a jury of view of the premises. It appeared in evidence at the
trial that the tide flowed at high tides above the gallows dam, but
at ordinary tides did not reach it. Plaintiff’s mill was built-in 1817,
by Peck, one of the Defendants, and conveyed by him to the
Plaintiff, by deed, under which deed the Plaintiff claimed a right
of way over the stream passing through Defendant’s land, and
upon which land the gallows dam was erected; the Shepody River
is a navigable river ; the logs to supply the Plaintiff’s mdl were
brought
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brought down the Shepody River, and thence carried up the creek
The gallows dam is a sill of timber sunk in the river, filled in with
stones, and above it is a ditch which leads the water to Defendant’s
mill. The creek is used by all persons with boats and scows in
times of freshet. There is a bridge across the Shepody River.
A wharf of the Plaintiff’s was floated away the spring after the
gallows dam was erected, by a rise of water occasioned by the dam.
PARKER J. left it to the jury to say whether the Plaintiff had
proved damage, and directed them that if so, the question as to
whether the stream were a public or private way, was not material.
A verdict was found for the Defendants.
E. B. Chandler, in moving for a new trial, admitted thatthe stream
was not a navigable river, or even a public highway, but contended
that the verdict was against evidence, and that the jury should
have been directed to find for the Plaintiff for some amount of
damage. The Plaintiff’s right to use the stream was necessarily
appurtenant to the ownership of his land and the prior occupancy
of the stream. It was conveyed to him by the same title under
which he held his lands, and was necessarily included in the term
appurtenances-—Hill v. Mason, 5 Barn & Ad. p. 16 26.
Cf. Botsford, for the Defendant, shewed cause.
The Plaintiff having abandoned his first three counts, it became
necessary to separate the evidence applicable to those counts, and
those on which the Plaintiff rested. To recover under the latter
counts be must shew specific damage. If the stream were a pub
lic river then the dam, if an obstruction, would be a public nui
sance, and the remedy would be by indictment unless for specific
damage. The stream is not a public highway—Angel on Tide
Waters, p. 60. Bower v. Hill, 2 Bing. N. C. 339. The passage
of boats did not necessarily import the stream to be a public high
way. The occasional use of the stream rendered navigable by
sudden freshets or thawing of the snow, would not make it a pub
lic highway, otherwise dyking marshes, occasionally overflowed by
the tide, would be a common nuisance. The stream was not a
private way ; the words privileges and appurtenances in a deed
will not create a right of way—Whalley v. Tompson ; 1 Bos. &
Pul. 375 ; Barlow v. Rhodes, 1 Cr. & Mee. 439. A private way
being an easement must be claimed by prescription or grant—
Plant v. James, et. al. 5 B & Ad. 791; 3 Salk. 40; 1 Yel.
159; 1 Com. Dig. 175; Tit. D. case for nuisance and cases
there cited. If the stream were a private way it was necessary
that the Plaintiff should prove special damage—Angel on Water
Courses, 51, 29 ; 3 Black. Com. 317 ; 16 Vin. Ab. 26 22 ; Ma
son v. Kill, 5 Barn. & Ad. 1; Bealy v. Shaw, 6 East. 215. It
was entirely a question for the jury, whether or not the Defendant’s
dam w'ere an obstruction—1 Bur. 337. Being so, and the jury
having
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having determined by their verdict that the dam was not an ob
struction, the Court would not grant a new trial—Harris v. Jones,
1 Mood. & Rob. 173; Anon. 1 Wil. 22.
E. B. Chandler, in reply, urged that ifthe tide periodically flowed to
the tail of Plaintiff's mill, then, although the river were not a
public highway, no party had a right to obstruct it.
Curia advisari vult.
In this Term the Court delivered their opinions.
Chipman, Ch. J.:
The principal ground upon which the application for a new trial
in this case rested, was, that the verdict was against evidence.
Before granting a new trial on this ground, at least in cases where
rights are not permanently bound, we should be satisfied that the
evidence is all on one side, or very greatly preponderates. When
evidence has been given on both sides and is conflicting, as in the
present case, although we may be of opinion that the weight of
evidence is against the verdict, yet “ the jury are the proper judges
which scale preponderates,”—2 Stra. 1142. In the present case
also the jury was a special jury, and part of them had a view of
the premises, and they were therefore peculiarly well qualified to
judge of the bearing of the evidence.—The right is not bound, for
the Plaintiff may, if so advised, bring a subsequent action for a
continuance of the obstruction. I am therefore of opinion that we
should be invading the propej. province cf the jury, if we were in
this case to grant a new trial upon this ground.
It was also contended, that the Plaintiff was, in all events, en
titled to a verdict for nominal damage? upon the counts in the
declaration which describee! his right as that of a private way
through the Defendant’s stream. This point opens the question,
whether the expressions in the deed, upon which the Defendant
grounds this right, are sufficient to convey the way which he thus
claims, and was argued at large on this motion. The way
claimed is oyer and upon that part of the stre.am which remained
in the Defendant's ownership and possession after the conveyance
to the Plaintiff, a right which is perfectly distinct from the water
course, or the flowing of the water in the stream up to the Defen
dant’s mill, and which vyould subject the Defendant’s part of the
stream to a servitude or burthen to be exercised within his own
limits. The words of the deed are as follows : “ a certain piece
or tract of land, being part of that farm or tract purchased by me
from James Peck, (described by metes and bounds,) together with
the said mill thereon, with ah and singular the privileges and
appurtenances belonging thereto, together with mill pond, mill
dam and any other privilege connected with, or belonging to, the
above described premises,” Tha" principle of law applicable to
the subject, is stated by Lord Denman, in the case of Plant v.
J ames,
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James, 5 B. & Ad. 794. “ Nothing isk, more clear,” says his
Lordship, “ than that under the word ‘ appurtenances,’ according
to its legal force, an easement which has become extinct or which
does not exist in point of law by reason of unity cf ownership does
not pass—1 Bui. 17; Moore, 467 ; 1 B. & P. 371 ; 1 Taunt.
205 ; 3 Taunt. 24; 3 Tyr. 230 ; 1 Cromp. & Mee. 439. If the
grantor wishes to revive or create such a right he must do it by
express words, or introduce the terms ‘ therewith used and enjoyed,’
in which case easements existing in point offact, though not ex
isting in point of law would be transferred to the grantee.”
As the Plaintiff claims the right of way in question as having
been created by the deed, the words of the deed are upon the prin
ciple stated by Lord Denman as derived from the cases which he
cites, evidently not sufficient for the purpose. With regard to
the point of nominal damages, there is also another ground upon
which I think the application for a new trial must be refused. It
is is reported to us by the learned Judge who tried the cause, that
the Counsel on both sides went to the jury on the point of actual
damages, the Plaintiff having therefore taken his chance upon this
broad and substantial ground, and the jury not having supported
him therein, is not, I think, in a condition to ask us to grant a new
tri J upon the new ground which he now assumes with regard to
damages, even if such an application could be successful if the
ground had been taken at the trial, when rights are not bound by
the verdict. In a very late case, Kenyon v. Western, 6 Dow.
Pr. C. 108, in which an application for a new trial was made on
the ground that the Plaintiff was entitled, at all events, to nominal
damages, the Court refused to disturb the verdict for the Defendant
on the express ground that the point was not raised at the trial.
For these reasons I am of opinion that the rule for a new trial must
be discharged.
Botsford, J.:
It was contended on the part of the Plaintiff, that by the words
in the conveyance, viz : “ all and singular the privileges and ap
purtenances, and every other privilege connected with and belong
ing to the above described granted and bargained premises, &c.”
a right of way was conveyed, in and by the stream, to the mill
and premises; and the case of Whalley v. Thompson, 1 Bos. &
Pul. 871, was much relied on. It is true that in that case it was
said by Eyre, Ch. J. “that the word appurtenances may convey an
existing right of way. The learned Lord C. J. qualifies this ex
pression by adding : “ but from the moment that the possession of
two closes is united in one person, all subordinate rights and ease
ments are extinguished.” And he further adds, “ that its opera
tion must be confined to an old existing light, and that if the right
of way had passed in this instance it must have passed as a mere
r1
easement
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A
easement. Had the devise been with the way now used, it would
certainly have been a devise of the close A with an easement new
ly created. The word appurtenances in the will had nothing to
operate upon.” The same doctrine is laid down in Clement v.
Lambert, 1 Taunt. 206, where an easement of common had been
extinguished by unity of possession, and where there had been an
user for 60 or 70 years. At the trial it was thought by Heath J.
that the words “ together with all common, common of pasture,
advai tages, hereditaments and appurtenances whatever thereto
belonging, or in any wise appertaining,” did not amount to evidence
of a new grant of common, and this opinion was concurred in by
Lord Chief Justice Mansfield, who, in delivering the opinion of
the Court afterwards upon a motion made to set aside the verdict,
said, “we cannot say upon looking at this deed, that a right of
common passed by it
The case of Archer and Bennett, 1 Lev. 132, is a case in point.
A man who owned a close upon which there was a kiln for drying
oats, and who also owned mills adjoining to the close, and occu
pied them all together; afterwards sold the mills cum pertinentiis
and the question was whether the kiln, and the parts of the close
on which they stood should pass to the Plaintiff, and it was held
clearly by the Court that they did not pass: “ for by the grant of
a messuage, or lands cum pertinentiis, any other land or thing
cannot pass, though by the words cum terris pertinentibusii would.
But by Windham J., if all the matters had been found, and that
the kiln was necessary for the use of the mills, the kiln had passed
as a part of the mills, though not as appurtenances.”
In the case now before the Court, it is not contended that
the saw mill was not useful without the right of way in the
stream.
In Beaudly v. Brook, which was an action upon the case, the
Defendant was seised in fee of the land over which the way is, and
of other land, and by indenture enrolled, bargained and sold to J.
S. land in fee, with a way over his land. J. S. let to the Plantiff
the land for years, and the Defendant disturbed him—Yelverton
J. took exception, “ that there is not any grant of the way in the
indenture, but only a bargain and sale of land, and of a way out
of his other land, which cannot be good, for nothing but the use
passed by the deed, and there cannot be a use of a thing which is
not in esse as a way, common &c., which are newly created, and
until they be created no use can be raised by bargain and sale.”
All the Court were of opinion that for this cause the Plaintiff had
not shewn sufficient title.
Tn Barlow v. Rhodes, 1 Crom. & Me. 448, Bayley B. said, “ it
has been decided over and over again, that when an easement has
been extinct by unity of ownership, and the owner wishes to grant
the
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the easement with the premises to which it was formerly appur
tenant, he must use language to shew that he intended to create
the easement de nov<P—
“ If in the case of an
easement extinguished by unity of ownership, a man grants the
land to which, before extinguishment, the right of common was
attached, and uses only the words appertaining and belonging, the
right will not pass, those words not being sufficient to revive the
right.” The learned Baron also held that there was no distinction
between the words belonging and appertaining, that the Courts
had uniformly considered them as having the same meaning.
It is clear from the above authorities, that when a right of way
has been extinguished by unity of ownership, or does not exist by
reason of that unity, that it will not be revived or pass under the
word appurtenance,and that the words appertaining and belonging
alone, are not sufficient to pass such right.
In the present case, a right of way in and by the brook did not
exist as appurtenant to the mills, by reason of the unity of owner
ship in Elisha Peck, one of the Defendants, and consequently did
not pass under the words of the deed of conveyance as has been
contended for by the Plaintiff; they were not in law sufficient to
create a right of way over the soil of Elisha Peck.
The Plaintiff must therefore fail under the 4th and 5th counts
of his declaration.
With respect to the sixth and last count, there is no doubt but
that the Plaintiff could recover damages under it, for any obstruc
tion placed by the Defendants in the stream, which, by penning
up or throwing back the water impeded or interrupted the working
of the mill. The evidence applicable to this count was contradic
tory and conflicting. It was left to the Jury by the learned Judge,
and they found in favor of the Defendants.
I am not therefore for disturbing the verdict
Parker J.:
Although I should probably have come to a different con
clusion from that which the jury have formed had I been in their
place, yet considering that they were special jurors, part uf whom
had had a view of the premises, I think we ought to be well satis
fied of the existence of the Plaintiff’s right, and that it will be
permanently affected by the judgment in this case, before we dis
turb the verdict.
As to the charge of the CouTt; if under the circumstances ofthis
case, it was my duty to have told the jury that the erection of the
gallows dam in the stream by the Defendants, was necessarily an
abridgment of the Plaintiff’s right, or interference w'ith his privi
lege, the verdict might be objected to on the ground of misdirec
tion, and although this was not made a distinct point in moving
for the rule nisi, I should feel loath to deprive the Plaintiff of all
the
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the benefit of it if, on consideration, I could be satisfied he was en
titled to a verdict. All, however, must depend on the Plaintiff’s
right to use the stream, the existence of which I assumed at the trial,
reserving the point, but have not been able since to find sufficient
ground for supporting.
The Defendants are certainly not entitled to place any erection
in the creek which may impede the working of the Plaintiff’s
mill or flood his land; but if it was intended the Plaintiff should en
joy together with the mill, the free and uninterrupted navigation
of the stream between the mill and the Shepody -iver, I do not
think the words in the deed are sufficient to convey such a right,
or that such will pass as incident to the possession of the milt
As to the manner in which I left this case to the jury, I have
already stated that finding the Plaffitilf could net decide on select
ing upon which counts he would proceed,—those charging it as a
public, or those stating it as a private stream, and that the case
was summed up to the jury by the Counsel on both sides (and it
appeared with great fairness and propriety,) as a question of
damage or no damage, I thought it right to direct the attention of
the jury first to the point of damage, telling them to find for the
Plaintiff if they were of opinion he had sustained particular damage
by reason of the erection, and then to decide on the nature of the
stream, giving them my reasons for thinking it a private one.
As there was some discrepancy in the evidence, and some doubts
as to heights and distances, and most of the witnesses were related
to the parties and seemed to side with one or the other, I was glad
to appeal to the personal knowledge which some of the jury had
derived from an inspection of the premises, and was in hopes their
verdict would have been decisive.
As the verdict returned for the Defendant is now sought to be
sat aside, we are driven to consider the question of right, supposing
the stream to be private ; for if it be public it is essential for the
Plaintiff to make out a particular injury in order to sustain his
private action. This the jury have negatived ; and as they have
also decided in favor of the Defendant on the conflicting evidence
relative to the turning back the water, there is no count on which
we can say he would be entitled to a verdict, and the rule must
therefore be discharged.
Rule discharged.
E. B. Chandler, for Plaintiff.
G. Botsford, for Defendant.

WILSON v. EILLS.
Under a general allegation ofloss of time and expence in regaining pro
perty taken under execution against a third person, evidence of expeiicts in
proving the Plaintiff’s right before a Sheriff’s jury is not admissible.
Que,
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Que. If under any circumstances or allegations in pleading, such expences
are recoverable where no right is barred.
A new trial will not be granted for imaginary damages.
This was an action of trespass, tried before Carter J. at tlie

Charlotte Circuit in November last. The facts appeared as
follow :—
The Plaintiff was possessed of a quantity of timber which the
Sheriff of Charlotte, by direction cf the Defendant, seized under
execution as the property of a third person. The Plaintiff claimed
the timber, whereupon the Sheriff called a jury of inquiry, who
found for the Plaintiff, and thereupon the Sheriff gave up the pro
perty. This action was brought to recover damages occasioned by
the taking and detention. The first count of Plaintiff’s declara
tion stated special damage by reason of the loss of time and the
expenditure of money in regaining the timber. The Plaintiff
tendered evidence of the expences attending the trial of the right
of property before the Sheriff’s jury, which the learned Judge re
jected.
A verdict was found for the Defendant which G'eorge D. Street,
for Plaintiff, fnoved in Hilary Term to set aside;
1st. On the ground of the improper refection of testimony—2
Bing. N. C. 210.
2d. Because a taking having been proved the Plaintiff was en
titled to a verdict if it were only for nominal damages.
per

Curiam.

The only point must be the rejection of evidence,—on that the
Court have some doubt; as to the other, the Court exclude it.
No right was barred, and the Court will not grant a new trial for
imaginary damages.
R. M. Andrews, in this Term shewed cause.
After the re-delivery of the timber to the Sheriff, the Plaintiff
brought this action for the taking and failed to establish his right
of property, and therefore if the evidence of the expences of the
inquiry were improperly rejected, the Court would not consider
that point. Secondly, the attendance of the Plaintiff was volun
tary ; he was not bound to pursue his claim before the Sheriff,
and if he chose to do so he was not entitled to his expences —Ros.
Ev. 37, 594; 1 Chit. 440 ; 1 Camp. 60; 2 Chit. R. 198; 8 T.
R. 130; 3 Sta. Ev. 1454. Thirdly, under a general allegation of
damage, evidence was only admissible of damage actually resulting
from the act complained of. The inquest and the Plaintiff’s ex
pences were not a natural result of the taking of the timber.
Chipman, Ch. J.:
Without considering whether under any circumstances the evi
dence rejected would be admissible, I am clearly of opinion that
the damages spoken of are not such as the law would imply, and
as
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as could be givfui in evidence by the Plaintiff under the general
allegation in his declaration. The proceeding by inquiry was a
voluntary one for the safety of the Sheriff, and not binding on any
party ; the Plaintiff took that easy and expeditious way to get his
property back ; the expences attending it cannot be considered
a natural or legal consequence of the act of taking.
Botsford, J.:
The Sheriff’s inquisition was for his own information, and in an
action against him would be only evidence in mitigation of dama
ges. Under the general allegation in the Plaintiff’s declaration,
that he was put to damage in regaining his timber, the Defendant
could not have been prepared to meet a claim for the Plaintiff’s
expences in attending the jury of the inquiry.
Parker, J.:
I am also of opinion that if the Plaintiff was entitled to recover
the expences of tliR proceeding before the Sheriff’s jury, which is,
to say the least, exceedingly doubtful, he ought to have made a
particular allegation of the payment; not having done so the Judge
was quite right in rejecting the evidence.
Rule discharged.
G. D.'Street, for Plaintiff.
R. M. Andrews, for Defendant;

REGINA v. CUNARD AND OTHERS.
The Court will quash an indictment for forcible entry and detainer,
brought up from the Sessions by certiorari after plea pleaded, upon its ap
pearing that the prosecutor was one of the Grand Jury who found the bill;
nor will the Court receive affidavit of the absence of the prosecutor from
the jury room when the bill was found, his name being mentioned in the
caption of the indictment.
At the Northumberland General Sessions in March, 1837, an

indictment was found against the Defendants for a forcible entry
upon and detainer of the lands of Joseph Russell. The Defend
ants pleaded not guilty, and traversed the indictment to the next
Sessions ; previous to which a certiorari was obtained, returnable
in Michaelmas Term, and the proceedings were removed into this
Court. The certiorari was returned and filed in the Crown office
on the 9th September.
By the caption of the ndictment it appeared that Joseph Rus
sell was one of the Grand Jury by which the indictment was found,
and the identity of the Grand Juror and the prosecutor was proved
by affidavits.
In last Hilary Term J. H. Peters moved for a rule nisi to quash
the indictment, on the ground that the prosecutor was one of the
Grand Jury, and contended that the indictment was void at com
mon law, and also by the Stat, of 11 H. 4, c. 9, and the Stat,
against
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against forcible entry and detainer. The trial by jury was the
great protection of the subject, and it was even more important
that inquiries before Grand Juries should be properly conducted,
their proceedings being secret, than before Petit Juries, who sat
openly and heard evidence in the presence of the Court and coun
try. Grand Jurors were as umpires between the accuser and
the accused—Phil, on Juries, 71. In Rex v. Dickenson, Russ.
& Ry. 401, a prisoner was pardoned because a witness w-as ex
amined before the Grand Jury without having been sworn.
A prosecutor for forcible entry and detainer was incompetent as
a witness—Anon. 6 Car. & Payne 90; and therefore as a juror, if
one interested person should be allowed to’ sit, then there might be
twelve tenants in common of the locus in quo, who might find
their own bill.
The Stats, of forcible entry and detainer direct “ that Justices
shall call an inquest of indifferent persons.”
As to quashing indictments, he cited 1 Leach, Cr. Ca. 11; 4
Com. Dig. Indict. D. 3; 3 Burr, 1731.
A rule nisi having been granted, Berton, for the prosecution, at
this Term shewed cause.
1st. The common law and Stat. 11 II. 4, c. 9, required that
jurors should be probi et legates homines, being such, they were
qualified to serve, and any objection to them on account of interest
in a particular matter should be taken by way of challenge—Rex
v. Sheppard, 1 Leach, c. c. 111,4 Bac. Abr. Juries ; A. 2 Hawk
Pl. Cor. 307.
2nd. That if the indictment was found contrary to the purview of
the Stat, the person arraigned might plead such matter in avoid
ance—2 Hawk. 312; 4. Bac. Abr. 525. Judges were in no
case bound ex debito justitioe to quash an indictment, but might
oblige the Defendant to plead or demur—2 Hawk. 367. Of late
years exceptions of this kind had not been favored, 4 Bac. 331,
and appeared confined almost to cases of manifest want of juris
diction—Rex v. Williams, 1 Burr, 389; Rex v. Haniton, 2 Str.
1018; 4. Bac. 332; Rex v. Brotherton, 1 Str. 702, 2 Hawk
307 ; Rex v. Inliab. of Relton, 1 Salk. 372.
3rd. After plea pleaded it was not competent for the Defendant
to move to quash an indictment—1 Leach, Cr. Ca. 10.
4. In forcible entry and detainer, even a defective indictment
would not be quashed—4 Com. Dig. 565, indictment H.
The Defendants had, in the present case, waived their challenge
of the Grand Juror, had appeared and pleaded to the indictment,
had removed it into this Court, had suffered the Michaelmas Term
to pass ; after so great delay this application should not be enter
tained, more especially as it was merely technical. The learned
Counsel offered affidavits of the prosecutor and foreman, and others
of
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of the Grand Jury, to shew that the prosecutor was not present at
the investigations and did not vote upon the bill.

Per. Curiam.
We cannot receive affidavits to contradict the record ; the pro
secutor’s name appears in the caption as returned, and the affida
vits are offered in contradiction thereto.
J. A. Street, in reply.
The indictment having been found the Defendants were obliged
to plead to prevent judgment of restitution passing against them.
In misdemeanor they could only plead one plea ; the indictment
could be quashed only in this Court. If it were a question of
irregularity the delay might help the prosecutor, but the objection
here rendered the indictment void.
Chipman, Ch. J.:
This is a motion to quash an indictment for forcible entry and
detainer, brought up by certiorari from the General Sessions of the
Peace for the County of Northumberland, on the ground tba| the
prosecutor of the indictment was one of the Grand Jury by whom
the bill was found —It is a principle which lies at tlie foundation
of the administration of justice, that a party shall not be a Judge
or Juror in his own cause. The expressions of Lord Mansfield
in 3 Bur. 1856, are very strong on this subject: “ There is no
principle in law,” says his Lordship, more settled than this, that
any degree, even the smallest degree of interest in the question
depending, ’s a decisive objection to a witness, and much more to
a Juror or to the officer by whom the jury is to be returned. The
law has so watchful an eye to the pure and unbiassed administra
tion of justice, that it will never trust the passions of mankind in
the decision of any matter of right. If therefore the Sheriff or Ju
ror, or a witness, be in any sort interested in the matter to be
te ’ id, the law considers him ns under an influence which may warp
his integrity or pervert his judgment, and (therefore itv/Z not trust
him.'” In the present case the objection has double force, from
the circumstance of the prosecutor being the tenant who would be
entitled to restitution if the proceedings should be successful, and
who on this ground is excluded even from being a witness—9 B. &
Cr. 549, Rex v. Williams. It is, I conceive, a fatal objection to
the indictment, and it is not helped by there having been a suffi
cient number on the jury to find the bill, without the prosecutor.
It is impossible to measure the influence which he may have had
upon his fellow jurors. In cases under the Statute 11 II.
c. 9,
it is expressly held that if owe juror be returned at the nomination
of the party, the whole indictment shall be avoided, although
twenty others were on the same inquest—Com. Dig. Indict. A ;
and although this may be a case which does not fall directly within
the provision of the Statute, yet the principles on which the
Statute

in the

First Year of VICTORIA.

329

Statute is founded most forcibly apply to it. It is argued that this
objection comes too late after plea. Now, although the Court will
not encourage applications to quash indictments after plea, yet it
is in the discretion of the Court to quash an indictment at any
time before trial—1 Leach, c. c. 11; 2 Hawk. 299. And in a
case like the present I should feel myself bound, for the sake of
public example, and from the paramount necessity of preserving
the purity of the streams of justice, to exercise this discretion at
any time when I am not absolutely prohibited by the rules of prac
tice from so doing. There is also, I think, weight in the reason
assigned on the part of the Defendant for traversing the force instanter at the Sessions, in order to prevent an award of restitution.
As to the objection that the Court will in no case quash an indict
ment fox forcible entry, I have looked into the authorities, and am
satisfied that there is no such rule, but on the contrary there are
many cases in which it is held that such indictments may be
quashed.
Botsford, J.:
To allo w one of the Grand Jury, as in the present case, to act in
the capacity of a juror when he is also the prosecutor, and so im
mediately interested as he must have been on this indictment for a
forcible entry and detainer, would be a violation of the principle of
law, which will not allow a man to be a judge in his own cause.
As to the objection that this Court will not quash an indictment
for forcible entry and detainer, it cannot be sustained. In Frith's
case, 1 Leach 11, it is said the Court may in its discretion quash
an indictment at any time before the jury are charged with the
trial of the prisoner. And in Rex “6. Blake, 3 Bur. 1731, an in
dictment for forcible entry, not shev ng any actual force, was
quashed upon motion.
Parker, J.:
The only difficulty I have felt in acceding to the present appli
cation has arisen from the delay which has taken place in coming
before the Court; but the objection is of too serious a nature to be
got over on that ground; indeed the Defendant’s Counsel have
satisfied me that it was necessary to plead to the indictment at the
Sessions, in order to prevent a restitution, so that the motion could
not be made before plea pleaded, as in ordinary cases it ought to
be done.
The proceedings before the Grand Jury being secret, we cannot
tell whether the bill in this case was found by the whole, or by
twelve only; for aught we can know there may have been only
twelve, and Russell, the party interested as the tenant in possession,
may have been one of those twelve.
The prosecution is of a private nature, conducted by the Pro
secutor’s own Counsel, who ought to have taken care that he was
Si
not
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not present when the matter was under discussion before the Grand
Jury, and that his withdrawal was duly noted on the minutes of
the Court. As his name appears on the caption there would be
the same reason for quashing the indictment, as there existed
for quashing the order of Session in the case of Foxham Tithing in
2 Salk. 607.
It has been argued that the Defendants should have challenged
the Grand Jury, but I do not see how they could well have done
this, and it has not been made out affirmatively that they were
aware of the intention of the prosecutor to prefer the bill at the
Sessions.
I do not find any case in the books exactly in point, but there
are two cases, viz. Rex v. Holiday, 3 Salk. 186, and Rex v.
Brown, Ld. R. 592, where indictments were quashed for errors in
the caption, and the Court has exercised a like discretion in nu
merous other cases.
We should not, I think, be justified in suffering the trial to
proceed on this indictment, and I am fully of opinion that the rule
for granting it must be made absolute.
Rule absolute.
J. A. Street, for the Prosecution.
J. H. Peters, for Defendant.
RANKIN AND OTHERS v. EMERY.
Where A sold and delivered to B a lot of Timber, subject to re-survey by
Mr. Scott, and it appeared that there were two Mr. Scotts, one a sworn
Surveyor under the Act of Assembly 1 Wm. 4, c. 45, and the other not, and
the latter made the survey but not according to the provisions in such Act,
in an action for the deduction and expences allowed upon such re-survey and
upon a verdict for the Plaintiff:
Held that the learned Judge put it rightly to the j ury to find which of the
two* Scotts the parties intended by their agreement; but that prima facie
the re- survey must be presumed to be according to the provisions oi the Act
1 Wm. 4, c. 45, and it should have been left to the jury to say whether
the parties intended such survey, or a re-survey according to the discretion
of the Surveyor; the onus probandi of which intention lies upon the party
seeking the benefit of it.

Assumpsit. The declaration contained a count for goods sold
and delivered, and other common counts.
The Plaintiffs put in evidence an account in writing signed by
the Defendant, in which he was charged with sundry items, and
credited with a lot of timber at a certain price per ton “ subject to
such deductions as might be made on a re-survey by Mr. Scott, th
their (the Plaintiffs) pond.” A balance was struck, and such
balance carried to a new account.
At and before the time of delivering the timber, the Plaintiffs
were in the habit of employing one John Scott to survey timber
for
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for them, who was not, however, a sworn Surveyor under the Act
of Assembly 1 W. 4, c. 45. A re-survey of the timber delivered
by the Defendant was made by John Scott, and his bill of deduc
tions and expences amounted to <£‘80 11s. For this sum, as well
as subsequent items of account, the Plaintiffs sought to recover in
this action. It came out in the course of the evidence that Scott’s
survey was not made according to the regulations of the Act of
Assembly, although it was the opinion of the Plaintiffs witnesses
that a survey under the Act would have been less favorable to the
Defendant, though in what particulars was not distinctly shewn,
neither did it appear by what rule the survey was made.
It did not appear that the timber was intended for exportation.
Evidence was given on the part of the Defendant that there was in
the Parish where the timber pond was situate, one James Scott, a
sworn surveyor of lumber under the Act of Assembly, ar.d it was
contended that the agreement should be construed to have intended
a sworn surveyor, and a survey according to the Act. The learned
Judge directed the jury to find for the Plaintiffs, if they were satis
fied that John Scott, by whom the timber was surveyed, was the
person intended by the agreement. The Plaintiffs obtained a
verdict
A t this Term the Solicitor General, for the Defendant, in moving
to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial, took several grounds.
1st. That the Plaintiffs should have declared specially on the
agreement to re-survey.
2nd. That the requirements of the Act of Assembly as to the
survey of lumber by qualified persons, were imperative, and could
not be controverted even by the terms of the agreement, and that
therefore the Mr. Scott mentioned in the agreement must be con
sidered to intend Scott, a surveyor of lumber.
3d. That the survey intended by the agreement was a survey
under tlie Act of Assembly; and it having been proved that the
survey was not made according to law, the Plaintiffs were not en
titled to recover the amount of deductions claimed.
As to the first point the Solicitor General contended that the
whole value of the timber was passed to account between the
Plaintiffs and Defendant. That account had been settled, and
Plaintiffs claiming a trifling balance due on that settlement sought
to recover the amount of the deductions on tlie survey of the tim
ber subsequently made. They could not go back and say that
before the settlement they paid Defendant certain sums which, by
reason of circumstances arising after that settlement, the Defen
dant was not entitled to retain.
\Chipman, Ch. J.—The original demand remains for all that was
not paid, and if an action had been brought to recover for the
timber, then the deductions would‘have been a proper subject of
allowance.] j
[Parker
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[Parker J.-—I have no doubt if the deductions were properly
made that they would, to that extent, reduce the credit originally
given. The evidence at the trial was not merely as to the balance
on the settlement, but shewed the whole of the original transaction
between the parties.]
As to the second point, the Court considered that there was
nothing in this case to prevent the parties naming a person to sur
vey who was not a sworn Surveyor ; and in the present case the
jury had determined that the survey was made by the person
intended by the agreement.
A rule nisi was granted on the third point.
Berton, for the Plaintiffs, shewed cause.
The Act of Assembly 1 W. 4, c. 45, was, as appeared by its
title and provisions, an Act regulating the exportation of lumber,
and could not affect any agreement between individuals respecting
the sale of lumber. In the present case it had not been shewn
that the contract related to timber for exportation ; there was
nothing prohibitory in the Act, it merely directed under certain
penalties that all lumber exported should be of the descriptions and
quantities therein mentioned, to be ascertained by the examination
of surveyors appointed and qualified pursuant to the provisions of
the said Act. It was perfectly competent therefore for parties
buying and selling lumber, to agree as to the quality and descrip
tion of the lumber, as to the manner of ascertaining such quality
and description, and as to the person by whom the same should be
ascertained. In this case the parties agreed upon a person not a
sworn surveyor; that fact alone proved that they did not contem
plate a survey according to the provisions of the Act of Assembly,
but rather that the person named was selected as an arbiter to
select the good from the bad timber, and to ascertain the deduc
tions according to his skill and judgment. Again, the Defendant
was benefitted by the manner of survey, inasmuch as a survey
under the Act would have condemned more timber, and increased
the amount of deductions.
The survey by Scott was made in May, 1836; the Act of 1 W.
4, c. 45, expired on the 1st of April in that year, and therefore its
provisions could not control a survey made after such expiration.
The Act, as to all matters not concluded at the time of its expira
tion, was as if it had never existed—3 W. 420 ; 1 Wils. B. 451.
[Chipman, Ch. J.—If the agreement between the parties were
an agreement for a survey under that Act, then its provisions
must be considered as embodied in and forming a part of the
agreement,
Solicitor General, in reply:—
There was nothing in the finding of the fact that John Scott
was the person intended to support the position, that Defendant
knew
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knew lie was not a sworn surveyor ; the presumption was rather
that he believed him to be a sworn surveyor. The Act of Assem
bly applied to every description of lumber, and in the trade there
was no distinction between timber for exportation and for home
consumption. If a party purchased lumber as merchantable.,
clear or refuse, the surveyor ascertained the description according
to the provisions of the Act.
Chipman, Ch. J.:
This motion for a new trial rests on the ruling of the learned
Judge at the trial that the parties were bound by Scott’s survey,
if the jury were satisfied that the survey was made by the Mr.
Scott intended by the agreement, without having put it to the jury
to consider whether such survey were intended to be a survey ac
cording to the lumber law or the discretion of the surveyor. I am
not disposed to shake the position that the Act of Assembly
regulating the exportation of lumber is a general regulation for the
lumber trade, although prohibitory only as to lumber for exporta
tion ; and that all surveys of lumber should be deemed to be surveys
under that Act, unless otherwise agreed upon. But here the
question arises, was a different rule agreed upon ? There is
nothing prohibitory in the Act, and if the question had been pro
perly decided by the jury, that the parties intended to be bound by
a different standard from that contained in the law, I should not
have been for disturbing the verdict. The agreement is quite open
to such a construction, but the iury were precluded from consider
ing that question by the broad ground taken by the Judge at the
trial. I think justice would not be answered unless the cause
went down again, in order that a jury may determine specifically
upon that fact.
Botsford, J. :
Under the peculiar circumstances I was doubtful if the Defendant
had not precluded himself from making any objection to the sur
vey. It appeared that Scott had surveyed timber for the Plaintiffs
for five years, during which time Defendant had been in the habit
of selling timber to the Plaintiffs, and that the surveys by Scott had
been made continually in the same manner. Now had it appeared
that Defendant knew all these facts, I think he would be bound
by the survey. Parties may agree as to a survey to be made by
any person they may select, and in such manner as they may ap
point ; but I think this case should be sent for the consideration of
a new jury, in order to obtain their opinion as to the manner of
survey intended.
Parker J.:
I should have been glad to support this verdict it possible, for it
is by no means clear that injustice has been done to the Defendant
by Scott’s survey, and independently of that there is a considerable
sum
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ble sum due to the Plaintiffs ; but I cannot find anything in the
evidence which will enable us to lay down a different rule for con
struing the agreement, as between these parties, from that which
would govern in ordinary cases.
The survey of timber is regulated by law, and persons who ex
ercise the calling of surveyors have their duty prescribed to them
by law ; and although it may not be required by the Act that tim
ber intended for home consumption should be surveyed, yet this is
constantly done, and when parties in a written contract use the
terms survey and re-survey 1 think, prima facie, they must be
considered as used in relation to the existing law, and it rests on
the party who seeks to give them a different interpretation, to
shew distinctly that such was the intention.
Here a quantity of timber is purchased by the Plaintiffs from
the Defendant (whether for exportation or home consumption does
not appear,) at an agreed quantity and price, subject however to
deductions to be ascertained afterwards. Suppose the memoran
dum had merely been “ subject to such deduBions as may be
made on a re-survey in your pond,” could it be said that prima
facie any other rule for the survey was meant than that specified
in that Act? but it is contended that the addition of the words “ by
Mr. Scott” shew that the parties intended that the deductions
were to be made according to Mr. Scott’s discretion, and not ac
cording to law. I quite agree that the partilfe having named Mr.
Scott, no objection shall be taken on the ground of his not being
a sworn surveyor ; he was no doubt acquainted with the business,
and the jury have rightly decided as to the identity of the person ;
but I cannot agree with the learned Judge who tried the cause,
that the Defendant is to be bound by Scott’s survey under this
agreement, when it comes out that he did not survey according to
the regulations of the Act.
The amount of the deductions is considerable, and I think the
Defendant has a right to know by what rule they were made, and
that the law should not be departed from without his assent.
If the Plaintiffs really intend to purchase, subject to their own
rules of survey or the discretion of their surveyor, it will be easy
for them to specify this so distinctly in their agreements that the
sellers may understand on what terms they are dealing. If they
use the terms of the law without any explanatory words, they must
be considered as referring to the law.
As the case is to go to a new trial I suggest to the Plaintiff’s
Counsel the expediency of amending the Bill of particulars, for it
is certain the particulars do not contain the items for which the
Plaintiffs seek to recover satisfaction under the common couuts;
and if the objection had been taken at the trial to the evidence, as
not corresponding with the particulars, it might have been
materia)
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material. The deductions I presume are not merly for work and
labour on the timber, but for rejections of parts thereof. As
the casp stands, the amount of the deductions is not to be
considered as a charge against the Defendant, but as a reduc
tion of the credit allowed him on a settlement made, which when
thus rectified would shew a different balance from that with which
the Plaintiff begins his particulars. The.,, deductions might per
haps be recovered for co tiofiine, on a special count, but here the
Plaintiffs proceed on the common counts only._
Rule absolute for a new trial, costs to abide the event.
Berton <§• Dibblee, for Plaintiffs.
Solicitor General for Defendant.

DOE EX DEM GILMOUR v. WHITNEY.
Secondary evidence of a will devising real property in this Province not
admissible, where it appeared that the original will was in the possession of
the Surrogate General of Nova Scotia, and no proof was given of any law of
Nova Scotia prohibiting its removal from such possession.
This was an action of ejectment tried before Botsford J. at

the Northumberland Circuit in September last.
On the part of the lessor of the Plaintiff secondary gvidencewas
offered of the will of James Fraser, deceased.
The original was filed in the Surrogate GeneraLs office in Hali
fax, Nova Scotia.
A commission to take the examinations of witness was issued,
and the original will was exhibited and proved before the commissi
oners. It appeared by the deposition of John Spry Morris, Esquire,
that he was the Surrogate General of Nova Scotia ; that the ori
ginal wills of persons dying in Halifax, Nova Scotia, were by law
filed in the Surrogate General’s office, that they had been some
times permitted to be taken out of his office into New Brunswick,
but it was a matter in his discretion, and as the will in question
affected large and valuable estates in Nova Scotia he thought it im
proper that he should suffer it to be taken out of the Province.
An examined copy of the will returned with the commission was
received in evidence, subject to a motion for a non-suit in banc.
The Defendant obtained a verdict.
J. iAkStreet, for the Plaintiff, in last Michaelmas Term ob
tained a rille
to set aside the jverilict and grant a new trial on
several grounds.
At this Term the* Court considered that it would be more con
venient to discuss in the first place the point reserved as to the
proof of the will, because if the Defendants should succeed upon
that point it would be unnecessary to argue the points raised on
obtaining the rule nisi, and called upon the Counsel for the
Plaintiff.
J. A. Street
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J. A. Street argued that the will was properly deposited in the
office of the Surogate GeneraL and he was not justified in letting
such an instrument be taken out of his office—2 Camp. 3S9, 3
Bac. Abr. Evid. F. 1 Star. Ev. 103, 389.
The will in question was beyond the control of the Court; the
Plaintiff had made a sufficient attempt to procure it; to refuse
secondary evidence would amount to a denial of justice.
The will had been proved in the proceeding before the commis
sioners as it would have been proved in open Court.
[Parker J. mentioned the cases of Morse v. Roach, 2 Str. 961,
and Frederick v. Aguscomb, 1 Atk. 627, as to the mode of pro
curing wills from the place of custody in England.]
Wilmot, for the Defendant, argued contra, that secondary evi
dence was admissible only when the primary testimony was not
attainable. The law applied with peculiar force to wills where
the manner of the execution and the situation of the testator
were so material to be enquired into.
The evidence states that Mr. Morris will not permit the will to
be removed, but no application has been made to the Surrogate
General in his Court.
It was not properly shewn that there was any law in Nova
Scotia regulating the deposit of wills in that Province; if there
were such a law it should be properly proved—Way v. Yally, 6
Mod. 194; Roscoe 77; 3 Camp. 166; 2 Swin. 814 (Note);
11 Vin. Abr. 59 ; 2 Rob. on Wills, 179, 183.
Chipman, Ch. J.:
This is a motion for a non-suit, on a point reserved at the trial.
In proving a devise of lands it is the constant course to produce the
original, and it is peculiarly necessary that, if practicable, this
should be done, because by positive Statute particular regulations
are prescribed for the execution of wills relating to lands in this
Province, and in questions of real property the lex loci rei sites
always prevails. Nevertheless, it seems to me, that in cases
where it is out of the power of the party to produce the original,
secondary evidence of a will would be admissible, as of any other
written instrument; but in the case of a will, the Court would be
peculiarly cautious in requiring a clear case to be made out, for
the reception of the secondary evidence. In the case of Alivon v.
Turnival, 1 C. M. & K. 277; 4 Tyrr. 751, where it appeared,
that by the usage of France, a document deposited with a Notary
could not be removed; a copy of the document so deposited was
admitted. To make that case applicable to the present, it should
be proved that by the law or usage of Nova Scotia, an original
will cannot be removed from its place of deposit in that Province.
If usage, distinct from law, is relied on, such usage should be very
clearly made out. If a rule of the law of Nova Scotia prevents
the
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the removal of such a document, such rule of law should also be
proved ; for although the Province of Nova Scotia is a part of thS
same empire, it id a, distinct community from this Province,1 and
this Court cannot take judicial notice of its laws, but they must be
proved in the same manner as the laws of any foreign country ; if
the law be written, by a copy of the Statute; if it be unwritten
law, by the testimony of persons who have a knowledge of it.
What is the testimony in the present case ? Mr. Morris states
that he is not aware of any law of Nova Scotia that prevents him
from allowing tliQ- will to be taken to New Brunswick, but that he
considers it a matter in his discretion. Whether he means that it
is a matter in his discretion, as a ministerial officer with whom
wills are deposited, or as a Judge of the Surrogate Court, does not
appear and it is not at all shewn that there is any such diserqtion recognized by the law or practice of NovarlScotia, nor even
that, in the presept instance, any specific application was made to
the discretion of Mr. Morris to permit this will to be brought to
this Province. It appears that there have bdhn instances of
original wills being brought from tha files of the Surrogate Court
in Nova Scotia for the purpose of being given in evidence of
trials in the Courts of this Province, and the reason assigned by
Mr. Morris for thinking it improper in the present case is, to say
the least of it, vague and unsatisfactory. Under this testimony,
although I should be disposed to go as far as the rules of evidence
will allow me in favor of the Plaintiff, I am of opinion that a case
has not been madejOut for the reception of the secondary evidence.
Botsford J.r
I thought at the trial that sufficient grounds had not been shewn
for the admission of the secondary evidence. The general principle
must only be avoided when the original is not attainable. It is
necessary to bring this within the reason of Doe v. Calvert 2
Campbell, 389, and for that purpose itmustbe shewn that theoriginal
was either lost or beyond control. The will was in custody of the
Surrogate General of Bova Scotia and no autheifticated copy of
any law was produced requiring that it should be’there kept. Mr.
Morris says there was no law to prevent him from sending it out of
the Province, and further, that in some instances he had suffered
wills to be taken out. As to his discretion, it would have been
perhaps an improper exercise of it to have allowed the will to have
been taken out of it, when unacquainted with the parties and the
objects for which it was desired ; but suppose an heir undbr the
will had applied and offefed security, would that not have been a
case for the exercise of his discretion?
Parker J.:
I am quite of the same opinion. According to the lex loci which
must govern this case, the original wiil, which is in existence, must
T1
be

342

CASES IN TRINITY TERM,

be produced in order to shew the devise, if it be in the Plaintiff’s
power to procure it yand it has not been sufficiently shewn that he
had not the means of obtaining it.
Perhaps, on the authority of Alivon v. Furnival, we might have
been justified in allowing the secondary evidence, if the law of
Nova Scotia did not permit the original will to be taken out of the
Province for a temporary purpose; but this is not the case, indeed
we are not very distinctly informed what the law is, or from what
source it is derived.
So far as we can understand it, the law appears to be, not that the
■will shall in no case be taken out cf the Province, but that it shall
not be taken without the consent of the Surrogate General, in
whose custody it is. Mr. Morris, in his evidence, states that he
considers it a matter for his discretion, and gives a reason for
thinking why he should not have allowed it to have been done in
the present case ; but no distinct application appears to have been
made to him, neither is the nature of the discretion he is called on
to exercise Stated whether judicial or official. From the questions
under the commission the necessity of producing the original will
at the trial is not very obvious. The objection he has made could
no doubt be got over if the interest of the estate required it.
In truth it may be observed that the difficulty has been one of
the testator’s own creating, and they who claim under his will must
be subject to it. The documents necessary to shew title to real
estates ought to bfe where the estate^ are ; and if a person, possessed
of large property in two separate Provinces, devises or conveys the
whole by one instrument, unless the law allows secondary evidence
the expence and risk of moving the instrument, when required for
the purposes of the estate, must be incurred, and purchasers from
the devisees may guard themselves by special covenants.
If the will should be lost or destroyed, secondary evidence would
be admissible ; whether it is expedient as a general rule to allow
such evidence in other cases, is a question for the Legislature, and
one which may demand some consideration.
Verdict for Defendant set aside, and non-suit entered.
J. A. Street, for the Plaintiff.
Wilmot, for the Defendant.

CALIFF v. ROBERTSON:
Affidavit of service of a notice of motion “on a Student in the office of
Plaintiff’s Attorney” not sufficient, it not stating that the service was at
the office.

Wilmot produced an affidavit of service of notice of motion “ on
a Student in the office of the Plaintiff’s Attorney.”

Per
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Per Curiam.
Was the notice served at the office of the Attorney. The terms
used in the affidavit would seem merely a description of the per
son. Gentlemen should learn to be more accnrate in the phrase
ology of their affidavits.
The motion was withdrawn in order, to amend the affidavit.

BROWN v. TAYLOR.
In tendering evidence which the Court rejects, Counsel should take care
that the question is stated explicitly, and that it be correctly entered on the
Judge’s notes.
This was an action of debt on a sealed note, tried before
Carter J. at the York Sittings. After last Hilary Term, plea

non est faction, the Plaintiff obtained a verdict.
Berton, for Defendant moved to set aside the verdict and grant
anew trial, for the improper rejection of testimony.
The Judges notes stated that the Plaintiff had told a witness
that the note was given for a particular consideration ; that De
fendant’s Counsel tendered evidence to shew that no such consi
deration existed as an item of fraud to invalidate the note.
Berton contended that the Defendant by his plea, and by the
course of his defence, denied the making, of the note, and asserted
that it was a forgery; that the making and execution of the instru
ment was proved only by evidence of the belief of the handwriting,
and the absence of a particular consideration stated by the Plaintiff
was a strong circumstance to affect the validity of the instrument,
and shew it a forgery.

Per Curiam.
The evidence tendered was to shew fraud; that does not neces
sarily imply forgery ; in tendering* evidence questions should be
stated explicitly, and Counsel should ascertain if they are taken
down correctly; in the absence of the learned J udge we can only
look to his notes.

ESTEY v. NEWCOMB AND ANOTHER.
Where a demand of plea was sent by Plaintiff’s Attorney in a letter to
his agent, a Student in the office of the Defendant’s Attorney, and was ad
mitted to have Ween in the office of the latter before sqpiing interlocutory
judgment, the Court set aside the interlocutory judgment upon an affidavit
of merits and payment of costs of the judgment.
Till Court condemns the practice of Students acting as agents for Coun
try practitioners without their master’s express sanction.

A'N application was made in Hilary Term by Berton, for De
fendants, to set aside an interlocutory judgment for irregularity,
and on an affidavit of merits.
The
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The irregularity complained of w^3b that the demand of plea
was sent in a letter to a Student in the office of the Defendants
Attorney, and was, after the signing of interlocutory judgment,,
found among the papers in the cause ; it was not disputed that
the demand had been~E®eived in the office before the signing of
interlocutory judgment.
Cause was shewn by TYs/ierY
The Court, under the circumstances, granted the application on
payment of costs, but strongly reprobated the practice of Students
acting as agents for country practitioners, except under the express
and immediate sanction and direction of their masters. In the first
place a Barrister having Students was entitled to their services,
which he could not have if the Student were otherwise employed.
Again, a Student, as agent, might be acting on onfcide of a cause,
while his principal was engaged on the other. On the whole, the
Court considered the practice inconvenient and improper, and ex
pressed a hope that gentlemen of the Bar would not hesitate to put
an end to its continuance in their offices.

HOLLAND v. CLOSE.
Where, ie an action brought to recover upon a note or memorandum for
the sum of .£22 payable in timber, the amount was reduced by the price of
an Ox, which had been delivered by Dq£ndant to the Plaintiff, to the sum
of .£14, the Court allowed full costs to 15e taxed upon a motion for an order
to review, the Clerk having taxed only summary costs, under 4 W. 4, a. 41.
At this Term Kerr, for the Plaintiff, moved to obtain an order

for the master to review the taxation of costs] and to tax full costs.
The case was special Assumpsit on the following note in
writing:—“ For value received I promise to pay to the said Plain“ tiff or order £22 13-6,’payable as follow's:—10 tons of pii'ie tim“ her to be- delivered the first of May, 1834, and one half of the
“ remaining sum to be paid on the11 aforesaid daj^, 1835, and the
“ third and last remaining payment payable on the said day, 1836.”
The Plaintiff’s Counsel opened the case upon the note, and
stated that the Defendant had sold to the Plaintiff an O.\"7 which
would come in as offset.
The Defendant went into evidence to prove that there wps an
agreement between the Plaintiff and Defendant, to the effect that
the Plaintiff would give up the said note to the Defendant upon
the Defendant’s giving him an Ox, the Plaintiff having previously
received 41 tons of timber, and that the Ox was delivered, being
one of a pair valued at 27 or £28. The learned Judge who tried
the case left it to the jury, stating that it would seem probable ^hat
the Ox was intended as the first phyment upon the urate.
The jury found a verdict for the Plaintiff for the sum of £14 8 K
The
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The Clerk refused to tax full costs, but proceeded under the Act of
Assembly 4 W. 4, c. 41, to ta.t'summary costs only.
It was argued by Kerr, lor Plaintiff, and D. L. Robinson, for
Defendant.

Botsford,

J.:

It does not appear that tlie Ox was received in full discharge of
the note, as the Plaintiff agreed to give ten pounds for it; neither
does it appear that the Ox,was adcepjed as part payment of the
debt. It could not be a set off. The Plaintiff was obliged to de
clare specially, and for the full amount,dan d had he acknowledged
the sum of £10 he must have done it by suggestions, and would
have been put to the expence of declaring specially. It is a mat
ter of discretion with the Court, and I think that full costs should
be taxed.

Parker,

J.:

The right of the Plaintiff to full costs is sought t<y be sustained
on two grounds. First, that this not being , a common action of
debt, but brought on a contract for the delivery of timber, does
not come within the meaning of the SummaryrAct. Second, that
if it might have been proceeded with in a sjunmary way, the circum
stances are such as will induce the Court to allow the larger costs.
Without giving any opinion on the first ground, I think the
second is sufficient to sustain the application. The amount for
which the agreement or memorandum isigiven was £22, upwards,,
payable in timber ; the payment by which it is alleged the sum
was reduced below £20, was not the article contracted for, but an
Ox. The case set up by the Defendant was, not that the original
debt had been reduced by a liquidated payment, but rather in the
nature of accord and satisfaction, that the Ox was given in full
discharge of the whole contract.
There was no indorsement on the contract, as is usual in such
cases, nor any application to the Plaintiff to make- such indorse
ment, neither was it very clearly shewn that the Oxiwas intended
as a payment in lieu of the timber, though the jury have drawn
such an inference from the circumstances.
As the! case stood I think the Plaintiff was fully justified in
bringing his action for the full amount of the contract, and that he
is entitled to the cpsts of his proceeding!; i this being in my opinion
clearly one of those cases to which tlie discretionary power vested
in the Judge or the Court was intended to apply, though I think
it much better that applications of this sort should be made to the
Judge who tries tlie cause, immediately after the trial.
Chipman, Cli. J.:
I did not hear the argument but fully concur.
Rule granted.
Kerr, for Plaintiff.
D. L. Robinson, for Defendant.
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DALEY v. MARKS.
A mere delivery of goods by the vendor, without an actual acceptance
by the vendee of some part thereof, is not sufficient within the Statute of
Frauds.—See Provincial Act, 26 Geo. 3. c. 14, s. 14.
The receipt of the goods by a common carrier from the vendor, without
any specific direction or authority from the vendee, will not amount to an ac
ceptance by the vendee within the Statute.
This was an action of Assumpsit for goods sold and delivered,
tried before Carter J. at the Charlotte Circuit in November,

1837.
The evidence on the part of the Plaintiff shewed a verbal agree
ment made between the parties in the autumn of 1836, for the sale
by the Plaintiff to the Defendant of a quantity of timber at Saint
Stephens, at a certain price, if delivered in time to be floated down
the river before the close of the season. It appeared to be the cus
tom at Saint Stephens to carry the lumber down a sluice-way into
the tide, and a witness for the Plaintiff sword’that the lumber was
sluiced and rafted at the foot of the sluice in time for the Defendant
to have taken it down the river, if he had been there ready to have
received it.
A non-suit was moved for on the ground that the agreement, not
being in writing, was void by the Statute of Frauds, and that there
had been no sufficient acceptance of the goods to take the case out
of the Statute, and the learned Judge being of this opinion, directed
a non-suit, which, however, the Plaintiff’s Counsel refused to ac
cede to, end the case having gone-to the jury, they, contrary to
the Judge’s direction, found a verdict for the Plaintiff.
In Hilary Term last, G. D. StMt moved for a rule nisi to set
aside the verdit on the grounds taken at the trial, and cited Maberley v. Sheppard, 10 Bing. 99 ; Hanson pl .Armitage, 5 B. & A.
567; 1 D. & R. 128.
Rule Nisi.
Berton now shewed cause, and contended that the sluice men
were in the nature of common carriers, that there was a sufficient
delivery of the lumber when placed in their hands, and it was
proved that the lumber was delivered in due time ; he <,6 ted El
more v. Stone, 1 Taun. 458 ; Ros. on Vend. 65 ; Dutton v. Solomonson, 3 B. & P. 582.

Per Curiam.
There must be an actual acceptance of the goods by the vendee,
with the intention of taking possession as owner, to satisfy the
Statute ; a mere delivery with the intention of vesting possession
is not sufficient without such acceptance. The language of the
Court in Maberly v. Sheppard, is -exceedingly strong. There is
nothing to shew that the parties contemplated a delivery to the
sluicemen as a delivery to the vendee. They were not the De
fendant’s agents for that purpose, and a delivery to and receipt by
them,
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them, as common carriers, would not make an acceptance by the
Defendant under the Statute.—See Johnson v. Dodgson, 2 M. &
W. 656, and Howe v. Palmer, 3 B. & Aid. 321.
But suppose even there were a doubt on this point, Lord C. J.,
Tindal says : “ it is the duty of the Plaintiff to free the case from
all doubt, and where any remains it is safer to adhere to the plain
intelligible words of the Statute, which point, as clearly as words
can do, to an actual delivery and an actual receiving of part or
the whole of the goods sold.”
There are two cases in 2 B. & C, pages 44 & 5, to the same
effect.
The verdict must be set aside.
Rule absolute.

DOE D. M'BRIDE v. ROE.
li 'right moved for rule of judgment nisi against casual ejector
on affidavit of service of declaration on the daughter of the tenant
in possession.
Rule refused.
' DOE D. PEABODY v. ROE.
Berton moved for rule for judgment nisi, against casual ejector
on affidavit of service of declaration on the wife of the tenant, at his
dwelling house.
Rule granted.

FARLEY v. PHILLIPS.
It is not sufficient to set aside proceedings! for irregularity, that the De
fendant was not personally served with process where it appeared that ser
vice of the writ was accepted by one who, whilst in the Defendant’s em
ployment, had a general authority to accept service of process for Defendant,
although such acceptance was made after having left Defendant’s employ
ment, the Defendant not having expressly denied any authority so to act,
or taken any steps to set aside the proceedings.
The rule was discharged without costs, the Plaintiff having proceeded to
judgment upon an affidavit of belief as to the hand writing of Defendant
which was in fact incorrect.

Berton, in Hilary Term last, obtained a rule nisi, returnable the
same term, to shew cause why the judgment and execution in
this case should not be set aside for irregularity. The application
was founded upon an affidavit of the Defendant’s which stated that
the Defendant had never been served with process in the cause,
nor with notice of proceedings being instituted against him.
On reference to the writ on the files of the Court, there appeared
an
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an indorsement thereon with the name of the Defendant attached,
acknowledging service of the process" and there was an affidavit
annexed to the writ of one John Robert, stating that he was ac
quainted with the Defendant’s hand writing, and believed the
signature to the acknowledgment of service to be that of the De
fendant.
D. L. Piobinson shewed cause the same Term.
An affidavit of one Purdy was produced, which stated that he
(Purdy) was the agent of the Defendant, and that as such agent,
and at the request of the Defendant, lie had acknowledged service
of the process upon which the proceedings in this cause were
founded, for and on the behalf of the Defendant.
An affidavit also of John F. Winslow, Sheriff of Carleton, was
produced, which stated that subsequently to the acceptance of the
service by Purdy, the Defendant had acknowledged to him
(Winslow,) that he had authorized Purdy to accept service of the
same writ; and that afterwards, when an execution in the suit was
placed in deponent’s hands, the Defendant offered to give security for
the amount, provided deponent would levy a subsequent execution
against Defendant at the suit of one Ratchford—1 Man. & Ry.
320 ; Phillips v. Ensell, 2 Dow. P. Ca. 684 ; Rhodes v. Innes, 7
Bing. 329.
The rule nisi was enlarged to the next Term, for the Defendant
to answer the affidavits produced by the Plaintiff, with leave for
Plaintiff to file additional affidavits within thirty days.
And now at this Term an additional affidavit was produced,
made by the Defendant, which, admitting that Purdy had been '
authorized to accept service'' df writs in his absence whilst he re
mained a clerk of the Defendant’s, stated that Purdy had, previous
to such acceptance of service of process, left the Defendant’s em
ployment. The affidavit further stated that Defendant did not
recollect any directions given by him to Purdy to accept service
of the process in question, but on the other hand a belief that no
such directions had been given. That the acknowledgment men
tioned in Winslow’s affidavit had reference solely to the power
which Purdy had whilst he remained in Defendant’s employment.
That at the time Winslow told the Defendant of what Purdy had
done, Defendant said to Winslow that Purdy had acted improperly.
The affidavit further expressly denied any acknowledgment by
Defendant of Purdy’s power after leaving his service.
On the part of the Plaintiff an additional affidavit was produced
of one M‘Kenzie, a clerk in the employ of the Plaintiff, stating that
in January last the Defendant had twice come to the Plaintiff’s
store at Saint John, in company with Mr. Ratchford, and had
held conversations with the Plaintiff on the subject of this suit,
and proposed terms of settlement, from which it was inferred that
both
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"both the Defendant and Ratchford were aware of the progress of
the suit.
Chipman, Ch. J.:
The Court must look at the whole case, and is pot confined to the
affidavit of service of process on file. I entertain no doubt but that
the Defendant must fail in this application. It clearly appears
that Purdy had a general authority to accept service of process
for the Defendant. The Defendant does not deny the authority
of Purdy in this particular suit, but only says that the authority
given by him to Purdy was to continue during his clerkship.
Upoi notice of the proceedings in November or December last, the
Defendant should have applied to a Judge at Chamber’s, and not
have laid by until the entry of judgment. This furnishes a strong
reason on the ground of waiver, also to maintain the judgment, but as
I think the Plaintiff ought not to have proceeded upon the affidavit
of belief as to the Defendant’s signature to the acknowledgment of
service, which now, from his own shewing, turns out to be incor
rect ; apd as I am not dispcsed to encourage a departure from tlie
usual and correct course of proceeding, I think the rule should be
discharged, but without costs.
BOTSFORD, J. concurred.
Parker, J.:
It is certainly true as stated by Mr. Berton, that the Plaintiff
seeks to support the service of process on a ground somewhat dif
fering from that on which the suit has proceeded; the acknow
ledgment of service having been subscribed, not by the Defendant
himself, but by his agent, Purdy. From several cases however
which have been cited, particularly Phillips v. Ensel, 2 Dow. P. R.
684, and Herbert «. Dailey, 4 D. P. R. 726, it appears to be the
practice of the Court to support the service, if the facts, when all
examined into, will authorize it, although they may not be such
as would have sanctioned the original affidavits.
That Purdy acknowledged the service on behalf of the Defendant
is clear; it is not denied that he had at one time express authority
to do this, and no express revocation of this authority is shewn ;
but it is said that there was an implied revocation when Purdy
left the Defendant’s employment. It is probable the Defendant
intended this, but as it would have been easy for him to have given
notice to the Sheriff, we ought to be satisfied that the Sheriff was
aware of the circumstance of Purdy’s dismissal, and that the De
fendant took the earliest opportunity of repudiating Purdy’s act,
neither of which are made out.
There can, I think, be no doubt that the Defendant gras fully
cognizant of the suits’proceeding when he came to Saint John
and held a conversation with the Plaintiff; Mr. Ratchford, wh<
was present at the conversation, and is largely interested in th
V1
result
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result of this application, would have corrected the statement in
the Clerk’s affidavit if he had been mistaken in his belief that the
negotiation related to the suit, and not merely the subject matter
of it.
Under all the circumstances, I agree in thinking that the rule
must be discharged; I think also, for the reasons stated by His
Honor the Chief Justice, it should be without costs ; the Plaintiff
ought to have obtained the affidavit of an eye witness to the sig
nature, and not trusted to the mere belief as to hand-writing.
Rule discharged.
D. L. Robinson, for Plaintiff.
Berton, for Defendant.

DOE D. PURDY AND OTHERS v. PETERS.
Where B, being put into possession of premises by A under an agree
ment for purchase, continued to hold such possession for upwards of 21
years, and receive the rents, profits, &c., the Court considering B strictly a
tenant at will, held in an action of ejectinent brought by the heirs of A
against B's grantee, that the Plaintiff’s right of action was barred by the
7th Section of the Act of Assembly of 6 Wm. 4, c. 43.
This was an action of ejectment tried before PARKER J. at the

Saint John Circuit in August, 1837. The declaration contained
counts upon the several demises of the widow and children of one
Obediah Purdy; deceased.
It appeared in evidence that the locus in quo was granted by the
Crown in 1784, to one Gilbert Purdy, the father of Obediah Pur
dy, who by deed poll, dated 24th September, 1818, transferred it
to the said Obediah. This deed was not registered until 1828.
Obediah Purdy died on the 22d November, 1836, intestate, leav
ing a widow and eight children, the lessors of the Plaintiffs. It also
appeared from the Plaintiffs evidence that one Burr, through whom
the Defendant claimed title, had been in possession of the premises
since the year 1800, and that sometime in the year 1820 or 1821,
having been called upon by Obediah Purdy to give up the possessesion thereof, he claimed to hold it as having purchased it from
the said Gabriel Purdy, but at the same time acknowledged that
he had never received a deed of it. The property had always been
known as Burr’s.
The Plaintiff having closed his case, Wilmot, for Defendant,
moved for a non-suit upon the following grounds:—
1st. No proof of possession in Gilbert Purdy, Obediah Purdy,
or the lessors of the Plaintiff.
2nd. Burr was in the adverse possession when Gilbert Purdy’s
deed was executed, so nothing passed thereby.
3rd. Obedian Purdy was barred by the Statute of Limitations,
and neither he nor his children came within any of the exceptions
of
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of the Statute—Roscoe Ev. 348, 431 ; Ch. Gen. Pr. 275 ; Mat.
on Pres. 4; Tolson v. Kaye, 3 B. & B. 217.
The Solicitor General objected that Burr having come into pos
session under Gilbert Purdy on an agreement of purchase, his pos
session was not adverse. He was'a tenant at will, which tenancy
was not put an end to until 1820 or 1821, when he refused to give
it up to Obediah—Ad. Ejt. 52 ; 1 Esp. 461. The learned Judge
overruled the motion, reserving the ’mints with leave for the De
fendant to move the Court to enter a non-suit if the objections
should be deemed valid.
The Defendant then went into some further evidence of Burr’s
long possession, and produced a deed from Burr to one C. J. Peters,
dated 11 th February, 1821; also a deed from the said C. J. Peters
to the Defendant, dated 12tli August, 1835. Livery of seisin had
been given by Burr to C. J. Peters, by the delivery of a twig.
The jury, under the direction of the Court, found a verdict for the
Plaintiff.
In Hilary Term last, Wilmot obtained a rule nisi upon the
points reserved at the trial, and also upon the further ground that,
supposing Burr’s to have been a tenancy at will, the Statute of
Limitations beginning to run at the expiration of one year from its
commencement, would consequently bar the title of the lessors
of the Plaintiff.
At the close of the learned Counsel’s argument, the following
points for consideration were suggested by the Court.
1st. Is Burr’s possession, after the facts proved in regard to the
disclaimer of Purdy’s title and the conveyance and delivery of
possession to Peters in 1820 or 1821, to be deemed absolutely ad
verse to Purdy, or can it be in the election of Purdy to consider it
adverse or not ?
2nd. It having been decided by this Court in the case of Doe d.
Hannington v. M‘Fadden, in Trinity, 1836, that no estate of free
hold or inheritance passes by a deed of bargain and sale not en
rolled under the Statute of Enrollments, until it is registered under
the Provincial Registry Act, is such registry to be viewed in the
light and be governed by the analogy of L’very of Seisin at Com
mon Law ?
3rd. The deed from Gilbert Purdy to Obediah being dated in
1818, but not having been registered until 1828, if Burr’s posses
sion is to be deemed adverse in 1828, when the registry was made,
did any estate pass on registry of the deed ?
4. At the time of the conveyance from Gilbert Purdy tc Obe
diah, was Gilbert’s estate possessory or reversionary, and if the
latter, would registry be necessary to give effect to the convey
ance ?
5. Supposing Burr’s possession not to have been adverse, but in
the
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i he nature of a tenant at will, would the deed of Gilbert to Obediah pass the estate in the premises without the assent and privity
of Burr ?
Now at this Term Kerr, for Defendant, had commenced his
argument upon the points suggested by the Court last Term, but
the Court desiring first to hear Counsel upon the Statute of Limi
tations.—
Wilmot was heard at length upon that point.
The Solicitor General and Wright contended that the time
when the Act commenced running vcould not, under the circum
stances of this case, be deemed to have arrived before the refusal
of Burr, in 1820 or 1821, to give up the possession to Purdy.
Chipman, Ch. J.:
,
This is a motion for a new trial, and in the progress of it various
important questions have been mooted. Among them was a ques
tion on the recent Provincial Statute of Limitations, 6 Wm. 4,
c. 43, and the Court directed this question to be argued first, as it
might be decisive of the case, the Act having come into operation
before the present action was commenced.
The principles upon which the Statutes of Limitations are
founded, seem to be, that it is essential to the peace of society to
affix a period to the right of disturbing possession; that long pos4
session affords one of the best proofs of right, and that, even apart
from the question of right, it would be very mischievous to take
away property from the possessor of it after long enjoyment.
They are considered as not affording any reasonable ground of
complaint, because it is only from the negligence of the party him
self that they can take effect. In accordance with these princi
ples, it is the habit of Judges at the present day to treat laws
limiting actions as laws of peace and justice, and to give them free
scope according to the intent of their provisions.
The Act of Assembly now brought into question, is evidently
founded upon the same principles, and framed in the same spirit,
and will undoubtedly have a very extensive and important opera
tion upon the lauded property of the country. It adheres to the
period of twenty years as the general limit for enforcing‘claims,
and prescribes positive rules for ascertaining the time when that
period shall be deemed to have commenced. The^general princi
ple upon which these rules are founded is, that the party’s right
shall be deemed to have first accrued, in other words, rhe period of
twenty years shall begin to be numbered against him at the time
when he shall have been first dispossessed of the land. There is
& particular rule prescribed for the case of tenants atwffl, as con
tra distinguished from other tenancies, in the 7th section of the
Act, which is in the following words : “.-And be it further enacted,
That when any person shall be in possession or in receipt of the
profits
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profits of any land as tenants at will, the right of the person enti
tled subject thereto, or of the person through whom he claims, 'io
make an entry or bring an action to recover such land, shall be
deemed te have first accrued either at the determination of such
tenancy, or at the expiration of one year next after the commence
ment of such tenancy, at which time such tenancy shall be deemed
to have determined: Provided always, that no mortgagor or cesiui quS trust shall be deemed to bd a tenant at will, within the
meaning of this clause, to his mortgagee or trustee.” I can inter
pret this clause of the Act in no other way than its express terms
seem to me to require. It is a positive enactment that a tenancy
at will shall at ail events for the purposes of the Statute “ be
deemed to have determined at the expiration of one year next after
the commenqement of such tenancy.” The other alternative of
the actual determination of the tenancy being necessarily confined
to cases where, in point of fact, the tenancy has expired before the
completion of the first year after its commencement. To admit
the construction contended for by the Solicitor General, that this
limit of a year shall be done away with by proof of an actual deter
mination of the tenancy at any time, even after the lapse of
twenty or twice twenty years from the time of its commencement,
would not only be contrary to the express terms of this clause, but
against the whole policy of the Statute. There is no such great
hardship in the case, because the party claiming the land, ’ subject
to the-tenancy at will, Hay always enforce his right within the
period of twenty years fixed by the Statute, by dispossessing the
tenant at will, or he may protect it for a new period of twenty
years by requiring an acknowledgment in writing according to the
provision in the 13th Section of the Act. Taking this to be the
true construction of the 7th Section, it is next to be considered
whether the present is a case which falls within its provisions.
The cases of Ball v. Cullimore, 2 C. M. & R. 120, 5 Tyrr.
753; and Doe d. Gray v. Stanion,,l M. & W. 695; 1 Tyrr. &
Gr. 1071, shew, beyond cHtroversjfi that a purchaser put into
possession of land under a contract of sale, is to be viewed in no
other light in a Court of law' than that of a strict tenant at will;
and the exception in the seventh section of the Act of mortgagors
and cestui que trusts, shews it to be the intention of the law to in
clude within its provisions persons of every description who may
fall within the class of tenants at will, other than those who are
thus expressly excepted.
The person through whom the lessors of the Plaintiff in this
case claim, is Gilbert Purdy, bis right was subject to the tenancy
at will in Edward Burr.1 created by Burr’s being let into possession
of the land under a contract of sale from the said Gilbert Purdy
in the year 1799, or thereabouts. By the positive enactment of
the
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the Statute, the right of those claiming under Gilbert Purdy was
barred at the termination of twenty years from the expiration of
one year after Burr was so let into possession, and this puts an
end to tlie“case of the lessors of the Plaintiff, and the rule for a
new trial must be made absolute.
Botsf6rd, J.:
I fully concur with the Chief Justice in thinking that the present
case falls witl in the meaning and construction of the 7th section
of the Act 6 Wm. 4, c. 43, and that by its provisions the lessors
of the Plaintiff are barred from recovering in this action. But as
this point was not made at the trial, the rule should be made abso
lute for a new trial.
Parker J.:
It is in vain to attempt upon any general reasoning, to give a
construction to the new Act of Limitations favorable to the lessors
of the Plaintiff in the present suit. It appears to be the manifest
intention of the Act, at the moment of its going into operation , to
take away the light of entry in many cases where it had previously
existed. To a certain class of cases namely, those where the pos
session would not be dee,med adverse at the time of the Act’s
taking effect, the Legislature have, for a further period of five
years, left the rights of the parties to be governed by the old law ;
but the only time allowed for bringing actions in cases like the
present, was that which occurred between the IGth March, 1836,
when the Act was passed, and the 1st of January, 1837, when it
took effect.
Burr came into possession in 1797, according to the Plaintiff’s
own shewing, as tenant at will to Gilbert Purdy, for unless that
be made out the right of action is gone, even under the Statute of
James. The lessors of the Plaintiff claim through the person who
was entitled, subject to that tenancy ; the possession of the De
fendant had clearly become-iidverse before the new Act went into
operation. To the provisions then of this Act we must look in or
der to ascertain when the right of entry accrued, in order to find out
when it would have expired.
The 7th section professes to determine the time at which the
right of entry, when a tenant at will is in possession, shall be
deemed first to have accrued to the person entitled, subject to such
tenancy, and says this shall be “ either at the determination of
such tenancy, or at the expiration of one year next after the com
mencement of such tenancy;” “at which time” it proceeds to
add “ such tenancy shall be deemed to have determined.”
I cannot give any other signification to this section than that
which His Honor the Chief Justice has already stated, namely,
that for the purposes of the Act the tenancy at will shall be con
sidered as having ended at the expiration of the year, if it had not
actually terminated at some period within the year.
If,
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If, as the Plaintiff’s Counsel contends, it is only ■where the ac
tual time of the termination of the tenancy does not appear that
it is to be considered limited to a year, see what such a construc
tion would lead to,—a Plaintiff might shew the commencement
of a tenancy at will forty or fifty years back, and then prove a de
mand of possession, or some other act to determine the tenancy,
than which nothing would be easier, a few days before the action
brought, which would exclude the operation of the latter part of
the clause, and throw on the Defendant the onus of shewing that
the tenancy was actually put an end to at an earlier period. This
would be at variance with the whole scope and spirit of the Act,
and would very often put it in the power of a Plaintiff to upset a
long possession by oral testimony, which it seems one of the great
objects of the Legislature to exo ide.
There is an apparent harshness in the application of the law to
the present case, arising from tlie circumstance of Obediah Pur
dy’s death but a short time before the Act took effect, and after
an action brought by him which consequently abated • but apart
from this there is nothing in the case which would make one desi
rous of withdrawing it from the operation of the new Act.
A mere tenancy at will is certainly the last sort of tenancy
which ought to be of long duration ; where it is suffered to con
tinue there are generally strong equitable circumstances (as in the
present case) in favor of the Defendant; audit is often unattended
by the ordinary relations of landlord and tenant, such as payment
of rent and the like.
If however there be such existing which the parties do not wish
to alter or terminateyJthe 13tli section provides a safe method,
namely, a written acknowledgment by the person in possession of
the other’s title.
This particular point on which we now decide this case, was not
raised at the trial, as the Defendant contended that Burr’s posses
sion was not that of a tenant at w„l, but altogether adverse ; but
if the case is governed by it, it is certainly unnecessary to go into
consideration of the other very important points which were sug
gested on obtaining the rule. The great changes introduced by
the new Act had not then been sufficiently noticed.
Rule absolute for a new trial.
Solicitor General and Wright, for Plaintiff.
J. Peters, Wilmot fy Kerr, for Defendant.
JOHNSTON v. TIBBITS AND MARSH.
Every Writ of Scire Facias should state th.- particular circumstances
which entitle the party to the remedy sought to be obtained.
Any matter which might have been pleaded in the original action cannot
be pleaded to an ordinary scire facias under the statute of Westminster.

A
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A party can only have judgment of the execuion prayed for in his scire
facias, and such judgment in the course ofan ordinary scirefacias will not be
available to give him an execution against a joint debtor not brought into
Court in the original action or under the Act of Assembly, 23 G. 3, S. 24.
Seattle. That the pleading to a sci. fa. under any Act of the Assembly
would be governed by the same rules as under the Statute of Westminster.
This was a Scire Facias brought upon a judgment obtained

against the Defendants, on a recognizance of bail entered into bytliem for cne James M'Cann. The scire facias was in the usual
form of such writs, under the statute of Westminster, and it was
sought under it by virtueof the Act of Assembly of 26 G. 3, c. 24,
to obtain an execution against the person and sole property of
James Tibbits, one of the Defendants, but who at the i time of
judgment obtained on the said recognizance, was out of the
jurisdiction of the Court, had never been served with process or
notice of the action, and had not appeared thereto. To this scire
facias the Defendant, Tibbits, pleaded several matters in bar, to
all of which pleas the Plaintiff demurred specially, and there was
a joinder in demurrer.
In Hilary Term last the demurrer was powerfully supported
by Kerr for the Plaintiff, he contending that the pleas were bad
both in substahce and form.
It was urged in support of the pleas by Berton, that as the
scire fqcias was under tile Act of Assembly, and brought upon a
judgment to which the Defendant Tibbits had never been a party,
either by service of process or notice, it was competent for him to
plead any matter in bar to the scire facias which could have been
pleaded in bar to the original action.
These several points received a very full and elaborate discussion,
but as the judgment of the Court was founded upon the insufficiency
of the scire facias itself, and as the learned Judges have in their
opinions adverted to the principal arguments of the counsel, we do
not give them at large here. At this term the Court gave their
opinions as follow : —
Chipman, Ch. J.:
This case stands under very peculiar circumstances. When I
came to consider it, I found it necessary in the first place to look
to the scire facias set out on the record. This writ recites that
the Plaintiff had recovered against the Defendants a judgment in
debt, and that execution remained to be made thereupon, and calls
upon the Defendants jointly “to shew if they Jiave or know of any“ thing to say for themselves, why the Plaintiff ought not to have
“ execution against themf according to the judgment. It is,
therefore, manifestly an ordinary scire facias under the statute of
Westminster to authorize an execution after the expiration of a
year from the time of the judgment. It is, nevertheless, dealt with
by the Defendant Tibbitts in his pleas, and has been treated on
both
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both sides throughout the argument as if it were a scire facias
against a joint debtor who had not been brought into Court under
the Act of Assembly, 26 G. 3, c. 24, for enabling creditors more
easily to recover their debts against joint debtors ; and there is no
doubt, that, in point of fact, it was intended for this purpose. The
impression at the bar seems to have been, that this was a general
form of the writofsc/re facias which was applicable to any special
case like that provided for in the Provincial Statute to which I
have referred. But this is not so. The scire facias is indeed a
judicial writ, founded on matter of record, but it lies in a great
number of cases, and as it may be pleaded to, it is considered in
the nature of an action. Hence, like the declaration in other actions,
it ought to state the particular facts upon which the Plaintiff calls
upon a Defendant to shew why the particular proceeding prayed
for, in most cases an execution, should not be so ha d against him.
In the books of practice we find a variety of forms of this writ
adapted to many of the cases in which it lies, several of them un
der particular statutes. And in cases under statutes there is
always an allegation that the proceeding is “ according to the form
of the statute in such case made and provided.” {vide Appendix to
Tidd’s and Chitty’s Practice, title Scire Facias.) Direct autho
rities on this point are not wanting. Thus in Gill v. Scrivens, 7
T. R. 27, which was a scire facias under 5 Geo. 2, c. 30, s. 9,
against a person who had been twice a bankrupt and bad not paid
fifteen shillings in the pound, the writ was quashed on account
of a defect appearing in the writ itself, which expressly purported
on the face of it to be under the statute, and Lord Kenyon says,
“ The writ ought to state all the circumstances that entitle the
Plaintiff to the execution prayed for by him.” So in the case of
Parker v. Hall, [Garth. 105, S. C. 2, Sal. 598,] Lord Holt said,
“ this was a judicial writ and might be framed upon the subject
“ matter,” and he proceeded to prescribe a form of a writ adapted
to the particular case. In Goldsworthy v. Southwark, 1 Wils:
243, where the Defendant died after interlocutory judgment, and
after a writ of inquiry executed and damages assessed, but before
final judgment was entered, the Plaintiff sued out a scire facias
to shew cause why a new writ of inquiry should not be awarded,
and the scire facias was quashed because it did not shew the state of
the cause at the instant of the Defendant’s death, and because it
ought to have been to shew cause why the damages assessed
should not be recovered. See Buchanan v. Hoskins, (2 Lord Ray,
1057, 6 Mod. 263.) A writ of scire facias was held to be good
on the face of it, and all that was amiss in it was that it did not
fit the case, and the court refused to amend it, and the Plaintiff
was driven to take out a new writ. I dare say that other autho
rities may be found to the same effect, but those I have c’ted
wl
sufficiently
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sufficiently establish that every writ of scire facias should state the
particular circumstances which entitle the Plaintiff to the remedy
which he is seeking to obtain. With respect to the Act of As
sembly, 26 G. 3, c. 24, for facilitating proceedings against joint
debtors, there is at least one precedent on the files of this Court
which shews that this principle has in former times been fully
acted upon, in framing writs of scire facias under this Statute. To
this precedent I shall presently advert more particularly. I am
clearly of opinion, that the scirefacias which appears on the record
must be viewed as the ordinary scire facias under the Statute of
Westminster, and cannot be considered as a scire facias under the
Act of Assembly above mentioned, and that the Court cannot deal
wtih it as having any other operation or effect than what its ap
propriate legal import will give to it. The consequence with re
gard to all the pleas will be that they cannot for a moment be sus
tained. One objection alone is fatal—for this being an ordinary
scire facias to revive the judgment, there is no rule in the law
more clear than that any matter which might have been pleaded
in the original action cannot be pleaded to the scire facias. In
applying t is rule to the case before the Court on this record, I
must not be understood as intending to intimate the slightest doubt
that the same rule would apply to a scire facias under the Act of
Assembly, 26 Geo. 3, c 24. But the case of a scire facias under
this Act not being before the Court, it would be extrajudicial to
give a direct opinion upon it. Nevertheless as this has been themain point in debate, I think it right to go thus far in making
known my sentiments upon this matter; I ought to add that I do
not feel that the application of the rule to cases under the Act of
Assembly could, as contended at the bar, render nugatory the scire
facias under the Act. The scire facias would give notice to the
joint debtor not brought into Court, of the judgment obtained
against him, who would thereupon have an opportunity to come
in and plead every matter pleadable to the scire facias; or if there
were any grounds for relief which would not be available in plead
ing to the scire facias, he might apply to the Court by motion,
and it would seem from the case of Cook v. Jones, Cowper.
727, that upon such a motion the Court would, if the case required
it, direct an issue for the trial of facts. In modern times the pro
ceeding by motion has superseded the writ of audita querela, which
seems to be the remedy provided by the common law for such a
case. On the grounds which I have stated, I am therefore of opi
nion, that all the pleas in this oase are bad, and that there must be
judgment for the Plaintiff on these demurrers. But thisjudgment
can be only, that he have the execution prayed for in his scire
facias, and will not, I conceive, be available to give him an execu
tion to be executed upon the person and sole property of the
Defendant
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Defendant James Tibbetts, as a joint debtor not brought into Court
under the Act of Assembly 26 Geo. 3, c. 24.
Here His Honor the ChiefJ ustice read the writto which he had allu
ded, as taken from the files ofthe Court but w'hich we do not insert, as
the Court have since by a rule prescribed a scire facias in such cases.
Botsford, J.:
I am of the same opinion upon all the points. These pleas can
not be sustained, and the proc eedings on the scire facias have been
irregular.
By the construction that the law has put on the terms of the
recognizance of bail, the Plaintiff is bound to issue a ca. sa.
against the principal, w'lio is not called upon to render himself in
discharge of his bail, at all events, but only when the Plaintiff by
issuing a ca. sa, has intimated his intention of taking the body.
The bail, therefore, are not bound to render their principal until
the Plaintiff sues out the ca. sa., the not suing out of whicn would
be a good defence.
I am not prepared to say that this Court would not grant sum
mary relief upon motion, in a case where no ca. sa. had been issued
against the principal, and the proceedings were by scire facias, pur
suant to the provisions of the Act of Assembly, 26 Geo. 3, c. 24.

Parker

.J.:

I am of opinion that the pleas in this case are bad both in sub
stance and form.
I also quite concur with His Honor the Chief Justice, in think
ing that the scire facias to which the pleas have been pleaded, is
not such as the Act of Assembly contemplated; it is nothing more
than the ordinary writ framed under the Statute of Westminster.
The Plaintiff has placed nothing on the record to shew that this
was a case under the Act of Assembly, or that the scire facias
under the Statute of Westminster might not have been necessary
in order to enable Mm to issue any execution, for the time of the
original judgment does not appear.
On this point the case might be determined, but as the sub
stantial ground of objection has been most folly and most ably ar
gued by the learned Counsel on both sides, and it is of much im
portance that it should be settled, I have felt it right to give it a
careful consideration, and have no hesitation in stating the con
clusion 1 have come to.
Let us first see what the state of the law was at the time of
passing our Act. The only mode of proceeding against joint
debtors in England, where all could not be served with process,
was, first to outlaw such as were not served and did not appear to
the suit and then to carry on the suit against the others, suggesting
the outlawry of the co-debtor on the record; and as by judgment of
outlawry the outlaw’s property was taken into the King’s hands,
the

360

CASES in TRINITY TERM,

the mode of getting satisfaction out of his estate was by applica
tion to the officers of the Crown. If any Defendant was served
with process and did not appear the course was to enter an ap
pearance for and interlocutory judgment against him, and on the
trial or inquiry to assess the damages against all.
As proceeding to outlawry was not very feasible in this Pro
vince, the Legislature have adopted a mode of proceeding more in
analogy to the case of a co-Defendant neglecting to appear after
having been served with process ; or perhaps to that of a Defen
dant against whom a scire facias has issued to which two nihils
have been returned, but as by this mode judgment would be entered
up against a party without notice to him of the suit, we must in
quire further what remedy the law has provided for such an emer
gency.
The audita querela is undoubtedly the ancient common law
remedy ; “ it lies,” said the learned editor of Saunders Rep. in his
note, 2d vol. page 148, “for a person who either is in execution,
or in danger of being so, upon a judgment, statute merchant, sta
tute staple or recognizance, when he has matter to shew that such
execution ought not to have issued, or should not issue against
him ; and is of a most remedial nature, and seems to have been
invented lest in any case there would be an oppressive defect of
justice where the party has a good defence, but had not nor has
any other means of taking advantage of it.”—Com. Dig. audita
querela (A.) 3 Bl. Com. 405. As if B be taken in execution
upon a statute acknowledged by A in his name; F. N. B. 233,
&c. &c. So if a man be, as is already noticed, only in* danger of
being taken in execution an audita querela lies quiq. timet Co.
Litt. 100 a.
This mode of redress remained legally in force, although a resort
to it was seldom had in consequence of the relief, equally effectual,
given hy the Court in a summary way on motion ; though occa
sionally where the matter of fact was doubtful and could not be
clearly ascertained by affidavit, and therefore proper to be tried,
the Court has driven the Defendant to his audita querela—4 Burr.
2287, 1 Salk. 264. And an instance is given in the note to
Saunders, of an audita querela proceeding, only three years before
the passing of our Act; though the course adopted in the case
cited by the Chief Justice from 2 Cowp. 727, of ordering an issue,
would supersede the necessity of the writ even in the case of a dis
puted fact. A party however is still entitled to his audita querela
even where the Court refuses to interfere on motion—Armitage v.
Rigby, 5 Ad. & E. 82.
Such being the law on this head, providing a remedy which
would he applicable to the case of a Defendant against whom a
judgment was entered without notice, and who might therefore
have
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have a good defence without having had an opportunity to avail
himself of it before judgment, letihs sde further whethef he could
avail himself of the defence by way of plea to a scire facias alter
judgment.
As has already been observed by the Court, it seems to be a
clearly established and long settled principle of law, that matter
pleadable in the original action shall not be pleaded ho a scire fa
cias on the judgment in that action—Baylis v. Hayward, 4 Ad. &
E. 256. In the case of Bush v. Gower, Rep. T. II. 233, Lord
Ilardwicke says, “ the general rule is that judgments are not to
be avoided by surmise of a matter of fact, especially a fact that
existed before the pronouncing the judgment, and it can never be
done at all but where such surmise is particularly given by Act of
Parliament, and then it maythe question there was, whether
under thte~Statute 12 Ann, c. 16, declaring void all bonds, con
tracts and assurances made upon a usurious consideration, usury in
the original contract could be pleaded to a scire facias on the
judgment upon shell contract; which the Court held could not be
done, although the judgment was entered up by virtue of a warrant
of Attorney, made*at the same time with the contract and tainted
with the same corruption.
The facts were much the same in the case in Cowper, where the
Court on motion directed an issue to try the usury.
The case before Lord Ilardwicke was in 1736, that before Lord
Mansfield in 1778; had our Act of Assembly (which was in
1786,) contemplated relief by pleading to the scire faciqs, I think
this surmise would have been particularly allowed; and I am
strengthened in this opinion by finding from a Nova Scotia Act,
with a memorandum of which I have been favored by Mr. Stewart,
that the Legislature there have expressly allowed a joint debtor
not served with process to plead either in bar to the original suit,
or in answer to the so«e facias- issued on the judgment in such
suit.
The«c«7'e facias directed by our Act is in itself no remedy, but
it appears to me was provided for the purpose of giving notice to
the Defendant, in order that he might plead such matters as were
properly pleadable thereto, and avail himself of the audita querela,
or other appropriate remedy where his ground of defence could not
be set up by way of plea to the scifefacias.
The mode of proceeding on a sole facias by no means secured
in all cases notice to the Defendant; indeed until our late’jVct on
this subject, 2 Wm. 4, c. 20, was liable to much abuse, but here
the old law stepped in and gave the relief by audita, querela,
where two nihils were returned instead of a scire feci'.'
So early as in the case before Lord Hardwicke, allusion is made
to the relief on motion ; he says in speaking of the cases cited, of
setting
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etting aside fines for fraud: “ to be sure the Court can do it, but
then that is not done by pleading and avoiding them upon record
but by the discretion of the Courts upon an interlocutory motion.
But however, it furnishes another consideration, viz. : whether
judgments of this sort might not be set aside in such an interlocu
tory way, as whether the party might not come to the Court and
by motion pray to set aside the judgment for ill practice.
So where an infant lets judgment go by default, if he appeared by
Attorney to whom he had made a sealed deed, though he could not
set it aside by writ of error or by audita querela, or upon pleading to
a scire facias, yet he might come to the Court and move to set it
aside, as was the case of Jackson and Mosey, Trin. 3 Geo. 1, in
C. B.”
In a late case Howell v. Scott 4 D. P. R. 386, where there was
a scire facias in the Exchequer on a Welch judgment, plea there
to and demurrer to the plea, Parke J. says: K the Defendant
should have made an application to the equitable jurisdiction of the
Court. It cannot be said as a general rule that all matters, as
well legal as equitable, which shew that execution ought not to
issue, can be pleaded to a scire facias.'1'
I am by no means satisfied that any change in the law is neces
sary for the purposes of justice, or that it would be any improve
ment to introduce the provision of the Nova Scotia Act. There
may be a very great difference in the relative situation of absent
parties in regard to their resident joint debtors, and what would be
a proper ground for the interference of the Court in one case might
be none in another; however, this is a matter for the consideration
of the Legislature, we must take the law as it is, which I clearly
think will not allow the want of a ca. sa. in the original action
against the principal, to be pleaded to a scire facias, or a judg
ment already recovered against the bail on their recognizance.
It would be superfluous to go into a critical examination of the
formal objections taken on special demurrer to these several pleas,
as the objection, in point of substance, applies to them all. The
Defendant has been sorely perplexed in trying to get his matter of
inducement on the record in order to let in his pleas of no ca. sa.,
which matter ought in fact to have come from the other side ; or if
the Defendant was desirous of waiving all objection to the form of
the scire facias, it would have taxed his ingenuity to get the mat
ter into his plea, except by oyer of the original record which would
have shewn how the Defendant has been proceeded against.
In the case of Simmons v. Parmenter, 1 Wils. 97, against two
joint debtors, one of whom was outlawed, oyer of the writ and
record of outlawry was granted ; and other cases I think may be
found to the same effect; but it is needless to say more on this
head;
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head i for the reasons already stated there must be judgment for
the Plaintiff on the demurrer to all the pleas.
Judgment on the demurrer for the Plaintiff.
Kerr, for Plaintiff.
Berton, for Defendant.

BROWN v. FRINK.*
Where goods are delivered under an agreement to be paid lor by endorsed
notes, payable — days after delivery, the vendor may, before the expira
tion of the term of credit, sustain an action against the vendee for a partial
breach of his contract, the vendee having in part paid for the goods according
to the agreement.
Averments in the declaration of past payment bv Defendant, and re
quest to deliver the notes, are surplusage, and need not be proved.
This was an action of special Assumpsit, tried before Parker

J. at the Saint John Circuit in January last.
The Plaintiff declared that in consideration that the Plaintiff
would sell and deliver three cargoes of Boards at an agreed price,
Defendant promised to pay by approved indorsed notes, at ninety
days from delivery ; that he did sell and deliver, and that al
though Defendant paid a part, to wit, £100, by an approved in
dorsed note, yet lie refused to pay for the remainder in like
manner.
The action was brought before the expiration of the term of
credit.
At the trial N. Parker, for the Defendant, moved for a non-suit
on the grounds,
1st. That the Plaintiff had not proved his averment of the pay
ment of a part.
2nd. That there was no evidence of the demand of a note for the
balance.
The learned .Judge reserved the points, and gave the Defendant
leave to move for a non-suit in banc, and the Plaintiff had a ver
dict.
At this Term N. Parker moved to set aside the verdict, and
enter a non-suit on the points reserved:—
The action, having been brought before the expiration of the ver
dict, could only be supported on the breach for not delivering the
promissory note.
The Plaintiff gave no evidence to support the averments of pay
ment of part or request of a note for the remainder, and therefore
had not proved the gravamen'of his charge. He did not seek to
recover on any legal or implied liability, but on the special agree
ment to do certain acts. He must recover secundum allegata et
probata.
[Chipman,
* This ease was omitted to be inserted among the Reports of last Term.

361

CASES in TRINITY TERM,

\Chipman, Ch. J.]—This action is by the vendor against the
vendee, for goods sold and delivered. Without the special agree
ment the Defendant would have been bound to pay. The special
contract is for his ease, and he is equally bound to pay for them
according to that special agreement; the question therefore is if
the averments are not surplusage.]
The rule as to surplusage is that all which may be struck out
and leave the declaration good may be rejected as surplusage ;
here to strike out the averment would leave the count without a
breach, and if the averment be surplusage, then, although he has
stated a payment of part, he may recover the whole amount of the
goods sold.
Chipman, Ch. J.:
It is contended that an allegation in the Plaintiff’s declaration of
a payment of part of his claim, and a demand of the residuec,
should be proved as laid. I cannot yield to either objection. A
precedent debt existed, and therefore no request was necessary.
This was a contract of sale payable by indorsed notes; the lum
ber was delivered and thereby the debt accrued, and it became the
Defendant’s duty to pay by indorsed notes, as in a common case
it would have been in cash. It cannot be contended that he must
prove payment of part to recover the balance ; it was an allegation
in diminution of his demand, and may be regarded as surplusage.
Botsford, J. concurred.
Carter J.:
I consider the allegation of the payment of a part as an admis
sion on the record in favor of the Defendant, which it was not
necessary for the Plaintiff to prove.
As to the second point, I think it was not necessary for the
Plaintiff to request. This is not different in its effect from a com
mon contract to pay, except that the Defendant was to pay in a
particular way ; the contract does not state on request.
In 1st Chitty, 290, it is said from Plowden, if a special request
be unnecessarily stated it need not be proved.
Parker, J.:
This notion was brought by the vendor against the vendee on a
contract of sale.
It was necessary for the Plaintiff to aver and prove the contract
and the performance of his part of it, namely, the delivery of the
goods to the Defendant, which was done, and upon this the duty
arises for the Defendant to perform his part, viz. paying for the
same by good indorsed notes.
It is true the Plaintiff has in addition to the averment of per
formance on his part, alleged a part performance by the Defen
dant of his part; but this I agree in thinking amounts only to an
admission
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admission for the Defendant’s benefit, saving him the trouble of
proving the fact, but not making it necessary for the Plaintiff to
prove it.
As to the request, the contract was not to give the notes on re
quest after the delivery of the goods, but on such delivery ; it was
not, therefore, a material averment, and may, I think, be rejected
as surplusage.
There is no ground for disturbing the verdict.
Rule refused.
Berton for Plaintiff.
N. Parker for Defendant.

TRINITY TERM, 1st Victoria.

1838.

GEUBEAL EWEE.

It is Ordered, That the entry of the Judgment on the Record,
in action of debt, when the amount to be recovered is ascertained
and assessed by the Court under the Act of Assembly, 7, W. 4,
c. 14, s. 6, shall be in the following form or of the like tenor and
effect, viz:
“ And the said A. B. [the Plaintiff'] prays that the amount to
be recovered in this action may be ascertained and assessed by the
Court here, according to the form of the Act of Assembly in such
case made and provided ; and thereupon it is suggested and proved
and manifestly appears to the Court here, that the said A. B.
ought to recover for his debt in this action, the sum of------ , there
fore it is considered that the said A. B. do recover against the said
C. D. [the Defendant] the said sum of------ for his debt so ascer
tained and assessed by the Court here, and also &c. [proceed with
the entry in regard to costs in the usual form] and the said C. D.
in money, &c.”
WARD CHIPMAN.
W. BOTSFORD,
R. PARKER.

Note.—Carter Justice was absent during the whole of this Term.

CASSES M MICHAEIMAS TEW,
IN THE

SECOND YEAR OF THE REIGN OF VICTORIA.

THE QUEEN v. JOHN KERR.
Courts of Judicature iu this Province have no authority to pronounce an
Act of the Legislature to he invalid, or to declare it null and void aiter’it
!! has been passed by the Legislative Council and Assembly and received, the
13 Governor’s assent, either on the ground tliat such Act interferes with the
exercise of private rights and is therefore unconstitutional, or that under the
Royal Instructions to the Governor the Act ought not to have been passed
without a suspending clause.
This was one of several indictments found by the Grand Jury

of the City and County of Saint John, at the Court of Oyer and
Terminer in January, 1838, for offences against the Act of Assem
bly 7 Wm. 4, cl 11, intituled ‘-An Act for the more effectual
prevention of fires within the City of Saint John.” The Defen
dant having pleaded not guilty, the issue came to be tried before
Parker J. at the Court in August last.
The first count in the indictment is as follows :—
The jurors of our Lady the Queen, upon their oath present, that
JohiT Kerr, late of the City of Saint John, in the City and County
of Saint John, Merchant, on the first day of May in the year of
our Lord one thousand eight hundred and thirty seven, with force
and arms &c. at the City of Saint John aforesaid, in the City and
County aforesaid, unlawfully and injuriously did erect and build,
and cause and procure to be erected and built in the City of Saint
John, to wit, at the City aforesaid in the City and County afore
said, a certain building of wood of greater height than twenty six
feet from the level of the street whereon the said building did front,
to the top of the corner posts of the said building, to wit, of the
height of twenty nine feet from the level of Prince William street,
in the said City, being the street whereon the said building did
front, to the top of the corner posts of the said building, to the
great damage and common nuisance of all Her Majesty’s liege
subjects, to the evil example of all others in the like case offending,
contrary to the form of the Act of Assembly in such case made and
provided, and against the peace of our Lord the late King and our
Lady the present Queen, their Crown and dignity.
The
xl
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The second count was for maintaining and continuing the same
building.
The following are the Sections of this Act on which the prosecu
tion was founded:—
I. Be it enacted by the Lieutenant Governor, Legislative Coun
cil and Assembly, That from and after the passing of this Act, no
dwelling house, store house, or other building whatsoever, shall be
erected of wood or other combustible materials, in the City of Saint
John, of greater height than twenty six feet from the level or
line of the street or wharf whereon the same may front, or of the
ground whereon the same is erected, to the top of the corner posts
of such building, and the ridge of the roof of which shall exceed fif
teen feet perpendicular from the wall plate.
*
#
#
“V. And be it further enacted, That every such dwelling house,
store house, or other building which, after the passing of this Act,
shall be erected, built, raised up, built upon, roofed, or repaired,
contrary to the provisions of this Act, and if constructed of stone
or brick, shall not have iron, copper or other fire proof window
shutters, and outer doors, as is herein before provided for, shall be
deemed a common nuisance.”
The charge being clearly made out by the evidence for the
Crown, Kerr, for the Defendant, took several exceptions to the
prosecution:—
1st. The indictment was not sufficient, as it did not set out the
height of the building above the ground on which it was placed—
non constat but the ground might have been much higher than
the street, and the building not higher than the law allowed. The
street might have been cut down so as to bring it much below the
level of the building1,’ as had been done in many instances.
2d. The Act itself is void, as being against common right and
against Magna Charta, and no indictment will lie for a breach of
its provisions.
3d. The Royal Instructions are part of the Constitution of this
Province ; they expressly require that no Act affecting private
property shall be passed by the Assembly without a suspending
clause. This Act affects private property, has no suspending
clause, and is therefore void.
4th. Being void at the time of its being passed, no subsequent
recognition by the Crown could give it validity.
5th. It is the province and duty of the Court to declare Acts
like this, which are unconstitutional, or not duly passed in confor
mity to the Royal Instructions, to be void.
The learned Judge was of opinion that the indictment suffici
ently charged the offence under the Act, and it lay upon the De
fendant to shew that there were any particular circumstances in
regard
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regard to the locality of the building, or peculiarity in the site,
which would withdraw the case from the operation of the Act.
The words of the Act are:—From the level of the street or
wharf, or of the ground,” the latter words were probably inserted
because buildings might not front on any street or wharf.
Prima/acf'e^when the house fronted on any street the level of
that street was the place from which the height was to be mea
sured.
As to the several objections to the Act itself, the learned Judge
suggested, and it was agreed to by the Counsel on both sides, that
they should be reserved for the consideration of this Court, and in
case of a verdict for the Crown the judgment should be respited
until an opportunity was afforded of taking the opinion of the
Court. The question raised on the construction of the Act was
also to be brought under consideration if the Counsel thought
proper.
The Defendant then proceeded to call witnesses, and the case
went to the jury on the facts, who found the Defendant guilty.
The learned Judge having stated these matters to the Court,
Kerr, was heard in support of his objections.
He cited and relied on the following clause in the Royal In
structions :—
“ And whereas great mischief may arise from passing bills ofan
unusual and extraordinary nature and importance in our Planta
tions, which bills remain in force there from the time of enacting
until our pleasure be signified to the contrary. We do hereby
will and require you not to pass or give your assent to any bill or
bills of an unusual and extraordinary nature and importance
wherein our prerogative and the property of our subjects may be
prejudiced, or the trade and shipping of the Kingdom any way af
fected until you shall have first transmitted unto us through one of
our principal Secretaries of State, and to the Committee of our
Privy Council for Trade and Plantations, for their information,
the drafts of such bill or bills, and shall have received our Royal
pleasure thereupon, unless you take care that there be a clause
inserted therein suspending and deferring the execution thereof un
til our pleasure shall be known concerning the same.”
He quoted also the maxim “ cujus est solum ejus est usque (id
ccehimr and contended that Colonial Legislatures had no power
to detract from the full exercise of the right of property by setting
limits to the height of buildings, at all events not without compen
sation.
If the public good demanded this injury to the individual, the
public should make compensation.
The difference was great between Acts of the Imperial Parlia
ment, and those of subordinate Colonial Legislatures; but even
with
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with regard to Acts of Parliament the Judges of the land were to
construe them and say what were laws and what were not.
The Acts of the Colonial (Legislature had not the force of laws,
unless they were passed in due conformity to the delegated autho
rity vested in them by the Royal Instructions.
The 14th Article of those Instructions evidently applied to Acts
like the present, which were in diminution of private rights; and
the Act not containing a suspending clause was wholly inoperati've,
and should be treated by Courts of Justice as no law.
The following authorities were cited and commented upon:—
1 Black. Com. 138; 2 Kents. Com.12 ; Co. Lit. 98 b.; 5 Com.
Dig.'313; Hob. 247 ; 7 Bac. Abr. 387, and several of the pases
and opinions in Chalmers’ Collection, as to the power of Colonial
Legislatures.
Chipman, C. J.:
I am of oj aion that the objections made to the Validity of tins
Act of Assembly cannot be sustained. The Lieutenant Gover
nor, Legislative Council and Assembly form the Legislative Body
in this Province, subordinate indeed to the Parliament of the Mo
ther Country, and subject to its control, but with this restriction,
they have the same power to make laws binding" within the Pro
vince that the Imperial Parliament has in the United Kingdom ;
and it is every days practice both in the Mother Country and
the Colonies, to make laws abridging the exercise of private rights’,
where the public good requires it. The propriety and necessity
of such enactments are within the competency of the Legislature
alone to determine. It is a thing unheard of, under British insti
tutions, for a radicial tribunal to question the validity and binding
force of any such law, when duly enacted. While the law re
mains on the Statute Book, the* Courts are absolutely bound to
give effect to it. There is this peculiarity in Colonial Legislation,
that the Crown reserves to itself a right to disallow any law to
which even its own representative in the Colonial Legislature may
have given his assent; thus keeping in its own hands a Legislative
power distinct and separate from that of the Colonial Legislative
body, and one which affords a remedy for any improper Colonial
legislation. But a law, passed in proper form by the Provincial
Legislature, (at least a law not objectionable on account of its re
pugnancy to an Act of Parliament relating to the Colonies,) goes
into force and must be executed, subject to being disallowed by the
Sovereign, unless it contain a clause suspending the execution of
it until the royal pleasure shall be known. The clause in the
royal instructions, referred to by Mr. Kerr, is founded on the very
assumption that every Act of the Colonial Legislature, of which
the execution is not thus expressly suspended, takes effect on
receiving the Governor’s assent, and the Governor is therefore
instructed
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instructed, in certain cases, to withhold his assent; but this instruc
tion is merely directory to the Governor, and does not in my opi
nion, in any manner affect the validity Ind binding force of any
enactment,” to which the Governor’s assent may be actually given,
after having been concurred in by the other two branclies’of the
Legislature. For these reasons, J cannot for a moment yield to
any of the objections that have been made to this Act of Assem
bly.
BotOORD, J. concurred.
Parker, J.:
I will merely add a few words to what has fallen from Ilis
Honor the Chief Justice.
I did not reserve these questions at the trial in consequence of
any doubts on my own mind, but because I thought it much bet
ter the learned Counsel should be heard in support of them at the
bar of this Court, than that a long argument and consideration of
several authorities should be gone into at the Circuit; and there
were a number of other cases in which the slime objections would
be raised.
Supposing him even to have'been right in his view of the power
and duty of the Court, I can by no means agree with him in opinion
that the clause in the Royal Instructions was intended to apply to
an Act like this, containing general regulations which might affect
all real property within certain limits.
I agree with him so far as to think that cases may occur in which
the Court would be bound to pronounce its opinion upon the vali
dity of an Act of Assembly, for instance^ when it conflicts with an
Act of the Imperial Parliament: whether in any other case, it
is unnecessary now to say; certainly not in the present, for any of
the reasons which have been urged or any others that I am aware of.
THE COMMISSIONERS OF HIGHWAYS FOR THE
PARISH* OF FREDERICTON v. WM. B. PHAIR,
POSTMASTER.
Postmasters are not exempted by the Statutes 1 Viet. c. 33, s. 1G & c.
36, from Highway labour imposed by any Act of Assembly of this Province.
This was a conviction had before a Magistrate in September

last, under the provisions of the Act of Assembly,"!) Wm. IV. c.
2, for a penalty for the non-performance of Statute labor. By the
17th section of the said Act, it is provided, “that all male inha
bitants of the age of sixteen years and upwards (with the excep
tions therein named) shall work either in person, or by able and
sufficient men in their stead, in each and every year” the number
of days prescribed by a scale therein contained, and graduated
according to the income or property of the several inhabitants.
Another
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Another clause provided that in the Parish of Fredericton, no per
son liable to perform statute labor should be suffered or permitted
to work by substitute, but should work in person or pay in lieu
thereof the sum of two shillings and sixpence, per diem. It was
also inter alia provided, that within six days after default in the
payment of the said sum, or refusal to work, report of such delin
quency was to be made by the Surveyor to one of the Commissi
oners, which Commissioner was required without delay to make
complaint before a Justice of the Peace, and the said Justice on
conviction was to adjudge every delinquent to pay the penalty of
four shillings per diem for each day’s work that he was liable to
perform. The defence set up was that the Defendant was an offi
cer of the Post Office, and exempted by the Acts of Parliament,
1 Victoria, c. 33, and 36.
In this Term Berton, for Defendant moved to quash the con
viction on the ground that Defendant was the Post Master in the
Town of Fredericton, and an officer in the,employment of the
Post Office within the meaning of the Acts, and as such officer
was exempt from the performance of labor on the Highways, which
otherwise by Act of Assembly he was liable to perform.
The 12th Section of the 1st Viet. cap. 33, enacted, “ That no
“ Postmaster General nor any officer of the Post Office shall be
“ compelled to serve as a Mayor or Sheriff, or in any Ecclessiasti“ cal or Corporate or Parochial, or other public office or employ“ ment, or to serve on any jury or inquest, or in the militia, any
“ law or custom to the contrary thereof notwithstandingand cap.
36 expressly declared the above section, together with the Act
from which it is extracted, to be in force in all her Majesty’s Co
lonies and Dominions.
The learned Counsel contended that it was the evident intention
of the Acts of Pa: ’'ament to exempt all officers of the Post Office
from any employment or occupation which might in the slightest
degree interfere with the discharge of their important official duties,
the steady, regular, and uninterrupted performance of which were
of paramount importance to the government and the community
at large; the framers of the A ct had particularly enumerated
every description of service known in England, and then had ad
ded general words to include any business or employment unknown
to them- it could not be contended that the performance of Statutute labour was not in the nature of an employment, because the
Act permitted the commutation of it by money. The penalty of
4s. per diem was expressly imposed for the non-performance of the
labor, not for the non-payment of the permitted commutation. If
i j should be decided that under the terms of the Act of Parliament
the Defendant, as Postmaster, was not exempted from the per
formance of Statute Labour, then under the same provision he
might
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might be compelled to shut up his office and work in person on the
roads, and the Provincial Act must be his excuse for the neglect
of his official duties.
Chipman, Ch. J.:
The performance of Statute Labour does not come within the
meaning of the term employment. Parochial employment neces
sarily imports something in the nature of an office, as for instance
a Commissioner of Highways or Surveyor of Roads.
Parker, J.:
1 I remember a case formerly where the officers of the Customs
claimed to be exempted from the performance of Militia duty,
under the term employment; my opinion was taken at the time ;
I decidedly thought that they were not exempted. Afterwards
the case was represented home and a special exemption from Mili
tia duty was inserted in the Act. This Act of Parliament seems
to contain the same exceptions.

Per Curiam.
We see no reason why officers of the Post Office who have in
comes and property, should not pay tax on the roads. If exemp
tion from Statute Labour were intended by the Acts of Parliament,
it would have been expressly named therein. We find the ex
emption from serving on juries or inquests, or in the militia, parti
cularly mentioned in the Act under which this exemption is
claimed, and these are much more within the meaning of the term
employment than the performance of Statute Labour. 1 f the Pro
vincial Legislature think that the public service is likely to suffer
by compelling officers of the Post Office Department to perform
Statute Labour, they can provide accordingly by an Act of As
sembly. We have not the slightest doubts as to the construction
which we have put upon the Imperial Acts.
The Court overruled the motion and confirmed the conviction.
Solicitor General for Plaintiff.
Berton, for Defendant.

LEONARD v. HANSON.
After a case lias gone to the jury on the whole evidence, who have found
a general verdict for the Plaintiff, the Court will not alter the verdict and
allow it to be entered on one count only, on the ground that the damages
were not more than an adequate compensation for the injury complained of
in the count, uuless all the evidence be admissible under that count, and
the Court are satisfied the damages were assessed wholly on the cause of
action contained in that connt.

THIS was an action of trespass tried before CARTER J. at the
Charlotte Circuit in April 1839.
The declaration contained a count for trespass, quare clausum
fregit;
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fregit; and also tlie common asportavit. count. The Defendant
pleaded the general issue, and also liberum tenementum to the first
count. The Plaintiff new assigned, setting out the abuttals of his
close ; and the Defendant pleaded the general issue to the new as
signment.
The Plaintiff, at the trial, went into evidence of entry on the
close, and injury to the fences, &c., and also proved the scutting
down and carrying away of part of the growing crop ; but having
failed in making out the abuttals of the close, the learned Judge
directed a nonsuit. The Plaintiff’s Counsel, however, refusing to
acquiesce, the case then went to the Jury, who, contrary to the di
rections of the Judge, found a verdict for the Plaintiff with 45s.
damages. His Honor’s attention was not distinctly drawn to the
aspoatavit count, and the verdict was entered generally on the
whole declaration.
In Trinity Term last Wilmot obtained a rule nisi for setting
aside the verdict and granting a new trial.
In Michaelmas Term, G. D. Street applied for a rule nisi to
amend the postea by entering the verdict on the asportavit count
only j which the Court granted and enlarged the previous rule into
the present term.
Kerr now shewed cause and contended that the verdict could
not be altered, aS it had been given by the Jury generally upon
the whole evidence. That the Court could not say that the Jury
had assessed damages on the asportavit count only; but the contrary
was evident, as the, Counsel had gone to the Jury on the whole
evidence, a great part of which was not applicable to the asportavit
count ,and that in fact no proof had been given of the value of the
articles taken away.
He cited Eddowes v. Hopkins, Doug. 376; and Williams v.
Breedon, 1 B. & P. 329.
G. D. Street contra, contended that although the value of the '
articles was not proved, yet there was sufficient evidence of the
quantity to satisfy the Court that the damages given by the Jury
were not more than adequate.
That this being the case, the Court would presume that the da
rn agefe were assessed on that count, upon which the Plaintiff was
clearly entitled to recover, and that the rule as to the reception of
evidence on the other counts only applied where the count was bad
in law.

Per Curiam.
It is clear that evidence was received and went to the jury in
this case, which would not have been properly admissible under
the asportavit count, and it is impossible for us to say that the jury
confined their damages to that count. It is true there was suffi
cient evidence to support that count, and the Plaintiff’s Counsel
should
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should, after failing in proof of the abuttals, have abandoned the
first count, and requested the learned Judge to submit the case to
the jury on the second count only, with the evidence applicable
thereto.
We cannot allow this amendment, and as the general verdict
cannot be supported there must be a new trial.
Rule to amend Posted discharged, and rule for new trial made
absolute.

MONTGOMERY v. M‘LEOD.
In an action for crim. con. the fact of the Plaintiff’s marriage may he
proved hy any person present at the ceremony, and if performed hy a Com ■
missioner under the Act of Assembly 8 G. 4, c. 9, it will he presumed (at
least in the absence of evidence to the contrary,) that he was acting within
the scope of his authority, and followed the requisition of the Acts as to
notification and form of solemnization.
The certificate made under the Act 52 G. 3, c. 21, and registered with
the Clerk of the Peace, is admissible in evidence without proof by the at
testing witness.
This was an action for criminal conversation with the Plain
tiff’s wife, tried before Parker J. at the last Gloucester Circuit.

The evidence of the Plaintiff’s marriage was as follows:—
Robert Ferguson, Esquire, a Justice of the Peace, and one of
the Commissioners for solemnizing marriage appointed under the
Act of Assembly 8 G. 4, c. 9, proved that he solemnized marriage
between the parties in the presence of several persons, after the
notification of banns ; that the notification was given to his clerk,
Thomas Barclay, to post up, (as was his usual custom a sufficient
time before the marriage, unless openly proclaimed,) that there
was a place of public worship in the Parish belonging to the Church
of Scotland, in which it was customary to proclaim the banns of
marriage on Sundays, if open for Divine Service.
Barclay proved that he was in the habit of publishing banns for
the last witness; that if not openly proclaimed in Church he
affixed a written notification signed by the Commissioner on the
Church door and at two other public places in the Parish ; that he
remembered so affixing a notification on the present occasion ; the
notification stated the time when the ceremony would be per
formed and was put up three weeks previous thereto; that the
notifications were put up and left by him, but he could not say whe
ther they were actually remaining up on three successive Sundays.
The Clerk of the Peace proved that the certificate required by
Act 52, G. 3, c. 21, signed by the parties and two witnesses, and
also by the Commissioner, was duly filed and registered in his
office, and he produced both the original certificate and book of
registrv
Street,
Yl
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Street, for the Defendant, objected that there was no sufficient
proof of a legal marriage having taken place—
1st. The publication of banns was not proved, as it should appear
that the notification was actually remaining up on three successive
Sundays.
2d. The certificate could not be received in evidence' without
proof by the attesting witnesses.
3d. There was no proof that there was no Parson, Vicar or Cu
rate in the Parish, and therefore the Commissioner’s authority to
marry was not shewn, he having only authority under the Act in
the absence of persons in Holy Orders of the Church,
4th. It was not proved that the marriage was celebrated accord
ing tc the form prescribed by the Governor under Act 31, G. 3, c.
5, s. 1.
The learned Judge overruled the objections and the case went to
the jury, who, on clear evidence of the fact of adultery, and of the
Defendant being possessed of some property, found a verdict for
the Plaintiff with <£650 damages.
Street now moved for rule nisi to set aside the verdict on the
objections taken at the trial, and also on the ground of excessive
damages but the Court were clearly of opinion that there was
sufficient evidence of a marriage having taken place, that it was
not necessary to call the attesting witnesses to the certificate, and
that the marriage might be proved by any person present, at the
celebration ; and that it being shewn that Mr. Ferguson was duly
commissioned to solemnize marriage, it would be presumed (at
least in the absence of evidence to the contrary,) that he had duly
performed the duties of such office.
As regarded the damages, there was nothing to shew that the
jury had acted at all improperly so as to induce the Court to inter
fere with wliat is their proper province, and most peculiarly so in
an action of this ,iatur<=
Rule refused.

DOE DEM PEABODY, v. M‘KNIGHT
The title conveyed by a Sheriff to land sold by him under s.fi.fa. issued
upon a Judgment in an action brought upon a former Judgment of the
Court, cannot relate to the time of signing the first Judgment, although such
first Judgment may have been a lien on the land.
A Judgment is not such a lien upon the land as to prevent the Defendant
conveying the legal estate and seisin to a third person,
Ejectment for lands in Northumberland, tried before P irker

J. at the last Circuit in that County.
The Plaintiff made out a case of title under a grant from the
Crown to one Spencer Crane, dated March 8, 1813, and a deed
of
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of bargain and sale from Spencer Crane to the lessor of Plaintiff
(and Edward Simonds, since deceased,) as joint tenants, dated
August 23, 1814, and duly acknowledged and registered.
The following evidence on the part of the Defendant was admit
ted by consent, viz. :—
1st. An exemplification of a judgment of the Supreme Court,
Patrick Henderson v. Spencer Crane, of Hilarj Term 54 G. 3,
and signed in March, 1814.
2d. An exemplification of a judgment of the Supreme Court in
an act'“n brought upon the former judgment of Hilarj Term 58
G. 3, (1818.)
3. A writ of fi. fa. de bonis et terris, issued on the last mentioned
judgment; a levy and sale by the Sheriff of Northumberland under
the said execution of the land in question ; and a deed of bargain
and sale by the Sheriff to Henderson, dated September 17, 1829.
4th. A deed of bargain and sale from Henderson to the Defend
ant, dated May 6, 1830.
A verdict was taken for the Plaintiff by consent, subject to the
opinion of the Court on the whole case.
Street now moved for a rule nisi to set aside the verdict and enter
a nonsuit, contending that the judgment of the Court in Hilary
Term, 1814, was a lien upon the land, and as the same had never
been satisfied and was prior in time to the conveyance from Crane
to Peabody, that conveyance would not operate except subject to
this lien.
That the tien remaining at the time of the recovery of the
second judgment and execution thereupon, the sale and conveyance
made by the Sheriff, by virtue of the Act of Assembly 26 G. 3,
c. 12, would relate back to the time of the first judgment, and thus
vest the legal title in the Defendant notwithstanding Crane’s con
veyance to the lessor of Plaintiff.
But the Court were clearly of opinion that, whatever lien might
have been created by the first judgment, the sale made by the
Sheriff under a fi. fa. could not relate to a time anterior to the
judgment on which such execution was issued, and that the legal
estate and seisin were transferred by Crane’s conveyance to Peabodj, notwithstanding the previous judgment of this Cour4- against
Crane.
Pule refused.

NARY v. OWEN.
A Magistrate is liable to an action of trespass if he commit a party brought
before him on a criminal charge to Gaol for trial, without proceeding to
make an examination into the charge as bv law directed.
In this case a -barge of a criminal nature had been made bv one J. F.
before

378

CASES IN MICHAELMAS TERM,

before the Defendant as a Magistrate, upon oath, against the Plaintiff,
upon which he had issued a warrant for his apprehension. The Plaintiff
was arrested by virtue of the warrant at the Parish of Cambo Bello, and
taken from thence to a steam boat lying ar a wharf in Eastport; in the
United States, where the Defendant was. The Defendant administered an
examination oath to J. F. in a store at Eastport, then took him on board the
steam boat and questioned him as to the identity of the Plaintiff, when J.
F. stated that the Plaintiff was the person against whom he had made tlie
charge Held that this examination was a nullity, and afforded no justifi
cation to the Magistrate for imprisoning the Plaintiff.
This
Parker

was an action of Trespass and false imprisonment, tried
before
J. at the Charli tte Circuit in April, 1838.
Plea—the general issue.
The Defendant was a Justice of the Peace and the resident pro
prietor of the Island of Cambo Bello, with the exception of some
small part in the possession of other persons. John Farmer acted
as constable on the Island, and was also the agent of Defendant to
look after trespasses in a certain part of the Island called Cran
berry Point.
On the 3d February, 1837, Farmer made a complaint to the
Defendant against the Plaintiff and charged him with riot, rout,
and robbery of some wood off the Island. A deposition of the
facts was made out and attested to by Farmer before the De
fendant as a Magistrate, whereupon Defendant issued his warrant
dated 4th February, 1837, for the apprehension of the Plaintiff,
directing him to be brought before the Defendant at his office in
Campo Bello. The warrant was delivered to one Greeno, a con
stable, to be executed. On the 28th June following the Defendant
being about to leave the Island, and being informed that Plaintiff
might then be arrested, left directions that in case he should be to
take him to Saint Andrews, as it was the nearest place where a
Justice of the Peace might be found. On the day last mentioned
the Plaintiff was apprehended by Greeno, and was taken by
Greeno and Farmer from Campo Bello to a steam boat then lying
at the wharf in Eastport, in the State of Maine, but on her way to
Saint Andrews, and on board of which boat the Defendant also
was at the time. The Defendant having previously taken Farmer
to a store in Eastport, and in the absence of Plaintiff having admi
nistered an oath to him to give evidence upon the charge against
the Plaintiff upon his return to the boat, asked him if Plaintiff
was the person against whom he had made the charge in the
January previous, to which Farmer said—yes. Defendant their
asked Plaintiff if he were the man who committed the trespass
alleged against him—Plaintiff answered that he was not then in
the country. These were all the words that passed, and nodeposi
tion was produced. Without any further examination Defendant
made out a warrant addres«ed to the constable to carry him to the
gaol
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gaol at Saint Andrews, and a commitment to the gaoler to receive
and keep him. The Plaintiff was taken to gaol and there remained
confined five months, and until he was discharged after his acquit
tal upon a trial for larceny at the Court of Oyer and Terminer
in November, 1837. The requisite notice of action was given.
The learned Judge told the jury that the examination on board
of the steam boat was an entire nullity, and that the Defendant
was not justified in committing the Plaintiff to prison for trial
without an examination, and was liable to an action of trespass
and false imprisonment for so doing.
The jury found a verdict for the Plaintiff for £50.
In Trinity Term last, the Solicitor General obtained a rule nisi
for a new trial, upon the grounds—
1st. That no action would lie.
2d. That if an action would lie it should be case and not trespass.
At this Term Wilmot, for Plaintiff, shewed cause.
The duties of Justices of the Peace are twofold, judicial and
ministerial, and when he in his ministerial capacity acts impro
perly he will be civilly liable—1 Bl. Com. 354, note 30. The
Defendant was acting in his ministerial capacity, and in his pro
ceedings was bound by the forms of the law of the land—2 Burn.
Jus. 113.
The Act of Assembly of 1st Wm. 4, c. 14, is imperative upon
Magistrates, by which examinations must be taken upon oath and
put into writing before a commitment is made or bail required.
The Defendant has acted illegally in this case, there never having
been any examination before him ; that in the steam boat being
altogether a nullity. In actions on the case malice must be proved,
and Magistrates might every day transgress the law, and the party
aggrieved would be remediless, if action on the case only would
lie. The Plaintiff being committed upon a charge of Farmer,
upon which perjury could not be sustained, the commitment was
therefore void and the acts of the Defendant illegal. The commis
sion to J ustices is in general words and gives no power; their duty
is clearly defined by the Act of Assembly. The Defendant should
have required bail of Plaintiff; Plaintiff in fact had never in legal
parlance been taken before a Magistrate—1 Chit. Cr. La. 56, 79 ;
7 Car. & Payne, 546; 1 B. & Cr 163; 10 B. & Cr. 28.
The Solicitor General in reply.
The Defendant had not gone beyond his jurisdiction, and
whatever errors there were in the proceedings were errors in
form only, consequently trespass would not lie. No law
makes it necessary that the commitment be in any par
ticular form, and it is discretionary with the Magistrate to insert
what he thinks necessary. The authorities are against a commit
ment being void on account of omission. Magistrates having
fuff
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full information it is not necessary to read tlie deposition to prisoner
before making out the commitment.
[Chipman, Ch. J.—How is the party to get a knowledge of the
charge against him ? It is the duty of the Magistrate not to wait
for prisoner to enquire the nature of the charge, but to detail it fully
to him.]
[Botsford, J.—He should have asked the party for his bail.]
[Parker, J.—Non constat whether the party were charged
with felony or misdemeanour.]
The Solicitor General did not contend that the proceedings were
not irregular, but there was no irregularity upon which to ground
an action of trespass,—there was no excess of jurisdiction. If the
commitment were null and void because it was founded upon pro
ceeding had in a foreign country, then it follows that the Defendant
would not be amenable to this Court for an Act committed with
out its jurisdic ion. The following cases were cited by the Solicitor
General in the support of his views.—2 Saun. Pl. & Ev. 613 ; 3
Big. 78 ; 8 East. 113 ; 12 East. 67 ; 1 Lord Ray, 46.
Chipman, C. J.:
This is an action of trespass and false imprisonment.
The Plaintiff was committed to the Gaol of the County of
Charlotte by rhe warrant of the Defendant, who is a Magistrate
for that County, for an offence which purports on the face of the
commitment to be a misdemeanour. A new trial was moved for
on the ground that under the circumstances of this case, trespass
will not lie, but that the action, if any, should have been an action
on the case. And the first question is, whether the commitment
was authorized by law, for if the commitment be void, it is clear
from the case of Davis v. Capper, 10 B. & C. 28, that trespass
will lie against the Magistrate who issues it. It appeared in evi
dence that in the month of February 1837, a warrant was issued
by the Defendant, who resided on the Island of Campo Bello, for
apprehending the Plaintiff on the information of one Farmer for
the alleged offence, and that he was not taken on this warrant
until the month of June following, when he was arrested and
brought before the Defendant on board a steam boat lying at the
wharf in Eastport, in the State of Maine. On this occasion the
Defendant administered an oath to Farmer, the informant, in a
store in Eastport, the Plaintiff not being present, and thereupon
proceeded on board the steam boat in the presence of the Plaintiff
to ask Farmer whether the Plaintiff was the person against whom
he had made the charge in the month of February preceding,
which question Farmer answered in the affirmative, and the De
fendant then asked the Plaintiff if he was the man who had com
mitted the alleged trespass, to which the Plaintiff replied that he
was
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was not then in the country. The Defendant thereupon without
any further examination of the matter, issued the commitment.
All these proceedings at Eastport, the bringing of the Plaintiff
before the Defendant, the administering of the oath to Farmer, and
the subsequent examination, must be deemed mere nullities, having
taken place within the limits of a foreign country; and what is
most important with regard to the oath, no prosecution for peijury
could have been sustained upon it, Any commitment founded on
these proceedings must therefore be necessarily void. It was at
tempted to sustain the commitment on the information given by
Farmer in the month of February preceding at Campo Bello, under
oath and in writing, upon which the warrant to apprehend was
issued. But this cannot avail the Defendant, unless it would be
lawful for a Magistrate to commit an offender for trial without the
offender ever having been brought before him and charged with
the offence. Now such a commitment would unquestionably be
illegal and void. There are many other extraordinary circum
stances in this case besides those to which I have adverted ; but
the facts which I have stated are those upon which I found my
judgment, and upon these facts I am clearly of opinion that this
action must be sustained, and the rule for a new trial discharged.
Botsford J.:
I quite agree with his Honor the Chief Justice This was a
high handed act on the part of the Defendant. The offence was
committed upon the Magistrate’s own property, and the complaint
made by his own bailiff. The Magistrate should not have acted in
the matter himself. If it were as aggravated atrespass as alleged
the party should have had an opportunity of hearing the charge, of
taking down the testimony of the witnesses, and of giving bail.
There was no examination except at Eastport, out of the jurisdic
tion of the Court, consequently the commitment was null and
void.
Parker J.:
I have nev er entertained a doubt that the commitment of the
Plaintiff was illegal, and that the Magistrate was liable in tres
pass for the wrong he has committed. It is very much to be re
gretted that he trusted himself to act at all in the case in the first
instance, or that after the Plaintiff was arrested he did not send him
before another J ustice at Saint Andrews, who could have obtained
the advice and assistance of the Clerk of the Peace if necessary.
Rule discharged.
Wilmot, for Plaintiff.
Solicitor General, for Defendant.

CLIFF
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DOE D CLIFF AND OTHERS v. CONNAWAY.
A party let into possession of Lands by the owner under an agreement of
sale, has no greater estate than that of a tenant at will, unless there be some
agreement also in regard to the occupation of the Lands before the sale is
completed.
An agreement was made between A & B, by mutual bonds, for the sale
and conveyance of Land by A to B on the payment of a certain sum on of
before the 1st May, 1829, together with lawful interest for the first three
years, and eight per cent, for the last two years,, as a consideration for the use
of the land. Held that B, who was let into possession under this agree •
ment, was not tenants will to A but tenant for years until the 1st May, 1829.
Before that day A died, and by his will devised the Land to his widow for
life, and after her death to his children, (the lessors of the Plaintiff.) He
appointed his widow his Executrix, and the Defendant, who was B’s assig
nee, paid the purchase money of the Land to the widow, and received from
her a deed ofbargain and sale. Held that the Defendant could not after
this, set up a tenancy at will under the agieement, such tenancy, if any,
having merged in the life-estate conveyed by the widow’s deed ; and that
after the death of the widow an ejectment might be maintained by the chil
dren without any notice to quit, or demand of possession.

Ejectment, tried before ClftPMAN, Ch. J. ar the sittings after
Michaelmas Term last.
The facts of the case were as follows :—
The lessors of the Plaintiff were the sons of one John Cliff,
deceased, through whom they claimed title; John Cliff died in
September, 1835, leaving a will by which he devised the premises
in question to his widow for her life, or until her marriage, and
after her death or marriage, which should first happen, then to the
lessors of the Plaintiff in fee. Sophia Cliff, his widow, was left
the Executrix of the will, she died in March, 1835. On the part
of the Defendant two bonds were put in evidence, bearing the same
date. One from the said John Cliff to one James Duncan, con
ditioned to give to the said Duncan a deed in fee of the premises
in question, upon the performance by Duncan of the condition of
the other bond from Duncan to John Cliff, which was to pay to
the said John Cliff on the 1st May, 1829, the sum of £80, with
lawful interest for three years and eight per cent, for the two last
years. The latter bond contained three indorsements of several
payments made thereon to the amount of £80 15s., the two last
payments were received by Sophia Cliff in the years 1826 and
1827. The conditions of these bonds are set out at large in Mr.
Justice Parker’s decision. The date and execution of these bonds
were antecedent to the date of the will of John Cliff. Duncan
went into possession of the premises at the time the bonds were
executed and remained in possession for the term of four years,
when he transferred all his claim and title to the Defendant, who
thereupon entered into possession and continued to hold it to the
time of the action brought. Sophia Cliff on 28th June, 1831, gave
the Defendant a deed in fee of the premises.
Wilmot,
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Wilmot, for Defendant, moved for a non-suit, on the ground that
no demand of possession was proved.
The Solicitor General objected, that there was no privity be
tween Cliff and Connaway, and therefore no tenancy.
The learned Chief Justice sustained the motion.
In Hilary last the Solicitor General obtained a rule, nisi to set
aside the nonsuit and to grant a new trial.
In moving for this rule it was contended, that although, if the
question had been between Cliff and Duncan, a demand of pos
session would have been necessary, still, as between these parties it
was not, because Duncan was merely a tenant at will under an
agreement to purchase and could not make his assignee a tenant
to Cliff without Cliff’s consent; that Duncan’s interest, whatever
it was, having been destroyed by Cliff’s devise as aforesaid, and
the Defendant having received a deed from Sophia Cliff, which under
the will she might give, at least of her own life estate, and all his inter
est having ceased at her death, there would be no privity of estate be
tween the lessorsof the Plaintiff and the Defendant. That the agree
ment was between Cliff and Duncan, and whatever might have
been Duncan’s rights under it had he lived, it was a chose in action
and could not be assigned to the Defendant; at all events the De
fendant would have to defend in Duncan’s name, but in the present
case he stood upon his own rights as assignee.—Right d. Dean
& Chapter of Wells v. Bawden and others, 3 East. 259 ; Doe d.
Parker v. Boulton, 6 M. & S. 148; Doe d. Knight v. Quigley,
2 Camp. 504 ; Doe d. Moore v. Lawder, 1 Stark. 308; Dowl
& Ry. 706.
In Trinity Term following Kerr shewed cause,—but upon
Parker, J. suggesting that from the peculiar wording of the condi
tion of the bonds Duncan’s estate might be deemed a tenancy for
years,—
The rule nisi was enlarged to this Term.
Wilmot Kerr now shewed cause:—The Defendant is in the same situation that Duncan would have
been, and Duncan’s possession having been lawful it rested with
the lessors of Plaintiff to shew us trespassers, which they could
not do without a demand of possession—2 Wm. Bl. 972. An agree
ment to lease shall be a lease in presenti if the words of the agree
ment shew the party’s intention that it should be so—3 Taunt. 65.
There is no doubt that if under an agreement for sale a party is let
into possession, the mere letting into possession creates a tenancy
at will—1 M. & Weis. 790 ; Co. Lit. 70 ; 3 Term R. 13. There
was no tenancy for years, it was merely an agreement to purchase.
The bonds could not create a legal present demise. If it be not a
tenancy for years without a putting into possession then there is no
tenancy
zl
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tenancy at all—1 Bar. & Ad. 498. No tenancy for years can be
created when the lessee had no right to enforce it.
The Solicitor General was heard in reply, and the Court gave
judgment as follows :—
Botsford, J.:
This was an action of ejectment for lands in the Parish of
Queensborough, tried at the Sittings after Michaelmas last past,
before His Honor the Chief Justice.
At the trial it appeared in evidence that John Cliff, deceased,
the father of the lessors of the Plaintiff, by his bond bearing date
the 1st of May, 1824, became bound to one James Duncan, in the
penal sum of £200, with a certain condition that he, the said John
Cliff, his heirs, executors or administrators, by a sufficient warranty
deed, would convey to the said James Duncan, his executors,
administrators or assigns, a certain lot of land (the premises in
question,) when he, the said Duncan, should pay the consideration
money for the same, agreeably to the conditions of a certain other
bond therein referred to, and made by the said James Duncan in
favor of the said John Cliff. By this bond, which was also in evi
dence, and bearing date the 1st May, 1824, it appeared that the
said James Duncan was obligated to pay to the said John Cliff the
sum of £80 for the said lot of land on or before the 1st day of May,
1829, together with lawful interest for the first two years, and
eight pounds per cent, for the last two years, for the use of the
land. That upon the bonds being made and passed, James Dun
can took possession of the premises. John Cliff died in the month
of August or September, 1825, leaving a widow and two sons, the
eldest of whom is now about fifteen years of age. Cliff by his will,
which was also in evidence, devised the premises in question to his
widow, Sophia Cliff, for and during her natural life or until her
marriage, then from her death or marriage, which should first hap
pen, to his sons John Wilson Cliff and James B. Cliff, the lessors
of the Plaintiff, their heirs and assigns forever. That Sophia Cliff
was appointed executrix in and by the said will, and took upon
herself the burthen of the execution of the same. That she was
again married, and died in March, 1835. It appeared that three
several payments had been made by Duncan upon his bond to
Cliff,—one on the 27tb May, 1824, of £20 to Cliff himself; one of
£30 on the 26th May, 1826, and another of £30 on the 6th Sep
tember, 1827,—the two last were paid to Sophia Cliff, the execu
trix. All the payments were indorsed upon the bond. There was
no evidence of any further payments having been made upon the
bond which had been given up by the executrix to the Defendant,
and was considered as discharged. It appeared that Duncan con
tinued in possession of the premises four years, when, he gave up
his right to Connaway, the Defendant, who took possession and
har
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has continued in the same to the present time, with the exception
of one year, when he put one John Colhoon upon the place, who
was to clear three acres of land for the use of it. There was no
evidence of the Defendant having paid anything to Duncan for the
giving up of his right in and to the premises. There was in evi
dence on the behalf of the Defendant a deed from Sophia Cliff, the
widow of John Cliff, to the Defendant, dated the 28th June, 1831,
by which she conveyed to him in fee all the premises in question,
and all her right, title and interest in and to the same.
It was contended at the trial on the part of the Defendant, that
having come lawfully into possession he could not be considered a
trespasser, and be ejected without a demand of possession having
been made and proved. In this His Honor the Chief Justice con
curred, and the Plaintiff was nonsuited.
This case now comes up before the Court upon a motion for
setting aside the nonsuit and for granting a new trial.
It is an acknowledged rule of law, that a person who has been
put into possession under an agreement for the sale of land, cannot
be ousted by ejectment before his possession is determined by a
demand of possession or otherwise, the possession being in the first
instance a lawful one, and the tenancy that of a tenant at will.
This rule of law is fully supported by the cases that have been
cited on the part of the Defendant—Right on the dem. of Lewis &
others v. Beard, 13 East, 210; Doe ex Dem Newbyyu. Jackson,
1 B. & C. 448; and Doe on the demise of Hiatt and others v.
Miller, 5 Car. & P. 595. As the facts in the present case are such
as to bring it within the rule of law that governed the decisions in
the above cited authorities, to entitle the Plaintiff to recover it is
incumbent upon him to shew the termination of the tenancy at
will in the Defendant. To me it appears that this was effected by
the Defendant's accepting of the conveyance from Sophia Cliff of
the premises in question, and by relying upon the title in fee it
conveyed on his defence to this action, it being a disclaimer of the
title of the lessors of the Plaintiff. Should I not be correct in this
view of the conveyance of the deed from Sophia Cliff to the De
fendant, but have to confine myself to the more limited and legal
operation of it, as a conveyance and transfer of all her estate for
life, <in the premises to which she was clearly entitled under the will
of John Cliff, then, by the operation of this conveyance, the De
fendant would become the legal owner of the premises as tenant for
life, or ratheras tenant per autre me, in which large estate his tenancy
at will would be merged and become extinct. In either case, whether
by the disclaimer of the title of the lessors of the Plaintiff or by
the merging of the tenancy at will in the larger estate, a demand of
the possession would not be necessary to sustain this action. I am
therefore of opinion that the rule must be made absolute.

Parker
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Parker, J.:
This case does not appear to me to fall within the ordinary clasof cases of persons let into possession under an agreement to pur
chase, for there, was said by Parke B. in delivering the judg
ment of the Court hi the late case of Doe d. Gray, v. Stanion, 1
M. and W. 695,—“although the possession is lawful it amounts to
a bare tenancy at will, and it is not the agreement but the letting
into possession that creates such tenancy.—Ball?;. Cullimore, 2 C.
M. & R. 120, may alse be referred to.
The case before us stands on a different footing ;—
John Cliff being seised in fee of the premises in question, makes
an agreement with Duncan not only for the sale, but for the occu
pation of such premises.
Two several bonds are executed, one by Cliff to Duncan in the
penalty of £200, with a condition as follows :—
“ The condition of this obligation is such, that if the above bounden John Cliff, Junior, liis heirs, executors or administrators, shall
well and truly give or cause to be given to the above named Janies
Duncan, his executors, administrators or assigns, a sufficient war
ranty deed of a certain piece or parcel of land and premises k nown
and distinguished as Jot number ninety three in the Parish of
Queensbury, on the said James Duncan paying up and fully com
plying with the conditions of a bond bearing the same tenor and
date with this obligation, given by the said James Duncan to the
said John Cliff, Junior'' then &c.
The other by Duncan to Cliff in the penal sum of £160, con
ditioned as follows:—
“The condition of this obligation is such, that if the above bounden James Duncan, his heirs, executors or administrators, shall
well and truly pay or cause to be paid to the above named John
Cliff, Junior, his executors, administrators or assigns, the full sum
of eighty pounds, lawful money of New Brunswick, on or before
the first day of May, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight
hundred and twenty nine, together with lawful interest for the
first three years, and eight per cent, for the last two years, as a
consideration for the use of a certain piece or parcel of land and
premises as explained in the conditions of a bond given by the said
John Cliff, Junior, to the said James Duncan, bearing the same
tenor and date with this instrument; remembering that ifthe said
James Duncan, his executors, administrators or assigns, should
at any time before the time is expired, agreeable to this obligation,
pay or cause to be paid any sum as a part of the eighty pounds as
expressed in this obligation, the sum paid to be considered as an
instalment, and per cent, to stop for the amount paid, then &c.”
The bonds are both dated the same day, viz. th< 1st May, 1824,
and have a distinct and unequivocal reference to each other, therefore
I
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I conceive, according to the rule laid down by Lord Eldon in
6 Vez. 565, and cited in 2 Stark, Ev. 551, n. (i ) the clause in the
condition of Duncan’s Bond (providing for the payment of “ lawful
interest [on the sum of £80 the agreed amount of purchase money,]
for the first three years, and eight per cent, for the last two years,
as a consideration for the use of a certain piece or parcel of land
and premises, as explained [described] in the condition of the bond
given by Cliff,” namely, the premises in question,) is virtually
incorporated in Cliff’s bond, and would give effect to it as a de
mise for five years.
Neither the form of the instrument nor the form of the words
would appear to be material, if the intention of the partie_s to create
a demise is sufficiently signified. The rule is thus laid down in
Bac. Abr. Tit. Lease K. :—
“ Here it may be laid down for a rule that whatever words are
“ sufficient to explain the intent of the parties, that the one shall
■“ dvdesl himself of the possession, and the other ciniie into it for such
“ a determinate time, whether they were in the form of a license,
“ covenant, or agreement, are of themselves sufficient, and will in
“ construction of law amount to a lease for years, as effectually as
“ if the most proper and pertinent words had been made use of for
“ that purpose.”
As to the form of the agreement in this case we have the autho
rity of Lord Mansfield in Collins v. Collins, 2 Burr. 226, that the
condition of a bond is an agreement binding the parties, and one, a
specific performance of which, will be enforced. There is also a
very strong and recent case in 3 Bing. N. C. 508, where Tindal,
C. J. referring to the recital of an agreement in the condition of
a bond, quotes with approbation the words I have just repeated
from Bac. Abr. as the production of Ch. Baron Gilbert, and adopts
the principle there laid down—Wilkinson v. Hall.
That it was the intent of the parties that Duncan should occupy
the land until the 1st May, 1829, by which time the w’hole purchase
money was to be paid, is, I think, clearly manifested by the instru
ments by them respectively executed on the 1st May, 1824.
But I can find nothing in the instruments extending the relation
of landlord and tenant beyond that period; at that time the lessor
•was to give to the lessee “ a sufficient warranty deed” of the pre
mises, if the purchase money were paid, or his bond would be for
feited ; if not paid, any legal right in Duncan to retain the property
ceased. Beyond this period the law would not imply any other
tenancy than that of tenancy at sufferance, except the lessee re
mained in possession by the express or tacit consent of the owner.
As no tenancy then after the 1st of May, 1829, is provided for in
the original agreement of Cliff and Duncan, if any such is to be
implied, the implication must be built on matters occurring at or
after
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after that period. Before however that time arrived other events
took place to which I will now refer, as they appear to me to have
a material bearingjon the case.
John Cliff died in September, 1«25, having by his will, duly
executed and bearing date subsequent to the agreement with Dun
can, devised the premises in question to his wife, Sophia Cliff, for
life, and after her death to the lessors of the Plaintiff in fee.
Whatever legal estate John Cliff had, passed by this devise, and
we have to enquire what that estate was. It was this—
The reversion consequent on the term granted to Dunpan. This
reversion then on the death of Cliff, became vested iij Sophia Cliff
for her life, and in the lessors of the Plaintiff after her death.
At the termination of the five years tenancy the Defendant was
in possession, holding under an agreement made with Duncan, and
there is no doubt he remained in possession with the assent of Sophia
■Cliff, and therefore may fairly be considered as tenant at will to
her.
On the 28th June, 1831, by indenture of bargain and sale duly
acknowledged and recorded, Sophia Cliff conveys the premises in
fee to the Defendant.
This conveyance could not certainly operate to the extent in
tended, and could pass no more than Sophia Cliff's life estate to
the Defendant, but without doubt it terminated any tenancy at
will. That a tenancy at will cannot co-exist with any greater
estate there is a strong authority in 2 Lev. 88, and Raym. 224—
Dinsdale v. Iles.
In March, 1835, Sophia Cliff died, and the remainder to the
lessors of the Plaintiff took effect in possession. It is not pretended
that any thing occurred by which a tenancy at will was created
between them and the Defendant, or that any such existed by
which they would be bound, unless created by the original agree
ment between Cliff and Duncan. On the facts of this case I can
not conceive that a tenancy at will existed at all before 1st May,
1829, and that even if such were in the original contemplation of
the parties, and not merely resting on the assent of Sophia Cliff, it
terminated with her conveyance of June, 1831, and would not re
vive at her death against those in remainder without their assent.
If Duncan or the Defendant, at the time of bringing this action,
be tenant at will, he must be tenant at will to the lessors of the
Plaintiff, which I think he cannot be for want of assent. There
is no assent of the Plaintiff’s lessors, and so far from an assent in
the Defendant, that he sets up the deed of Sophia Cliff to support
his present possession against them, they claiming not under her
but by the same title with her. Something was said at the argu
ment of her being guardian in socage to her children, but this she
could not be for they do not claim by inheritance but devise;
moreover
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moreover the estate devised is not the same which would have de
scended to them, therefore they could not claim by descent. Could
the Defendant in law be considered as having a better right than
Sophia Cliff and her heirs ?
immediately on her death the right of entry accrued to the re
maindermen, and as is said in 6 Cruise. Dig. 9, quoting Co. Litt.
“ The freehold is in the devisee before entry, and he may enter
without the assent of the heir of the devisor. If heir of devisor
enters devisee may bring ejectment.” “ It is clear,” says Lord
C. J. Abbot, in 6 B. & C. 116, “that a devised interest vests in
the devisee before entry.”
In considering this case I have treated the Defendant as identi
fied with Duncan; no particular rights are claimed for him as dis
tinct from the Defendant; indeed there is no doubt he abandoned all
his interest to the Defendant and delivered up the possession to him
and though the assignment might not be valid within the Statute of
Frauds, he, the Defendant, made the payments to Sophia Cliff on
his own account, and was treated by her as standing in Duncan’s
shoes.
Duncan it appears is dead, and there is no person representing
him in these transactions but the Defendant; I cannot therefore
think he is in a situation to set up any possessory right in the heirs
of Duncan (if any there be) against his, the Defendant’s, own acts;
r.o such had been claimed.
On the whole then I come to the conclusion, that in law the
Defendant had no defence to this action, and that the ground on
which the nonsuit proceeded, namely, an existing tenancy at will
in Duncan, or those claiming under him, cannot be supported.
The enforcement of a specific performance of a contract for the
conveyance of land is a matter clearly for the cognizance of a
Court of Equity, for the principles which wmuld govern there obvi
ate the difficulties suggested in the argument as to the persons
entitled to receive the money from Duncan. By the contract one
person is appointed to receive the money, and another to convey
the fee in case of the vendor’s death. The contract being made
and subsisting at Cliff’s death Equity treats the whole as personalty,
and will consider the money as properly paid to the executrix
(though she may have to account to the legatees,) and direct a
conveyance of the fee. Be that however as it may, we can only
deal with legal rights, and I am very sorry to be obliged to say !
cannot find in the Defendant even a scintilla of legal interest at the
time of bringing this action.
Chipman, Ch. J.:
At the trial I was governed by the position laid down in general
terms in the cases of Right v. Beard, 13 East. 210, and Doe v.
Jackson
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Jackson, I B. & C. 448,—that the possession of a purchaser un
der an agreement to sell was lawful; and I considered the same
doctrine as applying to the present case, in which Duncan had
transferred his possession to the Defendant. The Defendant’s pos
session also, it seemed to me, must be deemed lawful, and that he
could not be treated as a trespasser and turned out, without this
lawful possession being determined by a demand upon him to give
it up. I did not closely consider the nature of the legal estate,
which passes to a purchaser so let into possession, and the late
cases of Ball v. Cullimore, 5 Tyrr. 753, & 2 C. & M. 120; and
Doe d. Gray v. Stanion, 1 Tyrr. & Gran. 1071, and 1 M. & W.
691, were not then brought to my notice. These cases establish
that a purchaser so let into possession has, at law, the estate of a
tenant at will, and thia not by virtue of the agreement, which is
available only in a Court of Equity, (unless it contains matter
which operates as a grant of a legal estate,) but by virtue of the
act of letting him into possession. The legal estate which so passes
being that of a strict tenancy at will, is attended with all the inci
dents of such a tenancy, as well with regard to the circumstances
which put an end to it as otherwise. This is a doctrine which
will have a very extensive and important influence in this Pro
vice, where it is so common a practice for purchasers to be put into
possession under agreements, without conveyances of any legal
estate. Such purchasers can have recourse only to a Court of
Equity for remedies under their agreements, and it is for this,
among other reasons, most fortunate that an efficient Court of
Equity is at length established. In the present case I concur in
the view taken by Mr. Justice Parker, of the agreement contained
in the condition of the bond, that it created an estate for years,
and that, at lawr, all right to the possession ceased on the expira
tion of the term so created. I am also now satisfied, that even if
this had been merely the common case of a purchaser let into pos
session under an agreement, not containing a grant of any legal
estate, the rules of law relatingto estates at will wouldhave applied
to it, and that the circumstances given in evidence shewed that
such a tenancy at will would have been determined before this
action was brought, and on this ground also I am now of opinion
that a demand of possession was unnecessary, and that the nonsuit
was wrong.
Rule absolute for a new trial.
The Solicitor General, for Plaintiff.
Wilmot ty Kerr, for Defendants.
SHAW v. WILSON, AND ANOTHER.
f n an action of debt for the penalty of an arbitration bond, in which the
Plaintiff assigns as the only breach the non-payment of a certain liquidated
sum
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sum awarded by the arbitrators to be paid t< him by the Defendant, a set
off may be pleaded; and such set off is pleadable to the sum so awarded,
and not to the penalty of the bond.

The Plaintiff declared in debt upon an arbitration bond,
and set out for breach the non-payment of a certain sum of
money which the award of the arbitrators had directed to be paid
by the Defendant. The Defendant pleaded a set off, to which
there was a general demurrer and joinder thereto, which, coming On
to be argued last Term,
Kerr, in support of the demurrer, contended,—That as this was
a bond within the Statute 8 & 9 Wm. 3, c. 11, and not conditioned
for the payment of a certain sum, a set off could not be pleaded—
Hutchinson v. Sturgis, Willes 261 rtthat in debt on arbitration
bond the Plaintiff must assign a breach under 8 & 9 Wm. 3, c. 11,
although the measure of damages be ascertained by the award—
Welch u. Ireland, 6 East. 613 ; 2 Chit. Stat. 875, Tit. set off.
(Note)—Howlett v. Strickland. 1 Cowp. 56 ; that as the Act of
Assembly,‘6 Wm. 4, c. 14, s. 21, allows interest to be assessed on
debts payable at a specified time, and as a jury might give iuterest
by way of damages, it would necessarily follow that the demand is
uncertain and not a subject of setoff. In Hardcastle <>. Netherwood,
5 B. & Al. 93, the Court held a set off not sustainable because the
Plaintiff might be entitled to recover special damages. That as
the Court can only look at the bond, which shews a subsisting debt
of £600, and the Defendant’s off-set is only £200, u is clear that
the lesser sum can be no answer in law to the larger one—Wood
ward v. Robinson, 1 Str. 306. That the Plaintiff’ was not bound
by the particular sum stated in the declaration.
[Chipman, Gh. J.—He certainly is, he has set out the specific
sum due, and it is a matter of proof on both sides. Such a posi
tion would require the Defendant to traverse the penalty, which the
Statute renders unnecessary.]
That the Defendant should have stated the set off to have ac
crued subsequent to the award. But that, as a note of hand, paya
ble before the award made, was one of the items of the Defendant’s
set off, it followed as a matter of course that the award barred all
claim thereon, by which the plea was rendered bad in part, and
being bad in part was bad in the whole.
Berton, contra, urged that the award having ascertained the real
amount due, and being set forth in the declaration, the Plaintiff had
thereby rendered it strictly a debt to which a set off might be
pleaded. That even if the argument of the learned Counsel were
sound in considering the note of hand as barred by the award, still
the Defendant’s off-set being divisible and there being other items,
the consequence of the whole plea being bad would not follow;
besides the fact of the note of hand being an existing debt after the
award
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aw rd maderei.ia" ed to be proved upon issue joined; non. constat.
but it was indorsed subsequently to the making of the award.
Curia advisari vult.
At this Term the Court gave judgment as follows:—
Chipman, C. J.:
This appears to me to be a very clear case. The question raised
upon this demurrer is in effect whether a set off can be pleaded to
an action upon an arbitration bond where the award is for the pay
ment of money ; and that question depends upon this, whether the
award in such case in legal contemplation constitutes a debt, for it
is to c ases of mutual debts alone that the Provincial Statute of set
off applies. This Statute, 26 Geo. 3, c. 18, which embodies the
provisions of the two English Statutes, 2 Geo. 2, c. 22, s. 13, and
8 Geo. 2, c. 24, s. 4, in the second section, provides as follows:—
“ Tha by virtue of this Act mutual debts may be set against each
other, either by being pleaded in bar or given in evidence on the
general issue in the manner hereinbefore mentioned, notwithstand
ing that such debts are deemed in law to be of a different nature,
unless in case where either of the said debts shall accrue by reason
of a penalty contained in any bond or specialty ; and in all cases
where either the debt for which the action hath been or shall be
brought, or the debt intended to be set against the same hath ac
crued or shall accrue by reason of any such penalty, the debt
intended to be set off shall be pleaded in bar, in which plea shall be
shewn how much is truly and justly due on either side, and in case
the Plaintiff shall recover in any such action or suit, judgment
shall be entered for no more than shall appear to be truly and
justly due to the Plaintiff, after one debt being set against the other
as aforesaid.” The Defendant has framed his plea according to
the provisions of this Act, and if the cause of action stated in the
declaration will admit of a set off, the plea is a good one Now
that an award for the payment of money constitutes a debt, and is
not, as contended on the part of the Plaintiff, in the nature of un
liquidated damages, appears evidently from the circumstance, that
an action of debt will lie on such an award. It is the better course
however, as stated by Bayley J. in the case of Ferrer i?. Owen, 7
B. & C. 427, in all cases to declare on the bond and not on the
award. But in either case the substantial cause of action is the
debt arising from the award, by which the sum “ truly and justly
due” to the Plaintiff, which the Statute requires to be set forth in
the plea, is ascertained. Another objection was, that one of the
debts claimed by the plea to be set off is a note of hand given by
the Plaintiff to a third person, and by him indorsed to the De
fendants, which note became due before the submission to arbitra
tion. But the answer to this objection is, first, that there are other
debts alleged in the plea and claimed to be set off, and secondly,
that
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that with respect to all the debts mentioned in the plea it would
be matter of proof, if issue were taken on the plea, whether they
were existing debts at the time when the action was brought, and
any debt that was merged in the award could not be deemed an
existing debt at the time of action brought. For these reasons I
am of opinion that upon this demurrer there should be judgment
for the Defendants.
Botsford, J. concurred.
Parker J.:
I cannot find any express decision on the main question in this
case, though the reason of the act respecting setoff seems clearly to
apply to an action like the present, in which the Plaintiff, although
he sues for the penalty of the arbitration bond, yet himself sets out
the only breach of the condition of that bond, which is the non
payment of a liquidated sum awarded to him by the arbitrators,
anti for the recovery of which an action of debt would have lain,
wherein without doubt the Defendant might avail himself of his
set off.
The objections which have prevailed against the allowance of a
set off in the several cases on the subject do not seem applicable to
the present: to take them in order—
Willes 261, Hutchinson v. Sturges—“ To an action on a bond
conditioned for appearance of Defendant in the Palace Court at
Westminster, there cannot be a set off. Willes, C. J. said the
Statute applied to mutual debts, that this was not a bond condi
tioned for the payment of money, but a bail bond sued in the name
of the officer.”
Cowp. 56, Howlett v. Strickland—“ To an action of covenant
for damages, Defendant cannot plead by way of set off that the
Plaintiff had committed breaches of the covenant by which he had
sustained greater damage than the Plaintiff had sustained.”
Both demands here were for unliquidated damages—Lord Mans
field said—“ The Act of Parliament and the reason of the thing
relate to mutual debts only, these damages are no debtsand
Aston J. addsclearly an unliquidated demand or uncertain
damages cannot be set off.”
6 T. R. 488, Weigall v. Waters—“Uncertain damages by reason
of covenants in the lease cannot be set off to an action of covenant
for the rent.” Lord Kenyon said—“ one objection to the plea isthat
it does not set off any certain debt, but uncertain damages.”
5 M. & S. 439, Grant v. Royal Ex. Assurance Company—Cove
nant on a policy of Insurance in which the Plaintiff claimed the
whole amount of the policy. The Defendants averring that a less
sum was due, which they set out, pleaded thereto a set off. To
this plea the Plaintiff demurred. Lord Ellenborough—“ What
liquidation has there been of the loss ? The question must go to a
jury
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jury to ascertain the quantum of loss. The Defendants assume to
cut down the demand according to their own estimate of it. Why
is the Plaintiff to be obliged to abide by the liquidation ?—it seems
to me that this is a case of unliquidated damages.” For that rea
son mdgment was given for the Plaintiff.
3 Camp. 329, Hutchison v. Reid—When goods are sold to be
paid for by a Bill of Exchange at a given date, these cannot be a
set off to an action for not giving this bill, brought within the time
at which the bill would fall due.
Lord Ellenborough said—“ If the action had been commenced
after the two months had expired, the set off must in his opinion
have been permitted ; but there was no debt when the action wai
brought, which isforarefusaltodo a collateral act. The Plaintiff’s
demand is for unliquidated damages to which a set off is clearly in
applicable.”
In Colson v. Welsh, 1 Esp. N. P. C. 377, which was special
assumpsit for not paying over money pursuant to agreement, Lord
Kenyon rejected a set off for the like reason, saying the Declara
tion was not for a debt but for damages for breach of an agreement
and that the Statutes of set off went only to cases of mutual debts.
5 B. & A. 93, Hardcastle v. Netherwood—Special assumpsit for
not providing money to pay bills which Plaintiff had accepted for
Defendant’s accommodation, nor indemnifying Plaintiff, by reason
whereof the Plaintiff was obliged to pay the holders of the bills
certain sums of money, with interest, charges and expenses.—Plea
(among others) set off and demurrer thereto.
The Court, on the authority of Auber v. Lewis, E. T. 1818,
cited Man. N. Pr. Dig. 261 (2d edition), decided that the contract
declared on might entitle the party to recover special damages ; the
Statutes of set off do not apply though no special damage be
alleged. Here the jury might possibly give damages for the man
ner in which Plaintiff had been forced to pay the amount of the
bills. The Defendant might perhaps have pleaded a set off to that
part of the count which charges the Defendant with amount of ac
ceptance paid by Plaintiff.
In all these cases the great objection was that these were not
mutual debts, but uncertain or unliquidated damages. Some of
the J udges it is true say rather broadly that unless the bond is a
money bond it cannot be the object of set off, but the expressions
so used are to be taken with reference to the cases then before
them, and are much qualified by the observations which accompany
them. Graham B. in a case in the Exchequer—Gillingham v.
Haskett, reported in 13 Price, 434, and M‘Clel, 198, lays down
a rule which will reconcile the authorities—•“ This not being a
money bond the particular sum due upon it must have been found
and liquidated before a party could be entitled to set off a cross
demand against it.”
There
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There the bond was conditioned to re-in vest Stock, and the ex
act measure of damages could not be ascertained without a jury,
as it depended on the market value of the stock, which was fluc
tuating from day to day ; and the Court considered a plea of set off
inapplicable, and an issue joined thereon immaterial.
Ilullock B. after referring to the Statutes of set off said—“Still
they must be mutual debts, and then the question in all cases of
this sort is, whether when a demand is made both that and the sum
claimed to be due on the other side soifght tol to be set off against it
are such as to constitute mutual debts.” Ide adds, “ it is true the
primary question in the case is, whether this isa money bond, for
if it be not the plea of set off is bad,—on that point the case of
Hutchinson v. Sturgis is conclusive.” The case in Willes, as is ob
served in a note of the reporter, and as the decision itself plainly
shews, did not go any such length. It was the case of a set off to
a bail bond.
In the case before us mutual debts existed, and the exact sum
recoverable by virtue of the bond is ascertained and liquidated be
fore action brought, and set out on the Plaintiff's own declaration.
The effect of the Statutes of set off as declared by Lord Mans
field in Collins v. Collins, 2 Burr, 820, is to make stoppage equi
valent to payment. That was the case of a set off pleaded to an
action on a bond conditioned for payment of an annuity, and his
Lordship in delivering the judgment of the Court, after referring to
the Statute 8 & 9, W. 3. c. 11, proceeds as follows :—
“ Before this Statute the actual payment of money in discharge
of the demand was exactly upon the same foot as the set off is now
put upon, and a plea of payment of a sum of money sufficient to
discharge the whole demand was just the same then as d* set off of
a debt large enough to balance the whole demand is now, that is
to say, it was a full answer to the Plaintiff’s demand, and he could
have no judgment at all against the Defendant. * * * *
But the payment here intended was to be an actual payment.
For stoppage or setting o^’debt against debt was not then equiva
lent to actual payment; but cross actions must at that time have
been brought for the respective mutual debts Since these two
very beneficial Acts of 2 G. 2, c. 22, & 8 George 2, c. 24.^stop
page or setting off'of mutual debts is become equivalent to actual
payment, and a balance shall be struck as in equity and justice it
ought to be.”
The Defendant in the case before us might certainly have
pleaded payment of the sum awarded, and if so why not set off?
In Fletcher v. Dyche, 2 T. R. 32, a sum payable under the
condition of a bond by way of stipulated damages for the delay in
performance of work and labour, was held to be the proper object
of set off, because the amount was not uncertain, but had been
settled and liquidated.
In
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In Brick v. Depeyster, 4 Camp. 385, Gibbs, C. J. extended the
remedy beyond the previous decisions, for he held that a Plaintiff
should not deprive the Defendant of his set off by declaring
specially, and assigning a breach for not accounting when the
money might have been recovered as money had and received.
On full review of all these cases and the remedial nature of the
Act, I quite concur with the rest of the Court in thinking that a
set off was properly pleaded in the present case.
I see no weight in the two other points made at the argument.
The penalty of the bond, so far as regards set off, is not to be
considered the debt, but the debt is the sum actually due by virtue
of the condition ; and if the subject matter of the set off has al
ready been taken into consideration by the arbitrators, this may be
shewn at the trial.
The demurrer is to the whole plea, and whatever may be said
as to the promissory note, which would certainly seem to have
been held by the Defendants at the time of the submission, and
therefore properly within the submission ; there are other demands
w’hich may have accrued subsequently, and the general demurrer
cannot therefore be sustained.
Judgment for the Defendants.
Kerr, for Plaintiff.
Berton, for Defendants.

MTCHAELMAS TERM, 2nd Victoria.
1838.

CIEWBltAL K11H.
SUMMARY ACTIONS.

It is Ordered, That in future in Summary Actions tried at
Nisi Prius, a copy of the Plea, instead of the original Plea, may be
filed in the Court of Nisi Prius as a part of the Record.

IN THE

SECOND YEAR OF THE REIGN OF VICTORIA.
QUEEN v. APPLEBY.
This Court by virtue of the Commission under which it was constituted
may exercise the same jurisdiction in regard to the discharge of estreated
recognizances in this Province as the Court of Exchequer does in England,
under the Statute 33 Hen. 8. c. 39.—[Per Chipman, CT J., Botsford and
Parker, J. J. ]
The Court has a general discretionary power under the Statute to examine
into the sufficiency of the reasons alleged in excuse, and to discharge upon
motion the recognizance of a party making default in appearing for trial at
a Court of Oyer and Terminer, and to stay proceedings instituted upon
such recognizance iu this Court. The grounds of excuse contained in the
affidavits read upon motion in this case are sufficient to bring the case
within the Statute. Per Chipman, C. J., and Botsford, J. Dissentiente—
Parker J. as to the extent of the power conferred by the Statute, and the
propriety of exercising it in the present case.

THIS was an application made in Michaelmas Term last for
relief from the payment of a forfeited recognizance which had been
estreated into this Court from a Court of Oyer and Terminer holden
at Gagetown, in the County of Queen’s in March, 1838. Pro
ceedings had been instituted by the Attorney General on the re
cognizance by Scire Facias.
The application was made upon the following affidavits:—
Benjamin Appleby, of the Parish of Wickham, in the County
of Queen’s, Farmer, maketh oath and saith, that at the last Court
of Oyer and Terminer held for the said County of Queen’s in the
month of March last, this deponent, together with Isaac Appleby
and William Appleby appeared under recognizance to answer to a
charge preferred against this deponent and the said Isaac Appleby
and William Appleby, of having set on fire a Wood Boat belonging
to one Isaac Barnes and Benjamin Barnes, and of having stolen
sundry articles therefrom; that a Bill of Indictment was found
against this deponent and the said Isaac and William Appleby ;
that for eight weeks or thereabouts previous to the Sitting of the
said Court this deponent was an invalid, confined the principal part
of his time to his bed, and incapable of moving therefrom without
assistance ; that at the time of the Sitting of the said Court this
deponent
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deponent was still confined to his bed, and was taken therefrom
and laid upon a sled to be conveyed to the Court; that this depo
nent was much harassed and his mind deeply affected by the
charge made against him, and removed from the quiet of his home
to the bustle of a crowded lodging house, this deponent was inca
pable of collecting his ideas or acting for himself in any way ; that
he was advised by his Counsel that the evidence which was
detailed to him was wholly insufficient to support the charge, and
that this deponent and the said other Defendants must be acquitted
on the trial; that many persons attending the Court, actuated by
friendly motives in some instances, and in others by curiosity, and
in some as deponent believes by hostility, sought to converse with
deponent, and detailed to him very exaggerated statements of the
evidence in support of the prosecution, until this deponent, worried
in his mind and weak in body, believed that he was the victim of a
conspiracy determined to sacrifice him if possible, and being wholly
unable from bodily and mental weakness to combat with the reports
so industriously circulated, but subdued and broken down by what
he thought a determined persecution, this deponent, without ad
vising with his sons, the said Isaac and William Appleby, left
Ga^btown and got upon a sled and was conveyed about nine miles;
that this deponent there remained concealed and absent from the
Court, and thereby forfeited his recognizance. That the trial of
the said Isaac"Appleby and William Appleby took place, and they
were wholly acquitted and discharged; that the sons of this
deponent sought for this deponent and found him and surrendered
him to gaol, and afterwards upon application to his Honor Judge
Carter, an order was obtained to admit this deponent to bail, and
this deponent is now under recognizance to appear to answer to the
said indictment at the next Court of Oyer and Terminer for the
said County of Queens. That proceedings have been taken by
the Attorney General against this deponent, and also against
James Gilchrist and Lewis’M'Donald, to recover the amount of
their recognizance; that is to say, from this deponent the sum of
two hundred pounds, and from each of his bail the sum of one hun
dred pounds,—a copy of the process served upon the deponent is
hereunto annexed. And this deponent saith, that he is wholly
innocent of the charge preferred against him, and that he was in
fluenced not by a sense of guilt, but by the causes before mentioned
operating upon a mind weakened by long illness, in leaving and
absenting himself from the Court as above mentioned. This depo
nent is now fifty-two years of age, he was born and has always
resided in the County of Queens, near to his present residence;
he has been married nearly thirty years, and has a family of ten
sons and daughters, and until the making of the charge before men
tioned no offence of any kind against the laws was ever at any
time
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time made against tliis deponent, nor was this deponent ever en
gaged even in a civil suit. That this deponent has always
obtained his livelihood by farming, he owi^Stlie farm where he lives
containing eight hundred acres of land, and all the property he
possesses has been gained by patient industry, and now, unless the
proceedings against this deponent and his bail are arrested, the
property of this deponent must be sacrificed, as this deponent is
unable otherwise to discharge the same.
George F. S. Berton, of Fredericton, Barrister at Law, maketh
oath and saith, that he was retained as Counsel to defend the above
named Benjamin Appleby and one Isaac and William Appleby, at
the last Court of Oyer and Terminer held for the County of Queens,
on a charge of setting fire to a Wood Boat and of stealing articles
therefrom. That this deponent made diligent and careful inquiry
into the facts, and advised the parties that the evicjencg was so
loose and vague that they must be acquitted ; that the said Ben
jamin Appleby was at the time exceedingly weak and miserable,
and when called on his recognizance before the bill of indictment
was preferred, was brought on a sled from the Inn to the Court;
he and his sons stated to this deponent that the said Benjamin Ap
pleby had been for a long time confined to his bed, and had been
removed therefrom to be brought to y'ourt; that the said Benjamin
Appleby frequently sent and sought for this deponent to detail to
him statements of what he had been informed would be proved on
the trial, but the accounts were generally so absurd that this depo
nent paid little attention to them, and advised the said Benjamin
Appleby not to listen to such stories. That this deponent was
surprised to hear of the flight of the said Benjamin Appleby, and
verily believes that it was occasioned by nervous excitement, —that
being weak and miserable in health his mind became oppressed
and unable to bear up against the reports in circulation on the sub
ject of the charge against him, and this deponent believes that the
sons of the said Benjamii Appleby were ignorant of the flight of
their father, and they expressed their apprehensions to this depo
nent that he had destroyed himself. And this deponent saith that
the evidence for the prosecution was so insufficient that this depo9 nent would not enter into any defence, and the prisoners were ac
quitted, and His Honor, Mr. Justice Carter, in directing the jury,
told them he did not think there was sufficient evidence before
them to justify the hanging of a cat. And this deponent further
saith, that the said Benjamin Appleby did not appear when called
on his recognizance, and therefore on motion of the Solicitor Gene
ral, who conducted the prosecution, the said recognizance was
ordered to be estreated. And this deponent further saith, that
he first heard of the absence of the said Benjamin Appleby
from Lewis M'Donald, one of the bail, who thereupon desired
b2
to
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to surrender the said Isaac and William Appleby, and the bail
were permitted to do so. And this deponent further saith, that
there did not appear any cause of suspicion that either the bail or
the sons of the said Benjamin Appleby had connived at the depar
ture of the said Benjamin Appleby.
The Court, having taken time to consider, delivered their
opinion this Term.
Chipman, Ch. J.:
This recognizance has been estreated into this Court as the Pro
vincial Court of Exchequer, possessing, by the express terms of the
Commissions to the Judges, the powers not only of the Justices of
either Bench, but also those of the Barons of the Exchequer in
Westminster Hall.
For a description of the Court of Exchequer as a Court for the
recovery of the King’s debts, I refer to the following extract from
an opinion given by Lord Redesdale in the House of Lords in the
case of Watt and others v. the Attorney General—11 Price, TOO:
“ The original proceedings” says his Lordship “being by the com
mon process of the Court of Exchequer for the purpose of recover
ing debts due to rhe Crown the first question is from what side of
the Court that process issued. It issued from a Court which is a
Court of Record at Common Law, constituted for the purpose of
the recovery of the King’s debts. * # * Under the Act of King
Hen. 8, which was made for the relief of the subject, he was enti
tled, on any equity whatever, either to plead that equity, if it could
be received in theform of a plea at the Common Law. If it could
not be so received then he was entitled to have the benefit of it by
what is called an English hill, that is by an application by petition
to the Court, the same Court of Exchequer, but not to the same
branch of the Court of Exchequer', but still to the same Court with
this difference only, that as in in the Law Court of the Exchequer
the Barons Are the Judges, so, in what is called the Equity side of
the Court, the application is to the Chancellor and the Barons.
But the result would be that upon such an English bill he would
be afforded relief if he should be in a condition to prove, to the
satisfaction of the Court, that he was entitled to it. This jurisdic
tion of the Court of Exchequer is laid down with great clearness
by Sir Edward Coke in his fourth Institute, ch. 2. He describes
the Court from which the writ of extent Issued as a Court of Re
cord, constituted for the recovery of the King's debts, as described
by one of the most ancient writers on the subject, Britton Fol. 2, b.
who is supposed to have lived about the time of Edward the First
or Second. It if rather uncertain at what time he lived, but his
work is supposed to have been written in the reign of Edward the
First. He describes this Court of Exchequer as a Court of Com
mon Law and Record, touching the King's debts,—in the old
French,
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French,—' de choses que touchent lour office a oier et determiner
touts les causes que touchent nous dettes.” Now my Lords, of
this Court of Record as a Court of Common Law, the Barons of
the Exchequer are the sole Judges, as laid down by various autho
rities.”
The recognizance now in question has been brought into this
Court as the Court corresponding to the Law branch of tlie Court
of Exchequer in England, for the purpose of process being issued
upon it in the ordinary course of proceeding at Common Law. A
Scire Facias has accordingly been issued and the party has applied
for a discharge of the recognizance upon motion supported by affi
davits. The Crown officers did not resist the application, but
doubts were expressed from the Bench as to the power of the
Court.
1 shall in the first place er uire into the nature and foundation
of the jurisdiction which the Barons of the Exchequer in England
exercise in cases of estreated recognizances. I find this jurisdic
tion treated of with great particularity by Mr. Price in his “ Trea
tise on the Exchequer,” a book, which contains the most systematic
and detailed account of the constitution, powers and various offi
ces of the Court of Exchequer I have any where met with.
Mr. Price, in page 375 of this book, states as follows :—“ As
soon as the estreats are once recorded in this Court, the Barons of
the Exchequer have exclusive jurisdiction in respect of them, as
being from thenceforth under their authority and controul as part
of the King’s certain or determined revenue, for which the Sheriff’s
become accountable before them. That jurisdiction is exercised
on the one hand in judicially enforcing the collection and payment
for the Crown, and on the other, in discharging or mitigating and
compounding the respective charges on the part of the subject.
It is said that this latter part of the jurisdiction of the Barons was
first (1) committed to their discretion by the Stat, of 33 Henry 8,
c. 39, ss. 55, 60, 61, 62. By that Statute the Lord Treasurer, Chan
cellor and Baron of the Exchequer, were given power and autho
rity, (in the words of Sir Edward Coke, 4 Inst. 118,) to discharge,
cancel and make void all and singular recognizances and bonds
made to the King for payment for any debt or sum of money orfor
performance of conditions <jc. upon shewing the acquittance <&p.,
or any proof made of payment and performance. Also to cancel
and make void by their discretion all recognizances made for ap
pearance, or other contempt. And see Sec. 79, permitting parties
to plead in their discharge. Until the passing of that Act, conse
quently, it seems to be considered that the Court of Exchequer
could not of their own authority, discharge such recognizance and
bonds, even though the subject could shew to the Court on his be
half matter which would oe in law a plea in bar, as an acquittance,
of
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or payment of the money on performance of the condition, without
the especial authority of the King’s writ, or his express command
ment, under the great or privy seal. In the Treatise of Chief
Baron Gilbert also, p. 191, it is said—‘ By 33 Hen. 8. c. 39, the
Court of Exchequer have power to discharge all debts and duties
due to the King upon any Equity disclosed, &c.; and it is by virtue
of this Act that they discharge recognizances, and it seems by the
same Act that they may discharge penal laws, (q. penalties) made
before this Statute, but no penal law made after the Statute can be
discharged but must be compounded. At the present day, what
ever may have been the origin of this extensive discretionary
power of the Barons, it is more explicitly and definitely established
from time to time by “ express (general) commandment” of the
Crown issued regularly. At the commencement of every reignsince
that of Queen Elizabeth, inclusive, therAhasbeen issued, as matter
of grace, a writ of privy seal dormant (as it is termed) empowering
the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, the Treasurer, Chan
cellor and Barons of the Exchequer, and the Attorney General, to
“ discharge, mitigate, lessen or compound the forfeiture of recog
nizances,. (penalties, fines, issues and amerciaments, and other
sums in the nature of recognizances &c. estreated into the Court of
Exchequer" from any other Court or Commissioners) “ according
to the truth or equity of each respective case, by narration in open
Court." A third source of authority in tlie Barons xii respect of
that part of the Green Wax, which is derived from certain forfeited
recognizances is given by an Act of Parliament passed in the
fourth year of the late reign “ for the more easy discharge of re
cognizances estreated into the Exchequer."1 The Barons are
thereby expressly empowered to discharge by order, upon affidavit
and petition to be presented to them, any poor and ignorant per
sons imprisoned or liable to be imprisoned under the Exchequer
process, on the forfeiture of any recognizances estreated against
them “ for not appearing as parties or witnesses at the Courts of
Record at Westminster, or at the Assizes and General Quarter
Sessions, or other Courts of Record, or for not prosecuting indict
ments there, or otherwise not performing the conditions, and that
without any quietus."
To that part of tlie foregoing extract which states that the juris
diction in discharging recognizances, was first derived from the
Stat. 33 Hen. 8, c. 39, Mr. Price adds the following note:—
“ This however may well be doubted, although it appears
from the very early records that discharges were generally founded
on the authority of the King’s writs, yet it also appears that the
Treasurer and Barons discharged charges without express authority,
and that long before the reign of Rich. 2d. As has been before
observed, the King’s name and authority, and even the Legislative
enactments,
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enactments, appear to have had for object the exaction of a duty
(in some cases perhaps of a doubtful nature),' and not the creation
of a new authority.”
And with regard to the Statute 4, Geo. 3, c. 10, Mr. Price adds
the following note :—
“ The authority given to the Court of Exchequer by this
humane Statute, worthy the auspicious commencement of a long
and prosperous reign, should perhaps he considered a^pmounting
to somfething more than a mere power conferred on the Barons. It
may even be not too much to regard the Statute as a direction to
the Court to discharge all persons in such cases where the applicant
is poor and ignorant and in prison. The* Court had alreacly the
power to do so by the Statute of ffenhy 8, and also by the privy
seal dormant; and that power they had bedn constantly and un
ceasingly exercising in practice when this Act passed, as appears
from frequent instances in the Minute and Order Books.”
It is thus seen that Lord Coke and Lord Chief Baron Gilbei-t,
names of theWery highest authority, attribute the jurisdiction of
the Court of Exchequer in discharging recognizances altogether to
the provisions of the Statute, 33 Hdn. 8, d. 39. Mr. Price indeed
refers to the w r.t of privy seal dormant, as one source, but only as
an additional source, of this authority.
In Ashe’s case, as reported in llardres 334, in the reign of
Charles II. the authority of the Court in this respect is expressly
put upon the same Statute. That case is there reported as fol
lows :—“ Mrs. Ashe hiid obtained of the King a privy seal, whereby
was granted to her the forfeiture of certain recognizances for ap
pearing at the Sessions, amounting in the whole to <£800, and it
w s made a question whether the Court might compound those
forfeitures by virtue of their privy seal, which was before the privy
seal and grant to Mrs. Ashe ? And it was doubted whether this
latter privy seal did not take away and revoke the powers given to the
Court in this particular: but it was clearly held per C&riam that
the Court might, upon good matters in equity discharge these
debts by virtue of the Stat. 33 Hen. 8, c. 39.” And a composition
of the recognizance was accordingly made upon the facts of the
case.
There is a subsequent notice of the same case in page 395 of
the same book, in the case of Whitehill v. Attorney General, Ashe
and others, as follows:—“Upon an English bill to be relieved
against the forfeiture of a recognizance for not appearing at the
gaol delivery of Newgate, the forfeiture having been granted over
by privy seal, and the Barons here having compounded for it after
the privy seal granted, and the grantee prosecuting upon the re
cognizance, notwithstanding it was doubted whether the forfeiture
of such a recognizance be within the Stat. 33 Hen. 8, c. 39, for
relief
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relief n Equity against the King: and whether this composition
made by the Barons by vfirtue of their privy seal be a good com
position, being made1 after the privy seal granted to Ashe &c.
But becau^ the privy seal granted to iXslie &c. misrecited the
date of the Sessions at which the recognizance was taken nihilinde
factum fuit. But the Bill was dismissed, and the composition
made by the Court confirmed.”
Here it is true, that the reporter states the former proceeding of
the Court in cjoiilpounding the recognizance, as having been founded
upon the writ of privy seal. But if the point depended on this
case alone, I should certainly be inclined to rely upon the original
report as containing the most correct account of the opinion of the
Court.
We find in the most modern times that the Barons of the Exche
quer still ascribe to the Stat, of Hen. 8, the authority which they exer
cise in this respect I refer to the cftSd of ex-parte Williams, reported
in 8 Price’s Exchequer Reports, page 3. The marginal note of the
case by the feporrer is as follows : — “ This Court has jurisdiction
over recognizances entered into under the 28 Geo. 3. c. 52, (pro
viding for petitions against undue return's of Members of Parlia
ment) upon their being certified into the E"xchequerby the! Speaker
of the House of Commons, upon the report of the Select Committee,
and in a case of sufficient merits they will interfere to discharge
such recognizance so entreated upon a summary pplication by
rule to shew cause.”
The learned Barons in giving their opinions in this case, express
themselves as follows:—“Richards, Lord Chief Baron—‘■'•The
generaljunsdictioii''tn cases of this sort is founded on the 33 Hen.
8, c. 39, and unless there be any thing in the 28 Geo. 3, c 52, or
the 53 Geo. 3, c. 71, which takes away that jurisdiction, there is
no doubt that the Court may interfere in this case if satisfied that
the application is founded on sufficient merits.”
Graham, Baron— ‘ The recognizance being once brought here,
the jurisdiction of the Court over it attaches.”
Wood, Baron—“ The question is not whether this recognizance
has been forfeited or not, but whether we have a right to relieve
the party; I think we have that right under the 33 Hen. 8. and
that the 28 Geo. 3, does not affect it.”
Garrow, Baron—“ Tlie Speaker is obliged to return the recog
nizance here, and if this Court has not jurisdiction to relieve the
party in a fit case it would be a lamentable thing, as a man in con
sequence might be imprisoned for life ; and to tell him he might
bring an action would be absurd.”
Per Curiam.—Rule absolute (for vacating the recognizance on
the merits of the application.)
These authorities are quite sufficient to satisfy my mind that the
Barons
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Barons of the Exchequer in England consider themselves as acting
under the provisions of the Stat. 33 Hen. 8, when they dispense
relief in cases of estreated recognizances. But to complete the
view of the subject it will be well to refer to the Statute itself.
There are two sections of the Statute under either of which, it
seems to me, this jurisdiction may be supported, viz. the 62d and
79th sections. The 62d section runs as follows :—
“ And be it further enacted, by the authority afoi esaid, that the
same several head officers for the time being, in every of their said
several Courts (intent alias the Court of Exchequer) shall have full
power and authority to discharge, cancel, or make void, by his or
their discretion, all and singular recognizances now made or here
after to be made in the said Court, for any appearance or other
contempt; and that the same head officer or officers, and the par
ties so bounden and to be bounden, to be discharged against the
King our Sovereign Lord, his heirs, executors and successors, for
the cancellation ol the same recognizance.”
This clause of the Statute, it is true, is in terms confined to re
cognizances made in the respective Courts to wdiich authority is
gi' en to .vacate them. But as it is a .remedial law it is, according
to a very common rille of construction, to extend the benefit of the
Act to cases which are within the same mischief though not within
the words. The clause therefore may well be held to apply to re
cognizances estreated into the Court of Exchequer, as well as to
those made in the Court. Lord Coke, in the passage above quoted
by Mr. Price, evidently refers to this Section of the Act as giving
the general power to the Court of Exchequer to cancel “at their
discretion recognizances for appearance or other contempt.”
The 79th section of the Act is as follows : —
“ Provided always, and be it enacted by the authority aforesaid,
That if any person or persons\ci whom any such debt or duty is,
or at any time hereafter shall be demanded or required, allege,
plead, declare or shew, in any of the said Courts, good, perfect and
sufficient cause and matters in law, reason or good conscience, in
bar or discharge of the said debt or duty, or why such person or
persons ought not to be charged or chargeable to or with the same :
and the same cause or matter so alleged, pleaded, declared or
shewed, sufficiently proved in such one of the said Courts as he or
they shall be impleaded, sued, vexed or troubled for the same;
that then the said Courts, and every of them, shall have full power
and authority to accept, adjudge and allow the same proof, and
wholly and clearly to acquit and discharge all and every person
and persons that shall be so impleaded, sued, vexed, or troubled
for the same ; any thing in this present Act before mentioned to
the contrary- notwithstanding.”
Here there is a general power given to the Court to discharge any
person
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person from any debt or duty upon good cause in law, reason or good
conscience, alledged, pleaded, declared or shewn. The matter of
fered in discharge must be sufficiently proved, but the manner of
shewing and proving such matters is not prescribed, and why may
it not be by pleading, or by a summary application on the Common
Law side of the Court, in cases in which the practice of this branch
of the Court admits of these modes of proceeding, as well as by
English Bill on the Equity side of the Court ? This is evidently
the view taken of this part of the Statute by Lord Redesdale, in
the case of Wall v. the' Attorney General, above referred to.
This also being a remedial provision of the Statute must have an
extended and liberal construction.
The doubts which have been expressed on this subject appear
to have originated in what is said by Mr. Price, in a note to the
case of Pellow’s recognizance in the 13th volume of his reports,
page!'.‘102. Mr. Price there states as follows :—“There can be no
doubt, however, that whenever a recognizance becomes on?e
estreated into the Exchequer, that Court has jurisdiction over it.
The Statute 4 Geo. 3, c. 10, has given the Court of Exchequer
only a 1 nited authority to discharge estreated recognizances ; for
that Statute appears both from the recital to the preamble and the
enactment, to be confined to the cases of poor persons imprisoned
ordiablS to be imprisoned’, in other words such persons as are inca
pable of paying the amount. But the great source of the general
authority is a writ of privy seal which is issued at the commence
ment of every reign, by virtue of which the Court is fully empow
ered in their discretion, according to the equitable circumstances of
each particular case, generally to compound, mitigate, or discharge
estreated ivcAgnizances.”
“ It will be observed, however, that the writ recites the existence
of doubts-as to the power of the'Xiowrt to do this without the Royal
authority, and therefore the Crown gives them jurisdiction as a
matter of grace in ease of the subject.”
There is indeed no reference in this note to the Statute of 33
Hen. 8, but even if Mr. Price’s^opinion were alone to govern the
point, his distinct and repeated ascription of the jurisdiction to the
Statute of Henry 8, in his Treatise on the Exchequer, which I
have quoted so much at large, would be conclusive. In one of the
notes which I have before quoted he seems inclined to go further,
and to consider this jurisdiction as inherent in the Barons of the
Exchequer without the King’s writ, and antecedent to the Statute.
Upon the whole I cannot entertain any doubt that the Statute
33 Hen. 8, c. 39, does confer full authority upon the Court of Ex
chequer to afford relief upon recognisances estreated into that
Court. There is also no doubt that the clauses of the Statute
N which I have above referred to must be considered as extending to
this
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this Province. It has already been expressly decided by this
Court, in the case of the King v. M'Laughlin, Michaelmas Term, t
1830, that the 50th Section of this Statute which raises bonds to
the King to the rank of debts of record, does so extend as being ap
plicable to our Colonial condition. Those clauses of the Statute
which are remedial in favor of the subject, are at least equally ap
plicable.
It remains to enquire upon what side of the Exchequer it is that
the Barons in point of fact exercised the jurisdiction we are speak
ing of.
It seems to me indisputable that this jurisdiction is exercised on
the Common Law side of the Court. The estreats are brought
into and remain in the appropriate office for revenue matters on
that side of the Court, viz. in the office of the Lord Treasurer's
Remembrancer, from which office it is that the Common Law pro
cess upon estreats is issued, and in which it is that orders for vaca
ted recognizances are made up. Whereas the proceedings on the
Equity side of the Court are all conducted in the office of the
King's Remembrancer. For these positions I again refer to
Price’s Treatise on the Exchequer. The several cases which I
have before cited, viz. Ashe’s case, Hardres, 334, Williams’ case,
8 Price, 3, and Pellow’s case, 13 Price, 299, are reported as having
occurred on the Common Law side of the Court. The same re
mark applies to Bick’s case, 6 Price, 102, Dibbin’s case, Parker,
165, and to the case of Muilman and another, Parker, 241, in
which last case the party defended by plea to an estreated recog
nizance.
Whether the jurisdiction, in matters actually relating to Crown
debts, which is exercised on the Equity side of the Court of Ex
chequer, in proceedings on which side of the Court it seems that
the Chancellor of the Exchequer is still deemed and named as one
of the Judges (Price’s Tre. of Exch. 39, Wall and others v. the
Attorney General, 11 Price, 700,) can be exercised by this Court,
it is not necessary now to consider. There could never be any
pretence for this Court holding the jurisdiction which the Court of
Exchequer in England, either On the Common Law or Equity side,
exercises by fiction, in cases between subject and subject.
It seems to me to be clear that the matter with which we are
now dealing would, by virtue of the Statufe 33 Hen. 8, c. 39, be
within the jurisdiction of the Barons of the Exchequer in England
sitting on the Common Lau> side of the Court, and therefore, I
conceive, without any question, falls within our jurisdiction by vir
tue of our Commissions as Judges of this Court
I feel great satisfaction that the careful and anxious attention
which I have bestowed upon this subject has conducted me to this
result, because it is in unison with the conclusion to which this
c2
Court
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Court came upon a similar question, although without all the light
now before us, in the case of the estreated recognizance of Morse
and Nevers, decided in Easter Term, 1826, and because I consider
it to be a most beneficial authority for us to possess, and in the
words of one of the Barons in Williams’ case, “ it would be quite
lamentable if we were without it.”
The affidavits upon which this application is founded are as fol
lows: \here His Honor stated the substance of the affidavits.]
These affidavits in my opinion make out a case fully sufficient for
the Court to exercise its discretion in granting the relief prayed
for upon payment of all cost incurred by the Crown in this matter,
and upon this condition 1 am of opinion that the recognizance
should be vacated.
Botsford, J. concurred.
Parker, J.:
After the strong opinion expressed by His Honor the Chief Jus
tice on so thorough a research and full consideration, and the con
currence of Mr. Justice Botsford therein, it is with reluctance and
diffidence that I venture to state my dissent from the conclusion
to which they have arrived in this case.
I do not, 1 must confess, feel myself embarrassed by the former
decisions of this Court, which have been alluded to by His Honor,
for they were given without argument or opposition, and certainly
without any notice of the privy seal which has been for so long a
period granted by each successive Monarch to the Court of Ex
chequer in England, and under which I conceive relief, in most of
the cases which have occurred, to have been afforded.
At the establishment of this Court, combining as it may do the
Common Law jurisdiction of the Barons of the Exchequer as well
as that of the Justioes of either Bench at Westminster, we find the
Court of Exchequer exercising a power over recognizances estreated
into that Court, and two sources are referred to for that power,
namely, the Statute of Henry 8, and the writ of privy seal dormant,
issued at the commencement of each reign from the time of Queen
Elizabeth.
Now admitting that the Court may exercise the power granted
to the Barons of the Exchequer by the Statute of Henry 8, and
may grant relief by discharging recognizances in proper cases, on
motion made on the Common Law side of the Court, I cannot
think the present case falls within the meaning of the 79th Section
of the Statute, under which part of the Act alone it appears to me
the Court interferes on recognizance estreated from other Courts.
That Section does not provide for any mitigation or compounding
of the penalty, but simply gives power to the Court to acquit and
discharge, where “ a good, perfect and sufficient cause and matter
in law, reason or good conscience, is alleged, pleaded, declared or
shewn
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shewn in bar or discharge of the debt or duty, or why the party
ought not to be charged or chargeable to or with the same, the
same cause or matter so alleged, pleaded, deelared or shewed
being sufficiently proved in the Court in which the party shall be
impleaded, sued, vexed, or troubled for the same.”
The writ of privy seal goes farther, and gives express power not
only to discharge, but to mitigate or compound where a case for
such relief is made out in equity and good conscience, and makes
particular reference to recognizances estreated into the Court of
Exchequer, and provides for relief on petition as well as suit.
In many of the cases cited from the Exchequer Reports, and
especially in that styled Mrs. Aslie’s case, in Hardres, the Court
clearly proceeded under the privy seal, and it is rather doubtful
whether that was not considered the real source of authority in the
other cases.. The only instance I can find where it distinctly ap
pears that relief was granted upon the Statute, independently of
the privy seal, is recited in Price’s Ex. Pr. 381, in the time of the
Protectorate, where, to a recognizance estreated from the Sessions,
there was a plea under the Statute shewing an impossibility for
the Defendant’s appearing, he being imprisoned in another place.
At this period we may presume no privy seal was in existence,
and the matter in bar or discharge would be certainly good in reason
and good conscience, if not in law
It is stated distinctly by Mr. Price, in the note to Pellow’s case,
“ that the great source of the general authority of the Exchequer is
the writ of privy seal, by virtue of which the Court is fully em
powered in tlieir discretion, according to the equitable circum
stances of each particular case, generally to compound, mitigate or
discharge estreated recognizances.”
In 2 Ch. Gen. Pr. 397, treating of the Court of Exchequer, it
is said in a note quoting from Man. Ex. Pr. Appx. that the
writ of privy seal which is issued ex gratia at the commencement
of each reign, allowing the parties to apply in a summary way to
the Court of Exchequer to compound or discharge any fines, issues,
amerciaments and recognizances, according to the circumstances
of each case is the source of the jurisdiction of the Court to hear
motions on these subjects.
No one can, I think, carefully examine the cases w'hich have
occurred, without feeling that there has been no disposition in the
Court to enlarge the remedy under the Statute, and I cannot hear
of any case where the Courts in any of the other Colonies have
acted under it so far as to discharge a recognizance.
These considerations, although they certainly ought not to pre
vent the Court from giving effect to the Statute in a case brought
properly before it, and supported by sufficient proof, yet suggest
caution in the application of the law to cases which would seem more
fit
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fit objects for the g/ace and favour of the Crown to mitigate,
than the exercise of a judicial discretion to discharge the penalty
incuri ed.
I have carefully examined the affidavits on which this motion
Las been made, and supposing that the proof is sufficient of the
facts which have been alleged, yet the grounds laid for the dis
charge of the recognizance do to my mind appear wholly insuffi
cient.
Here is the case of a person committed to prison on the charge
of a capital felony, and let out on bail, coming to the Court at
which a true bill is found against him and two others by the Grand
Jury, and voluntarily going away so as to avoid being tried, and
making his appearance again after a trial of the two others had
resulted in an acquittal, with a strong opinion of the learned Judge
as to the insufficiency of the evidence
For the Court to declare that these affidavits contain good, per
fect and sufficient matter in law, reason, or good conscience for the
discharge of this recognizance, appears to me, I must confess,
rather dangerous.
I should feel more reluctance in declining to interfere if the De
fendant would, in such an event, be deprived of all relief; but that is
not the case, he my still apply in the proper quarter for the inter
position of the prerogative. The grace and favour of the Crown
are not withheld or denied, although we may not be the dispensers
thereof.
It is not, moreover, at all essential to the exercise of our judicial
functions that we should possess this power, and there may have
been very good reasons not applicable to us for giving it to the
Court of Exchequer in England, concerned as it is in man y fiscal
matters which do not at all fall within the province of this Court.
If it is thought advisable that we should possess it, a writ of privy
seal might have issued, or a legislative enactment passed similar to
that lately made in England relative to recognizances at the
Sessions.
For these reasons I am unwilling to interfere in the present case.
Rule absolute for vacating the recognizance
upon payment of costs.

THE QUEEN v. 162 PIECES OF WHITE PINE TIMBERThomas E. Perley—Claimant.
On motion for a prohibition to the Court of Vice Admiralty,—Held that
that Court has jurisdiction under the Statutes 8 Geo. 1, c. 12, and 2 Geo. 2,
c. 35, to entertain a suit in rem. instituted by the Crown against Pine
Timber seized as cut on Crown Land without licence, and to proceed to
adjudge the forfeiture and condemnation thereof, although there has been
no prosecution for the pecuniary penalties imposed by the said Acts on per
sons cutting or carrying away the same. A prohibition was accordingly
refused.
IN
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In Michaelmas Term last, a rule was obtained on behalf of the
claimant, calling on the Advocate General to shew cause why a
prohibition should not issue to the Court of Vice Admiralty of this
Province, to prohibit it from holding plea of the matters there de
pending in a suit«instituted for the forfeiture and condemnation of
certain white pine timber, seized by officers of the Crown under
the Statutes 8 Geo. 1, c. 12, and 2 Geo. 2. c. 35.
The rule was moved for by Street and Berton, on the grounds
that the timber in question was cut within the body of a County,
and that the Court of Vice Admiralty had no ordinary jurisdiction
in such a case, and that the Statutes above mentioned gave juris
diction to the Judge of the Admiralty only in proceedings to recover
the penalties thereby imposed on persons cutting or carrying away
the white pine trees growing on Crown Land; or that at all events
if that Court had jurisdiction as to the question of property it could
only be incidentally in the proceeding for the penalties.
It was urged that this Act, giving jurisdiction to the Judge of
the Admiralty, was a very great abridgment of the right of the
subject in depriving him of a trial by jury, and should be construed
strictly, and that it could not have been the intention of Parlia
ment that the right of property in timber, as between the Crown
and an innocent holder or purchaser, should be tried in any other
than the ordinary tribunals of the country.
There were no express words in the Acts giving the jurisdiction
now claimed for the Admiralty, and the power of Inferior Courts
ought not to be extended by implication.
Affidavits were read stating the facts relied on, and shewing the
proceedings in the Court below; these are however so fully de
tailed in the learned and elaborate judgment of the Judge of the
Vice Admiralty Court (the Honorable W. B. Kinnear,) that it is
unnecessary here to repeat them. The minutes of that judgment,
as furnished by the learned J udge himself, are as follow :—

Court of Vice Admiralty, New Brunswick,
Friday, tlie 31s£ day of August, 1838.
The Queen v. 65 pieces containing 112 tons White Pine Timber,
Thomas E. Perley, Claimant;-—and against 47 pieces contain
ing 75 tons Whitft Pine Timber, Richard Ketchum, Claimant.
In these cases monitions were issued, founded on proper affidadavits, and after their return Mr. Berton appeared for the owners,
under protest, objecting to the jurisdiction of the Court, on the
ground that the alleged cause of seizure of the timber having arisen
within the body of the County of Carleton, in the Province of
New Brunswick, this Court has no jurisdiction therein, but is con
fined to matters arising on the High Seas, and out of the bodj of
any County. On which, the Advocate General having joined
issue,
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issue, the question arose for the decision of the Court, and is now
decided on this point, viz, whether the Statute 8 Geo. 1, c. 12,
s. 5, gives jurisdiction to this Court to proceed in this or in any
case to the condemnation of timber seized as having been cut on
Crown Lands within this Province without the Royal licence, con
trary to the provisions of that Act, and a subsequent one of the 2d
Geo. 2, c. 35, p. 714.
It is on the one hand admitted by Mr. Berton, that such con
demnation may perhaps necessarily follow when there is a convic
tion for the penalties duly proceeded on, but denied that the Act
authorizes a direct proceeding against the timber. On the other
hand the Advocate General admits that unless the first mentioned
Act confers the authority, there is nothing in the law which sanc
tions it. The jurisdiction therefore of this Court must stand or fall
upon the terms, or a legal construction of the terms of the Act.
The first clause of the Sth Seg^ion expressly clothes the Court
with jurisdiction over the person of any individual who may in
fringe its provisions, with full power to proceed to sentence and
execution against him for heavy penalties; but the Etter part of
the Section which declares the forfeiture of the timber, neither
mentions the Court before which the proceeding is to take place for
condemning the property seized, nor gives any directions concern
ing it.
A doubt then naturally arises, and it seems has for many years
existed, whether the Court of Admiralty can exercise jurisdiction
for any thing arising out of the Act but a proceeding for the
penalties.
Now it is laid down in Cornyns Dig,, 7th vol. Tit. Pari. 318,
(R. 10, 6,) “ that every Statute ought to be construed according to
the intent of the Parliament.” And in another place under the
same head, “ not according to the letter, but according to the in
tent.” And further, “in the construction-of Statutes the ends
contemplated are to be considered.” And under head of R. 11,
“ the preamble is a good means for collecting the intent.” So the
ground and cause of the making of a Statute explains the intent.
In the same book R. 22, it is also stated that a Statute made
for the benefit of the King shall be construed most beneficially for
him; as the Stat. J7th Ed. 2d de Proear Regis, which says, that
the King shall have the ward of his tenant seized in fee, extends to
his tenant seized in tail.
It is at the same time to be distinctly kept in view as a general
principle of Law, that a penal Statute is to be construed strictly,
but a remedial Statute beneficially.
Under the head of R. 21, in the same book, it is laid down, that
a penal Statute may also be a remedial one—1 Wils. 126 ; and a
Statute may be penal in one part and remedial in another part—
Doug.
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Doug. 702; which last case is very strong and clear on this
point.
Taking these authorities with us let us see whether the intent,
scope and object of the Act was or was not to give to the Court of
Admiralty jurisdiction as well to proceed directly to the condem
nation of timber seized, contravening its provisions, as to a suit for
the penalties.
The preamble shews the object of the Act to be the preservation
of white pine trees in the Colonies for the masting of the Royal
Navy, an object confessedly of great general and public benefit.
Then the intent, of the proceeding, so far as the seizure and con
demnation of the timber extend, was evidently not to disturb any
British subject in the enjoyment of his property, but to protect the
property of the Crown against a wrong doer, which, it is agreed,
might be done m a Certain way by the ordinary course of Law ;
and as the rights of the Crown are for the benefit of the whole body
politic, it can scarcely berurged that additional sanctions ought not
to be made for the accomplishment of so beneficial an object, sanc
tions which in fact have surrounded and guarded the fights of the
Crown from the earliest period of the British Constitution. Can it
reasonably be doubted then that the whole design of the Act was
to add to the Common Law remedies of the Crown, and to throw
obstacles in the way of the trespasser on Crown Lands by penal
ties, and by casting the onits probctridi on the trespasser, and by
giving a more summary method of proceeding against the property
illegally obtained than could be had in the Courts of Common Law ?
I certainly am unable to construe this Act in any othdr way.
From some of these considerations also we may very safely infer,
in accordance with one of the rules of Law already stated, that the
latter part of the Sth Section of the Act is decidedly remedial,
while at the same time it is as freely admitted that the proceedings
in the former part of it against the person are highly penal.
The latter part then beiilg remedial and in favor of the King is
entitled to a most liberal and beneficial construction, a construction
which could not by any means be bestowed on the penal part, so
that were the clauses of the Section in fact reversed, by the very
same rules which are now adopted to expound this Act as being
intended to authorize this Court to condemn timber seized on a
proceeding direct for the purpose,UI should feel myself obliged to
hold there was no jurisdiction in the Court to proceed for the
penalties.
Would it not also appear very extraordinary that by one Section
of an Act authority should be given to a Court, which proceeds
out of the course of the Common Law to convict a party for the
heaviest penalties and suffer sentence to be passed on him, extend
ing not merely to his property but to the imprisonment of his person
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for a length of time, and much of that time at the discretion of
the Judge; and yet use words in the very same Section which
were not intended to sanction a proceeding by the same Court for
the condemnation of property, which by the very Act or sentence
itself must be considered the property of the Crown, and is but the
resumption by means of a Court of what had been wrongfully, ille
gally and unjustly taken from the Crown?—Would not such a
construction amount to this—you may proceed for the penal part
of the Act before a Court where only a single Judge presides, and
where there is no jury; but for the remedial part you must apply
to a Court composed of four Judges, who, with a jury, will mete
out the justice which the case requires? In the one Court the
alleged owner will require you to prove that he has taken the
King’s property, and may succeed in defeating the rights of the
Crown under the shield of that difficulty, at the very time perhaps
that he has failed in shewing in the other Court that the property
is in any other party than the Crown, and has been sentenced ac
cordingly.
It was objected in argument to such a construct’on as that con
tended for by the Advocate General, that the latter clause of the
5th Section did not enact but merely declared such timber &c. to
be forfeited. It does not however appear to be material in what
form an Act is made, if the intent is apparent—7th Com. Dig. 314,
(R. 3.) The words “It is hereby declared that all logs&c. shall
be forfeited and seized,” appear to me to mean the same thing as,
“ It is hereby enacted,” the usual words in an Act not declarative
of the Law. The first expression proclaims to be law what the
second decrees or establishes.
It was also asked, could such a proceeding, grounded on a seizure,
take place after the six months, the time limited for prosecution on
the penal part of the Act—could it even be before that time ? I
answer, the Act evidently distinguishes between the infliction of
a penalty for the wrongful Act, which because it is so highly penal
must be proceeded in within six months, and the case of tlie pro
perty seized, as cut contrary to the Act, which it declares to be
absolutely forfeited. And if a time were limited for proceeding to
procure its condemnation it would even compel the giving up of
any quantity of timber seized although clearly with n the Act,
when by some accidental delay or late seizure, the case could not
be brought before the Court within six months after the offence
committed.” Besides, if the timber should have been wrongfully
seized and the officer does not proceed to its condemnation, an
action of Trespass or Trover will lie against him which will speedily
bring the point to issue.
In deciding this day against tli'e protest, and in favour of the
Turisdiction of this Court, had I felt far less satisfied than I do feel
of
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of the correctness of the conclusion to which I iiave come, I should
still have hesitated very long indeed before I could have brought
my mind to believe that the judgment of such eminent men as the
late Lord Eldon, Chief Baron M‘Donald, and Lord Stowell, when
holding high official situations at the English Bar, together with
two other Counsel, given in 1792, in answer to a question proposed
on this very point, in favour of that conclusion, could be erroneous.
Had it been a decision by either of them as a Judge, this issue
would not have been joined. Had the opinion contained the rea
sons on which it was founded, this lengthy discussion might not
have been necessary. It runs emphatically as follow’s:—
“ Case.—Whether the Vice Admiralty Court of Nova Scotia is
competent to try the legality of seizures made in pursuance of the
Sth Geo. 1, c. 12, s. 5.
Opinion.—We think the seizure may properly be tried in the
Vice Admiralty Court of Nova Scotia, and that it ought to be
proceeded upon in that Court.
Signed,
Wm. Scott,
Alex. M‘Donald,
J. Scott,
Wm. Battino,
Thomas Brodrick.”
For these reasons I feel myself bound to over-rule the protest,
and assign the party Defendant to appear absolutely.
W. B. KINNEAR,
Judge of the Vice Admiralty.
The Solicitor General and Wright, Acting Advocate General,
here shewed cause, and supported the judgment of the Court be
low in favor of the Jurisdiction, contending that it had been exer
cised without dispute for the last forty years in this Province ; and
had been expressly sanctioned by the Crown Lawyers in England,
even of the first eminence and highest character.
That by the Common Law the property in all trees is in the
owner of the land. That all timber in the forests belongs to Iler
Majesty, and the said Statute declaring all timber cut without
licence to be forfeited, the onus of proving licence was necessarily
thrown upon the party claiming. That Parliament^ by giving a
power to the Crown which it had not before, plainly intended
thereby to relieve the Crown of that onus which, if proceedings
wrere had in a Court of Common Law, would have remained .
and to effect this, created by the said Statute a new jurisdiction in
the Court of Vice Admiralty.
J. A. Street, in reply, urged the objections made on obtaining
the rule, and contended that the Crown should have proceeded first
in personam for the penalties before proceeding in rem.—Bac.
Abr. Tit. Court of Admiralty; Kent’s Com. 375.
d2
That
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That it was a new question, and although similar proceedings
may have taken place before, yet this was the first time the objec
tions had been raised; and the former practice, if erroneous, could
not influence the present decision.
That it was a case in its effects of the utmost importance, and
the Court ought to consider well before they gave such a construc
tion to an Act of Parliament as was not called for by its terms,
and would so materially abridge the rights of the subject.
Before the close of the Term the Court gave Judgment.
Chipman, C. J.:
In this case a rule nisi for a prohibition to the Court of Vice
Admiralty was obtained at the last Term. The question depends
upon the 5th Section of the Statute of 8 Geo. 1, c. 12, which is as
follows: —
“ And whereas the Laws already made, and still in force, for
the preservation of White Pine Trees in His Majesty’s Colonies of
New Hampshire, the Massachusett’s Bay, and Province of Maine,
Rhode Island, and Providence Plantation, the Naraganset Country
or King’s Province, and Connecticut, in New England, and New
York and New Jersey, in America, for the masting the Royal
Navy, have been found insufficient for that purpose, so that a fur
ther provision is necessary to be made therein : And forasmuch as
there are great numbers of White Pine Trees, fit for masting the
Royal Navy, growing in Ills Majesty’s Province of iNova Scotia,
in America, Be it therefore enacted by the autlioi ty aforesaid,
that from and after the twenty first day of September, one thou
sand seven hundred and twenty two, no person or persons within
the said Colonies or Plantations of Nova Scotia, New Hampshire,
the Massachusett’s Bay and Province of Maine, Rhode Island and
Providence Plantation, the Naraganset Country or King’s Pro
vince, and Connecticut, in New England, and New York and
New Jersey, in America, or within any of them, do or shall pre
sume to cut, feil or destroy any White Pine Trees, not growing
within any Township, or the bounds, lines or limits thereof, in any
of the said Colonies or Plantations, without His Majesty's Royal
licence for so doing first had and obtained, on pain that every per
son so cutting, felling and destroying such Pine Trees, or who
shall be aiding and assisting therein, or in draining away such
Pine Trees after the- same shall have been so cut, felled or de4 siroyed, shall for every such offence forfeit and pay the several
and respective sums following, that is to say, for every White Pine
Tree of the growth of twelve inches diameter and under, at three
foot from the earth, the sum of five pounds ; for every such Tree
from twelve to eighteen inches dia meter, the sum of ten pounds ;
for every such tree from eighteen inches to four and twenty inches
diameter, the sum of twenty pounds; and for every such tree from
four
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four and twenty inches diameter and upwards, the sum of fifty
pounds; which several penalties and forfeitures shall and may be
sued for within six months after the offence committed, by plaint
or information upon the oath of one or more credible witness or
witnesses, before the Judge of the Admiralty or his deputy, within
the 'Colony or Plantation where such Pine Tree shall be cut, felled
or destroyed, one moiety of such penalties and forfeitures to be to
His Majesty, lus heirs or successors, the other moiety to the infor
mer who shall sue for the same, and in case any dispute shall
arise whether such Tree when cut, felled or destroyed was growing
within any Township, or the bounds, lines and limits thereof, the
proof shall be upon the owner; and on conviction of such offender
for such offence as aforesaid, if he shall refuse or neglect to pay
the penalty and forfeiture thereby incurred, by the space of twenty
days after such conviction, that then such Judge or his deputy
shall and may, by warrant under his hand and seal, cause the
same to be levied by distress and sale of the goods of the offender,
rendering the overplus, if any be, to the owner; and where no
sufficient distress can be found, such Judge or deputy shall commit
the offender to prison within the Colony or Plantation where such
offence shall be committed, there to remain without bail or mamprize during such time as such Judge or deputy shall appoint, not
exceeding twelve months nor less than three months, or until such
offender shall pay the penalty or sum of money so recovered, and
after such payment made shall likewise find sufficient security for
his good behaviour during the space of three years, to be accounted
from the term of such his conviction; and it is hereby declared
that all White Pine Trees, Masts or Logs made from such Trees,
which from and after the one and twentieth day of September, one
thousand seven hundred and twenty two, shall be found cut or
felled without such licence as aforesaid in any of His Majesty's said
Colonies or Plantations, shall be forfeited and seized for the use
of His Majesty, his heirs and successors, any former law, usage,
or custom to the contrary notwithstanding
The 1st Section 2d Geo. 2, c. 35, was adverted to in the argu
ment, and is as follows:—“ Whereas by an Act passed in the eighth year of His late Ma
jesty's Reign, intituled ‘ An Act giving further encouragement for
the importation of Naval Stores, and for other purposes therein
mentioned, it is enacted, That no person or persons whatsoever
in any of His Majesty's Colonies of Idoa. Scotia, New Hampshire,
the Massachusetts Bay, the Province of Maine, Rhode Island,
and Providence Plantation, the Naraganset Country or King’s
Province, and Connecticut, in New England, and New York and
New Jersey in America, or within any of them, do or shall pre
sume to cut, fell or destroy any White Pine Trees, not growing
within
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within any Township, or the bounds, lines or limits thereof, in any
of the said Colonies or Plantations, without His Majesty's licence
for so doing first had and obtained: and whereas, since the passing
of the said Act, great tracts of Land where Trees fit for Masting
grow, have been, in order to evade the provisions of the said Act,
erected into Townships; Now for the better preservation of White
Pine Trees in His Majesty’s said Colonies, for masting His Royal
Navy, be it enacted by the King’s most excellent Majesty, by and with
the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and
Commons, in. this present Parliament assembled, and by the autho
rity of the same, that from and after the twenty ninth day of Sep
tember next, no person or persons within the said Colonies of
Nova Scotia, New Hampshire, the Province of Maine, the Massachusets Bay, Rhode Island, and Providence Plantation, the Naraganset Country, or King's Province, and Connecticut, in New
England, and New York and New Jersey, in America, or within
any of them, or in any other Province or Country in AmericathM,
now belongs or shall hereafter belong to the Crown of Great
Britain, do or shall presume to cut, fell or destroy any White Pine
Trees, except only such as are the property of private persons,
notwithstanding the said Trees do grow within the limits of any
Township, laid out or to be laid out hereafter in any of the said
Colonies or Plantations, without His Majesty’s Royal licence for
so doing first had and obtained.”
The object of these Laws is the preservation of White Pine
trees on the Crown Lands in these Colonies for public purposes.
To effect this object Parliament has imposed penalties on persons
who cut such trees without licence, and has also expressly enacted
a forfeiture of all trees, masts and logs made from such trees which
shall be found cut and felled without licence. Jurisdiction in re
gard to the penalties is expressly given to the Court of Admiralty.
In respect to the forfeiture of the timber cut without licence the
law is silent as to the Court in which the forfeiture shall be prose
cuted. But it seems to me in “ trying out tlie right intendment”
of this law, as Lord Coke expresses it, to be the fair if not neces
sary implication, that Parliament intended that the Court to which
it had expressly given jurisdiction over the penalties, should as a
part of the same subject matter have power to adjudicate a for
feiture of the timber cut without licence. It was conceded in the
argument that this implication was necessary with respect to any
timber for the cutting of which the personal penalties were pro
ceeded for, but as the Statute expressly creates a forfeiture of all
timber found cut without licence without exception, whether the
penalties for cutting it are prosecuted or not there is no good rea
son for not making the jurisdiction co-extensive with the forfeiture.
It has been the constant course of the Parliament of the Mother
Country
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Country to give tlie Court of Admiralty in the Colonies jurisdic
tion over penalties and forfeitures under the laws of trade and navi
gation, and there is at least equal reason for withdrawing the sub
ject matter of the Statute we are now considering from the popular
tribunal of a jury. It is a far less departure from the privilege of
trial by jury to take away that privilege in mere questions of pro
perty which arise in proceedings in rem for the forfeiture, than in
questions of personal delinquency which the proceedings for penal
ties would involve, and these too, attended with the imprisonment
of the person if not paid. In construing this Statute, even if the
point were more doubtful than I conceive it to be, I should place
great reliance upon the opinion, cited at the Bar, of the eminent
Counsel in England in the year 1792. This opinion is in point of
authority but a degree below that of a judicial decision, having
been given by Crown officers for the regulation of the proceedings
of a public Department. Upon the whole I entertain no doubt that
the Court of Vice Admiralty has jurisdiction over the case in
question, and that the rule for a prohibition must therefore be dis
charged.
Botsford, J. concurred.
Parker J.:
If this were the only instance of the Parliament of the Mother
Country vesting in the Colonial Vice Admiralty Courts a juris
diction more peculiarly belonging to the Court of Exchequer, or if
the practice of the Admiralty Instance Court, in the exercise of its
ordinary functions, were inapplicable to proceedings in rem, I
might entertain some doubt on the question before us ; but as the
reverse is notoriously the case, and as the power of deciding on the
right of property is necessarily incidental to an adjudication of the
penalties, where the penalties are proceeded for, it appears to me
also that the true construction of the Act has been given in the
Court below, and that the question as to the forfeiture of the pine
timber which has been seized as cut on Crown Land without licence
may there be decided.
Rule for prohibition discharged.
Solicitor General and Advocate General for the Crown.
J. A. Street and Berton for the Claimant.

The ATTORNEY GENERAL ex relatione B. ROBINSON, Provincial Treasurer, v. 250 Barrels PICKLED
FISH.
C. M‘Lauchlin, Claimant.
The Act of Assembly 6 Wm. 4, c. 4, s. 4, imposes a forfeiture of all
goods which shall be landed before they are reported at the Treasurer’s office,
anda permit obtained in the manner prescribed in the Act. Held that an
information
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information charging that the goods in question “ were imported and brought
into this Province from the territories of the United States of America con
trary to the Acts of the General Assembly of this Province of New Bruns
wick in such case made and provided,” did not contain a sufficient allegation
of an offence under the aforesaid Act of Assembly, and judgment arrested
on this ground.
This was an information filed by the Attorney General ex rela

tione Beverly Robinson, the Provincial Treasurer, against 250
barrels of Pickled Fish, as having been ’ nported and brought into
this Province from a Foreign country contrary to th? Acts of As
sembly of this Province made and provided, whereby the same be
came forfeited ; to which information the claimant pleaded that
they were not forfeited in manner and form, &c. This issue
came on tobe tried before CHIPMAN, Ch. J. at the Circuit Court in
Saint John in January, 1838, and the jury found a verdict for the
Crown.
In Hilary Term last Parker moved in arrest of judgment, upon
the following grounds,—
1st. That as the importation into the Province of pickled fish
had been prohibited by the Imperial Statute of 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c.
59, s. 7, no duty or regulation could be imposed thereon by any
Provincial Act, and that consequently there could be no breach of
any Act of Assembly ;
2d. That the information does not set forth any specific offence.
The learned Counsel contended that as pickled fish was not
enumerated amongst the dutiable articles in the Provincial Act,
and as the Imperial Statute had prohibited their importation, the
Provincial Act could not be intended as referring in any way to
articles which were mentioned in the said Statute.
The following cases were cited in support of this motion,—2
Haw. Pl. Cr. 309, 312 ; Tidd. Pra. 167-8; Israel v. Middleton,
1 Ch. Rep. 319; Thomson v. Pheney, 1 Dow. Pr. Ca. 441.
Rule Nisi granted.
In Trinity Term last cause was shewn by the Attorney General
and Solicitor General,—
Although the Imperial Act prohibits the importation of pickled
fish, still the 4th sec. of the Provincial Act of 6 Wm. 4, c. 4, (un
der which this proceeding is sought to be sustained) directing that
all goods shall be reported &c. is not contrary to, but in aid of, the
Imperial Statute. That the information is sufficiently explicit,
stating that the articles were imported from the United States
contrary to the provisions of the Act of Assembly, the same Acts
throwing the onus of their being properly imported upon the owner.
That even jf every thing necessary to be proved be not properly
stated upon the information, the verdict will cure the defect, as
every thing will be presumed to have been proved at the trial
which was necessary to sustain the action.

Mansel
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Manseion Demurrer, 162; Lord Raymond,427; 4 Burr, 2020;
Avery v. Hoole, 2 Cowper, 825 ; 2 Vin. Abr. 399 ; Clark v. King
& others, 3 T. R. 147; Macmurdo & othersft Smith, 7 T. R. 518;
Ward v. Harris, 2 B. & P. 265.
Wright, in reply,—
The 60th Section of the Imperial Act which directs the forfeiture
of articles, also points out the perrons who are to seize them, so
also the Provincial Act directs that certain officers are to seize
goods forfeited under it; so that if the Act of Assembly had refe
rence to such articles as were dealt with by the Imperial Act, then
it would follow that two several officers would be entitled to seize
at the same time, which on the score of repugnancy, would clearly
render the Act of Assembly void, even if by a legal construction
it would be said to attach to articles not dutiable.
Curia advisari vult.
At this Term the Court delivered their opinions seriatim.
Chipman, Ch. J.:
In this case the information states that the “ Relator, on tlie
seventh day of July, 1837, did, pursuant to Acts of Assembly &c.,
seize &c. 250 barrels of pickled fish, which were since the first day
of April, 1837, imported and brought into this Province from the
Territories of the United States of America, contrary to the Acts
of the General Assembly of this Province of New Brunswick in
such case made and provided: By means whereof the said 250
arrels &c. have become forfeited &c.”
The claimant pleads that the articles mentioned in the informa
tion are not liable to forfeiture in manner and form as in the infor
mation is alleged.
Upon this plea the Attorney General joined issue, and the jury
have found a verdict for the Crown.
A motion in arrest of j udgment has been made on the part of the
claimant upon two grounds,
1st. That the articles being prohibited from being imported into
this Province by an Act of the Imperial Parliament, the Act of
the Provincial Legislature upon wdiich this prosecution is founded
does not take effect;
2. That there is no allegation in the information of any offence
under the Provincial Statute.
The Act of Assembly upon which the Attorney General founds
the forfeiture in this case, is the 6 William 4, c. 4. and the mate
rial Sections are the 2d, 3d and 4th, which are as follows:—
“ II. And be it further enacted, That all goods subject to du
ties under any Act or Acts of the General Assembly of this Pro
vince, and which have been or shall be imported or brought by sea
or inland navigation, or by land carriage into this Province from any
port or place abroad beyond the seas or out of this Province, or which
being
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being so subject to duties shall be carried and transported by sea
from one port or place within this Province to another port or place
within this Province, shall be and the same are hereby made liable
and subject to the several rules, restrictions, conditions, regulations,
penalties and forfeitures in this Act contained, in respect to such
importation and the payment or security of the duties tlieroon, or the
warehousing the same goods.”
“ III. And be it further enacted, That the Master, Com
mander or person in charge of every Ship or Vessel arriving at
any port or place in this Province shall, within twenty four hours
after such arrival, and before bulk be broken make due report of
such Ship or Vessel to the Treasurer of the Province^ or to the
Deputy Treasurer at or nearest the place of such arrival, under
oath subscribed by him ; and such report shall contain an account
of the particular marks, numbers and contents of all the different
packages or parcels of the goods on board of such ship, and the
particulars of such goods as are stored loose, to the best of his
knowledge, and of the place or places where such goods were
respectively taken on board ; and shall in the same report state on
oath as aforesaid, the name of each and every owner and consignee
of such cargo, and where the same is intended to be landed, and
whether any, and what part thereof, has been landed and taken
from such Ship or Vessel after arriving within the Province ; and
the Master of any Ship who shall fail to make such report, or who
shall make a false report, shall forfeit the sum of one hundred
pounds.”
“IV. And be it further enacted, That the owmer, consignee, or
person entering any goods inwards, (whether for payment of duty
or to be warehoused upon the entry thereof, or forpayment of duty
upon taking out of the warehouse, or whether such goods be free of
duty,) shall deliver to the Treasurer of the Province or to the
Deputy Treasurer, as the case may be, a report in writing by him
subscribed, under oath, of all articles belonging to or consigned to
hi?n on board of such Ship or Vessel; and any part of such cargo
which shall be landed before the report of the Master or Com
mander of such Ship or Vessel, and the report of the owner, or
consignee or other person entering the same, and a permit obtained
from the said Treasurer or Deputy Treasurer, as-the case may be,
for landing the same, such goods, so landed shall be forfeited, and
+he person or persons concerned in concealing such articles, or in
landing them without a permit for that purpose, shall each respec
tively forfeit and pay the sum of one hundred pounds.”
The Act of Assembly 7 W. 4, c. 1, imposes duties, either spe
cific or ad valorem, on all foreign articles imported into the Pro
vince, and under this Act pickled fish imported from a Foreign
Country being a non-enumerated article would be liable to an ad
valorem duty of ten per cent.
Among
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Among the articles prohibited to be imported from any foreign
Country into any of the British Possessions in America, by the
Act of Parliament, 3 & 4, W. 4, c. 59, s. 7, are “ Fish dried or
salted,” of which latter description are the fish mentioned in this
information.
It is contended on the part of the claimant that by reason of this
prohibition, the provisions of the Acts of Assembly above stated,
are not applicable in the present case, and the 56th section of the
Imperial Statute, 3 & 4, W. 4, c. 59, is referred to, which declares
all Provincial laws which are repugnant to an Act of Parliament
to be null and void.
Now the Provincial Statute, 7 W. 4, c. 1, which imposes duties
on foreign articles, does not authorize or justify the importation of
any articles prohibited by this Act of Parliament; it only imposes
duties on articles which are actually imported.
The particular provision of the Provincial lawr which the Crown
relies on, as working a forfeiture in the present case, is the clause
in the 4th section of the 6 W. 4, c. 4, which enacts, that any goods
which may be landed before the reports, required by the Act, are
made at the Treasurer’s Office and a permit obtained from that
Office to land them, shall be forfeited.
The preceding clauses of the Act require that the report, both
of the Master and Consignee shall contain an account of all the
goods on board the vessel, whether liable to, or free of duty without
any exception. As the words of the Act do not make an excep
tion of prohibited goods, so neither do I think that reason or policy
requires us to imply that such goods are excepted from the opera
tion of this provision of the Act. Requiring all goods, even if
prohibited, to be reported at the Treasurer’s Office, does not con
travene the effect of the Act of Parliament which contains the
prohibition, but on the contrary has a tendency to aid the enforce
ment of it, by leading to a discovery of prohibited goods. And
there is no incongruity in the goods being liable to a forfeiture on
the two distinct grounds of idegal importation, and of being landed
without having been reported at the Treasurer’s Office. The right
of seizing and prosecuting for the forfeiture, it is true, is vested in
the two respective cases in different Officers. But no question
arises in this case on a conflict of right between the Officers of the
Customs and the Provincial Treasury. The Provincial Legisla
ture seems to have had an eye to remedying the difficulties which
might arise on this account between the two deDartments, in the
provisions of the 43d section of the Act 6 W. 4, c. 4, which makes
the distribution of the proceeds of goods seized and condemned
under the provisions of any Prov icial Revenue Act, to be similar
to the ^distribution of forfeitures contained in the Imperial Act,
that is to say, one third to the Crown, one third to the Governor,
and one third to the Seizing Officer.
On
e2
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On the first ground therefore, upon which this motion in arrest
of Judgment was made, I am of opinion that it cannot be sustained.
As to the second ground, I take it to be a clear rule of pleading
under penal laws, that the facts which constitute the offence to be
charged, shall be alleged in the Indictment or Information.
(2 Hawk. p. c. 342.) In the present case the fact which con
stitutes the offence, which the Attorney General is actually pro
ceeding for, is, that the goods were landed without having been
reported at the Treasurer’s Office, contrary to the Provincial
Statute, 6 W. 4, c. 4, s. 4, and this is the only ground of forfeiture
to which these goods are liable under the Provincial Laws. The
offence, allegedin the Information, is that they were imported into
the Province from the territories of the United States, contrary to
the Acts of the General Assembly of this Province. Now the
offence intended to be prosecuted, and the offence actually charged
are so entirely different from each other, that I cannot reconcile
them. The importing of goods is one thing; landing them without
having reported them at the Treasurer’s Office is another thing,
which takes place after the fact of importation is complete. In
order to constitute an importation, says Sir W. Scott, in the case
of the Mary (1 Dods, 72,) “it is not necessary that the goods
should have been actually landed. It is sufficient if they are
brought into the harbour with an intention of importing them.”
The allegation in this Information might have been a good mode
of charging the offence of being imported contrary to the prohibition
of the Imperial Statute ; but I cannot admit that it may be substi
tuted for an allegation of the specific fact which constitutes the
offence uuder the Provincial Statute.
But then it is argued if there be a defect in the information, it is
cured by the verdict. The rule on this head, as laid down in 1
Ch. on Pl. 6th Ed. 673, and as supported by the cases cited at
the Bar, is as follows:—“ The expression cured by verdict signifies
that the Court will, after a verdict, presume or intend that the
ticular thing which appears to be defectively or imperfectly stated,
or omitted in the pleadings was duly proved at the trial." Now
under a charge of illegal importation, which would be fully estab
lished by proving the fact of bringing into port with intention to
land, it can never be intended that an actual landing without report
at the Treasurer’s office was proved. The truth is, that this case
does not fall within the rule. It is not an instance of a defective
statement of title, but an instance of a statement of a defective
cause of action or ground of forfeiture, which is never aided by a
verdict,—1 Chit, on Pl. 621. The ground of forfeiture alleged
is the specific fact of importation contrary to the Provincial
Statutes, whereas those Statutes do not contain any prohibition of
importation. “ A verdict” says Lord Mansfield, in one of the cases
cited
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cited at the Bar, (Avery v. Hoole, Cowp. 826,) “ will not mend
the matter where the gist of the action is not laid in the declara
tion.”
On this second ground I am of opinion that the rule for arresting
the judgment must be made absolute.
Botsford J.:
I am of the same opinion.
In Rex v. Holland, 5 T. Rep. 607, which was an Information
filed by the Attorney General against the Defendant, for malver
sations in Office, during the time he was one of the Council in
Madras, it was stated by Mr. Adam in the course of his argument,
that three things ought to concur in every criminal proceeding,
viz.: 1 st. “ that the party accused should be apprised of the charge
he is to defend ; 2d. “ that the Court might know what judgment
was to be pronounced according to Law: and 3d. “that posterity
might know what Law is to be derived from the Record. These
general propositions were assented to by Lord Kenyon, C. J., and
were afterwards recognized as Law by Garrow B. in Rex v. Mor
ley, 1 Y. & J er. 224. In this case it was laid down that a crimi
nal charge should be direct, positive, single, and definite, and
judgment was arrested on the ground that the allegation was in
the alternative, it having been laid in the Information, that the
Defendant had imported, or caused to be imported certain foreign
Silks, &c. So ii the case ex parte Pain, 5 B. and Cres. 251, the
Prisoner having been convicted under the 6 Geo. 4, c. 108, s. 3, it
was held that the allegation although laid in the express words of
the Statute, that the Casks of Wine, “ of the sort or description
used, or intended to be used for the smuggling of Spirits,” being in
the alternative was bad.
From these authorities, it is clear that every criminal charge,
whether by Information or Indictment, should be direct, positive,
single and definite. The Information in the case before the Court
alleges that the Pickled Fish, were imported and brought into this
Province from the territories of the United States of America,
contrary to the Acts of the General Assembly in such case made
and provided; by means whereof and by force of the Act of Assem
bly of this Province, the same became forfeited and liable to con
demnation. Now it is not stated whether they were imported and
brought into this Province by sea, by inland navigation, or by
land; whether they were prohibited, or were liable to duties on im
portation, nor is it alleged under what particular provisions of the
Acts of the General Assembly they became liable to forfeiture and
condemnation.
In the argument it was stated by the Counsel, on the part of the
prosecution, that this Information was founded on the Act
of the General Assembly, (6 W. 4, c. 4,) for a violation of
the

CASES IN HILARY TERM,
the fourth section, in landing the Pickled Fish before a report had
been made, and a permit obtained from the Treasurer or Deputy
Treasurer of the Province for that purpose. It was contended
that this Act did not contravene, but was aiding and subsidiary to
the Act of the Imperial Parliament, Stat. 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 59,
which prohibits the importation of Pickled Fish into this Province.
I am not prepared to say that this is not the case, but I must con
fess that there appears to be some incongruity in proceeding against
a prohibited article, on the ground that the same had been landed,
before a report had been made, and a permit had been obtained for
landing the same.
Parker, J.:
As there is an affinity between the Province Treasurer and
myself, I have not taken part in the deliberations of their Honors
on this case ; but as it is one, which involves questions materially
affecting the Public, I have considered it apart, and may perhaps
without impropriety now say, that [fully concur in the Judgment
which has been pronounced.
Rule absolute for arrest of judgment.
Attorney General and Solicitor General, for Crown
Parker and Wright, for Claimant.
426

DOE D. THOMSON

WIFE,

BARNES

and
v.
When at the time of the execution of a deed of conveyance from A to B
of certain lauds, A is actually disseized thereof, no estate passes to B.
AU the facts which constitute a disseizin should be clearly made out, and
no presumptions should be allowed in favour of a disseizin.
The doctrine of descent cast tolling the entry enures only to the benefit
of heirs and not to strangers.
A demise in the name of husband and wife of the wife’s property, laid
previous to the marrage, is not good.
Where it is doubtful whether certain acts amount to a disseizin or are
m are acts of trespass, or whether the occupation was adverse or permissive,
the question should be left to the jury.
This
Carter,

was an action of Ejectment tried at Charlotte Circuit in
November 1839, before
J.
The declaration contained two demises, one on the 3d of Au
gust 1836, the other the 26th August 1829 ; tli action was brought
to recover a place called Currie's Island, on behalf of the lessors of
the Plaintiff. The original grant of the premises in question to
one John Currie, bearing date 1st June, 1792, was produced, also
a deed poll from the said John Currie to James, John, Patrick,
and Daniel MlMaster, dated the 17th August, 1795, also an in
denture of release and quit claim from Daniel MiMaster, the sur
vivor of the aforesaid grantees, James, John, Patrick, and Daniel,
to John, Charlotte, and Angus Master, children of the said
James M‘Master, deceased, and to James Allanshaw, the Widower
of Janet, another of the children of the said James MlMaster,
deceased
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deceased, bearing date the 20th June, 1824, also a release from the
last mentioned John M'-Master, Angus M‘Master, and James
Allanshaw, to Charlotte M‘Master, dated the 1st September,
1829. Charlotte M‘Master, one of the lessors of the Plaintiff,
was married to Thomson, the other lessor, on the 7th July, 1836.
Patrick M‘Master died in 1798, James M'Master in 1804,
and John M'Master the elder in 1809.
Daniel M'Master diedin 1830. It was proved also, that in the
year 1809, Daniel M‘Master had visited the island and some
fishermen who were there, put some fish into his boat, and that he
was in the habit of calling it his island.
On the part of the defendants it was proved that in the year
1797, one Sprague lived on the island, and built a frame house
and barn, and cultivated sufficient ground to raise provisions for
his family, that he died there, leaving his wife and six children in
possession, that he lived there seventeen or eighteen years, that he
built also a log house on the place, in which one David Laskey
lived two years by permission of Sprague, that Sprague’s family
left the island shortly after his death, that one Joseph Conolly then
went into possession, but under whom it did not appear, not claim
ing it however as his own, that Conolly remained three years in
possession, that after he left one Estey took possession and kept it
for ten or eleven years, that after Estey left, the defendant re
mained in possession, he having been living in part of Estey’s
house previous to Estey’s going away, that defendant has been
there five or six years since Estey left.
It was in evidence also that Estey, in the year 1815, had stated
that the island had been granted to Currie, and was now owned by
ATMaster, and that he (Estey) was going to buy it.
L. A. Wilmot, for the Defendant, insisted at the trial that the
lessors of the Plaintiff had failed in making out their case,—
1st. The second demise was ill, it being laid in 1829, when
Thomson had no interest;
2nd. As there was an adverse possession at the time of giving
the deeds of 1824 and 1829, nothing passed thereby;
3rd. Entry was tolled by descent cast at the death of Sprague,
who died seized.
But His Honor reserved the points and directed the jury that the
Plaintiff’s case was made out, subject to the points reserved ; that
there was no continuous possession sufficient to bar the Plaintiff’s
right; that no adverse possession of twenty years in any one occu
pant was shewn, and no connection or privity between the several
occupants.
The jury found a verdict for the Plaintiff.
Chipman, Ch. J. cited a case where, at the Saint John Circuit,
Simonds, the Plaintiff, was nonsuited, not having proved a posses
sion within twenty years.
In
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In Hilary Term last Wilmot, for Defendant, obtained a rule
m'sz for a new trial, on the several points reserved. There was
also another point mooted as to there being no proof of any entry
within 20 years.
In moving for the rule nisi, Wilmot, in support of his third point,
cited Ad. Ej. 41; Ros. Rea. Pro. 81, 83; 1 Saund. Pl. & Ev.
175, 2 Prest. Ab. Descents Cast; and contended, that as Sprague
had died seized leaving his heirs in possession, the descent tolled
the entry of the Plaintiffs.
[Chipman, Ch. J.—This doctrine is only for the benefit of the
heirs,—you do not hold under the heirs. This does not enure to
the benefit of strangers.]
In Trinity Term, 1838, Solicitor General shewed cause,—
1 he doctrine that a man cannot convey lands when out of pos
session is founded upon the principle that a mere right of entry
cannot be conveyed, but there must be an actual disseizin to bring
a case within the reason of the doctrine. Where there is an ac
tual disseizin it deprives a person of that title which must be
regained before he can convey ; but that does not apply to every
adverse possession, but only to such as works a disseizin, which
must be by tortuous entry and an actual ouster. If one takes pos
session of my estate, not claiming it as his own, his possession
enures to my benefit, unless I allow him to remain 20 years, at the
end of which period I would be barred by the Statute of Limitation,
and not by the original taking operating as a disseizin ; but at
any time within the 20 years I remain seized, unless by some open
and notorious act he sets me at defiance. Sprague’s possession
then could not affect Daniel M‘Masters’ right.
The doctrine in 4 Cruis. 98, cited on the other side, and stating
that a right of entry cannot be assigned is exemplified by the case
of a grantor disseized, and all the authorities on the same point go
upon that principle. The doctrine of disseizin is extensively laid
down by Lord Mansfield, in Taylor v. Horde, 1 Bur. 78 ; a mistake
has crept into the definition of disseizin, by reason of a party’s
right to elect to be disseized, that would make him a disseizor if he
gave notice of his intention.
[Parker, J.—Can a person give livery of seizin, if out of posses
sion?]
At the common Law if he came to give livery and was pre
vented, that would be an ouster and disseizin, but non constat that
such would be the case, and the Law presuming such holding to
enure to the owner’s benefit, the estate would pass by the registry
of the deed, livery of seizin not being necessary ; Doe v. Hartt and
others,—2 Dow and Ry. 38, was a devise of an estate out of pos
session,—3 Price, 575. By the Act of Assembly, 26 Geo. 3, c. 3,
s. 10, the execution and registry of a bargain and sale passes all
the estate, right, title, and interest, of the grantor to the grantee,
and
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and unless in the case of an actual disseizin, the estate would pass
under the Act, and it would not be necessary for the grantor to oust a
person who might be considered as a tenant at sufferance; livery of
seizin is an act of the grantor, but registry of the deed is an act of
the grantee, and so far as the grantor is concerned, the estate
passes by the execution of the deed,—Doe v. Pike and another, 3
Bar. Ad. 738; 3 M. and S. 271, Doe tu Perkins.
Wilmot, in reply, supported the views taken by him at the trial,
and contended that there was a disseizin. That it was evident
from Butler’s note on the case of Taylor v. H >rde, that Lord
Mansfield had founded the doctrine in relat n to election of disseizin
upon false premises,—Co. Lit, 153 b. A party being out of pos
session cannot convey, for that you shall not convey a right of
entry is a clear and common Law principle of universal application :
that Sprague took all the rents and profits, and never recognized
the title of any other person, and having built houses and made
improvements on the property, must be considered as claiming it
as his own, and therefore holding an adverse possession ; that as to
the release of 1829, there was no foundation upon which it could
operate, inasmuch as at the time it was given, B irnes was in the
adverse possession of the premises; that the Plaintiff should have
shewn himself in possession within twenty years which he has
not done.
[Chipman, Ch. J.—The possession would be deemed to be in
accordance with the title, unless you shewed an adverse possession.]
The acts of Sprague and in fact of all the subsequent occupiers,
shewed that their possession was adverse. That as to the Act of
Assembly which was cited by the other side, it was clear that land
could pass by a deed and registry only in such cases and in like
circumstances, as the grantor would be enabled to give actual
seizin, registry by that Act being substituted for livery of seizin,—
3 Bl. Com. 324 ; Lit. Ten 5, see 445 ; 1 Taunt. 578 ; Goodright v.
Forrester, 1 Cruise, Dig. 58 ; 4 Cruise, Dig. 98 ; Ad. Ej. 87; 4
Mod. 48; 9 B. & Cr. 864 ; 2 Salk, 563; 2 Ad. & El. 14; Doe
v. Gregory, 12 East. 154; 1 Burr, 107.
Curia adversary vult.
At this Term the Court gave judgment.
Chipman, C. J.:
This case comes up upon points reserved at the Trial.
One point was that the entry of the lessors of the Plaintiff, or of
those under whom they claim, was taken away by descent cast
from one Sprague to his heirs, Sprague having died many years
ago, in the occupation of the premises or apart of them. On this
point it need only be remarked, that this doctrine of descent cast
is one which obtains only for the protection of the possession of the
heir, and will not enure to the benefit of a stranger, and therefore
cannot
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cannot avail the Defendant in tlii s case, even if it had been proved
that Sprague had such a seizin of the inheritance as would have
cast the descent upon his heirs.
Another point was, that the conveyan ces of June 20tli, 1824,
and September 1st, 1829, given in evidence on the part of the
Plaintiff, were each of them made, when there was a possession of
the premises adverse to the grantors in those deeds respectively,
and therefore no estate passed by either deed.
There are two demises laid in the declaration, one on the demise
of Samuel Thompson and Charlotte his wife, on the 3d x'Yugust,
1836, the other on the demise of several persons including Thom
son and wife! on the 21st August, 1829. Thomson was proved
to have been married on a day subsequent to the day of the second
demise, viz.: on the 7th July, 1836, and therefore on this demise,
the Plaintiff must fail.
On the first demise, which is laid on a day subsequent to both
deeds, an objection to either deed is available.
It is doubtless a doctrine of the common Law, that a person who
is disseized of land cannot, while he remains so disseized, make a
valid conveyance of the land to a third person. This doctrine is
found in Co. Litt. 214, a. Plowd. 88, and is repeated in the modern
text writers (1 Cruise 428, Ros. on Real Property 128.) The
reason given by Lord Coke as the foundation of the doctrine is,
that under such conveyance, “pretended t'Hes might be granted
to great men, whereby right might be trodden down and the weak
oppressed.” This reason certainly does not apply to modern times,
and has called forth the following observation from Mr. Evans :
“ The Law upon this subject, was originally instituted upon the
most wise and salutary principles, and as a guard against judicial
corruption. Whether there is equal necessity for continuing such
a Law in the existing state of the community, is a question which
may admit of a very different consideration. The possession which
has the benefit of the protection of the Law, is by the very suppo
sition of the case a possession founded in wrong, and the practical
eflect of prohibiting any contract with relation to the right which
is withheld, is to render that right nugatory and unavailing, unless
the party in whom it is vested, has in his own hands the means of
resorting to legal remedies for its infraction.” (2 Evans, Statutes
335, note.) Nevertheless I am compelled to acknowledge that the.
doctrine itself still remains a part of the Law of the land, and must
be enforced where it is applicable.
In applying the doctrine it is most material to consider the na
ture of a disseizin. It is thus defined by Lord Coke, Co. Lit. 153, b
“ a disseizin is where one enters intending to usurp the possession
andto oust another of his freeholdf and he adds that the Judge is
to ask “with what intent the entry is made.” If the entry be
made
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made without an intent to claim the freehold it will be a bare
trespass. Actual disseizin is described by the Judge in Blundel
v. Baugh, (Sir W. Jones, 315,) as follows:—“ it never shall be a
disseizin unless there be a claim of a Stanger by entry to have the
freehold.” Again in Jarrett v. Weave, 3 Pri. 599, Graham
Baron says “ there must be a manifest, intention to oust, as well
as an actual ouster, and we must look well to see what it was the
intention of the party to do before we hold the fact done to be in
point of fact a disseizin.” Chancellor Kent following the words
of Lord Coke expresses himself as follows : “ every disseizin is a
trespass, but every trespass is not a disseizin, A manifest inten
tion to oust the real owner must clearly appear in order to raise
an act which may be only a trespass to the bad eminence of a
disseizin.”
It is also laid down that “ a disseizin of part of a manor, rent,
&c. if there can be a severance, will not be a disseizin of the whole,”
—Com. Dig. Seizin F. 2.
I apprehend also that the doctrine of disseizin, as it crea tes estates
by wrong, should be taken strictly, and the facts which constitute
it should be clearly made out, and no presumption oe admitted in
favour of it, but on the contrary that every legal presumption will
be in favor of the rightful title. Disseizin moreover must be a
question of fact to be found by a jury! ~
In the present case the question waS not submitted to the jury,
whether at the time of making either of the deeds given in evidence
the grantors were actually disseized of the premises, or any and
what part of them. For tnis reason I am of opinion that there
should be a new trial.
When the rule was moved for a question was made upon the
Statute of Limitations, but notmuch urged afterwards. Upon this
point I will only remark, that this action having been commenced
before the recent Statute of Limitations 6 W. 4, c. 43, came into
operation, the law as it stood before that Statute must, in this re
spect, be the law applicable to this case.
Botsford, J. concurred.
Parker, J.:
I should not have been disposed to grant a new trial in this case
had the points of disseizin and adverse possession been left to the
jury by the learned Judge, and they had then found in favour of
the Plaintiff. The evidence would, I think, have justified such a
finding, but the questions should have been put to them for their
consideration, which does not appear to have been done.
If Daniel M‘Master was actually disseized by Estey at tlfe time
of the conveyance in 1824, there can be no doubt he could have
passed, no estate, and the title of the lessors of the Plaintiff would
f2
wholly
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wholly fail. It is a main principle of the Common Law of Eng
land, and has been acted on also repeatedly in the United States,
that he who is disseized cannot, while such disseizin lasts, convey
to a third person ; his deed, if he makes any, gives no estate, or no
right of entry to his grantee. This, until altered by the Legisla
ture, must be considered the law of this Province, however inap
plicable some of the reasons on which it is founded may be to the
present times and circumstances,—1 Taunt. 578, Goodright v.
Forrester.
Admitting the principle then, we have to consider how far it is
to govern the present case; we must look to the character and in
tent of the possession, and observe the' circumstances under which
it has been taken and held, and the declarations of the party in
possession, in order to ascertain the intention,—Co. Litt. 153, b;
William v. Thomas, 12 East. 155 ; Jarrett v. Weare, 3 Price, 575.
And whether there be a disseizin or not is a matter of fact. It may
often be a mixed question of law and fact, and there are some cases
in which doubtless the jury ought to conclude a disseizin and should
be so directed by the Judge, but in the present case I think the
evidence was such as to require it to be left to the jury to deter
mine on the nature and intention, and also the extent of Estey’s
possession.
They have held in the United States that to constitute a dissei
zin of the true owner, (and particularly in the case of uncultivated
land) the possession of the disseizor must not only be adverse to
the true owner, Imtopen, notorious, continued and exclusive. This
seems a very sensible rule.
In 9 Vin. Abr. 163 it is said, “ there is nothing plainer in the
law than that rights and the purging of wrongful acts are always
favored, therefore where the Plaintiff has recovered his estate and
an entry is found by the jury, that entry purges the disseizin, and
the continuer in possession afterwards is but a trespasser ; though
there was a disseizin it is now purged.”
In 2 Bac. Abr. 679, “an entry by sufferance without claim is no
disseizin.”
There was nothing to connect Estey’s possession with that of
Sprague or Sprague’s heirs, and on that account, as has already
been said, there was no descent cast to bar the entry as against
Estey; but beside that it is very questionable whether Sprague’s
possession was adverse ; under the evidence it might fairly be con
sidered as permissive. As to the question under the Statute of
Limitations, Barnes, the present Defendant, has not a sufficient
adverse possession unless he can avail himself also of the time that
Estey held, and treat that also as adverse; now whether Estey’s
possession was adverse or not, and if so, whether Barnes’ is a
continuation

in the

Second Year of VICTORIA.

433

continuation of that of Estey, are proper matters for the consideration
of a jury,—8 B & C. 717, Doe v. Clark.
I do not think it necessary to say anything at present as to the
operation of the deed of 1829.
There must be a new trial, and it is but fair under the circum
stances, as the Judge was not asked to leave the questions to the
jury, that the costs should abide the event.
Rule absolute.
Solicitor General, for Plaintiffs
Wilmot, for Defendant.

SPRAGUE v. MATTHEWS.
There is no arbitrary rule thai two Terms or two Assizes should pass
after issue joined in order to sustain a motion for judgment, as in case of a
non-suit, but the Plaintiff is bound to proceed to trial at the first Nisi Prius
holden next after the Term immediately succeeding that in which issue is
joined, provided there be sufficient time to give notice of trial.

THIS was an application made in Michaelmas Term last for
judgment, as in case of a non-suit for not proceeding to trial, ac
cording to the practice of the Court. Issue was joined of Hilary
Term, 1838.
At this Term judgment was given.

Per Curiam.
The Court have taken time to consider this case, in order to
look particularly into the practice and lay down a general rule for
future observance.
The question here arising has undergone full discussion in seve
ral recent cases in England, and until the last decision, viz. that
of Evans v. Barnard, 6 Dow, Pra. Rep. 367, could hardly be con
sidered as settled ; the case of Smith v. Miller, in 6 Dowl. 154,
being at variance with Robi.ison v. Taylor, 5 Dowl. 518, and Wil
liams v. Edwards, 3 lb. 183.
The observation of Lord Abinger, in Smith v. Miller, that a
party should have two opportunities of going to trial and therefore
a motion could not be made for judgment, as in case of a nonsuit
in a town, cause, until two Terms had elapsed, and in a country
cause until two Assizes had elapsed, is evidently not correct. The
rule is laid down by Parke B. (after consultation with the other
Judges,) in Gough v. White, 2 M. & W. 363.
On the whole of the cases it appears that there is no arbitrary
rule as to the passing of two Terms or two Assizes, but that the
Defendant may move whenever the Plaintiff has omitted to try
the cause at a Term or Assize for which he ought by the practice
of the Court to have given notice of trial.
The words of the Statute (14 Geo. 2, c. 17) are as follow: “ when
any
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any issue is or shall be joined in any act ion or suit at law in any
of Her Majesty’s Courts of Westminster &c. and the Plaintiff or
Plaintiffs in any such action or suit shall neglect to briug such
issue to be tried according to the course or practice of the said
Courts respectively, it shall and may be lawful for the Judge or
Judges of the said Courts respectively, at any time after such ne
glect, upon motion made in open Court (due notice having been
given thereof), to give the like judgment for the Defendant or De
fendants in any such action or suit, as in cases of nonsuit, unless &c.”
By the old practice of the Court, which is to be adopted in the
interpretation of the Act, there was a step subsequent to the join
ing of issue which the Plaintiff was not compelled to take during
the same Term in which issue was joined, viz. that of entering the
issue ; he had the whole of the next Term for entering the issue
and was nor bound to give notice of trial until that had elapsed.
It will be borne in mind that joining issue in the vacation of any
Term is the same as joining issue in the Term next preceding.
After the Term for entering the issue has passed, which in all
cases is the Term next after that in which issue is joined, the
Plaintiff is not allowed to wait until the expiration of another Term
before giving notice of trial, but should proceed to trial at the ntjxt
succeeding Nisi Prius if there be sufficient time between the Term
and the Court of Nisi Prius for giving notice of trial.
If there be not sufficient time for this purpose before the first
Court of Nisi Prins, the Plaintiff in that case, and in that case
only, may defer giving notice of trial until the second Court of
Nisi Prius after the Term in which the issue ought to be entered,
without subjecting himself to a proceeding for judgment as in case
of a nonsuit. This affords a plain and intelligible rule as well for
causes triable at the Circuits as at the Sittings for the County of
York.
In the case now before us which is one arising in the County
of Northumberland, issue was joi led in the Hilary vacation and at
the end of Trinity Term the cause was ripe for trial, and it was
the Plaintiff’s duty to have gone] to trial at the Circuit in Sep
tember ; the Defendant therefore did not come too soon at the last
Term, and is entitled to his rule for judgment as in case of a non
suit.
Rule absolute.

DOE D. PARKINSON, v. HAUBTMAN.
Where a tenant under a parol lease for 7 years holds over the term, (no
rent having been paid) no notice to quitis neecssary before ejectment brought
by the landlord.
Ejectment, tried before Carter, J. at Charlottte Circuit, Octo

ber, 1837,

At the trial it appeared that the Defendant had
entered
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entered upon the premises under a parol lease for seven years from 1 st
August, 1828, which term had expired before action brought.
A verdict was taken by consent for the Plaintiff with leave for
Defendant to move to enter a nonsuit should the Court be of opinion
that a notice to quit was necessary.
No notice to quit had been given, and it was contended at the
trial that under the construction of the Act of Assembly 26 Geo.
3, c. 14, such a parol lease would enure as a tenancy from year to
year, and that a notice to quit should have been given. Evidence
was given that Defendant, when called upon in the fall of 1835,
refused to pay rent, and that when the possession was demanded of
him he made no reply.
In Hilary Term last W. Chandler obtained a rule nisi to set
aside the verdict and enter a nonsuit upon the grounds reserved at
the trial.
In Trinity Term last R. M-, Andrews shewed cause.
This being a tenancy at will no notice to quit was necessary,
but only a demand of possession, which was clearly proved at the
trial; but if a tenancy exist which requires a notice to quit before
action brought, then there is sufficient evidence of disclaimer to do
away with the necessity of notice,—Doe v. Williams, Cowp. 622;
Doe d. Lewis, v. Cawdor, 1 Cr. M. R. 398; Doe d. Gray, v.
Stanion, 1 M. & W. 695; Roe d. Rigge, v. Bell, 5 T. R. 471.
Kerr, contra,—Whenever a party recognizes a person in any way
as a tenant, he must give a notice to quit,—1 T. R. 159, Rights.
Darby. In the present case there has been nothing to take it out
of the general rule, such as disclaimer &c.
in the
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We entertain no doubt upon the part of disclaimer, there is no
evidence of the fact, and as to the first point,
Curia advisari vult.

At this Term the Court gave judgment.
Chipman, C. J.:
In this case the first question is, whether a notice to quit was
necessary. It appeared that the Defendant held the premises
under a parol lease for seven years from the 1st August, 1828, and
the Ejectment was brought after the expiration of the seven years;
it was contended on the part of the Defendant, that the Courts had
construed such a tenancy under the Statute of Frauds, as an ab
solute tenancy from year to year, and that the Landlord could
therefore in no case recover possession without giving a regular
notice to quit at the end of a year. If the Landlord had sought to
dispossess the Tenant within the period for which the parol lease
was given, there would have been no doubt of a notice to quit
heing necessary, and the cases of Clavton r Blakey, 8 T. R. 3,
and
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and Doe v. Bell, 5 T. R. 471, were both cases where the principle
of tenancy from year to year was applied within the term for which
the parol lease was given.' Blit no case was cited, and I have not
found any one where the question arose after the termination of
the period for which the parol lease was given. If the agreement
under which the tenant held be in writing, there is no doubt that
if he holds over, after the expiration of the term mentioned in the
agreement, he may be treated as a wrong doer and a trespasser,
and dispossessed without any notice to quit. And it does appear
to me that it is subversive of the spirit of the Statute of Frauds,
the great object of which is to encourage and require instruments
n writing, to hold that a tenant under a parol lease, is in this re
spect in a better condition than if his estate were conveyed by
writing, and that he cannot be dispossessed, even after the expira
tion of the stipulated term without a regular notice to quit; the
words of the Statute of Frauds are as follows : “ All leases, estates,
or terms of years, made or created by parol, and not put in wiiting,
&c. shall have the force and effect of leases or estates at will only,
and shall not either in law or equity be deemed or taken to have
any other or greater force or effect,”—Act of Assembly, 26 Geo.
3, c. 14, s. 1. It is to be observed that the Statute does not make
any lease void, but directs the character which the estate created
by parol shall have, and it seems to me that the Court have gone
quite far enough in protecting the tenant, when we consider the
positive expressions of the Statute, by deciding that the tenancy at
will created by it, shall enure as a tenancy from year to year within
the term originally stipulated by the parties. To allow such a
tenant a greater privilege after the expiration of the term to wdiich
his right was by his owm agreement limited, than if the agreement
had been in writing, seems to me so great a contravention of the
principle of the Statute of Frauds, that I want some positive au
thority on the point before I can yield to it; and in the absence of
any such positive authority, I cannot bring myself to think that a no
tice to quit in this case was necessary. If the estate were to be con
sidered according to the words of the Statute an estate at will, there
was evidence in the case of a demand of possession wdiich would
put an end to ail estate at will, although it was not a regular notice
to quit at the end of a year.
Another point was made, viz.: that there was in this case suffi
cient evidence of a disclaimer. The law’ on the subject of dis
claimer, is stated by Baron Parke, in a very late case, as follows :
“ In order to make a verbal or written disclaimer sufficient, it must
amount to a direct repudiation of the relation of landlord and
tenant, or to a distinct claim to hold possession of the estate upon a
ground wholly inconsistent, "with the existence of that relation,
which by necessary implication is a repudiation of it,”—1 Tyr. and
G. 1071, 1 M. and W, 695.
I
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I do not think that the evidence in this case shewed such a
repudiation of the title of the lessor of the Plaintiff, as would amount
to a disclaimer, but upon the first ground I am of opinion that the
rule for entering a nonsuit should be discharged.
Botsford, J.:
Tn the case of Doe v. Bell, which was one of the authorities re
lied upon by the Defendant, and in that of Clayton v. Blakey, 8
T. R. 3, where a holding under a parol demise for twenty one
years was held by Lord Kenyon to be a tenancy from year to year,
the rent had been paid, which distinguishes them from the present
case where there was no payment of rent. Bythewood, in speak
ing of tenancies from year to year, says—“ where a person is let
into possession under a parol demise, which is void on account of
its being for a longer period than is allowed by '•’the Statute of
Frauds, that is for more than three years, he is tenant from year
to year ; such at least is the rule where rent has been paid. What
is the nature of the tenancy before any such payment has been
made seems to be a debateable point.”
J am not aware of any case in the Books where length of occu
pation under a parol lease void by the Statute of Frauds, inde
pendently of the payment of rent, has been held to const itute a
tenancy from year to year.
Parker, J.:
This is a new point and I am glad time has been taken to con
sider it, as I was much prbssed with the argument of the Defend
ant’s Counsel, and was for some time disposed to adopt the view
taken of it by the learned Judge at the trial; that this being
clearly only a tenancy from year to year could not be put an end
to without due notice, and 1 cannot say now that my mind is free
from doubts.
On full reflection, however, I concur in the opinions already de
livered by His Honor the Chief Justice, and Mr. J. Botsford, that
the verdict should stand.
It is quite true that the agreement between the deceased John
Parkinson and the Defendant would only operate as a lease from
year to year, and they must be taken to have been aware of this
when they entered into it, and therefore it might have been put an
end to by either party by proper notice at the termination of the
first or any subsequent year. But it does not appear to me to
militate against the provision of the Statute of Frauds to give this
much effect to the agreement, that the tenancy from year to year
should not extend beyond the seven years. Why may not. this
stipulation as to the seven years be taken to operate as a notice to
quit at the end of that period, made by both parties at the incep
tion of the tenancy ? True, the notice might here have been
superseded
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superseded by notice to quit at an earlier period, but this not having
been done, and the Defendant having had the full benefit of the
parol lease ought not to seek to extend it.
There is no evidence of any recognition of the tenancy by either
party after the seven years, by the payment and receipt of rent or
otherwise; indeed there was no evidence of any payment of rent at
all, which, as has already been observed, makes this case differ
from others which have been quoted. Neither is there any ap
pearance of surprise, and although the evidence has failed to make
out an actual disclaimer, and therefore on that ground the Plaintiff
can not recover, yet the circumstances are such as to raise a
strong suspicion that the Defendant did not desire to continue his
holding as a tenant, if he could have disputed the Plaintiff’s title.
We shall do no injustice by allowing the verdict to stand, and
we certainly do not overrule any decided case.
Rule discharged.
R. M. Andrews, for Plaintiff.
W. Chandler, <j‘- Kerr, for Defendant.

438

Note.—Carter J. was absent during the whole of this Term.

IN THE SUPREME COURT.
Hilary Term, 1st Victoria,

A. I). 1839.

PROCEEDINGS AGAINST PRISONERS.

I. It is Ordered, That from and after the first day of this Term,
in all cases where a Prisoner is or shall be taken, detained or
charged, in custody by mesne process thereafter returnable, issuing
out of this Court, and the Plaintiff shall not cause a Declaration
against such Prisoner to be delivered to such Prisoner, or to the
Sheriff in whose custody such Prisoner is or shall be detained or
charged, within three Calendar months after the return of the Pro
cess, by virtue whereof such Prisoner is or shall be tab en, detained
or charged in custody ; and cause an affidavit to be made and filed
with the Clerk of this Court, of the delivery of such Declaration,
and of the time when, and the person to whom the same was deli
vered, before the last day of the Term next after the delivery of
such Declaration, the Prisoner shall be discharged out of custody
by writ of supersedeas to be granted by this Court, or one of the
the Judges thereof, upon tiling common bail; unless upon notice
given to the Plaintiff’s Attorney, good cause shall be shewn to the
contrary ; and in case of a commitment or render in discharge of
bail, after the return of process, and before a Declaration delivered,
unless the Plaintiff shall cause a Declaration to be delivered, and
an affidavit thereof made and filed; before the end of the Term
next after such commitment or render shall be made, and due no
tice of such render given, the prisoner shall be discharged out of
custody by writ of supersedeas to be granted as aforesaid, upon
filing common bail; unless upon notice given to the Plaintiff’s
Attorney good cause shall be shewn to the contrary
II. It is further Ordered, That on every Declaration so to be
delivered against a prisoner as aforesaid, a rule to appear and plead
shall be indorsed according to the form following, that is to say :
“ The Defendant C. D. is to appear and plead hereto at the suit of
the Plaintiff A. B. within twenty days after service of this Decla
ration ; otherwise judgment will be entered againsr him by default ”
G. H. Plaintiffs Attorney.
------ 1'83 .
and
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and that J udgment shall not be entered against such Defendant by
default until the expiration of the said rule.
III. If is further Ordered, That the Sheriff who shall have re
ceived a copy of a Declaration against any prisoner in his custody,
shall indorse thereon the time of his so receiving the same, and
shall forthwith deliver the same to the said prisoner, and shall also
enter in a book to be by him kept for that purpose, the time of
receiving such Declaration, and of delivering the same to the
prisoner.
IV. It is further Ordered, That where the Plaintiff declares
against the prisoner, it shall not be necessary to make more than
two copies of the Declaration, of which one shall be served, and
the other filed with an affidavit of service, and a copy of the Rule
to appear and plead indorsed thereon.
V. It is further Ordered, That upon application made by the
Plaintiff before the time at which the Defendant may be supersede
able, and good and sufficient cause shewn by affidavit; further
time to declare may be given by Rule of Court or order of a J udge.
VI. It is further Ordered, That upon every application for a
supersedeas for want of declaring in due time, in addition to the
certificate of the Sheriff that no Declaration has been delivered to
him for the Prisoner, there shall be an affidavit of the Defendant,
that he has not been served with such declaration.
VII. It is further Ordered, That unless the Plaintiff shall pro
ceed to trial or final judgment within three terms next after the
delivery or filing of Declaration, if by the course of this Court the
Plaintiff can so proceed; of which three terms, the term wherein
such Declaration shall be delivered shall be taken! to be one ; or if
by the course of the Court the Plaintiff cannot so proceed to trial
or final judgment within the time above limited; then unless the
plaintiff shall proceed to trial or final judgment as soon after as by
the course of this Court he may so proceed; the Prisoner shall be
discharged out of custody by writ of supersedeas to be granted as
aforesaid, upon filing common bail, unless upon notice given to the
Plaintiff’s Attorney good cause shall be shewn to the contrary.
VIII. It is further Ordered, That in all cases after final judg
ment obtained against a Prisoner unless the Plaintiff shall cause
such Prisoner to be charged in execution within three calendar
months next after the day on which such final judgment shall be
signed ; in case no writ of error shall be depending nor injunction
be obtained for stay of proceedings ; and if any writ of error shall
be depending or injunction be obtained, then within three calendar
months next after judgment shall be affirmed, the writ of error be
nonprossed or discontinued, or the injunction dissolved, the Prisoner
shall be discharged out of custody by supersedeas to be granted as
aforesaid; unless upon notice given to the Plaintiff’s Attorney good
cause shall be shewn to the contrary.
IX
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IX. Ii is further Ordered, That after trial had unless the Plain
tiff do proceed to have his judgment entered up and signed as soon
as by the course and practice of the Court he may so do, or within
one calendar month thereafter ; in case no injunction shall be ob
tained or order made, then within one calendar month after such
injunction shall be dissolved or order discharged: the Prisoner shall
be discharged out of custody, in like manner as in the last preced
ing Rule is provided.
X. It is further Ordered, That in case of a render in discharge
of bail after final judgment obtained, unless the Plaintiff shall cause
the Defendant to be charged in execution within three calendar
months next, after such render and due notice thereof given, and
in case of render after trial and before judgment, unless the Plain
tiff do proceed to have his judgment entered up and signed within
the time limited by the last preceding Rule, or within one calendar
month after such render and due notice thereof, the Prisoner shall
be entitled to his discharge in manner aforesaid, unless good cause
be shewn to the contrary.
XI. It is further Ordered, That no treaty or agreement shall
be sufficient cause to prevent any Prisoners having the benefit of a
supersedeas, unless the same be in writing signed by the^Prisoner
or his Attorney, or some person duly authorised by such Prisoner.
WARD CHIPMAN,
W. BOTSFORD,
R. PARKER.
of Scire Facias under Act 26, Geo. 3, c. 24.
It is Ordered, That the writ of Scire Facias to be issued under
the Act of Assembly, 26 Geo. 3, c. 24, shall be in the form fol
lowing, or to that effect; adding in the body of the same any spe
cial matter which in particular cases may be deemed requisite.

Writ

FORM OF WRIT.

Victoria, &c.
To the Sheriff of
Greeting.
Whereas A. B. lately in our Court before us at Fredericton, im
pleaded C. D. and E. F. in a plea of
, (the said C. D.
having been duly taken and brought into Court by virtue of process
issued in the said suit against the said C. D. and E. F., and the
said E. F. not having been taken and brought into Court by virtue
of such process,) and did afterwards by the judgment of the same
Court recover as well against the said E. F. as the said C. D.
[state the recovery,] in the same manner as if they had both been
taken and brought into Court, pursuant to the Act of Assembly in
such case made and provided, whereof the said C. D. and E. F. are
convicted as by the record and proceedings thereof still remaining
in our same Court manifestly appear :
And
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And now on behalf of the said A. B. in onr same Court, we are
informed that although judgment be thereupon given, yet satisfac
tion of the [debt ano ] damages aforesaid still remains to be made
to him ; and he is desirous of executing an Execution for such
[debt and] damages against the body, or the lands or goods the sole
property of the said E. F. wherefore the said A. B. hath humbly
besought us to provide him a proper remedy in this behalf: And
we being willing that what is just in this behalf should be done,
command you that by honest and lawful men of your Bailiwick,
you make known to the said E. F. that he be before us at Fre
dericton, on
to shew if he has or knows of any thing to say for
himself, why the said A. B. ought not to have execution for the
[debt and] damages aforesaid, to be executed against the body or
the lands or goods the sole property of him the said E. F. according
to the force, form and effect of the said recovery, and pursuant to
the said Act of Assembly in such case made and provided, if it
shall seem expedient for him so to do; and further to do and receive
what our said Court before us shall then and there consider of him
in this behalf: and have you there the names of those by whom
you shall so make known to him. and this writ. Witness, &c.
WARD CHIPMAN.
W. BOTSFORD.
R. PARKER.

Rules

to

Reply.

I. It is Ordered, That in future where the Defendant in any
action shall plead one or more special pleas, and serve copies on the
Plaintiff’s Attorney, writh rule to reply in twenty days, the Plain
tiff shall file and deliver his replication in twenty days from the
time of such service of plea and rule, and in default thereof the
Defendant shall be entitled to judgment of non pros a replication
being first demanded after the said twenty days; and in like man
ner twenty days shall be allowed for every subsequent pleading,
and the opposite party shall be entitled to judgment by default or
non pros, as the case may be, for not rejoining, surrejoining, &c. a
rule to rejoin, surrejoin &c. being served and demand made as
aforesaid, unless the Court or a Judge shall think proper to allow
further time. Provided that no such judgment of non pros or de
fault shall be signed until ten days after demand of replication, re
joinder, &c.
II. It is further Ordered, That all such rules to reply, rejoin,
surrejoin, &c. may be taken out in vacation and entered as of the
preceding Term, the Attorney delivering to the Clerk a prtecipe
for such rule.
WARD CHIPMAN.
W. BOTSFORD.
R. PARKER.
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T1R> fITT TERM, 2«1 Victoria, 183®.
Rules for the payment of Money into Court under the
Act 1st Victoria, c. 13, s. 3.

I. Whereas by an Act passed in the first year of Her Majesty’s
Reign, intituled “An Act for the further amendment of the Law,”
it is enacted “ that it shall and may be lawful for the Defendant
in all personal actions pending or to be brought in the Supreme
Court of this Province, (except actions for assault and battery,
false imprisonment, libel, slander, malicious arrest or prosecution,
criminal conversation or debauching of the Plaintiff’s daughter or
servant,) by leave of the said Court or a Judge of such Court, to
pay into the said Court a sum of money by way of compensation
or amends, in such manner and under such regulations as to the
payment of costs, and the form of pleading, as the said Court, or
any three of the Judges thereof, shall, by anv rules or orders by
them to be from time to time made, order and direct”:—
It is Ordered, That when money is paid into Court under the
said Act, such payment shall be pleaded, and as near as may be in
the following form, Mutatis Mutandis.
“ C. D. i And the said Defendant comes by E. F. liis Attorney,”
ats. > (or “ in person, &c.”) and says (or incase it be pleaded
A. B. S as Pal’t onbr> a<ld “ as t°------ being part of the sum
in the Declaration or------ Count of the Declaration mentioned” or
as to the residue of the sum of------ ) that the Plaintiff ought not
further to maintain his action, because the Defendant now brings
into Court the sum of------ ready to be paid to the Plaintiff, and
the Defendant further says that the Plaintiff has not sustained da
mages (or in actions of debt “ that he is not indebted to the Plain
tiff”) to a greater amount than the said sum of &c., in respect to
the cause of action in the Declaration mentioned” (or “ in the in
troductory part of the plea mentioned) and this he, the Defendant,
is ready to verify, wherefore he prays judgment, if the Plaintiff
ought further to maintain his action thereof against him
and no
other plea shall be pleaded to the said action or to so much thereof
as the said plea of payment into Court is applicable.
II. It is further Ordered, That upon a Rule or Judge’s order
being made for paying money into Court under the said Act, the
money shall be paid to the Clerk at the time of filing the plea,
together with his poundage thereon, and the Clerk shall make a
minute of such payment in the margin of the plea, and shall also
give a memorandum of such payment to be delivered with the copy
»of the plea to the Plaintiff’s Attorney ; w'hich sum shall be paid
out to the Plaintiff’s Attorney on demand.
III. It is further Ordered, That the Plaintiff, after delivery of
a plea of paj ment of money into Court, shall be at liberty to reply
to
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to the same, by accepting the sum so paid into Court in full satis
faction and discharge of the cause of action, in respect of which it
has been paid in, and he shall be at liberty in that case to tax his
costs of suit, and in case of non-payment thereof within ten days,
to sign judgment for his costs of suit, or the Plaintiff may reply
“ that he sustained damages” (or “ that the Defendant was and is
indebted to him” as the case may be) to a greater amount Ethan
the said sum, “ and in the event of an issue thereon being found
for the Defendant, the Defendant shall be entitled to judgment and
his costs of suitProvided that if the sum of money paid into
Court in any action not summary would have been recoverable
under the summary form, the Plaintiff, if he take the money out of
Court in discharge of the action, shall not be entitled to more than
summary costs, unless he obtain the order of the Court or a J udge
for the larger costs, upon good causes shewn therefor.
WARD CHIPMAN.
W. BOTSFORD.
J. CARTER.
R. PARKER.
Note.—The Reports of Trinity and Michaelmas Terms, 1839, will be made
up by the present Reporter, David S. Kerr, Esquire.
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A
ABSCONDING DEBTOR.

1. The Court have no power
under 26 Geo. 3, c. 13, to
grant a supersedeas of a war
rant of attachment issued against the goods of a concealed
debtor, unless it appears that
all the creditors consectthereto
Ex parte Gove.
187
ADMIRALTY.

Vide Courts,

2.

AMENDMENT.

1. The Court will allow amend
ment in pleading upon pay
ment of costs after demurrer
argued. Strangv.Bell. 287
2. Afterdemurrerbooksdelivered, &c. Prac. 14
3. The Sheriff’s endorsement on
a writ returned may be amen
ded. Writ. 2
ARBITRATORS

1. As to power of.

Awards 1
2. When a verdict was taken
In an application by one of two for the Plaintiff for £1000
subject to the award of Arbi
defendants for relief under the
insolvent Act, 1 W. 4, c. 43, trators to be agreed upon, and
the affidavit was entitled in
a rule of reference, subsequent
the name only of one of the ly drawn up which, after re
citing the agreement directed
defendant the applicant. The
entitling was held sufficient.
that the award should be en
tered on tixepostea as a verdict
Wilmot v. Cornwell, et al. 31
of the jury, held that the
AGENTS.
award could not be made in
A right to retain for agency f >r favor of the Defendant, and
that the power of the Arbitra
commission is exercisable onlj
on the specific monies received tors was confined to the quan
for which the charge is made. _ tum of damages only. Held
alsothatasthe submission was
Quebec and Halifax Steam
“all matters in the cause”
Boat Company v. Cunard and
Aden
47 they could not give the
AFFIDAVITS.

vide

ii.

INDEX.

Defendant credit for an item
which could not come under
the head of payment or set
off in the cause.—Campbell v
Wilson.
104
3. Where a cause is referred to
three Arbitrators whose award
or that of any two of whom is
to be final, two of these can
not proceed to make an award
without giving notice to the
third—Raymond and another
v Luke.
116
ARREST.

A Defendant discharged from
custody by one of several
Plaintiffs, cannot be again
arrested by a co-Plaintiff.—
Executors of Andrews v
Clarke.
32
ASSUMPSIT.

1. Where the verdict is under
Lb it is considered prima
facie the amount of the de
mand for which the action is
brought and the Court will
allow a suggestion to be en
tered to deprive the Plaintiff
of costs underfiO Geo. 3, c. 17.
Dickenson v Balloch.
24
2. Where an Executor declared
upon promises to himself and
upon an account stated with
him as Executor as well as
upon promises to the Testatrix
and was nonsuited, the Court
allowed Defendan t her costs.—
Executors of Grosvenor v
Agnew.
29
3 In Assumpsit the verdict of
the jury is not in all cases
conclusive upon the Court to
depri' e Plaintiff of costs when
the jury find for less than £5.
— J/‘ ilhanny y Wiswall. 67

4. Assumpsit for money had and
received will lie by one tenant
in common against another
for the price of common pro
perty sold by Defendant with
the consent of Plaintiff.—Shaw
v Grant.
110
5. Where a contract was en
tered into by eight persons
with the Defendant for build
ing a ship, and six of these
against the will of the other
two, afterwards agreed with
Defendant to put an end to
the former contract, and ac
tually received pay for their
work done under it, it was
held that the remaining two
might maintain Indebitatus
Assumpsit against the Defen
dants in the name of the whole
eight for their share of the
work done.—Palmer et al v
Long.
29
6. Where goods in the posses
sion of B in which A is tenant
in common with B have with
out A’s. authority been de
livered to C held that A
cannot maintain Assumpsit
against B for goods sold and
delivered nor money had and
received to recover the value
of his interest in them their
being no proof of a sale from
B to C.—Doyle v Taylor et
al.
'
' 201
Semb. Otherwise if a safe had
taken place, and in such case
the produce of the sale would
be the measure of damages, id.
7. When A delivered goods to
B upon the understanding that
B should deliver other goods
in exchange, but subsequently
A renders an account to B of
the same which B acknow
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iii.

upon the party seeking the
ledged to be correct and pro
benefit of it.—Rankin and
mised to pay, A may recover
therefore under an account
others v Emery.
330
stated notwithstanding his bill 10. When goods were delivered
of particulars gives the items
under an agreement to be paid
as the ground of his demand.
for by endorsed notes payable
Grant v Aiken d‘- Shaw. 259
in — days after delivery, the
8. When the Session under an
vendor recovered in assumpsit
authority to sappoint for an
before the expiration of the
unlimited time displaced an
time of credit for a breach of
officer without a reasonable
the agreement in not giving
the said notes.—Brown v
cause and appointed another
in his stead, the former can
Frink.
363
maintain an action for money
ATTACHMENT.
had and received against the
latter for the profits received 1. Delay sufficiently accounted
subsequent to his removal.—
for, is not a cause for setting
Joplin v Davidson.
308
aside an attachment against
9. When A sold and delivered
a Sheriff where he has not
been preju iced by such delay.
to B a lot of Timber subject
to a resurvey by Mr. Scott,
—Rex v Sheriff of Glouces
ter.
’
187
and it appeared that there
were two Mr. Scotts, one a 2. An Attachment will not be
granted for net obeying a Sub
sworn Surveyor under the act
of Assembly, 1 W. 4, c. 45,
poena when the witness is in
custody at the time of service.
and the other not, and the
—Regina v Wetmore.
244
latter made the survey but not
according to the provisions in 3. An Attachment against a
witness for contempt must be
such act, in an action for the
applied for at the next term
deduction and expenses al
lowed upon such resurvey, and
after the contempt committed.
Doe dem. Howe v Mealley. 121
upon a verdict for the Plain
tiff. Held that the learned
ATTORNEY.
Judge put it rightly to the
jury to find which of the two 1. An Attorney is liable over to
a Sheriff who sustains dama
Scotts the parties intended by
ges by proceeding under what
their agreement; but that
purports to be a Writ of the
prima facie the resurvey must
Court bi’.t is not, when the
be presumed to be according
same is put into the Sheriff’s
to the provisions of act, 1 W.
hands by him.—Johnston v
4, c. 45, and it should have
Winslow.
53
been left to the jury to say
whether the parties intended
AVERMENT.
such survey, or a resurvey
according to the discretion of 1. In an action by payee vs. ac
ceptor of a Bill of Exchange
the Surveyor; the onus propayable at a particular place
bandiof winch intention lies

INDEX.

iv.

it is not necessary to aver
presentment at the time it
falls clue it is sufficient to prove
it.—Chandler vBeckwith. 268
AWARD.

B
BAIL

1. Special Bail discharged, al
though indemnified when they
had been prevented from sur
rendering Defendant by tlie
Plaintiff’s procuring his ab
sence from the Province.—
Pollock et al v. Short. 279
2. Bail discharged for delay in
Plaintiff to proceed.—vide
Prac. 27

1. Arbitrators are competent to
determine matters of law.—
Fowlis v Kinnear, et al. 26
2. The Court will not entertain
an application to set aside an
award made under rule of re
ference where the award was
to be entered on the postea as a
BAIL PIECE.
verdict of a jury when the ap
plicant has been guilty of 1. Exoneretur on.—vide Prac
laches.—id.
tice. 13, 26, 27
3. An award made under a rule
BILLS OF EXCHANGE.
of reference set aside on ac
count of arbitrators exceeding 1. In an action by the payee
their power.— Vide Arbitra-'
against the acceptor of a Bill
tors. 2
of Exchange, payable at a
4. An award will not be dis
particular place, which became
turbed where the witnesses
due on the 3d of Nov., the
were examined without being
Plaintiff averred presentment
sworn, although the rule of
for payment on the 2d. It
reference required them to be
appeared in evidence that the
sworn if the party objecting to
Bill had been presented on the
the award were present and
2d, and that on the 3d, the
consented to such examina
day it became due, the De
tion.—Reilly v Gillan. 120
fendant expressly refused to
5. Under a submissiri at Nisi
pay it to the Plaintiff’s Agent,
Prius to the award of it, B
who called again, but it did
and C or any two of them,
not appear that the Note was
they agreed upon an award
again produced ; held that
and it was draw up, signed by
proof of presentment on the
A and B and delivered to C.
3d was admissible and that
to be signed by him and han
the refusal to pay on the 3d,
ded to the parties ; C disco
rendered the actual present
vered a mistake to which A
ment of the Bill on that day
and B consenting the award
unnecessary.---- Chandler v.
was corrected and signed by
Beckwith.
268
all three but not within the
BOND.
time limited. The Court re
fused to give effect to either.—
1. In an action of Debt brought
PiIson v Kerr and Camp
by a Sheriff upon a Limit
bell.
280
Bund under 10 & 11 Geo. 41

INDEX.

v.

c. 30, it is! a good defence to 2. When at the ti le of the ex
shew that the Sheriff had re
ecution [of a conveyaifce 'of
lands from A to B, A is ac
ceived the Defendent again
into close custody.—Camp
tually disseized thereof, no
bell v. Henan, et dl.
72
estate passes to B.—Doe dem
2. Non Damnifieatus is a good
Thompson and JUfe v.
plea only where the Bond is
Barnes.
426
merely to indemnify.—id.
3. When A, the owner of a Mill
3. In an action brought on a
and of the Stream from the
limit bond against the princi
Mill to a navigable1 River,
pal and sureties for an Escape,
sells the Mill ands<>me laud,
including a part of the1 stream,
it appeared that the Plaintiff
let the Defendant go, upon the
to B, the: right to lift* the
understanding that the De
stream through A’s land for
fendant should pay all costs,
the purpose of taking logs to
the Court refused relief to the
and from the Mill, will not
sureties under 6 W. 4, c. 41,
pass by the words privileges
s. 13, it not appearing that
and appurtenances, nor-as in
all costs had been paid.—/>'ocident to the Mill, although
bertson, Assignee of Sheriff v.
A, previous to the sale, had
Currie et al.
190
used it for that purpose.—
Bogers v Peck others. 318
C
COSTS.

CONTRACT.

1. By Infant when voidable,
void or valid.—Fisher v. Jew
ett, et al.
35
2. A contract can only be re
scinded by the consent of all
the contracting parties.—
Palmer, et al v. Long. 1'29
CONVEYANCE.

1. A deed wherein the vendor
for a valuable consideration
“ remised, released and quit
claimed” unto the vendee all
right, &c. to have and to hold
to him and his heirs, &c. hav
ing been duly executed, proved
and registered, pursuant to
the Act of 26 Geo. 3, c. 3,
was held a good conveyance
of lands under the 10th sec
tion of said Act.—Doe dem
Wilt v. Jardine.
142

1. Under 50 Geo. 3,'c. 17.
Vide Assumpsit 1
2. Executors liable for, when
">,««<$? Assumpsit 2
3. On discharging a Rule nisi.
Vide' Practice 4
4. Demand of security by Post.
Vide Practice 6
5. When on several issues join
ed and some are found for
Plaintiff and some for De
fendent, in Replevin costs al
lowed to'both parties.—Dick
enson v Ketchum:
63
6. Court will not deprive Plain
tiff of costs in all cases where
verdict is below £h.—MlIlhaney v Wiswell.
67
7. Where the verdict was but
£4 in Assumpsit, but the
Judge reported that the ma
terial question in the cause
was on the construction of a

I N DEX.
Deed under which the Plain
the ground that such act in
tiff sought to recover for use
terferes with the exercise of
and occupation, the Court re
of private rights and is there
fused to deprive Plaintiff of
fore unconstitutional, or that
costs. —Black et al v Kirk. 81
under the Royal Instructions
8. Costs of a commission to ex
to the Governor, the act
amine witnesses are under 5
ought not to have been passed
W. 4, c. 34, costs in the cause.
without a suspending clause.
—Fergus v.JK'Intbsh.
91
The Queen v John Kerr. 367
9. When the verdict was for 2. On motion for a prohibition
£1 1 the Plaintiff was allowed
to tl'.e Court of Vice Admi
full costs, notwithstanding he
ralty. Held that that Court
had by an account rendered
hasjurjsfliction under the Sta
to the Defendant shewn a ba
tutes 8 Ged. 1, c. 12, and 2
lance due to him under £20,
(too. 2, c. 35, to entertain a
it appearing that by the De
suit in rem, instituted by the
fendant’s own conduct the
"Grown against Pine timber
Plaintiff was compelled to
seized as cut on Crown Land
bring his action for the full
without License, and to pro
amount of his account.—
ceed to adjudge the forfeiture
Douglas v Hanson.
121
and condemnation thereof,
10. W here in an action brought
although there has been no
to recover upon a Note or
prosecution for the pecuniary
memorandum for the sum of
penalties imposed by the said
£22 payable in timber, tlie
acts on persons cutting or
amount was reduced by the
carrying away the same. A
price of an Ox, which had
prohibition was accordingly
been delivered by Defendant
refused.— The Queen v 162
to the Plaintiff, to the sum of
pieces of timber, Perley claim
£14, the Court allowed full
ant.
410
costs to be taxed upon a mo 3. This Court by virtue of the
tion for an order to review,
Commission under which it
the Clerk having taxed only
was constituted may exercise
summary costs, under 4 W.
the same jurisdiction in re
4, c. 41.—Holland n Close.
gard to the discharge of es
344
treated recognizances in this
Province as the Court of
COURTS.
Exchequer does i England
1. Courts of Judicature in this
under the Statute, 33 Hen. 8,
Province have no authority
c. 39, and has a general dis
to pronounce an act of the
cretionary power under the
Legislature to be invalid, or
statute to examine into the
to declare it null and void
sufficiency of the reasons al
after it has been passed by
leged in excuse, and to dis
the Legislative Council and
charge upon motion the re
Assembly, and received the
cognizance of a party making
default in appearing for trial
Governor’s assent, either on

vii.

I X DEX.
at a Court of Oyer and Ter
miner, and to stay proceed
ings instituted upon such re
cognizance in this Court.—
The Queen v Appleby. rg97

D

DEFAMATION.

1. In calling a woman a Whore,
what is a sufficient averment
in the, declaration.— Tide
pleading., 2
DESCENT CAST.

DAMAGES.

1. In an action brought in this
Province for the value of
goods sold and delivered in
England, the Plaintiff’ is en
titled to recover such a sum
currency as would be equiva
lent to the demand in ster
ling at the actual rate of Ex
change at the time of trial.—
Compbell v Wilson,
265
2. In an action of trespass for
taking goods, &c. the expense
of attending an enquiry be
fore a Sheriff’s Jury will not
be evidence of damages under
an allegation of special dama
ges in regaining the goods by
the Plaintiff.— Wilson v Eills.
y'j25

DEBT.

1. Will not lay by a Sheriff on
a limit bond when he had re
ceived the prisoner into close
custody after taking the bond.
— Campbell v Henan,
73
2. A bequeathed a legacy to B
to be paid to C in trust, to be
put at interest until B should
attain the age of 18 years,
and then principal and interesttobepaidtoB. The legacy
was not paid to C, held that
B might maintain an action of
debt against the Executor for
this legacy after he had arri
ved at the age of 18.—Living
stone v Powell, et al Execu
tors.
225

1, The doctrine cf descent cast
enures to the benefit of the
heirs only and not to stran
gers.—Doe det/fa Thompson
ayd Wife v B/yrnff.
426
DISSEIZIN.

1. All the acts which constitute
a disseizin should be clearly
made out and no presumption
should be allowed in favor of
a disseizin, and when it is
doubtful whether certain acts
amount to a disseizin or mere
ly acts of trespass or whether
the occupation was adverse or
permissive, it should be left to
the jury.—Doe dem. Thomp
son and Wife, v Barnes. 426

E
EASEMENT.

1. 1 he words privileges and
appurtenances in a Deed do
not create a right of way.—
Rogers v Peck, et al.
318
EJECTMENT.

1. Where B being put into pos
session of premises by A under
an agreement for purchase,
continued to hold such pos
session for upwards of 21
years, and receive the rents,
profits, &c. the Court consi
dering B strictly a tenant at
will, held in an action of
ejectment brought by the
heirs of A against B’s grantee,
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that the Plaintiff’s right of
sttfion was barred by the 7th
’■ Section of the Act of Assem
bly of 6 W. 4, c. 48.—Docd.
Purdy, et al. v Peters, 350
2. Ejectment was sustained bv
a lessor of the Plaintiff under
a Deed of bargain and sale
from A-against the Defendant,
who claimed under a pur
chase from the Sheriff by vir
tue of an Execution issued
upon a judgment which had
been obtained upon a former
judgementof the Court against
A, which latter judgement was
prior to the deed of bargain
and sale to the lessor of the
Plaintiff, the ■ Court holding
that the Execution could not
have relation back to the first
judgement.-—Doe d. Peabody,
v M. Knight.
376
3. An agreement was made by
A and B by mutual bonds,
for the sale and conveyance of
lands by A to B on payment
of a certain sum on or before
the 1 st of May 1829, together
with lawful interest for the
first three yearsjt and 'eight
per dent for the last two years,
as a consideration for the use
of the land. Ileid that B,
who was let into possession
under this agreement was not
tenant at will to A, but tenant
for years until the 1st Mav
1829.
Before that day A died, and
by his will devised the land to
his widow for her life, and after
her death to his children (the
lessors of the Plaintiff.) He
appointed his Widow his Ex
ecutrix, and the Defendant
who was B’s assignee, paid

the purchase money of the
land to the Widow, and re
ceived from her the dqed of
bargain and sale. Held that
the Defendant could nofi after
this, set up a tenancy at will
under the agreement, such
tenancy if any having merged
in the life estate conveyed by
the Widow’s Deed ; and that
after the death of the Widow
an ejectment might be main
tained by the children without
any notice to (juit^pr demand
of possession.—Doe d. Cliff,
et al. v Connaway.
382
4.. Jfide descent cast.
1
5. In ejectment against a tenant
under a parol lease for 7 years
(no rent being paid) who holds
over, no notice to quit was
considered necessary.—Doe a.
Parkinson v Haubtayan. 434
EVIDENCE.

1. Admissions under the Great
Seal of the Province, evidence
against the Crown.—Rex v
Wilson, et al.
1
2. A plan produced by the heir
of one of the original grantees
which had been in his pos
session for 25 years, and which
he had seen in his fathers pos
session 15 years before, but
which he never saw annexed
to tlie grant, although found
and kept together with it, was
held to be sufficiently authen
ticated to be given in evidence
as to the plan referred to in
the grant as being^j annexed'''
thereto.—Rex v. Wilson etal. 1
3. An altered fieri facias not re
ceivable as evidence.— Vide
Writs. 1
4. A promissary note though

ix.
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made payable at a particular
place is evidence under the
common counts in action by
the payee against the maker.
■—Merritt v Woods.
261
5. In action for Oral Slander,
an affidavit made by the De
fendant before a Magistrate
as the foundation of a criminal
proceeding against the Plain
tiff which is still pending, is
not admissible evidence to
shew malice in the Defendant.
—Rankin v Clarke.
303
6. Secondary evidence of a Will
devis'ng real property in this
Province not admissible where
it appeared that the original
Will was in the possession of
the Surrogate General of N ova
Scotia, and no proof was
given of any law of Nova
Scotia prohibiting its removal
from such possession.—Doe
ex dem. Gilmour v Whitney.
339
EXCHEQUER.

Vide Courts. 3
EXECUTOR.

1. Liable to costs, when— Vide
Assumpsit. 2
2. An Executor may be sued in
an action of debt for a specific
or certain legacy.— Vide
Debl. 2
FALSE IMPRISONMENT.

1. A Magistrate is liable to an
action of trespass for false im
prisonment if he commit a
party to goal, brought before
him on a criminal charge
without proceeding to make
an examination into the charge

as by law directed, and an ex
amination taken under an
oath administered by the Ma
gistrate without the jurisdic
tion of the Province was held
anullity.—Naryv Owen. 337
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.

1. A license to cut a quantity
of Timber within certa.. pre
scribed limits and to remove
the same does not convey any
interest in lands under the
statute of Frauds or give any
property in the standing trees.
The Liceacee has no right to
timber cut by a stranger
within the limits of his license
without authority, and the
timber so cut remains the
propertv of the owner of the
land, bat as against all other
persons the possession of the
timber and the labor bestowed
upon it gives the maker, al
though a wrong doer, the right
to it.-—Kerr v Connell. 133
2. A mere delivery of goods by
the vendor without an actual
acceptance by the vendee of
some part thereof, is not suffi
cient within the statute of
Frauds.—See Provincial Act,
26 Geo. 3, c, 14, s. 14.
The receipt of the goods by a
common carrier from the ven
dor, without any specific di
rection or authority from the
vendee, will not amount to an
acceptance by the vendee
within the statute.—Daley v
Marks.
346
HIGHWAYS.

1. Within the meaning of the
act 50 Geo. 3, c. 6, a return
B

INDEX
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of the Commissioners is not in
itself a laying out of a Road.
The road must be feza? out be
fore it is recorded.—Rex v
Sterling.
22
HUSBAND AND WIFE.

1. In an action of trover, the
wife is a good subscribing wit
ness to a bill of sale of her
husbands, through which the
Plaintiff claims title.—Fla
herty v Sayre.
83

INFORMATION.

1. Judgement was arrested upon
an information where the of
fence was not sufficiently al
leged.—Attorney General ex
relatione Robinson v 250 bar
rels Piekled Fish.
419
INQUIRY, WRIT OF.

1. Where a jury under a writ of
inquiry gave no verdi it and
were dismissed, damages as
sessed by a jury under a se
cond writ were held regular.
INDICTMENT.
— Ward v Dow.
21
1. For obstructing a Highway. 2. When a writ of inquiry was
directed to the Sheriff and the
■—Vide Highways. 1
Justices of Assize, and com
2. After an acquittal no copy of
manded the Sheriff to sum
an indictment should be fur
mon the jury and the parties
nished without the order of
to certify the inquisition, held
the Judge or the fiat of the
that the writ and inquisition
Attorney General.—Heaney
returned under the seal of the
v Lynn.
27
Judge were defective and void
3. The Court will quash an in
and not merely an irregularity
dictment for forcible entry and
which could be waived by the
detainer, brought up from the
Defendant.—Fowlie v 3&roSessions by certiorari after
nach and another, Adminis
plea pleaded, upon its appear
trators of English.
57
ing that the prosecutor was
one of the Grand Jury who
INROLLMENT.
found the bill ; nor will the
Court receive affidavit of the 1. The Statute of Inrollment
27, II 8, c. 16, in force in this
absence of the prosecutor from
Province.—Doe d. Hanning
the Jury Room when the bill
ton v McFadden.
153
was found, his name being
mentioned in the caption of
INSOLVENT AND CONFINED
the indictment.—-Regina v
DEBTORS.
Cunard et al.
326
INFANTS.

1. A person after he comes of
age is liable in assumpsit upon
a note of hand made by him
when an infant, if alter coming
of age he promise to pay it.—
Fisher v -Jewett, et al.
35

1. An affidavit for relief under
1 W. 4, c. 43, must account
for all the property the De
fendant may appear to have
possessed.— Wilmot v Corn
well and Babine.
31
2 Applications for relief are ab
solute in the first instance

INDEX.
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LEGATEE.
when notice and copies of af
fidavit are given.—Id.
1. A Legatee may maintain an
3. To entitle a debtor to a dis
action of debt against an Exe
charge on the ground of having
cutor for a certain Legacy
been confined for a year, it
given by his testator.—Li
must explicitly appear that he
vingstone v Powell, et al.
has been in confinement for
Executors of Powell,
225
the whole time in the suit to
LETTERS PATENT.
which the application refers.
Ex parte Hennigar.
209 1. Letterspatent described lands
as extending from the point of
INTERLOCUTORY JUDGEMENT.
departure 32 chains, or to a
certain
road leading between
1. VidePrae.'32
certain lands, and the tract
IRREGULARITY.
described in the grant, and
thence
to run a certain course
1. Judgement set aside for.—
on said road. Held that the
Vide Prae. 20
latter alternative should be
2. Irregularity in not swear
the one by which to construe
ing witnesses waived.— Vide
the grant. Held also that the
Award. 4
subsequent mention of quan
3. A ca sa differing in the
tity contained could not coun
amount only from the judg
teract the previous definition
ment upon which it is issued is
of boundary described by metes
not void but only irregular.—
and bounds.-—Rex v Wilson,
Spence v Stuart and Thomp
1
son.
219 et al.
2.
Two
grants
issued
the
same
4. It is not sufficient to set aside
day mutually referring to
proceedings for irregularity,
each other, must be consider
that the Defendant was not
ed together to discover the in
personally served with pro
tention of the Crown in re
cess where it appeared that
gard to premises contained in
the service of the Writ was ac
each respectively.—Id.
cepted by one who, whilst in
the Defendants employment,
LICENSE.
had a general authority to ac 1. A license to cut timber and
cept service of process for De remove it from lands does not
fendant although such accep
enure as a grant of the trees
tance was made after having
until cut under the license.-—left Defendants employment,
Kerr v Connell.
133
the Defendant not having ex
LIEN.
pressly denied any authority
so to act, or taken any steps 1. A judgement is not such a
to set aside the proceedings.
lien upon lands as to prevent
—Farley v Phillips.
347
the Defendant conveying the
legal estate and seizin to a
JURISDICTION.
third person.—Doe dem. Pea
body v McKnight.
376
1. Vide Courts, 1, 2, 3.
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LIMITATION OF ACTIONS.

MANDAMUS.

1. When a feme sole was pre 1. A mandamus to the Justices
vious to her coverture in the of an Inferior Court requiring
actual occupation conjointly
them to enter up judgement
with her brother of lands for the Plaintiff for an action
which descended to them from on a recognizance of bail in
their father, and upon her that Court when such Justimarriage left the possession in tices had in the exercise of
her brother, who occupied it their discretion set aside the
for more than 40 years, pay Plaintiff’s judgement and al
ing during that period all lowed the render of the prin
taxes and charges thereon and cipal, although their proceed
receiving all the rents and ings might not have conform
profits, in an action of eject ed to the rules or practice of
ment brought by her heirs on this Court was refused.—Ledthe death of A and her hus den v Russel et al.
217
band. The Court held that Semb. The Courts of Common
under 14 section of 6 W. 4,
Pleas have the same controul
c. 43, the question of advers over recognizances of bail as
possession should be left to this Court, and are not bound
the jury to determine, and by the rules of this Court.—Id.
that it should be decided ac
MARRIAGE.
cording to the law as it stood
when the said act came into 1. In an action for crim con. the
operation.—Doe dem. Cole,
fact of the Plaintiff’s marriage
et al. v Harper and Wife. 289
may be proved by any person
21 When B was put into pos present at the ceremony, and
session of lands by A under if performed by the commis
an agreement to puruhase, and sioner under the Act of As
remained thus for 21 years,
sembly, 8 G. 4, c. 9, it will
receiving all rents and profits,
be presumed (at least in the
the heirs of A were barred by absence of evidence to the
7 section of 6 W. 4, c. 43, in contrary) that he was act
an action of ejectment against ing within his authority, and
B’s grantee.—Doe dem. Pur followed the requisition of the
dy, et al v Peters.
350 acts as to the notification and
form of the solemnization.
MAGISTRATE.
The certificate made under
Vide False Imprisonment. 1
the Act 52 G. 3, c. 21, and
registered with the Clerk of
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.
the Peace, is admissible in
1. A copy of an indictment cer evidence without proof by the
tified by the Droper officer attesting witness.—Montgo
though iniDroperly obtained is mery v McLeod.
375
admissible in evidence in an
NEW TRIAL
action of malicious prosecu
tion.—Heanyv Lynn. 27 1. Where Plaintiff' in trespass

INDEX.
q c f had it in his power to
shew definitive bounds but re
lied on the uncertain lines of
another grant and the jury
found against him, the court
refused to disturb the verdict.
--Bates v Lyon.
63
2. Notice of motion to the Judge
for new trials applies equally
to causes where points are
reserved as to others.-—Fla
herty v Sayre.
83
3. The court will not set aside a
verdict to enable the Defend
ant to set up a release from
the Plaintiff given prior to the
trial where it appears that the
meritorious cause of action is
in the wife and the defence is
unconscionable.—Clarke v
Robinson.
86
4. The court will not grant a
new tr°l on the grounds that
nominal damages should have
been given when the point
was not raised at the trial.——Rogers v Peck, et al. 318
5. A new trial will not be grant
ed for imaginary damages.—
Wilson v Eills.
325
6. When a new trial is to be
moved for on the ground of
improper reception of evidence
counsel should take care that
the question is correctly en
tered on the Judges notes.—
Brown v Taylor.
343

XIII.

2. Judgment as in case of vide.
--Practice. 23 25
3. Rule for judgement as in case
of a nonsuit will be discharged
with costs, when the Plaintiff
after giving notice of trial
was induced by the Defendant
to submit the cause to refer
ence.—McDonald v McIn
tyre.
280
4. It is not necessary that two
terms or two assizes should
pass after issue joined to sup
port an application for judge
ment as in case of a non suit.
—Sprague v Matthews. 433
6. Non suit will be granted
though the objection appear
upon the record.—Fisher v
Jewett.
35
NOTICE TO QUIT.

1. Ejectment. 4
OFFICE.

1. An appointment to an office
without limitation is an ap
pointment for life.—Joplin v
Davidson.
308
PARTICULARS.

1. A bill of particulars which
gives substantial information
of the Plaintiff’s demand and
does not confine the claim to
any particular count, or mis
lead the Defendant is suffi
cient to let in evidence under
NON PROS.
any count to which the same
1. Practice. 13
may be applicable.-—Grant v
Aiken and Shaw.
259
NON SUIT.
2. The Plaintiff’s bill of parti
1. W dl not be granted upon a
culars was dated at Liverpool,
England, and made up in
point reserved at the trial
sterling money, held that with
where no verdict was taken.—
out an affidavit of the De
Doe dem. Duncan v Chris
topher.
83
fendant’s being misled by it,

XIV.
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A was sufficient to warrant 2. In an action of defamation
the j ry giving a sum suffi
for calling a woman a Whore
cient to cover the difference
it is sufficient to aver in the
of exchange.—Campbell v
declaration that the Defend
Wilson.
265
ant intended to impute unchas
PARTIES.
tity.—Martindale and Wife,
n Murphy and Wife.
85
1. When some of a number of
3. A plea justifying an entry
joint contractors had settled
upon Plaintiff’s land to retake
w ith Defendant and avowedly
Defendant
s timber carried
rescinded the contract the re
there
by
a
sudden
rise of water
maining parties may sue in
in
a
river,
in
which
it was
the nameof all.—Palmer et al.
being floated to market, held
v Long.
122
bad because it was not shewn
PEREMPTORY UNDERTAKING.
that Defendant’s were not in
fault. -Readv Smith ,etal. 173
1. Not discharged by Defend
Semb.
Under such circumstan
ant leaving the Province.—
ces even the care and dili
—Leslie v Rae.
32
gence of the Defendant to
2. A peremptory undertaking
prevent the accident would
will not be enlarged on the
not justify an injury to the
ground that the record was
herbage and soil by the haul
withdrawn because a witness
ing or removing of the tim
who resided in town was not
ber.—Id — Vide Index, p. 17
in court when the cause was
PRACTICE.
called on.—Doe dem. Kinnear,
1. Vide Inquiry as to writ of
v Wiswell.
127
2. Where an award is to be en
PLEADING.
tered on the postea as a ver
1. In an action by the Sheriff
dict of a jury, a motion to
on a limit bond after Oyer the
disturb the award must be
Defendant pleaded Secondly—
governed by the same rules as
That the prisoner had been
motions for new trials.—Fowsurrendered by his bail and
lis v Kinnear et al.
26
received into custody by the 3. Title of affidavit, vide Insol
Sheriff. Thirdly,—that the
vent Debtor.
prisoner had surrendered him 4. Where a Defendant was dis
self, and been received by the
charged by one of several
Sheriff into his custody, and
Plaintiff’s he cannot be ar
Fifthly,—-non damnificatus
rested a second time at the
held upon demurrer that the
instance of co-plaintiff, and a
second and third pleas were
rule nisi obtained by consent
good and an answer to the
of Defendant’s counsel in order
action, but that the fifth was
to file affidavit to get licence
bad, as it could not be pleaded
of the court to issue a second
except when the condition
ca sa was discharged with
was solely to indemnify.-—•
costs.—Executors of An
Campbell v Henan et al, 73
drews v Clarke.
32
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5. A peremptory undertaking
will not be discharged on ac
count of the defendant having
gone out of jurisdiction of the
Court.—Leslie v Rae.
32
6. Demand for security for costs
sent by post held sufficient.—•
Abbott v Ledden.
33
7. Where a party has no right
in law to recover, a non suit
will be ordered though the ob
jection may appear upon the re
cord. —Fisher v Jewett, etal. 35
8. In an exemption of an execu
tion the endorsement of the
Sheriff as to the time of the
receipt of the writ was held
not amendable by parol evi
dence, although it was a mis
take.—Johnston v Wins
low.
53
9. Where points are reserved at
the trial, notice to the J udge of
a motion for new trial is neces
sary. — Flah erty v Sayre. 83
10. Applications for relief of
confined debtors when notice
and copies of affidavits have
been served are absolute.—
Wilmot v Babino, et al. 62
11. In replevin where some of
the issues were found for the
Plaintiff and others for the
Defendant, both parties are
entitled to costs, and the court
will direct the postea to be
given to the Plaintiff for a
given time to enter up the
judgment, and in case he ne
glect to do so then to be given
to the Defendant.—Dickenson
v Ketchum
63
12. Where the affidavit in shew
ing cause contradicts the one
on which the rule nisi was ob
tained, the former must pre
vail.—Ellis v Newton.
77

xv.

13. Where two writs for the
same cause of action were
simultaneously issued to two
Counties, and the Defendant
was arrested under both and
put in special bail in both
Counties, the Plaintiff’s At
torney having apprized the
Defendant’s Attorney that
there was but one cause of
action and having filed a de
claration therein, judgement
of non pros signed upon one
of the writs was set aside for
irregularity. The Defendant
should have applied to the
court for relief. An exonera
tion was ordered to be entered
on the bail since last given,
and the Plaintiff directed to
pay to the Defendant his costs
upon entering the same, and of
the appearance.—Johnston v
Bransfield.
78
14. After demurrer books are
delivered to the court and the
cause set down on the special
paper the Plaintiff may amend
liis declaration upon payment
of costs.—Pine et al. v McLauchlan.
81
15. Where no verdict has been
given, a non suit will not be
granted upon a point reserved
at the trial v ith leave to move.
—Doe dem. Duncan v Chris
topher.
83
16. Attachment against a wit
ness for contempt in not at
tending on a subpoena must be
applied for at the next term
after the contempt committed.
-Doedem.Howev Meally. 121
17. When the verdict for the
Plaintiff was evidently the
result of compromise and the
weight of evidence was in fa-
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vor of the Defendant, the
court set it aside.—Keys v
Flynn.
125
18. When a peremptory under
taking will not be enlarged.
—Fide peremptory under
taking. 2
19. Service on a clerk is insuf
ficient unless at the office or
dwelling house of the Attor
ney.—Moulton v Dibblee. 128
20. A judgment having been
signed on the 16th October,
the rule nisi being entered on
the 13th, was set aside as ir
regular, the four day rule not
having expired.—Hatton v
Flaherty.
129
21. A supersedeas under the 26
Geo. 3, c. 13, will not be
granted by the court unless
with the consent of all the cre
ditors.— Ex parte Gove. 187
22. Service of a declaration of
ejectment on a daughter on
the premises not sufficient
secus if on the wife.—Doe
dem. Disbrow v Fen.
234
23. An affidavit by an attorney
of the absence of a material
witness and of his belief that
the testimony would be pro
cured at the next circuit, not
sufficient to oppose a rule for
judgment as in case of a non
suit.—Mitchell v Cuppage
and White.
277
24. A plaintiff is bound to try
his cause at the first circuit
after issue joined unless issue
be joined of the term imme
diately preceding—Samuel v
Saunders.
278
25. An affidavit stating the tem
porary mental derangement
and subsequent recovery of a
witness held sufficient to dis

charge a rule for judgment as
in case of a non suit upon a
peremptory undertaking and
payment of costs.—Id.
26. The court ordered an exoneretur to be entered on the
bail piece where the Plaintiff
procured the Defendant to go
without the limits of the Pro
vince.—Pollock et al. v
&W.
279
27. Where the Defendant ob
tained a stay of proceedings
until security for costs were
given, after sufficient time had
elapsed and no further pro
ceedings in the cause taken
by the Plaintiff, the court or
dered in exoneretur to be en
tered on the bail piece.—Hill
v Rind.
281
28. Where a surplus remained
in the hands of a Sheriff from
the sale of goods taken under
an execution against A ats of
B, the court would not order
him to pay the same over to
the Coroner upon an execu
tion in his hands against A at
the suit of C.—Stevenson v
Douglas.
281
29. The declaration in an ac
tion on the case contained
counts for oral slander and
also for libel, the jury found
for the Plaintiff with general
damages, the court refused to
allow the verdict to be enter
ed on the slander counts only,
the Plaintiff not having re
quested to have the verdict
corrected before the jury were
discharged, and not being sa
tisfied that the jury had limit
ed the damages to these counts.
—Rankin v Clarke.
303
30. A Plaintiff is bound to pro-

INDEX.
cetd to trial at the first Nisi
Prius holden next after the
term .mmediately succeeding
that in which issue is joined,
provided there be sufficient
time to give notice of trial.—
Sprague v Matthews.
433
31. After a case had gone to the
jury on the whole evidence,
and a general verdict found
for the Plaintiff in trespass,
the court would not allow the
verdict to be entered upon one
count only, on the ground that
the damages were not more
than adequate compensation
for the inquiry complained of
in that count, unless all the
evidence was admissible under
that count, and the court could
be satisfied that the damages
were assessed wholly on the
cause of actioncontained there
in.—Leonardo Hanson. 373
32. Where a demand of plea
was sent by Plaintiff’s attor
ney in a letter to his agent, a
student in the office of the
Defendant’s attorney, and was
admitted to have been in the
office of the latter before sign
ing interlocutory judgment,
the court set aside the judg
ment upon an affidavit of
merits and payment of costs.
—Estey v Newcomb et al. 343
pleading.

4. In an action to recover in this
Province for goods sold and
delivered in England it is not
necessary to aver in the decla
ration that the debt was con
tracted in sterling money,or the
relative value of sterling and
currency; and the difference
of exchange may be recovered
under the Common Counts.—
Campbell v Wilson.
265

XYll.

5. It is not necessary to allege
in the declaration the place
where the debt is payable when
it is not required to support
the action but only to regulate
the amount.
id.
6. Rein en arrear is not a good
plea in an action for double
value.—Strang v Bell. 287
7. In an action of assumpsit the
Plaintiff averred part per
formance by the Defendant,
and demand as to the residue
which was not necessary, and
failed in proving both, held
that both averments were sur
plus age. -Brown v Frink. 363
8. The allegation that the goods
were imported into this Pro
vince from the territories of
United States of America con
trary to the Acts of the Gene
ral Assembly of this Province
of New Brunswick in such
case made and provided was
not a sufficient allegation of an
offence under 6 W. 4, c. 4,
s. 4, which imposes a forfeiture
of all goods which shall be
landed before they are reported
at the Treasurer’s Office, and
a permit obtained, tyc. and a
judgement obtained on an in
formation filed by the Attorney
General was arrested thereon.
— The Attorney General ex
relatione Robinson v 250 Bar
rels Fish.
419
9. A demise in a declaration of
Ejectment in the name of hus
band and wife of the wife’s
property laid previous to the
wife’s marriage is not good.—
Boe d. Thompson and Wife
v Barnes.
126
10. On nul tiel record pleaded
to a judgement of an Inferior
c
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Court a variance between the
ca sa and the judgment or in
consistency between the teste
and issue thereof cannot be
taken advantage of.—Spence
v Stewart.
113, 219
POSTEA.

Vide Practice 11.
POSTMASTER.

*
1. The Imperial Statutes of 1
Vic. c. 33, s. 12, and c. 36,
do not except Postmasters
from Highway Labor imposed
by an Act of the Assembly of
this Province.—Commissioner
of Highways v Phair.
371
PROMISSORY NOTES.

1. Made by an Infant voidable
only.—Vide Infant 1.
2. In an action by the payee
against the maker of a promis
sory note although it is made
payable at a particular place,
yet it is admissible evidence
under the Common Courts.—
Merritt v Woods.
261
RECOGNIZANCE ESTREATED.

1. Vide Courts, 3.
REFERENCE

Vide Award and Arbitrators.
RELEASE.

1. A general release “ excepting
a certain judgment” sufficient
to make an interested witness
competent.—Turner v Elliot.
117
REMA.NET.

1. When a jury is discharged
from giving a verdict by the
court, the cause stands as a
remane t.-Doe exd. Duncan v
Christopher.
83

REPLEVIN.

1. Goods mentioned in the writ
cannot be taken unless in the
possession of the Defendant
named in the writ.— Wiggins
v Garrison and Wood.
17
2. When in Renlevin some of
the issues were found for both
parties.— Vide Practice 11.
SCIRE FACIAS.

1. Every writ of scire facias
should state the particular cir
cumstances which entitle the
party to the remedy sought,
so that in the case of an ordi
nary scire facias under the
statute of Westminster the
party would not be entitled to
an execution against a joint
debtor under the Act of As
sembly, 26 Geo. 3, c. 24, and
nothing which might have
been pleaded to the original
action can be pleaded to such
ordinary scire facias.—John
ston v Tibbettts, et al.
356
SECURITY FOR COSTS.

1. Demand of security by post
sufficient.-/W;o<7 vLedden. 33
2. Security for costs will not be
granted when the Defendant
knew of the Plaintiff’s absence
previous to the term preceding
the one in which application
was made.-Gibbs\ Deveber 78
SERVICE.

1. Service on a clerk insufficient
unless at the office or house of
the Attorney.-Moulton v Dib
blee.
128
2. An affidavit of service of no
tice of motion “on a Student
in the office of Plaintiff’s At
torney,” not sufficient, in not

INDEX.
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stating it to have been at the 3. A Sheriff who sustains da
(A'ite.e.—Calif’\ Robertson. 342
mage by proceeding under an
improper writ given to him by
3. Service of a declaration in
an attorney, has his remedy
Ejectment on the daughter of
tenant in possession not suffi
over against such attorney.
cient, but otherwise if on the
—Id.
wife at his dwelling house.— 4. As to the effect of taking into
custody a prisoner at large
Doe cl. MlBricle v Roe, Doe
upon a limit bond.— Vide
d. Peabody v Roe.
347
Bond 1.
SET OFF.
5. Where the Sheriff levies on
real property under a fi fa
1. In assumpsit upon promises
and omitting to advertize and
to an intestate, a note of hand
made by him and after his
offer it for sale, returns that
death endorsed to the Defend
“ the lands remain unsold for
ant cannot be pleaded as a set
want of buyers" such omis
off to an action by the Admi
sion is a breach of duty on his
nistrator.—Curry and Orr,
part and the return a false re
turn, nominal damages only
Administrators, n Hibbard.
given however, unless actual
183
damage be proved.—Jarvis
2. In an action of debt for the
v Miller.
191
penalty of an arbitration bond,
in which the Plaintiff assigns 6. A Sheriff is bound to proceed
as the only breach the non
under a fi fa and is not at li
payment of a certain liquida
berty to wait for a venditioni
ted sum awarded by the arbi
exponas.—
trators to be paid to liimby 7. A Sheriff has no right to ap
the Defendant, a set off may
ply any surplus remaining in
be pleaded ; and such set off
his hands from a sale under a
is pleadable to the sum so
prior execution to one receiv
awarded, and not to the penalty
ed after such sale.—Stevenson
of the bond.—Shaw v Wilson
v Douglas.
281
and another.
390 Quere—Whether it is necessary
to direct any other but jury
SHERIFF
process to a Coroner, when
1. Cannot justify the taking of
the only objection to the She
goods mentioned in the writ of
riff is, that he is related to the
replevin if he take them from
Defendant.—Id.
a third person who is not
STATUTES.
named in the writ.— Wiggins
v Garrison and Wood.
17 1. The court would not act un
2. In an action of trespass
der the sec. 2, W. 4, c. 26,
against Sheriff for taking
without >t being shewn that
tlie “ corporation deemed the
goods, he cannot justify under
an altered fieri facias re-issulands absolutely necessary."
ed as an alias.—Johnston v
—Ex parte St. John Water
Winslow.
53
Company.
128
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2. The statutes of uses and in 4. When two persons cut and
rollments, 27, H. 8, c. 10,
haul timber made under an
and 27 H. 8, c. 16, are in
agreement that such timber
force in this Province.—Doe
is to be got on the halves they
dem. Hannington v McFad
are tenants in common.—Kerr
den.
v Connell.
133
5. One tenant in common can
STATUTE LABOR.
not recover in assumpsit
1. Postmaster notexcepted from.
against his co-tenant for the
—Commissioners of High
value of his share of common
ways v Phair.
371
property unless a sale by the
co-tenant be actually proved.
SUMMARY PRACTICE.
—Doyle v Taylor, et al. 201
Vide Costs, 9, 10.
TRESPASS.

SUPERSEDEAS.

Vide Practice, 21.
SURETY.

Vide Bond, 3.
SURPLUSAGE.

Vide Pleading, 7.
TENANT FOR YEARS.

Vide Ejectment 3.
TENANTS IN COMMON.

1. Where persons jointly manu
factured timber which it was
agreed should be divided be
tween them they are not partnersbut tenants in common
and each has aright to dispose
only of his own share.— Wig
gins v White, et al.
97
2. —Whether any and what acts
short of the destruction of
joint property will enable one
tenant in common to sustain
trespass against his co-tenant.
—Id.
3. A tenant in common is liable
in assumpsit to his co-tenant
when he sells more than his
share of the common property
with the consent of his cotenant.—Shaw v Grant. 110

1. A Sheriff is liable in trespass
for taking goods under ‘&fifa
which had been once returned
and re-issued as an alias.—
Johnston v niaklow.
53
2. Where a person having au
thority by a statute abuse
such authority by some posi
tive act contravening the
same, he will be liable as a
trespasser ab initio.— Califf v
Wilson.
79
3. W’here personal property of
»|he Defendant is in the actual
possession of the Plaintiff un
der an agreement between
them, the latter may sustain
trespass against the former
for taking it away.—Holmes
v Clarke.
87
4. An admission by the Defend
ant that he had killed the
Plaintiff’s Ox and ought to
pay for it, 'will not support an
action of trespass against him
for the act,- Bransfield v
Bishop, et al.
89
5. Quer\—Whether any acts
short of the destruction of
property will enable one ten
ant in common to sustain
trespass against his co-tenant.
— Wiggins v White, et al. 79

I NDEX.
6. Trespass for entering upon
and injuring the soil of the
Plaintiff cannot be justified on
the ground that the Defend
ant’s timber being floated
down a river to market, was
by a sudden rise of water and
wind carried upon the Plain
tiff’s land against the will
and despite the care and dili
gence of the Defendant.—
Head v Smith, et al.
L73
Qvere.—Whether a mere entry
under such circumstances
could be justified.—Id.
7. A under a claim of fijlt en
tered upon land in the pos
session of C and without his
consent or privity surveyed
and fenced off a part of C’s
enclosure but did not remain
thereon ; B pulled down and
destroyed the fences for which
A brought trespass q cf
gainst him. Held that A
failing to shew title to the
land or the actual expulsion
of C therefrom, had not suf
ficient possession to sustain
the action.—Merritt v Quin
ton.
‘ y
What is a sufficient possession
is a question for the court and
not for the jury.—Id.
8. In trespass q c f by A against
B, one count of the declara
tion described the locus in quo
by abuttals as lot No. 135,
held that B, the occupant un
der a verbal agreement for
purchase with C, the owner of
the adjacent lot No. 134,
could not justify an entry on
any part of the land in A’s
possession in order to contest
the true boundary between
the lots, neither B nor C

XX!.

having actual possession, and
there appearing no Command
or distinct authority from C
for such entry.
A Defendant in trespass may
justify his entry by the Com
mand but not by the mere
licence of the person entitled
to the possession.—Parent,
et al. v Corneilison;et al. 235
9. Where the respective owners
of adjoining lands'screed by
parol to asurvey-and marking
of their division line, the court
in an action of trespass q c f
held that such agreement was
not within the statute of fraud
and that the Plaintiff mightrecover although the trespass
was committed on a part of
the premises which the De
fendant previous to such sur
vey, had actually occupied
according to a boundary which
had existed for a number of
years between the Plaintiff
and Defendant.—Lawrence
and Hill v McDoioall. 283
10. In an action of trespass for
improperly taking the goods of
the Plaintiff under an execu
tion, the declaration alleged
as special damage, loss of
time and expenditure of money
in recovering the possession,
&c. The court hdld that the
expences attending a trial be
fore a Sheriff’s Jury (upon
whose finding the goods were
returned to the Plaintiff,) were
not recoverable.
Quere—Whether under any cir
cumstances or allegations in
pleading, such expences could
be recovered.— Wilson v Eitls.
325
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TROVER.
2. When the verdict is the result
of a compromise. — Vide Prac
1. A licence of the Crown to
tice
17.
ent and carry away timber
from off a certain described 3. When verdict is general the
Court will not give leave to
portion of Crown Lands can
enter
it on some particular
not maintain Trover against
counts.
— Vide Practice 29.
a wrong doer for timber cut
4.
In
an
action on the case for
and carried away by the latter
special
damages
the Court will
from off tlie same limits.—
not
disturb
a
verdict
for defen
Kerr v Connett.
133
dant when no permanent rights
2. Quere—As to Trover by one
are bound by it unless the
tenant in common against his
evidence is all on one side or
co-tenant.- -Wiggins \ White,
very
greatly preponderates.
et al.
97
—Rogers v Peck, et al. 318
TRUSTEES.
WITNESS.

1. The President and Directors
of a Ejavin^s Bank duly elected 1. A general release “ except
ing a certain judgment in the
for one year under an Act of
releasors favor” held suffi
Incorporation, and filling the
cient to make a person a com
1 office of Trustees thereunder,
petent witness, it not appear
remain in office until others
ing that the judgment referred
are appointed and are liable
to the matter in question.-Tur
to a deposit—or in an action of
ner n Elliot, (in error.) 117
debt for the amount of his de
2.
Vide Husband and Wife.
posit.—Gilchrist v Wyer et al,
Trustys, ^p.\'
219
WRITS.
x'tSES.

1. A returned fieri facias was
altered and re-issued by the
Attorney as an alias, the writ
was held void and not recivable
in evidence in an action of
trespass against the Sheriff
VERDICT.
for taking goods under it.—
Johnston v Winslow.
53
1. Although in assumpsit the
verdict w 1 be taken as evi 2. A mistake in the indorsement
of a writ by the Sheriff may
dence of the amount of the
be amended.—Id.
original debt due yet it is not
conclusive or binding on the 3. A writ against two persons
was returned by the Sheriff
Court to deprive the Plaintiff
“ cepi corpus” held that it ap
of costs in all cases where it is
plied to both Defendants.-Rex
under £5. —Mflhaney v Wisv Sheriff of Gloucester. 187
wall.
67

1. The 27 H. 8, c. 10, Statute
of uses in forcein this Province.
—Doe d. Han ington v U/‘ Fadden.
153

